Battle of Kursk and tank battle for Prokhorovka. How the myth of the battle near Prokhorovka was born

In May last year, I very actively traveled to places associated with tragic events. I managed to talk about some of them in the blog, about some I haven’t yet. Why? Well, firstly, this topic is very difficult for me to write, both morally and technically, and secondly, many citizens of the Russian Federation remember the Second World War only when Victory Day and related days off approach. And during the year they try not to bother themselves with patriotism and terrible details of hostilities. Accordingly, there is no interest, and then just no one reads the posts, and the statistics do not show even half of the average views for my blog. It is for these two reasons that quite a lot of photographic material lay on the hard drive for almost a year. But spring is in full swing, many will go on various trips for the May holidays and, perhaps, even stop somewhere along the way to honor the memory of soldiers and officers who fell in battle. For example, to Prokhorovka, where on July 12, 1943, during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk, one of the largest battles in military history took place with the use of armored forces.

In this post, I will give an overview of what you can see in Prokhorovka, where to spend the night, eat, and so on. And, of course, as briefly as possible (after all, May 9 is still far away) I will tell you about the meat grinder that happened here in the summer of 1943.

So, north, urban-type settlement Prokhorovka. In fairness, it is worth noting that the famous tank battle took place near the Prokhorovka railway station, named after the railway engineer V. I. Prokhorov, and located a little to the side. This settlement until 1968 was called the village of Aleksandrovskoe. In the post-war years, it grew and included the very Prokhorovka station, which became the western part of the village.

02 . There are no hotels in Prokhorovka other than the one you see in the photo below, so I recommend booking rooms in advance through the website of the Prokhorovskoe Pole hotel complex. The hotel is not bad, especially for the provincial. The only bad thing is the catering for the guests. Breakfast is extremely slow, and we didn’t manage to have dinner at all, because the restaurant at the hotel closes very early. We also wanted to walk at sunset. However, public catering is bad everywhere in Prokhorovka. More than 9 thousand people live in the village, there is a sports complex, a cinema, an elevator, factories, but there is nowhere to eat. We made a raid on three cafes that the administrator at the hotel advised us, and as a result, one had a wedding, the other served only beer and snacks, and the third turned out to be completely closed. Therefore, we had to improvise ourselves in the room. We had a three-year-old daughter with us, who did not really want to feed sandwiches at night.

03 . Next to the hotel parking there is a sculptural group "Tankman and infantryman". It is clear that the role of the infantry in the tank duel was the most unenviable and, in fact, suicidal.

04 . Almost opposite the hotel complex there is a huge building of the Museum of Military Glory "The Third Military Field of Russia".

05 . The building was opened on May 02, 2010. Outwardly, it resembles an arc, lined with gray granite, and the main facade, according to the architect's idea, imitates tank tracks.

06 . A sculptural composition that struck me to the core. Two Soviet and three life-size German tanks converged in a powerful ram. They write on the Internet that you can climb into one of the tanks and see a defeated fascist there, but they open this door, as I understand it, only for large organized groups.

06 . Traditionally, Soviet sources indicate that about 1,500 tanks participated in the battle of Prokhorov. 800 Soviet and 700 German. Some modern historians claim that there were fewer tanks, but looking at this monument, I can’t even imagine what hell was going on here then.

07 . To the right of the museum building is a rather unusual church of Peter and Paul.

08 . Novodel. Built for the 50th anniversary of the Great Victory.

09 . In the courtyard there is also a small Nikolskaya church and the so-called. "Bell of Unity". This is a monument erected as a symbol of the unity of the three Slavic peoples: Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Opened on the anniversary of the 55th Victory Day. The opening was attended by Patriarch Alexy II, Putin, Kuchma and Lukashenko.

10 . By the evening light we drove from the village, in fact, to the battlefield. Now bread grows on it everyday, but how much blood it once absorbed into itself...

11. Height 252.2 is marked by a belfry.

12. The height of the belfry itself is 59 meters. Inside, under the dome, there is an alarm bell weighing 3.5 tons, and on 4-wall pylons there are 24 high reliefs with 130 images. I specially publish a photo in a large size so that you can appreciate this work of art and the main monument of the entire Prokhorovskoye Pole memorial complex.

13 . A little further away, a monument was erected to one of its creators - the sculptor Vyacheslav Klykov. He died in 2006

14 . Nearby is another sculptural group - "The great commanders of the three military fields of Russia - Dmitry Donskoy, Mikhail Kutuzov, Georgy Zhukov."

15 . And, of course, tanks.

16 . More precisely, tanks, Katyushas, ​​cannons and other military equipment of the Great Patriotic War.

17 . T-34-85 and my favorite Vikushonok.

18 . The next morning we continued to explore Prokhorovka. We had breakfast, checked out of the hotel and went to the museum.

19 . But first they went around him in a circle. Behind the building, a rather interesting exposition was found, showing a fragment of the defense line: trenches and enemy equipment in positions.

20 . In the post-war years, almost all German equipment was melted down, so the German tank is represented only by a turret on a stand.

21 . Shortly before our arrival, next to the museum for the 70th anniversary of the Victory, another monument was opened, which is called "Tank landing". Work on the improvement of the territory was in full swing around him (we were in Prokhorovka on May 1) and by the ninth there was still a lot to be done.

22 . Also, work was going on at another exhibition site of military equipment, where 12 of the most significant vehicles in the history of armored vehicles are presented, through which you can trace the main stages in the development of armored vehicles and tank weapons. In addition, on May 9, the opening of the tank track with an obstacle course, stands for spectators for 1300 seats and other things was to take place. It is a pity that we did not manage to see the tank show, but there will be a reason to return somehow.

23 . In general, then we go to see the museum exhibition. It is huge and, perhaps, I will talk about it in a separate post, and now there are just a couple of fragments. An excellent interactive map of the sights of the Belgorod region. It can be seen that now the belfry and the Peter and Paul Cathedral are highlighted on it, but if you turn on another area on the multimedia screen next to the map, then other objects will be highlighted, and you can read general information on the monitor. Very cool, in my opinion.

24 . I note that everything in the museum is very modern and interactive. It does not feel the typical museum "naphthalene", if you know what I mean.

25 . Although not without overlays, as it turned out. In my presence, one of the spectators puzzled the guide with a question about some discrepancy between the details of the soldier’s uniform (I don’t remember what exactly) the form of the 1943 model. The woman was embarrassed and said that the stands were made and designed by some Moscow office and in a very fast mode, so there could be slight discrepancies.

26. And finally, let's return to the topic of public catering in Prokhorovka. Not far from the belfry there is a rather interesting themed cafe "Dugout". In general, I give the institution a "test" (a wooden jukebox with songs of the war years and shells of artillery shells as vases for wildflowers is five!), But in the evening of the first day it was already closed, and at lunchtime on the second day, almost the entire ration was eaten.

27 . In particular, there was not enough foie gras potatoes. The last portion was snatched for the daughter (the cook scratched the bottom of the barrel for a little girl), and Lena and I took the less popular millet for ourselves. I note that around the "Blindage" there were also landscaping works and it is quite possible that another cafe appeared nearby. At least on Wikimapia there is a mark for the "Prival" cafe, so I hope that people who, on my advice, go to Prokhorovka, will not go hungry after all.

28 . After lunch, we went to see the observation post of the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov. It was from here that the command of the Prokhorov battle was carried out. Alas, there was a lock on the door and I had to limit myself to only an external examination. After that, our program had a wonderful

"I want everyone..."

So, by the beginning of the battle, the tank forces of the USSR that were available near Prokhorovka had an overwhelming numerical superiority: 368 tanks and self-propelled guns against 150 German ones. However, this numerical superiority of the Red Army was somewhat leveled by the higher combat characteristics of some Wehrmacht tanks: the heavy Tigers simply did not have an equal enemy on the field near Prokhorovka. Even our heavy KVs made their way through the "Tiger" at maximum firing ranges, and they themselves could hit the German "cat" only when firing almost point-blank. Thank God that the whole company of "Tigers", and not a battalion, operated in this sector ... In domestic literature, it is customary to sing the praises of the power of our main medium tank T-34; this is indeed true in relation to 1941, however, by the beginning of the battle for the Kursk Bulge, the Germans were able to improve their Pz.IV medium tanks so much that they were equal in their combat qualities to the "thirty-four" and in nothing but the speed of movement along the highway (and only on the highway!) She was not inferior. The “Tigers”, on the other hand, the “thirty-four” of the 43rd year, armed with a 76-mm cannon, simply could not resist yet. But the weakest point of the 5th Guards Tank Army was a huge number (139 pieces!) of light T-70 tanks, protected by thin armor and armed with a weak 45-mm cannon. These tanks were quite suitable for reconnaissance or combating enemy infantry, but to resist medium, and even more so heavy tanks ...
Based on the figures given in the table, we can state that in the battle of Prokhorovka, the Soviet tank troops suffered not just huge, but horrific losses - 70% of all tanks. The Germans, having more than two times less forces, lost only about half of the armored vehicles - 47%. There are several reasons for this. In particular, simple luck, a case that is often of decisive importance in a war. After all, the Germans were the first (perhaps due to their excellent optics) to notice the enemy and managed to reorganize for battle, the Soviet tankers had to do this already under fire, incurring losses. The communication system also played a role: at that time, not every Soviet tank had a transceiver, and even when an enemy was detected, many tankers simply could not inform their comrades about it. It was also important what I already said above: that the basis of the Soviet armored forces near Prokhorovka was "thirty-four", which did not have any advantages over the enemy, and light T-70s, which could not compete in battle even with medium Pz.IV and Pz III. In addition, the self-propelled artillery that the opposing sides had was unequal: all the self-propelled guns of the Soviet armored forces were "anti-personnel" and almost could not resist the tanks. At the same time, most of the self-propelled guns available to the Germans were precisely anti-tank, and they were capable of inflicting very serious damage on the enemy from closed positions of the second line.
And yet, despite the superiority of the enemy in terms of armored vehicles, despite his better organization and simple luck, despite huge, actually catastrophic losses, it was the Soviet tankers who won this battle. Yes, at the cost of your own life. But they stopped the advance of enemy tanks, bleeding the Germans, knocking out almost half of their vehicles. And they turned to flight, having made a turning point in a grandiose battle. And they drove the enemy - those who survived, and those who came to the rescue from the reserves. The day of the battle near Prokhorovka was a turning point for the Battle of Kursk: until that day, the Soviet troops only defended themselves, and from that day they went on the offensive! And the Germans were no longer able to seize the initiative and attack again - never!
That war was such a hard and bloody, and not a mass beating of “numerous, but weak and cowardly fools-Germans”, as Soviet propaganda during my childhood represented. The war, in which my 17-year-old uncle remained forever, and my father, then still a boy, literally miraculously survived (otherwise there would be no me). And after studying for many years the figures of losses hidden from us by our government, I began to respect the people who fought in that war, even more - the “dry figures” personally told me about the heroism of our ancestors, who despised death, much more than the tales of semi-official Soviet propagandists ...

Surprisingly, the general reader learned about the "tank duel" only 10 years after the battle itself, in 1953, when I. Markin's book "The Battle of Kursk" was published. The battle of Prokhorovka was an integral part of this battle and, perhaps, the most important, because after Prokhorovka the Germans were forced to retreat to their original positions. So why was the Soviet command so eager not to advertise the Prokhorov battle? Yes, because it was better to remain silent about such massive losses, both human and armored vehicles, especially since the causes of the losses lay in the fatal mistakes of the leadership.

WHEN DID IT HAPPEN?

Until 1943, the Germans advanced quite confidently in almost all directions. Germany decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943: it was planned to strike from Orel and Belgorod, and then the strike groups, uniting in the Kursk region, were to surround the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. This operation was called "Citadel". Then the Germans corrected the original plan along the way, deciding that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps would turn to Prokhorovka, where the terrain conditions made it possible to arrange a global battle with the armored reserves of the Soviet troops.

The Soviet command knew about the Citadel plan and planned to conduct defensive battles (for this, a defense in depth was created) in order to wear down the Germans, and then defeat them with advancing counterattacks.

Official historiography speaks of a clear date for the battle at Prokhorovka - July 12, 1943, when our army launched a counteroffensive. However, as sources show, the fighting in the Prokhorovka direction began already on the third day of the German offensive on the Kursk Bulge, and it would be more correct to consider the beginning of the Prokhorov battle on July 10, when the Germans began to break through the rear army line of the Soviet defense and capture Prokhorovka.

July 12th is the culmination, the “tank duel”, which, however, ended with unclear results and continued on July 13th and 14th. The end of the battles on Prokhorovka should be considered the day of July 16, 1943, more precisely, the night of July 17, when the Germans began to withdraw their troops.

SURPRISE EFFECT

The beginning of the battle at the Prokhorovka station came as a surprise to our troops. And then the versions differ. Some say that the battle was unexpected for the Germans. It was just that two tank armies were solving their offensive tasks and did not expect to meet a serious enemy. Tank groups moved at a noticeable "angle", but the Germans were the first to notice Soviet tanks, managed to reorganize and prepare for battle. They quickly attacked the Russians, which caused the inevitable confusion among the Soviet tankers.

Other historians argue that the Germans worked out the option of a counterattack by the Red Army from the Prokhorovka area, and the SS divisions deliberately "substituted" for the counterattack of the Soviet tank army. The result was a head-on collision of Soviet tanks with large German tank forces, and this maneuver forced Russian tanks to fight in extremely unfavorable strategic conditions.

There is a big reason for the second version, because when the Soviet tanks came into direct range of their guns, the enemy met them with dense fire, so powerful that they were stunned. Under this hurricane fire, it was necessary not only to fight, but also to psychologically rebuild from a breakthrough deep into the enemy’s defenses in a positional war. And only the high density of combat later deprived the Germans of all these advantages.

AGAINST "TIGERS" - LIGHT

It is believed that the main participants in the “duel” on July 12, 1943 near Prokhorovka were the 5th Panzer Army under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser. According to German generals, about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle. According to other sources, ours had 850 cars. On the German side, researchers "count" about 311 tanks, although the official Soviet historiography put forward the figure of 350 only wrecked German tanks. However, now historians believe that this figure is clearly overestimated, and more than 300 vehicles could not participate from the German side. One way or another, about a thousand tanks collided near Prokhorovka in July 1943. By the way, it was here that the Germans first used telewedges.

In Soviet times, it was claimed that German "Panthers" were going to our tanks. Now it turns out that just the "Panthers" did not take part in the Prokhorovsky battle. Instead of "Panthers", the Germans "incited" not only "Tigers" on Soviet tankers, but also ... Soviet tanks "T-34" - as many as 8 captured vehicles.

But the worst thing is that our army near Prokhorovka consisted of one-third of even weaker than the T-34s (and the T-34s were clearly losing in the battle in the open to the German medium tank with its new long-barreled gun, not to mention powerful "Tiger"), tanks "T-70", designed for reconnaissance and communications. They could not be used in open combat against heavy and medium tanks of the enemy, any projectile of which destroyed light “seventies”. Our historians preferred to keep silent about this.

LAND OF LOSS

The losses in the battle of Prokhorovka on our part turned out to be absurdly huge. Now historians are talking about a ratio of 5:1 or even 6:1 is not in our favor. For one German killed, there were five or six Soviet soldiers killed. Modern historians give the following figures: from July 10 to July 16, the Soviet participants in the Prokhorov battle lost about 36 thousand people for various reasons, of which 6.5 thousand were killed and 13.5 thousand were missing (this is 24 percent of the total losses Voronezh Front during the entire Battle of Kursk). The total losses of the Germans in the same period amounted to about 7 thousand soldiers, of which 2795 were killed, 2046 were missing. However, it is almost impossible to establish the exact number of casualties: until now, search groups have found dozens of unnamed Soviet soldiers who fell near Prokhorovka.

The total losses of the two Soviet fronts on southern the face of the Kursk ledge amounted to 143,950 people! Both fronts especially lost a lot of missing people - about 35 thousand people. Most of them were captured: according to German data, 24 thousand of our soldiers and officers were captured by July 13, that is, during the Prokhorov battle.

Immensely huge losses were also in equipment: Rotmistrov's 5th Panzer Army lost up to 70% of its tanks (this accounted for 53% of the entire armored vehicles of the army that took part in the counterattack), while the Germans lost only ... 80 vehicles. And according to German data, they generally lost only 59 tanks in the “duel”, of which 54 managed to evacuate from the battlefield, and even managed to “pull” several Soviet ones. After the Prokhorovsky battle, they already had 11 T-34s in the corps.

The main reasons for such huge casualties are the mistakes and miscalculations of the headquarters of the Voronezh Front, which was headed by General N.F. Vatutin. The counterattack on July 12, to put it mildly, was unsuccessful. Later, based on an analysis of events, he was recognized as a “model of an unsuccessful operation”: the moment for the counterattack was chosen extremely poorly, people were thrown into battle in the absence of real data about the enemy, without reconnaissance and with little knowledge of the situation.

The front command underestimated the nature and possible development of the situation in the next 2-3 days. The interaction between our advancing units was organized so badly that in some cases it led to battles between our units, the bombardment of our own positions by our aircraft.

After the end of the Battle of Kursk, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Georgy Zhukov tried to initiate the process of analyzing the events of July 12, 1943 near Prokhorovka, targeting the main culprits of the gigantic losses - N.F. Vatutin and the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army P. A. Rotmistrov. The latter was generally going to be given to the tribunal. However, the perpetrators were saved by the successful completion of hostilities in this area, and later they even received ... orders for the Battle of Kursk. P.A. Rotmistrov, by the way, after the war even became the Chief Marshal of the armored forces.

THE QUESTION OF VICTORY

Who won the battle of Prokhorovka and the Battle of Kursk in general? We argued that the victory, of course, remained with

By the Red Army: the Germans were unable to "crack" the defenses of the Red Army, their strike force was defeated, and the enemy retreated.

Now they say that such a "victorious" view is only a myth. In fact, the withdrawal of the Germans was not caused by the defeat of their strike force, but by the impossibility of holding the wedging area with a length of up to 160 km along the front. The English historian Richard J. Evans is generally sure that the Battle of Kursk ended on the "order of Hitler." As for our troops, they could not immediately overturn the enemy's cover and immediately go on the offensive in order to defeat the retreating forces due to colossal losses.

And against such a rather bleak background, the feat of Soviet soldiers and tankers, forced to operate in terrible conditions, is enormous. It was the ordinary soldiers who held the lines, it was they who paid with their own blood for the miscalculations of their command.

This feat will be best told by those who survived in that hellish cauldron. Here is what the Hero of the Soviet Union Grigory Penezhko recalled about the events of July 12, 1943: “... There was such a roar that the membranes pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild rattle of torn iron ... From point-blank shots, towers turned off, armor burst, tanks exploded ... Hatches opened, and tank crews tried to get out ... we lost the sense of time , did not feel any thirst, or heat, or even blows in the cramped cockpit of the tank. One thought, one desire - while alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, getting out of their broken vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, also left without equipment, and beat with pistols, grabbed hand-to-hand ... ".

The documents preserved the memories of the Germans about that "duel". Here is what Untersturmführer Gürs, the commander of the motorized rifle grenadier regiment, said: “The Russians launched an attack in the morning. They were around us, above us, among us. A hand-to-hand fight ensued... It was hell.”

Our tankers, getting out of their broken vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, also left without equipment, and beat with pistols, grabbed hand-to-hand

And here is more evidence of those terrible events: “... at that moment the ether turned into a cauldron of human emotions, something unimaginable began to happen on the radio waves. Against the background of the usual crackle of interference in the headphones, dozens of commands and orders were carried, as well as everything that hundreds of Russian peasants from different parts thought about the Hans, Fritz, Nazis, Hitler and other bastards. The ether was so full of vigorous Russian swearing that it seemed that all this hatred at some point could materialize and, together with shells, hit the enemy. Under the hot hand, the tankers also recalled their own bosses, who led them into this inferno ... ".

Only in 1995, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the victory, the Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul was opened in Prokhorovka - the day of these saints falls exactly on July 12 - the date of the main battle of Prokhorovka. The earth, stained with blood, waited for the gratitude of the descendants.

Episode 2. Prokhorovka. Legend and Reality

The Battle of Kursk is often cited as the turning point of World War II, which actually took place on July 12, 1943, in the largest tank battle in the Prokhorovka area. This thesis is found mainly in Soviet historiography. Presumably, the front line of the entire course of the Second World War was the wide isthmus between the Psel River and the Prokhorovka railway station near Belgorod. In a truly titanic duel between two steel armadas, no less than 1,500 tanks collided in a limited space. From the Soviet point of view, this was a collision of two mobile avalanches - 800 Soviet tanks against 750-800 German ones. On July 12, 400 German tanks were destroyed and units of the SS Panzer Corps suffered losses. Marshal Konev melodramatically called this battle "the swan song of the German tank forces."

The creator of the myth about Prokhorovka is Lieutenant General Rotmistrov, who commanded the 5th Guards Tank Army, which on July 12 suffered the biggest losses in its entire existence. Since he needed to justify himself to Stalin, he made up a legend about a great victory over the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This myth was also accepted by Western historians and exists to this day.

Commander-5 Guards TA Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov

“Coincidentally, just at the same time, German tanks launched an attack from the opposite side of the field. Huge masses of tanks rushed into a head-on collision. Taking advantage of the turmoil, the T-34 crews attacked the Tigers and Panthers, firing at short range on the sides or rear where the ammunition was stored. The failure of the German offensive near Prokhorovka marked the end of Operation Citadel. Over 300 German tanks were destroyed on 12 July. The Battle of Kursk tore the heart out of the German army. The Soviet success at Kursk, in which so much was at stake, was the most important success of the entire war.

In German historiography, the vision of this battle is even more dramatized. In "the largest tank battle in history", "two armored formations with the most complex structure met each other in open close combat in an area no more than 500 meters wide and 1000 meters deep.

What was the actual battle of Prokhorovka.

First, it should be noted that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on July 12, 1943 could not lose 300 or (as Rotmistrov had) 400 tanks;

In total, in the entire Operation Citadel, his total losses amounted to only 33 tanks and assault guns, which is clearly visible from German documents. He could not resist on an equal footing with the Soviet troops, without even losing the Panthers and Ferdinands, because they were not in his composition;

In addition, Rotmistrov's statement about the destruction of 70 Tigers is a fiction. On that day, only 15 tanks of this type were ready for use, of which only five took part in the fighting in the Prokhorovka area. In total, as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, by decree on July 12, a total of 211 tanks, 58 assault guns, 43 tank destroyers (self-propelled guns) were in working order. However, since the SS Panzergrenadier Division "Dead Head" that day was advancing to the north - above the Psel River, then 117 serviceable and combat-ready tanks, 37 assault guns and 32 tank destroyers, as well as another 186 combat vehicles were to resist the 5th Guards Tank Army.

On the morning of July 12, Rotmistrov had 838 combat vehicles ready for battle and another 96 tanks were on the way. He thought about his five corps and withdrew the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps to the reserve and transferred about 100 tanks to it to protect his left flank from the forces of the 3rd Wehrmacht Panzer Corps advancing from the south. 186 tanks and self-propelled guns of the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions were involved in the battle against 672 Soviet ones. The operational plan of Rotmistrov can be characterized by two directions of the main attack:

The main blow was delivered frontally from the northeast against the SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte. It was applied from Prokhorovka between the railway embankment and the Psel River. However, since the river was swampy, there was only one section of 3 kilometers left to maneuver. In this area, to the right of Psel, the 18th tank corps was concentrated, and to the left of the railway embankment, the 29th tank corps. This meant that on the first day of the battle, more than 400 combat vehicles went to 56 tanks, 20 tank destroyers and 10 Leibstandarte assault guns. The superiority of the Russians was about fivefold.

At the same time, another blow was to be delivered to the flank of the Germans at the junction between the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions. Here the 2nd Guards Tank Corps advanced, supported by the 2nd Tank Corps. In total, about 200 Soviet tanks were ready to act against the German division, which consisted of 61 combat-ready tanks, 27 assault guns and twelve tank destroyers.

In addition, one should not forget about the formations of the Voronezh Front, especially about the 69th Army, which fought in this direction. In the battle zone of the 5th Guards Tank Army, in addition to the reserve units, units of the 5th Guards Army also operated, for example, the 9th Guards Airborne Division. Vatutin also sent Rotmistrov 5 artillery and 2 mortar regiments, reinforced with anti-tank units, and 10 anti-tank artillery brigades. As a result, in the Prokhorovka area, the density of fire was such that the chances of surviving outside the armor protection were minimal. The Soviet counterattack was supported by two air armies, while the German side could only occasionally count on air support at the climax of the battle. The 8th Air Corps was to allocate two-thirds of the aircraft at its disposal for operations on other fronts, in particular in the offensive zone of the 9th Army.

In this regard, the psychological aspect should not be neglected. In the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, starting on 5 July, the soldiers were in continuous fighting and experienced severe supply difficulties. Now they have found fresh Soviet units, namely the elite units of the Fifth Guards Tank Army, led by P.A. Rotmistrov, a well-known tank specialist in the Red Army. The Germans were afraid of the principles of warfare by the Russian troops, the hallmark of which was an avalanche of massive attacks without taking into account losses. Fears caused not only overwhelming numerical superiority. The attacking soldiers often fell into a kind of trance, and did not react at all to the danger. What role vodka played in the fighting on the Eastern Front was no secret to the Germans, in Russian historiography, apparently, only recently began to consider this topic. According to two American military historians, such a violent attack near Prokhorovka on July 12 was not without the use of psychotropic drugs.
This may be a partial explanation for the puzzling events that occurred at 252.2. For others, it was a complete surprise. This was an outstanding achievement by Rotmistrov and his staff - to quickly and quietly bring into battle an armada of tanks and other vehicles. This was supposed to be the logical conclusion of a three-day march of 330-380 km. German intelligence indeed expected a counterattack, but not of this magnitude.

The day of July 11 ended with local success for the Leibstandarte Panzergrenadier Division. The next day, the division was tasked with crossing the anti-tank ditch. Then she swept the height of 252.2 with a "giant wave". Having taken the height, the Leibstandarte went to the Oktyabrsky state farm, where he ran into resistance from the 9th Guards Airborne Division, 2.5 kilometers from Prokhorovka. But at the same time, they themselves exposed the flanks of their position. On the right flank, the Leibstandarte could be supported by the Das Reich motorized division. An even more dangerous situation developed on the left wing, which was almost hanging in the air.

The commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, Obergruppenführer P. Hausser (left) assigns a task to the commander of the artillery of the SS division Totenkopf, SS Brigadeführer Priss

Since the attack of the SS motorized division Totenkopf was not in the east, but rather in the north direction, the shock wedges parted. A gap was created that was monitored by the intelligence department of the Leibstandarte, but hardly controlled by it. An enemy strike along the Psla could lead to fatal consequences at this stage. Therefore, the Leibstandarte was instructed to stop the advance of the enemy.

The 2nd SS Panzer Corps went on the offensive the next day. The first blow, under the tangible impact of all the artillery of the corps, was followed by the strike of the "Dead Head" division on the Pselsky bridgehead and the dominant height of 226.6. Only after capturing the heights north of the Psel River could the other two divisions continue their attack. The Leibstandarte formations advanced separately. On the right southern wing of the railway embankment, the 1st SS motorized regiment operated, to the left, closer to height 252.2, the 2nd SS motorized regiment operated. The tank regiment was redeployed to the bridgehead behind the height of 252.2 in order to recuperate. But the regiment actually consisted of only one battalion with three companies, and one battalion of heavy tanks with four ready Tigers. The second battalion, equipped with Panther tanks, was sent to the zone of action of the Das Reich division.

It is necessary to note the following bright moment - in the space between the Prokhorovka station and the Psel River there was no German tank army of 800 combat-ready tanks, as Soviet historians say, but only one tank battalion. It is also a legend, the fact that on the morning of July 12, two tank armadas met in battle, attacking in close formation, like knights clad in armor.

According to Rotmistrov, at 7:30 a.m. (8:30 a.m. Moscow time) the attacks of the Leibstandarte tankers began - “In deep silence, the enemy appeared behind us without receiving a decent answer, because we had seven difficult days of fighting and sleep, as a rule, was very short".

At that time, the 3rd tank battalion of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment was operating on the front line, whose commander was Sturmbannfuehrer Jochen Peiper (someday I will finish his biography, he was a damn interesting person), who became known later (during the offensive in the Ardennes).

Joachim Piper

The day before, his unit occupied the trenches at a height of 252.2. On this hill, on the morning of July 12, the following scene played out: “We were almost all asleep when they suddenly, with air support, threw all their tanks and motorized infantry at us. It was hell. They were around us, above us, and between us. We fought against each other." The first German tanker who saw the approaching columns of Soviet tanks was Obersturmführer Rudolf von Ribbentrop (son of Reich Foreign Minister I. von Ribbentrop - A.K.)

Rudolf von Ribbentrop

When he looked this morning at Hill 252.2, he saw a purple flare, which meant "Attention, tanks." While the other two tank companies remained behind the ditch, he went on the attack with seven of his company's Panzer IV tanks. Suddenly he saw a huge tank column coming towards him. "After passing 100 - 200 meters, we were shocked - 15, 20, 30, 40 appeared in front of us, and then just an uncountable number of Russian T-34s. Now this wall of tanks was coming at us. Car after car, wave after wave, increasing "Unbelievable pressure, at maximum speed, came at us. Seven German tanks had no chance against superior forces. Four of them were immediately captured, and the other three tanks escaped."

At that moment, the 29th Tank Corps under the leadership of Major General Kirichenko, consisting of 212 combat vehicles, entered the battle. The attack was carried out by the forces of the 31st and 32nd tank brigades and the 53rd motorized rifle brigade, with the support of a regiment of self-propelled guns and the 26th Guards Airborne Regiment. When the tanks passed the peak of Hill 252.2 at maximum speed, they went down the slope to attack two German tank companies that were standing in the lowland and opened fire on them. The Russians mistook the German tanks for Tigers and wanted to destroy them using their technical superiority. A German eyewitness reported: “Those who saw all this believed in a kamikaze attack, which the Russians were forced to go on. If the Russian tanks had continued to break through, this would have been followed by the collapse of the German front.

However, in a matter of minutes, everything changed, and the seemingly inevitable success turned into a disaster for the attackers. The reason for this was the incredible Soviet negligence. The Russians forgot about their anti-tank ditches. The aforementioned obstacles, 2 meters deep, were dug by Soviet sappers below the level of height 252.2 along the entire line of the German - and now Soviet - attack. The German soldiers saw the following picture: "All the new T-34s went up the hill, and then picked up speed and collapsed into their own anti-tank ditches before they saw us." Ribbentrop was saved by the fact that he managed to slip between the Soviet tanks on his tank, covered with a dense cloud of dust: “Well, obviously, these were T-34s trying to get out of their own ditches. The Russians were concentrated on the bridge and were a convenient target for encirclement, most of their tanks were shot. It was a hell of fire, smoke, dead and wounded, and burning T-34s!” he wrote.

On the opposite side of the ditch, there were only two German tank companies that could not stop this steel avalanche. But now there was no "shooting at a moving target." Finally, four Tiger tanks, which were located on the left flank of the division, entered the battle. The 2nd SS Panzer Regiment managed to carry out a counterattack before noon in order to capture Hill 252.2 and the Oktyabrsky state farm. The leading edge of this height was like a tank graveyard. Here were the most burnt wreckage of more than 100 Soviet tanks and several armored personnel carriers from Peiper's battalion.

As can be seen from the material and technical documentation of the Leibstandarte division on July 12, the division captured more than 190 abandoned Soviet tanks. Most of them were found in a small area, on the indicated hill. However, this number seemed so incredible that Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser, commander of the II SS Panzer Corps, went to the front line to see it with his own eyes. According to the latest Russian reports, the 29th Panzer Corps alone lost 172 of 219 tanks and assault guns on 12 July, 118 of which were irretrievably lost. In manpower, the losses amounted to 1,991 people, of which 1,033 were dead and missing.

"Pappa" Hausser. Judging by the profile photo, he has already had an excursion to the Borodino field

While at a height of 252.2, the frontal offensive of the 19th Panzer Corps was repulsed, the critical situation on the left flank of the Leibstandarte division reached its apogee. Here, the offensive of the units of the 18th tank corps of Major General Bakharov, advancing in the area of ​​the Psel River with the forces of 170, 110 and 181 tank brigades, was supported by the 32nd motorized rifle brigade and a number of front-line units, such as the 36th Guards Tank Regiment, equipped with British tanks " Churchill".

Commander of the 18th Tank Corps, Major General B.S. Bakharov

From the German point of view, this unexpected attack was the worst case scenario, namely, the blow was struck in the previously described gap between the motorized divisions of the SS "Totenkopf" and "Leibstandarte". The 18th Soviet tank corps penetrated deep into the enemy positions almost without hindrance. The left flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment fell into disarray, a clear front line no longer existed. Both sides lost control, control, and the course of the battle broke up into many separate battles in which it was difficult to determine "who is attacking and who is defending."

Commander of the division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" SS Oberführer Theodor Wisch

The Soviet notion of this battle is full of myths, and in the next episode, the level of drama reaches its climax. On the morning of July 12, the second battalion of the 181st Armored Brigade of the 18th Tank Corps joined the offensive along the Petrovka-Psel line. A projectile fired from a Tiger tank hit the T-34 tank of the commander of the guard battalion, Captain Skripkin. The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev replaced him in the burning car.

Senior lieutenant (during the Battle of Kursk captain) P.A. Skripkin,

commander of the 1st tank battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tk with his daughter Galya. 1941

This episode is traditionally interpreted as follows: “The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev jumped back into the burning tank, started the engine and rushed towards the enemy. The tank rushed like a flaming fireball towards the enemy. The Tiger stopped and prepared to retreat. But it was too late. A burning Soviet tank crashed into a German tank at full speed. The explosion shook the ground. The courage of the Soviet tankers shocked the Germans, and they retreated."

Tanker Alexander Nikolaev

This episode became the hallmark of the Battle of Kursk. Artists captured this dramatic scene on art canvases, directors - on movie screens. But what did this incident look like in reality? The driver of the allegedly exploded "Tiger" Scharführer Georg Letsch describes the events as follows: "In the morning, the company was on the left flank of the second tank division. Suddenly, about 50 enemy tanks, protected by a small forest, attacked us on a wide front [...] I knocked out 2 tanks T-34, one of which, blazing like a torch, was rushing towards me. I was able at the last moment to dodge the burning mass of metal that was coming at me at great speed. " The strike of the 18th Panzer Corps was repulsed with heavy losses, including (according to Soviet data) 55 tanks.

No less unsuccessful was the attack of the Soviet troops in the south-east of the Prokhorovka-Belgorod railway embankment. At the Stalinskoye 1 state farm, there was an SS Panzergrenadier Regiment operating on the right wing of the Leibstandarte division, having no tank support and having lightly armored Marder tank destroyers as reinforcements. They were opposed by the 25th tank brigade of the 19th tank corps, with the support of the 1446th self-propelled artillery regiment of the 28th Guards airborne regiment and part of the formations of the 169th tank brigade of the 2nd tank corps.

To the south was the stretched right flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which was covered by the Das Reich division. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps operated in this direction. Their attacks, planned in the direction of Yasnaya Polyana-Kalinin, were repulsed after heavy fighting. Then the German troops counterattacked and captured the village of Storozhevoye, located on the left wing.

The most significant success was achieved on July 12 by the SS motorized division "Dead Head", which, contrary to Soviet notions, did not fight with the 5th Guards Tank Army of General Rotmistrov in the Prokhorovka area. In fact, all the tanks operated on the opposite bank of the Psel and attacked from there to the north. Despite the losses suffered, the division planned to counterattack in the Mikhailovka area in order to overturn the Soviet tanks, which were attacking the Leibstandarte division, with a blow in the back. But this attempt failed because of the swampy banks of the river. Only in the Kozlovka area were some infantry units operating as part of the 6th SS motorized regiment. They remained on the south bank to provide a reserve.

SS Gruppenführer Max Simon - commander of the "Dead Head" division

Also incorrect is Rotmistrov's statement that on July 12 he launched an attack on the positions of the "Dead Head" with the forces of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and with the help of his reserves. Although he sent the 24th Guards Tank Brigade and the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade on the offensive north of the Psel River. But, as American historians write, these formations were delayed on the march and took part in the battle only the next day.

The "Dead Head" division at that time attacked the positions of the 5th Guards Army of General Alexei Semenovich Zhadov, reinforced by units of the 6th Guards Army and the 31st Tank Corps. By the middle of the day, crushing Russian attacks in the direction of the Prokhorovka-Kartashevka road were repulsed, which caused Rotmistrov's nervousness. He was afraid of losing control of his formations because of the threat to his flanks and rear. This northernmost offensive became the symbol of the entire day of 12 July. The German troops were initially surprised by the strength of the Soviet counteroffensive and crowded together for defense, but then abruptly launched a counterattack and drove back the Soviet formations with heavy losses, due to which the Russians could not continue the offensive in the afternoon.

The tank battle near Prokhorovka (took place on July 12, 1943), as an episode of the Battle of Kursk during the operation "Citadel" by the German troops. It is considered one of the largest battles in military history using armored vehicles (?). On July 10, faced with stubborn resistance in their movement to Oboyan, the Germans changed the direction of the main attack on the Prokhorovka railway station, 36 km southeast of Oboyan.

The outcome of this battle is still hotly debated today. The amount of equipment and the scale of the operation are being called into question, which, according to the versions of individual historians, were exaggerated by Soviet propaganda.

Side forces

The main participants in the tank battle near Prokhorovka were the 5th Panzer Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov, and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, commanded by SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser.

According to one version, the 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th tank army, which attacked the positions of the Germans, included 190 medium tanks T-34, 120 light T-70, 18 English heavy Mk-4 "Churchill" and 20 self-propelled artillery mounts (ACS) - a total of 348 combat vehicles.

On the part of the Germans, historians give a figure of 311 tanks, although in the official Soviet historiography there is a figure of 350 only destroyed enemy armored vehicles. But modern historians speak of a clear overestimation of this figure, in their opinion, only about 300 tanks could take part from the German side. It was here that the Germans first used telewedges.

Approximate data in numbers: the II SS Panzer Corps had three motorized divisions. As of July 11, 1943, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler motorized division had 77 tanks and self-propelled guns in service. The motorized division of the SS "Dead Head" had 122 and the motorized division of the SS "Das Reich" had 95 tanks and self-propelled guns of all types. Total: 294 cars.

From documents that were declassified at the end of the 20th century, it can be assumed that about 1000 armored vehicles took part in the battle from both sides. This is approximately 670 Soviet and 330 German vehicles.

Not only tanks participated in this battle. Historians insist on the term armored forces, which also includes wheeled or tracked vehicles, motorcycles.

The course of the battle near Prokhorovka

July 10 - the attack on Prokhorovka began. Thanks to the very effective support of their attack aircraft, the Germans by the end of the day managed to capture an important defensive point - the Komsomolets state farm - and gain a foothold in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Krasny Oktyabr. The next day, German troops continued to push the Russians around the Storozhevoye farm and surrounded the units that defended the villages of Andreevka, Vasilievka and Mikhailovka.

Only 2 km remained before Prokhorovka without any serious fortifications. Realizing that Prokhorovka would be taken on July 12 and the Nazis would turn to Oboyan, having at the same time reached the rear of the 1st Tank Army, Nikolai Vatutin, the front commander, hoped only for a counterattack by the 5th Tank Army, which could turn the tide. There was practically no time left to prepare a counterattack. The troops had only a few hours of daylight and a short summer night to carry out the necessary regrouping and positioning of artillery. Moreover, both gunners and Rotmistrov's tanks experienced a shortage of ammunition.

Vatutin, at the last moment, decided to move the offensive time from 10.00 to 8.30. As he believed, this should have made it possible to preempt the Germans. In fact, this decision led to fatal consequences. German troops were also preparing for the attack scheduled for 0900. By the morning of July 12, their tanks were in their original positions, awaiting orders. Anti-tank artillery was deployed to repel a possible counterattack.

When the tanks of the Rotmistrov army moved into battle, they came under the destructive fire of artillery and tanks of the SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" prepared for battle. Already after the first minutes of the battle, dozens of medium Soviet tanks T-34 and light T-70 were blazing on the field.

Only at 12:00 did our tanks manage to approach the German positions, but they were subjected to a powerful air raid by attack aircraft armed with 37-mm cannons. Soviet tank crews, among whom were many untrained and almost the first time crews who entered the battle, fought heroically literally to the last shell. They were forced to fight under fatally accurate German fire and air attacks, without, for their part, proper support from aviation and artillery. They tried to shorten the distance, the tanks that broke through, having shot all the ammunition, went to ram, but the miracle did not happen.

In the afternoon, German troops launched a counterattack, concentrating their main efforts north of Prokhorovka, in the zone of the Totenkopf division. There they were opposed by about 150 tanks from Rotmistrov's army and the 1st Panzer Army. The Germans were able to stop mainly due to the excellent anti-tank artillery.

Losses

As for the losses, the greatest damage to our troops was inflicted by the artillery of the Germans. The number of equipment destroyed in the battle of Prokhorovka is very different in various sources. It is likely that the most plausible and documented figures are about 160 German cars; 360 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns.

And yet, the Soviet troops were able to slow down the German offensive.

The feast day of the holy apostles Peter and Paul, after whom the temple in Prokhorovka is named, falls on July 12 - the day of the legendary battle.

The Soviet T-34 tanks that participated in the battle had an advantage over all German tanks in speed and maneuverability. Because of what the Germans regularly used captured T-34s. In the battle of Prokhorovka, eight of these tanks took part in the SS Panzer Division Das Reich.

The Soviet T-34 tank commanded by Pyotr Skripnik was hit. The crew, having pulled out their commander, tried to take cover in the funnel. The tank was on fire. The Germans took notice of him. The German tank moved towards our tankers to crush them with caterpillars. Then the mechanic, saving his comrades, rushed from the saving shelter. He ran to his burning tank, and sent it to the German "Tiger". Both tanks exploded.

In Soviet times, there was a popular version that Soviet tanks were attacked by German Panthers. But according to the latest research, there were no Panthers at all in the battle of Prokhorov. And there were "Tigers" and .... "T-34", captured vehicles.