Party control. Central Control Commission of the CPSU

In Latvia, the Days of Russian Culture is in full swing, a holiday that was revived in 2011 at the initiative of the local Russian intelligentsia with the support of the Russian embassy, ​​the House of Moscow and the Riga City Council. The program of the spring cycle includes more than 170 different cultural events that take place in Riga, Daugavpils, Jelgava, Jekabpils, Jurmala, Rezekne, Preili…

In the foyer of the Great Guild, the audience was entertained by a cheerful family ensemble "Berendeyka"

According to a long tradition - and the Days of Russian Culture in Latvia have been held since 1925 - the festive events are timed to coincide with the Day of Slavic Literature and Culture, widely celebrated in Russia and the countries where our compatriots live, and the birthday of the world famous and beloved Russian poet Alexander Pushkin. So this year, in the main Orthodox and Old Believer churches in Latvia, on May 24, solemn services were held in honor of the holy Equal-to-the-Apostles brothers Cyril and Methodius, thereby giving a blessing to the Days of Russian Culture - 2017.

And the day before, the organizers of the Russian festival held a press conference in the Riga Big Guild, at which they acquainted journalists and guests with the program of the seventh season of the DRC. But besides this, the co-chair of the Organizing Committee, Irina Markina, presented a booklet and a postage stamp with a portrait of the Russian educator, theologian, local historian, historian Ivan Nikiforovich Zavoloko, an outstanding figure of the Old Believers in Latvia, whose 120th birthday anniversary is celebrated this year. In honor of the anniversary of the person who once stood at the origins of the Days of Russian Culture in Latvia, the organizers of this festival have issued a commemorative envelope and a postage stamp that can be sent anywhere in the world. The circulation of the stamp is only 150 copies. Through the efforts of the Foundation for the Development of Culture, a public organization that has taken care of the revival of the Days of Russian Culture in Latvia, over the past six years, five commemorative postage stamps related to Russian history and culture of the country have already been issued. And they have already become a philocartic rarity, which is hunted by collectors and connoisseurs of philately.

Irina Markina (left) and Irina Konyaeva are the main organizers and inspirers of the Days of Russian Culture in Riga

Talking about the portrait of Ivan Zavoloko, depicted on the stamp and envelope, Irina Markina recalled the life of this man, who became a symbol of the Old Believers in Latvia. He considered himself a follower of the first Old Believers, he himself was ready to sacrifice himself in the name of faith. But at the same time, Ivan Zavoloko, who received his higher education at the University of Prague, gathered around him the Russian intelligentsia with a variety of views. He always believed that the Old Believers could be preserved only through education and culture. Having created the Circle of Antique Lovers in pre-war Riga, Zavoloko was the first in Latvia to start studying Russian iconography, he collected poems, songs, legends, descriptions of life and family traditions, believing that there was not a single superfluous detail in the Old Believer culture. In the autumn of 1940 the Riga theologian was arrested and spent 18 years in exile in Siberia. Returning to his homeland, Ivan Nikiforovich continued his research. He was the editor of the Old Believer publications, he himself wrote many bright scientific articles, was the author of textbooks, leaving behind an invaluable cultural spiritual and historical heritage.

– The merits of Ivan Zavoloko to the Russian culture of Latvia cannot be overestimated,- said Irina Markina, - and today we would simply not know about many things if it were not for this unique and amazing person, who combines religious rigor and breadth of views, understanding the need for cultural cooperation and mutual cultural exchange.

From Russian colleagues taking part in the Latvian Days of Russian Culture, the floor was taken by a guest from Moscow - the first secretary of the Union of Russian Writers Svetlana Vasilenko:

– We have a great friendship with Latvia, as the Latvian branch of our Union is located here,- Svetlana told reporters. – We often meet at poetry festivals in St. Petersburg, Yerevan, Kaliningrad. In Riga, we presented the Yuri Dolgoruky Prize to the winners of the Baltic Russian Writers' Competition. For Russia, Latvia is one of the most expensive places, our compatriots live here - Russians and Latvians, who love and know Russian literature. We have brought new works by young authors to this festival, which we would like to introduce to the people of Riga. For ourselves, we hope to discover new names of young writers in Riga, whose works can be included in the almanacs we publish.

Svetlana Vasilenko's colleague, Moscow photo artist, writer, editor-in-chief of the almanac "Patrons and the World" Levon Osipyan spoke about his works, which can be viewed at the exhibition at the Baltic International Academy. And the artist from Volgograd Tatyana Tur, in addition to participating in the exhibition, will hold several master classes in Riga for children and adults on various painting techniques. The special guest of the Days of Russian Culture in Latvia, opera singer Maria Veretennikova, laureate of international competitions, a native of Tallinn, now living in the UK, did not tire the audience with a long story, but instead impressed everyone with the sparkling performance of Saint-Saens’ “Nightingale” vocalization (and not more familiar to the Russian ear of Alyabyev) - without chanting and without accompaniment. By the way, our compatriot, winner of the Grand Prix of the International Competition of English Music and Russian Romance in London, recently performed in front of Prince Charles with a program of Russian sacred music. According to her, the heir to the British crown is reputed to be a lover of Russian culture...

Organizing such a large-scale festival of Russian culture for the seventh year in a row, and mainly on the basis of the enthusiasm and voluntary principles of several activists, is a rather complicated matter. The Russian embassy helps out, which from the very first year supported the project and assists in establishing ties with Russian regions and creative teams, which the well-known journalist Irina Konyaeva noted in her speech, the main permanent inspirer and organizer of the DRC in Latvia:

– This assistance is important for us, in addition, the embassy disseminates information about our festival abroad and at the level of official structures in Russia. Every year, Russian figures of art and culture, creative teams from various regions of Russia come to us with performances. This year we are waiting for guests from the Pskov region, with which we have established a mutual cultural exchange. But the main pillars of the Days of Russian Culture are in Latvia, although, of course, they are also in Russia, since it is the center of Russian spiritual culture. We would like our project to develop in different directions, and for it to have more and more supports.

Russian choir "Belfry" sings

Representatives of Latvian society often come as spectators to concerts, master classes, theatrical performances, especially excursions that take place in different parts of Latvia within the framework of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Latvian writers and poets take an active part in literary readings. Their works translated into Russian are also published in almanacs and collections, but still, as the members of the Festival Organizing Committee noted, the main task of the revived DRC is to show what Russian amateur groups can and can do, which do not receive any support from state structures. For them, the Days of Russian Culture is that rare opportunity when they can show their creativity to the general public.

But be that as it may, the fact that the first Days of Russian Culture in Latvia, revived in 2011, was opened personally by the President of the country, Valdis Zatlers, will remain a landmark event in history. The words he said at the opening of the Russian project that “Latvian Russians have a unique opportunity to draw from the huge heritage that the Russian people possess, but at the same time continue to create those cultural roots that have already arisen in Latvia” went down in history. Since that year, greetings - in Latvian and Russian - from the first person of the state to the next DRC have already become a good tradition. The current president of Latvia, Raimonds Vejonis, also confirmed her loyalty to her (by the way, the son of a Russian mother, a native of Pskov). As in the past year, so this year, at the opening of the Days of Russian Culture, a greeting and congratulation from the President of the Republic of Lithuania was read out.

At the press conference, the journalists asked the organizing committee whether the Days of Russian Culture are needed today in our rapidly changing world? Sighing tiredly and leaning slightly on the stick, the university teacher, associate professor of the Baltic International Academy, specialist in the history of Russian spiritual culture, Irina Semyonovna Markina, calmly and distinctly, as she probably did for decades, explaining her subject to students, answered:

- Of course we need it! With all the changes taking place in the world, the diversity and preservation of cultures remains an urgent need, which is noted in all UNESCO programs. The international community is well aware that the gray, sticky pop cultural mass will not ensure the survival of mankind. Days of Russian, and not only Russian, culture are necessary in order for culture itself to be preserved - as an active process, as creativity, as a process of humanizing a person. The potential of the Days of Russian Culture lies in the opportunity to shape the cultural consciousness of a Russian person and other people who understand that there are different cultures in the world, and all of them deserve interest. That is why Russian culture has always been and will be in demand in a changing world.

... And in the evening, on one of the historical stages in the Riga Great Guild, the grand opening of the 7th Days of Russian Culture took place with the participation of professional vocalists and musicians of the Latvian National Opera, as well as amateur, youth and children's choirs, which Russian Latvia is rightfully proud of.

PARTY CONTROL COMMITTEE

party control under the Central Committee of the CPSU (CPC), created in accordance with the Charter adopted by the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952, to replace the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Organized by the Party Central Committee. The CCP "a) check the observance of party discipline by members and candidate members of the CPSU, hold accountable communists guilty of violating the Program and Charter of the party, party and state discipline, as well as violators of party morality (deception of the party, dishonesty and insincerity before the party, slander, bureaucratism, everyday licentiousness, etc.); b) considers appeals against decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, territorial and regional party committees on expulsion from the party and party penalties "(Charter of the CPSU, 1972, p. 34).

The November plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1962) reorganized the entire system of control in the USSR. The Committee of Party and State Control of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Party Commission under the Central Committee of the CPSU were created. The December plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1965) transformed the organs of party and state control into organs of people's control, the CPC was restored.

The CPC, strictly following VI Lenin's precepts on the purity of party ranks, analyzes issues related to strengthening party discipline and increasing the responsibility of communists for the implementation of party policy. In its work, the CPC observes the highest principle of party leadership - collectivity, which creates reliable guarantees for making correct, comprehensively considered, well-founded decisions. The most important decisions of the CPC on bringing to justice the Communists guilty of violating the Program and the Charter of the CPSU, party and state discipline, are published in the central organs of the party press. The CPC is led by a chairman; The committee consists of vice chairmen and CPC members. Since April 1966 A. Ya. Pel'she, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, has been chairman of the CPC.

L. K. Vinogradov.

Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB. 2012

See also interpretations, synonyms, meanings of the word and what is the PARTY CONTROL COMMITTEE in Russian in dictionaries, encyclopedias and reference books:

• COMMITTEE in the One-volume large legal dictionary:
  (French comite, from lat. committo - I instruct) 1) a state body formed to conduct special events "or manage any industry. in Russia ...
• CONTROL
  EXPORT SYSTEM - see EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM ...
• CONTROL in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  CUSTOMS ZONE - see CUSTOMS CONTROL AREA ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  TENDER - see TENDER COMMITTEE ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  INVESTIGATION - see INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  RING - see RING ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  AUDIT - see AUDIT COMMITTEE ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  ACCORDING TO THE PROCEDURES OF THE TRADING ROOM - the committee of the exchange, which, together with the administration, establishes the regime ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  FOR THE ADMISSION OF HOBbIX MEMBERS - a committee that considers applications for membership ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  FOR HUMAN RIGHTS - a treaty body formed in accordance with part IV of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  FOR NEW PRODUCTS - a committee that studies the possibilities of trading in new products on ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  BY LISTING - the working body of the exchange, carrying out ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  ON BUSINESS ETHICS - a committee that serves as a jury of assessors on internal disciplinary issues ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  SUPERVISORY - see SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  MINISTER - the highest legislative body in the Russian Empire, a meeting of the king with senior officials on all issues of state administration. Established in…
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  CONTROL COMMITTEE - see CONTROL COMMITTEE...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  EXECUTIVE. see EXECUTIVE...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  EXCHANGE - see EXCHANGE ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  ARBITRATION - see ARBITRATION COMMITTEE...
• COMMITTEE
  (French comite from lat. committo - I charge), 1) a state body formed to conduct special events or manage an industry. In Russia …
• COMMITTEE in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Euphron.
• COMMITTEE
  COMMITTEE OF MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (Komuch), the authority on the territory. Wed Volga and Ural regions in June - September. 1918. Educated in ...
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  "COMMITTEE FOR THE SALVATION OF THE HOMELAND AND THE REVOLUTION", an organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (Petrograd, Oct. - Nov. 1917, chairman - A.R. Gotz). Organized the armed the performance of the junkers against the authorities ...
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  COMMITTEE OF RUSSIAN OFFICERS IN POLAND, rev. org-tion in parts grew. armies on the territory Kingdom of Poland in 1861-63. Leaders - A.A. …
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SECURITY (1792-95), one of the French committees. …
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SALVATION (1793-95), one of the French committees. Convention. During the period of the Jacobin dictatorship, he played the role of pr-va. Head - M. Robespierre ...
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE, Highest. legislators organ Ros. empire (1802-1906), a meeting of the emperor with ministers, and other higher. officials on matters affecting the interests of ...
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  USSR CONSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISION COMMITTEE, in 1990-91, a body elected by the Congress of the people. deputies ...
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  COMMITTEE (French comite, from Latin committo - I charge), state. body formed to conduct special. events or leadership to.-l. industry. AT …
• COMMITTEE in the Encyclopedia of Brockhaus and Efron.
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of the Russian Language Ozhegov:
  ! a collegial body that directs some kind of work Executive office of the Council of People's Deputies. Trade union office. State Planning Committee of the USSR (Gosplan). K. by ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dahl Dictionary:
  husband. , French deliberative assembly, by appointment of any authority; thought, glad, circle, meeting, meeting, advice. Committee of Zemstvo duties in the province ...
• COMMITTEE in the Modern Explanatory Dictionary, TSB:
  (French comite, from lat. committo - I charge), 1) a state body formed to conduct special events or manage an industry. AT …
• COMMITTEE in the Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language Ushakov:
  committee, m. (from Latin comitatus, lit. accompanying) (official). A collegial body of a more or less permanent type, formed to work in some kind of …
• COMMISSION OF SOVIET CONTROL
  Soviet control under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (KSK), a state control body, was created in 1934 instead of the People's Commissariat of the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspection (RKI) to systematically check ...
• PARTY CONTROL COMMISSION in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  party control under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (CPC), created by the 17th Party Congress (1934), which decided to transform the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ...
• ESSER, HERMANN
  (Esser), (1900-1981), one of Hitler's closest associates in the early years of the Nazi movement. He was among the founders of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany. …
• SPEER, ALBERT in the Encyclopedia of the Third Reich:
  (Speer), (1905-1981), Hitler's court architect. Born March 15, 1905 in Mannheim. Studied architecture, was an assistant at the Berlin Technical Institute. AT …
• TATARINOV VALERIAN ALEKSEEVICH in the Brief Biographical Encyclopedia.
• PEREVERZEV in the Literary Encyclopedia:
  Valerian Fedorovich is a professor of literature, a historian of Russian literature. Studied at Kharkov University. 502 From 1902 he participated in the social-democracy. movement, adjoining ...
• MERING. in the Literary Encyclopedia.
• Khrushchev Nikita Sergeevich in the Big Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  (1894-1971) statesman, Hero of the Soviet Union (1964), Hero of Socialist Labor (1954, 1957, 1961). From peasants. Since 1909, a locksmith for ...
• SHKIRYATOV MATVEY FYODOROVYCH in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  Matvey Fedorovich, Soviet party leader. Member of the CPSU since 1906. From the peasants. Worker. …
• FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE AUCP(B) in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  Congress of the CPSU (b), was held December 18 - 31, 1925 in Moscow. There were 665 delegates with a casting vote and 641 with ...
• CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  Committee of the CPSU, the highest body leading the party between congresses; members of the Central Committee and candidate members of the Central Committee are elected at congresses ...
• CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE AUCP(B) in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks [Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks], the highest control body of the party in 1920-34. Created according to the plan of V. I. Lenin, who ...
• CHARTER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the basic law of the internal life of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which determines the duties and rights of a member of the party, its ...
• UNIVERSITIES OF MARXISM-LENINISM in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  Marxism-Leninism, one of the forms of the highest echelon of the system of party education. Listeners U. m.-l. (mainly party, Soviet, economic workers, workers ...
• UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  Soviet Socialist Republic, Ukrainian SSR (Ukrainian Radianska Socialist Republic), Ukraine (Ukraine). I. General information The Ukrainian SSR was formed on December 25, 1917. With the creation of ...

Reforms of the state and party apparatus

All the time of Khrushchev's activity as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was a period of constant reforms in the administration of the country. The super-centralized, militarized economy of the country of Stalin's time gave rise to an appropriate management system. This system included, in particular, a very extensive system of branch ministries, a key link in the country's command and administrative system. The ministries, directly or through their subordinate main departments, managed their industrial enterprises, communicated to them the figures of the state plan, set numerous indicators for them - the number of employees, norms for increasing labor productivity, and many others. The ministries determined who should be the supplier of raw materials for enterprises, and where the products of enterprises were to go. The fractional structure of executive authorities - ministries - in principle assumed that each branch of the economy, industry, administration assumed the presence of its own "headquarters of the branch", as the ministries were often called. In the post-war period, about 50 ministries functioned in the country (See table)

The first blow was dealt to this system after the death of Stalin. As early as March 15, 1953, there was a sharp reduction in the number of ministries. It affected mainly the interconnected branches of the defense industry and mechanical engineering. The Ministry of Mechanical Engineering of the USSR included the Ministries of the Automobile and Tractor Industry, Mechanical Engineering and Instrumentation, Machine Tool Building, and Agricultural Engineering. Another surviving ministry - transport and heavy engineering - included the ministry of heavy engineering, transport engineering, construction and road engineering, shipbuilding industry. The new Ministry of Defense Industry included two of several defense ministries, armaments and the aviation industry.

Later, during the July 1953 Plenum, the responsibility for the sharp reduction in the number of ministries was assigned to Beria. This was seen as a manifestation of his criminal designs. It is easy to understand that the sharp reduction in the number of ministries caused dissatisfaction with the metropolitan bureaucracy. In 1954, the former Stalinist system of ministries was almost completely restored.

At the end of 1956, at the December plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the problem was discussed: how to strengthen the central planning of industry, centralized control over it, etc. This course in the leadership of the CPSU is associated with the activities of a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR MG Pervukhin. However, by December 1956, it became clear that the ambitious five-year plan drawn up under the leadership of Pervukhin, adopted by the 20th Congress of the CPSU, turned out to be unrealistic.

At the beginning of the next year, 1957, N. S. Khrushchev sent a note "On improving the management of industry and construction" to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. A commission was created, which included members of the Presidium, secretaries of the Central Committee, secretaries of regional party committees, and ministers. Khrushchev's proposals were submitted to the February (1957) plenum of the Central Committee. The proposals were highly radical. They changed the entire previous order of industrial management.

"In accordance with the tasks of the further development of the national economy ..., - was reported in the theses of Khrushchev's report at the plenum, - it is necessary to transfer the center of gravity of the operational management of industry and construction to places closer to enterprises and construction sites. For these purposes ... it is necessary to move from former ... forms of management through sectoral ministries and departments to new forms of management according to the territorial principle. The form of such management can be, for example, councils of the national economy (sovnarkhozes) ".

Behind Khrushchev's usual love for political archeology, where the extreme starting point was the first years of Soviet power (sovnarkhozes were created in late 1917-early 1918 and existed in the 1920s), the transition from vertical planning - from directive instructions of the party - resolutions Council of Ministers of the USSR - orders of ministries - to industrial enterprises - to eliminate industrial ministries.

The proposals of the plenum, as usual, were approved in the form of a law "On the further improvement of the organization of industry and construction" of May 10, 1957 by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ON THE FURTHER IMPROVEMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

(Law of the USSR)

[Extract]

Article 2. Establish that the management of industry and construction should be carried out according to the territorial principle on the basis of economic administrative regions. Economic administrative regions are formed by the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics.

Article 3. To manage industry and construction, a council of the national economy is formed in each economic administrative region.

Article 4. The Council of the National Economy of the economic administrative region is formed by the Council of Ministers of the Union Republic, consisting of: the Chairman of the Council of the National Economy, the Vice-Chairmen and members of the Council of the National Economy.

Establish that chairmen of economic councils, on the proposal of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of a Union Republic to the Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic, may be appointed ministers and be members of the Council of Ministers of a Union Republic.

Article 5. The Council of the National Economy of the economic administrative region in all its activities is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the Union Republic.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR directs the councils of the national economy through the councils of ministers of the union republics.

Article 6. Under the Council of National Economy of the Economic Administrative Region, the Technical and Economic Council functions as an advisory body.

Article 7. The structure of the Council of the National Economy of the economic administrative region is approved by the Council of Ministers of the Union Republic.

to put an end to the arms race and start disarmament as soon as possible. Moreover, the Soviet state reinforced this initiative by taking practical measures, implementing these measures unilaterally. The Soviet Union liquidated its military bases on the territory of other states, significantly reduced the size of its Armed Forces and its military spending, once again stopped testing atomic and hydrogen weapons and decided not to resume them unless the Western powers resume testing nuclear weapons. Desiring to make a new contribution to the cause of peace and creation! the most favorable conditions for reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decides:

Article 1. Carry out a new major reduction in the Armed Forces of the USSR, namely by 1,200,000 people.

Article 2. In this regard, to disband the corresponding number of units, formations, military schools of the Soviet Army and Navy, reducing armaments accordingly, and also to reduce the spending of the Soviet Union on military needs under the State Budget of the USSR.

Article 3. Instruct the Council of Ministers of the USSR:

a) take the necessary measures for the implementation of Articles 1 and 2 of this Law, determine specific terms for the reduction of the Armed Forces of the USSR to be carried out and ensure that the personnel of the Armed Forces dismissed from the army and navy work in the national economy;

b) maintain the country's defense capacity at the proper level, maintaining the necessary Armed Forces of the USSR and weapons until an international agreement on general and complete disarmament is reached.

By adopting this Law, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expresses the hope that the new reduction in the Armed Forces of the USSR will serve as a stimulating example for other states, especially those with the greatest military power. This would facilitate the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 19bO, N 3, art. 26.

The councils of the national economy of economic administrative regions became the key link. The Economic Council is, first of all, a territory united by the unity of economic management. The boundaries of this territory in the Russian Federation coincided with the autonomous republics, territories and regions. In the RSFSR, 70 economic councils were created, in Ukraine - 11, in Kazakhstan - 9, Uzbekistan - 4, one each - in all other union republics. Secondly, the economic council is a collegial governing body that led the complex development of industry, to which industrial and construction enterprises, economic institutions located on this territory were subordinate. In the structure of this institution, in addition to the council of the national economy of the governing body, there were also production and sectoral departments created for individual industries, as well as functional departments - transport, financial and some others.

Centralized control was retained only for the most knowledge-intensive and important branches of the military industry.

The economic consequences of the creation of economic councils were already positive in the first years. The costs of transporting raw materials and products have been reduced, and cooperation between enterprises located in the same territory has been strengthened.

The social consequences of the organization of economic councils turned out to be more complex and contradictory. Of course, these reforms aroused the indignation of the metropolitan bureaucracy. The administrative vertical of people's commissariats-ministries that had been developing for decades was collapsing, and with it the jobs of the ministerial nomenklatura. The prospect of leaving Moscow to work in the economic councils was both undesirable and not too real - there were candidates for governing bodies there.

On the other hand, the local party and economic elites saw the liquidation of the ministries as an extension of their own possibilities. The producers were the winners. Directly in the leadership of the council of the national economy included the chairman of the economic council, his deputies and heads of departments and departments of the economic council. In April 1960, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution according to which directors of the largest enterprises and construction projects were also included in the leadership of the economic councils. Note that there was no place for the party leadership of the regional party committees. Of course, there were connections between economic councils and regional committees, but they were not provided for by law.

A situation arose when business executives turned out to be relatively independent in relation to the regional committees.

Personally for Khrushchev, it seemed that this was of no fundamental importance. In the struggle with his old opponents - first with Malenkov, until the beginning of 1955, and then against Bulganin, who alternately held the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Khrushchev decided to take this position himself. In February 1958, Bulganin was removed, and Khrushchev combined the highest power in the party with state power, and he himself became chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. This created additional opportunities for direct control of the state apparatus, but, on the other hand, gave rise to legitimate fears of the party apparatus in the unreliability of Khrushchev as its representative and defender, deprived him of the halo of a fighter for the interests of the highest party nomenclature, which he received during the work of the June (1957) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The bandwagon for the party nomenklatura was the new charter of the Central Committee of the CPSU, adopted in October 1961 at the XXII Congress of the CPSU. It provided for the need for a systematic renewal of party bodies from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the primary organization. The lowest link of the elected bodies of the party - up to and including the district committee - at each election was to be updated by half, at the republican and regional level - by one third, the composition of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Presidium of the Central Committee was to be updated by one quarter. The possibilities for a particular person to be elected several times to the same party body were also limited. These decisions in themselves posed a threat to the stability of the party apparatus.

In November 1962, a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held, at which two important decisions were made. One of them - on the creation of a system of party-state control - will be considered by us below. Another - "On the development of the economy of the USSR and the restructuring of the party leadership of the national economy" - meant the division of party organizations according to the production principle. Party organizations - from the regional and below - were divided into industrial and rural. Thus, two regional committees appeared on the territory of one region or territory. And since the party system of government was a kind of model for the Soviet government, instead of united Soviets and their executive committees, rural and industrial Soviets and executive committees were created. A blow was dealt to the most massive group of party workers - the secretaries of rural district committees of the CPSU. According to these decisions, the rural district committees of the party were liquidated, and the management of agriculture was transferred to territorial production departments covering several regions.

The changes also affected other public and state organizations - the Komsomol, trade unions, and the police. As V.E. Semichastny, who was in charge of state security at that time, recalled, Khrushchev wanted to divide even the KGB departments into industrial and rural ones. "And how do I divide spies into rural and urban?" - Semichastny fought back. He was able to change Khrushchev's opinion, in his words, only by proving that the division of the KGB "according to the production principle" would lead to a sharp increase in the officers and generals in the KGB. "Khrushchev, Semichastny recalled, had a very bad attitude towards military ranks in the KGB, he often liked to repeat:" We must disperse you, disperse you.

The changes also affected the economic councils. Their functions have been slightly changed. So, the construction industry was outside their jurisdiction, their managerial rights now extended mainly to the industrial sector. The number of economic councils was sharply reduced and increased to 47. This time their borders covered several regions. It is not difficult to understand that this additionally weakened the position of the regional party committees, those industrial regional committees that were created by decision of the November (1962) plenum. The industrial regional committees found themselves in actual submission not only to the Central Committee, but also to the local economic councils.

This decision brought complete confusion into the activities of the local government apparatus, became a nightmare for party and Soviet officials. Following the party and Soviet bodies, they began to be divided into rural and industrial organizations of trade unions, the Komsomol. The administrative apparatus has increased dramatically. So, in the district town of Gus-Khrustalny, Vladimir Region, the city party committee, the party committee of the production collective farm and state farm administration, the industrial and production party committee, the city executive committee, and the rural district executive committee acted simultaneously.

All these measures caused irritation and were perceived as an obvious administrative whim. However, these decisions had their own meaning. The separation of rural and industrial branches in the party leadership in the localities was, in its own way, a logical continuation of the merging of the party and state apparatuses. The fact that it was precisely rural party bodies that appeared created the usual illusion of the possibility of solving the problems of agriculture (by this time especially acutely realized) by sharply strengthening the party leadership.

We consider it necessary to note that such a weakening of the local party and Soviet leadership objectively strengthened the positions of business executives, since the economic councils remained the only regional government bodies. However, the influence of business executives proper was incomparable with the party apparatus. The nomenklatura system made them completely dependent on party organs. The habitual threat of party secretaries at all levels, "I didn't appoint you to this job, but I can always remove you" was quite real. Moreover, they were appointed to any responsible economic positions only with the consent of the party organs. Therefore, the decisions of the November (1962) did not create new allies for Khrushchev and added many new opponents among the influential secretaries of the regional committees - the most numerous part of the plenums of the Central Committee.

The changes in the Charter of the CPSU, adopted at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, could not but cause alarm among the party nomenklatura. In the new Charter, a policy was pursued to replace the composition of elected party bodies - from the primary party organization to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. At the level from the primary party organization to the district committee of the CPSU, half of the members of the elected bodies were to be re-elected, from the regional to the republican committees - up to a third, in the Central Committee and its Presidium - a fourth. With all the additions, clarifications and clarifications that retained the ability to influence the election results, the principle of turnover and renewal of party cadres hung like a sword of Damocles over the heads of the party nomenclature.

Notes

1. Popov G. Kh.
2. Tsikulin V. A. History of state institutions of the USSR. 1936-1965 M., 1966, p. 52
3. Ibid, p. 80
4. CHECK ON THE TEXT OF THE PLENUM AGAINST BERIA
5. Shapiro L. Communist Party of the Soviet Union. London, 1990, p. 771
6. On the further improvement of the organization of management of industry and construction. Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the report of comrade. N. S. Khrushchev, adopted on February 14, 1957. M., 1957, p. four
7. Law "On further improvement of the organization of management of industry and construction. M., 1957
8. Tsikulin V. A. History of state institutions of the USSR, p. 53-55
9. Khrushchev times. Recorded by N. A. Barsukov // Unknown Russia, Vol. 1. M., 1992, p. 273
10. Kommunist, 1964, No. 16, editorial; True, November 17, 1964

Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB

The unprecedented resignation of Khrushchev (and if you call a spade a spade - the success of the plot to remove the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. S. Khrushchev) raises a logical question - how did this become possible? In search of an answer to this question, one cannot ignore the relationship between Khrushchev and the Ministry of the Interior and the KGB.

After the arrest of Beria, his first deputy S. N. Kruglov received the post of minister. Above, we have already cited evidence that many of the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs perceived the removal of Beria as a signal to restore the order of the Stalin era. However, the situation was not at all as unambiguous as it seemed in the heat of the moment to the participants in the meetings to condemn Beria. On the one hand, a number of enterprises were returned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs - Glavspetsstroy and Glavpromstroy (however, not for long), on the other hand, the purge of its employees, accused of having close ties with Beria, continued. Already at the end of August 1953, the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported to the Presidium of the Central Committee on the work to purge the apparatus of the ministry and the heads of the regional departments of the MVL. A number of former leaders were put on trial, sentenced to death or long terms of imprisonment.

There is no doubt that the influence of this particular ministry, which was accused of repressions in the 1930s and early 1950s, was steadily declining. On March 12, 1954, the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was formed. I. A. Serov, a long-term deputy minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was appointed its chairman, in recent years - from the beginning of 1953 - Beria's deputy, and then - S. N. Kruglov. A number of functions of the former Ministry of Internal Affairs go to the KGB. In 1955, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR was created by decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Recall that the Russian Federation for the past thirty years did not have its own Ministry of Internal Affairs (the NKVD of the RSFSR was abolished in December 1930)

In early 1956, on the eve of the 20th Congress, S. N. Kruglov was dismissed. N. P. Dudorov, former head of the construction department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, was appointed the new minister. During 1956-1957. there was a purge of the apparatus of the ministry. Deputy ministers - long-term employees of the NKVD-MVD were replaced by party workers. In September 1957, the border troops were withdrawn from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and transferred to the KGB.

The logical result of the process of reducing the role of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was the liquidation of this ministry. On January 13, 1960, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was abolished, and its functions were transferred to the republican ministries. In Russia, it was the Ministry of Public Order, renamed in 1962 in a new way.

Another situation developed for the State Security Committee. I. A. Serov was associated with N. S. Khrushchev through joint work in Ukraine. Under the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Khrushchev, I. A. Serov was the People's Commissar of the NKVD from September 2, 1939 to July 25, 1941. He was considered "Khrushchev's man". Serov played one of the key roles in the preparation of Khrushchev's "secret report" at the 20th Congress. The removal of the chairman of the KGB - as a supporter of Khrushchev - was sought by members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee at the very meeting on June 18-21, 1957, at which Khrushchev himself was almost dismissed from the post of the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

We do not know the exact reasons that forced I. Serov to be transferred from the post of chairman of the KGB of the USSR to the post of head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, although prestigious, but not of political importance, and most importantly, politically useless for Khrushchev. There is a tradition to link I. Serov's resignation with the intensified investigation into the circumstances of the political repressions of Stalin's time after the 20th Congress, with Serov's important role in the deportation of the peoples of the North Caucasus. Perhaps that is how it was. A. N. Shelepin recalled that he repeatedly spoke to Khrushchev about the need to expel Serov from the party and deprive him of military awards for participating in the repressions of the past. In any case, the departure of I. Serov was a personal loss for Khrushchev.

Serov was replaced by the head of the department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the former first secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, A. N. Shelepin. The KGB performed a number of political police functions from the first days of its existence. With the advent of A. N. Shelepin, these functions were enshrined in the "Regulations on the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR", approved by a resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on January 9, 1959. This document, which determined the activities of the KGB, proclaimed: "The State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and its local bodies are political bodies carrying out measures of the Central Committee and the Government to protect the socialist state from encroachments by external and internal enemies"

With the advent of Shelepin at the head of the KGB, the purge of the ranks of the KGB officers continued. In a report sent to the Presidium of the Central Committee in January 1963 by Shelepin's successor, also the former first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee V. Semichastny in the first days of his work as chairman of the KGB, it was reported that "for the period from 1954 from the state security agencies (without troops ) . . more than 46 thousand officers were fired, including almost half since 1959. "The purge affected not only the KGB apparatus, but also intelligence and counterintelligence. "Over 90% of generals and officers of military counterintelligence ... have been appointed to senior positions in the last four years," the document said.

The recruitment of new KGB officers was mainly at the expense of persons who had recommendations from the Komsomol and party bodies, as well as from among the party and Komsomol workers.

In turn, a number of KGB leaders moved in 1960-1962. for party and Soviet work, to the prosecutor's office.

The KGB, its apparatus merged with the party organs. Former employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security were performers - including criminal orders. The new KGB was headed political leaders, and its employees more clearly than their predecessors, realized themselves as "an armed detachment of the party", were more enterprising and independent than their predecessors. This is far from identical with the personal support of N. S. Khrushchev personally.

And in the KGB, the reduction in the number of staff by 110 thousand people, the reduction in pay, the elimination of a number of privileges (free delivery of medicines, benefits for years of service, and a number of others) could not but cause irritation.

The leadership of the KGB could not but be alarmed by the obvious strengthening of opposition sentiments in the country. In the first half of 1962 there was a kind of explosion of mass dissatisfaction with the policy that was identified with Khrushchev. In a report sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU in July 1962, Shelepin reported on an extremely alarming fact - for six months in 1962, twice as much leaflets and anonymous letters of anti-Soviet content, than for the same period in 1961. In this report, the KGB reported that in the first half of the year there were 60 local anti-Soviet groups, and for the whole of 1961 - only 47 groups. During this half of the year, 7,705 leaflets and anonymous letters produced by 2,522 authors were recorded.

What was also new was that, after a long break, letters praising the anti-Party group began to be sent out. This was Khrushchev's personal political defeat. Through the efforts of the Chekists, 1039 authors of 6726 anti-Soviet documents were identified. They were written by representatives of almost all strata of society - 364 workers, 192 employees, 210 students and schoolchildren, 108 persons with no fixed occupation, 105 pensioners and 60 collective farmers. More than 40% had secondary and higher education, 47% were under 30 years old. Among the authors of these documents were both military personnel and old communists.

The function of the political police in the KGB increased dramatically after the events in Novocherkassk, which reverberated throughout the country. Both the party authorities and the KGB bodies were essentially taken by surprise. Immediately after the suppression of unrest, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a large number of decisions aimed at strengthening political investigation and combating dissent in the country. On July 19, 1962, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a lengthy resolution was adopted, which stated: "1. To agree with the draft resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Prosecutor General of the USSR submitted by the Commission on the issues of intensifying the fight against hostile manifestations of anti-Soviet elements ... .

2. To allow the KGB of the USSR to increase the staffing of counterintelligence units of the territorial bodies of the KGB by 400 servicemen. "

The KGB was criticized for weak undercover work, especially in many higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, institutions of science, culture, and art. He was criticized for having little contact with the Ministry of Internal Affairs to combat anti-social elements.

A draft order of the chairman of the KGB was attached to the resolution. It noted: "Recently, mass riots have occurred in some cities, accompanied by pogroms of administrative buildings . . . ". Responsibility for them was assigned to criminal elements, former German punishers, "churchmen and sectarians", who sought to give spontaneously arisen events a counter-revolutionary character. (We note that such an assessment did not at all correspond to the specific circumstances of the unrest in Novocherkassk)

The draft order ended - in form - in a standard way, in essence - with new wording in content: "... eliminate serious shortcomings in the placement of agents and its use." Particular vigilance was supposed to be shown in relation to re-emigrants, "reactionary-minded church and sectarian authorities," . . . "more actively use the possibilities of operational and technical services, outdoor surveillance; . . . signal about persons ... standing on anti-Soviet positions and trying to undermine the confidence of the people in the policies and activities carried out by the party and the Soviet government ... . .; suppress any open hostile manifestations anti-Soviet elements, . . . authors of anti-Soviet leaflets and anonymous documents, . . . but to all kinds of instigators of mass riots in coordination with party bodies take steps to isolate them. . . "

These events required additional organizational decisions. Considering that industrial enterprises became the centers of unrest, the appearance of a section in this order becomes clear: "Create in the Second Main Directorate ... Department, which will be entrusted with the functions of organizing intelligence and operational work at large and especially important industrial enterprises ... "

The viciously anti-church orientation of the KGB attracts attention. This document, in essence, confirms the former KGB policy of eradicating religion by destroying the church. KGB officers are ordered: “Resolutely increase the level of intelligence and operational work to suppress hostile manifestations on the part of churchmen and sectarians, paying special attention to the rapid paralysis of the activities of illegal groups and communities. In relation to the leaders and organizers of church and sectarian formations, carry out active Chekist measures, (Italics ours. Auth.) which would allow in the near future to completely expose the anti-Soviet work they are carrying out, and to bring the malicious ones to criminal liability in accordance with the law.

The old Khrushchev plan to fight the "parasites" was not forgotten either. But if in the late 40s. it spread to the collective farm village, then in the early 60s - to the whole country. Therefore, it was prescribed: "... The KGB organs are obliged to provide more assistance to the party organs in the steady implementation of Soviet laws to combat parasites."

The order of the chairman of the KGB A. N. Shelepin ends with an instruction defining the relationship between the party and the KGB: "To the leaders of the KGB-UKGB, authorized by the KGB in cities and districts, to provide clear information to the Central Committee of the Communist Parties, ... regional committees, regional committees, city committees and district committees of the CPSU".

The leadership of the KGB, which was directly part of the party-political elite of the country, could not but be concerned about the growing discontent of the country. The situation offered two options. The first is the intensification of repressions (let us recall that it was in July 1962 that the infamous Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR was adopted, which restored and legalized political repressions). The second way out is changes in the political leadership itself, the removal from it of that person whose name was identified with failures in the development of the country - N. S. Khrushchev. The situation developing in the country could not but disturb Khrushchev himself. He had to face an incredible amount of fraud, the most flagrant deceit. Moreover, the deceivers were the secretaries of the regional committees, large economic leaders. It is clear that the party could create "beacons". They were allowed (more precisely, tacitly allowed) postscripts, but in those cases when it had to meet a certain political goal - to stimulate the rest. Yes, and the right to be a "beacon" assumed a certain party support, almost legitimation. That is exactly what happened, for example, with Larionov, the first secretary of the Ryazan regional committee of the CPSU. But even they were forbidden simple criminality, to which the Ryazan party leader, personally supported by Khrushchev, reached. But cheating, especially in agriculture, was done by almost all of the big party-Soviet and economic officials. (Another question is why they did it).

Khrushchev tried to fight this. He personally traveled around the camp, scolded those who came under his arm, organized inspections, but the situation did not change. The super-centralized power was unable to ensure control over the implementation of its own decisions. Since such a power, as it well knows, in principle cannot make wrong decisions, those who do not follow its wise instructions are to blame. And in order for them to be carried out, it is necessary to establish verification of execution, for which it is necessary to create another institution, another department, which should provide "accounting and control," as the great Lenin said.

Notes

1. The last "anti-party" group. Verbatim report of the June (1957) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU // Historical archive, 1993, N3, p. 32, 39, 57-58
2. See, for example, information about the surveillance of the physicist L. D. Landau: According to agents and operational equipment. Reference of the KGB of the USSR about academician L. D. Landau // Historical archive, 1993, N 3, p. 151-162
3. Okhotin N. G. and others. Expert opinion. . . , With. 31
4. See the resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On measures to prevent facts of deception of the state and to strengthen control over the reliability of reports on the fulfillment of plans and obligations" dated May 19, 1961, 9

Committee and Council of Ministers of the USSR

Among the numerous administrative transformations of N. S. Khrushchev, this is perhaps the most unexplored, although it played a significant role in the events of the mid-60s

Control institutions have been repeatedly reformed. The former Ministry of State Control, headed by such politicians as L. Z. Mekhlis (in 1946-1950) and V. N. Merkulov (1950-1953), was abolished in 1957, along with a number of other ministries . Instead, the Commission of Soviet Control of the Council of Ministers of the USSR appeared. However, the effectiveness of this institution, according to Khrushchev, was insufficient.

Khrushchev came to the idea of ​​the need to create a special control institution that could check both party and state bodies at the end of 1961, when it was already clear that it was impossible to carry out the plan for building communism in the USSR recently adopted at the XXII Congress of the CPSU.

Khrushchev, who in every possible way demonstrated his commitment to the resurrection of Lenin's traditions, here again tried to give his own interpretation of Lenin's instructions on control. It is curious that in the process of preparing the decision, Khrushchev was provided with original documents of 1923-1928. on the activities of the commission of A.D. Tsyurupa, deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, deputy chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense and at the same time People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (let's pay attention to this circumstance!). They told about the activities of the commission on the issue of improving the work of the state apparatus and combating abuse. The commission was created on the initiative of F. E. Dzerzhinsky, it was led by Tsyurupa, it included people's commissars, representatives of the judiciary.

The reform of the control apparatus in the USSR in the early 60s. it was unusually long (unusually for Khrushchev's sudden reforms). Decisive opponents of the creation of the Committee of Party and State Control, judging by the memoirs of A. N. Shelepin, were A. N. Kosygin and A. I. Mikoyan. On January 8, 1962, a draft resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee "Issues of State Control and Party Control" was prepared. No decision has been made on this project. On February 19, 1962, a note by N. S. Khrushchev "On improving control over the implementation of party and government directives" was sent to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in which he substantiated the need to strengthen party-state control, and in fact - to reform control, party and state authorities of the country.

The note is multi-page, replete with quotes from Lenin, not at all Khrushchev in style. As a rule, such documents are rarely personally written by the person who signs them. But the ideas, the main provisions contained in such papers, were always specified and agreed with him in advance. Khrushchev's note to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU reported: "Due to the fact that the XXII Congress of the CPSU instructed the Central Committee to develop measures to improve and improve party-state and public control, we in the Central Committee need to immediately think over the practical issues related to the implementation of this order. I I would like to express some thoughts on the measures that should be taken for these purposes... During the period of Stalin's personality cult, the remarkable Leninist system of party and state control was in fact overthrown and replaced in essence by a bureaucratic control apparatus cut off from the masses.

Khrushchev informed the members of the Presidium that corruption in the country had affected the highest levels of government, that bribery had penetrated the State Planning Commission and other ministries and departments. The facts of bribery, Khrushchev reported, were also revealed in some other regions of the RSFSR, in the Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, Azerbaijan, Georgian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Kazakh republics.

In Khrushchev's note, it was said in particular detail that these phenomena - bribery, corruption - also penetrated into the courts, the prosecutor's office, and the bar. "Over the past two years, a number of prosecutors, investigators and members of the Moscow city and regional courts, people's judges and lawyers have been brought for bribes only in Moscow and the Moscow region." These examples were supposed to prove the need for extrajudicial persecution. This extrajudicial or pre-trial proceedings were to become the subject of the activities of the new control bodies.

What was this control body supposed to be? First - party rhetoric. “The main and decisive condition for a radical improvement in control should be the involvement of the broad masses of working people ... Therefore, we need, along with special Party control bodies, to have a system of public inspections that would work under the leadership of Party control bodies and cover every enterprise, construction site, state farm, collective farm, institution ... as an instrument for improving the state apparatus, eradicating bureaucracy, and timely implementation of the decisions of the Party."

Further - the first Khrushchev's reform plan. "Based on this, I would consider it expedient to form a single control center - the Party Control Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU (CPC) by the relevant local bodies, entrusting it with the responsibility to exercise control over all lines. This will be the implementation of Lenin's instructions."

Khrushchev defined the tasks of the future Party Control Committee: "To monitor the strictest observance of party and state discipline, the fight against any manifestations of departmental and parochial tendencies, against fraud, postscripts, mismanagement and waste, ... the strictest regime of economy for the correct and most expedient spending of money means and material values. Particular attention of the CPC and its local organs should be directed to a resolute struggle against bureaucracy and red tape, which cause the greatest harm to our cause.

“The Party Control Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU should be a broadly representative body,” Khrushchev wrote. “It could be formed of 80-100 people, including representatives of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, the Central Union, the press, workers, collective farmers, the intelligentsia, and chairmen of party control committees Union republics and the largest territories and regions. It would be correct to approve the composition of the Committee at a plenum of the Central Committee for a period of 4 years, and the collegium of the CPC could be approved at the presidium of the Central Committee ... providing for effective control over both sectors of the national economy, as well as on an administrative-territorial basis. The CCP should have freelance inspectors, in particular, it would be possible to attract communists and non-party people who have retired, but are able to perform public duties ".

Khrushchev also foresaw the danger of such an institution. “Given the wide rights of the Party Control Committee, I want to emphasize that it is necessary to exclude any possibility of any opposition to its Central Committee of the CPSU. In this regard, it must be firmly established that all the work of the Committee must be carried out under the guidance of the Central Committee of the CPSU and its Presidium, the Committee is obliged to constantly report before the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU about their activities, submit plans for their work for consideration by the Central Committee, all responsible employees of the apparatus of the Committee must be approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Note that Khrushchev initially saw this control body as a Committee party control. This committee was to be controlled Central Committee. Its number, according to Khrushchev, should be small.

According to Khrushchev's note, a special resolution of the Presidium was adopted. It reported: "1. Approve the proposals of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, . . . outlined by him in a note dated February 19, 1962 and send it to members of the CPSU Central Committee, candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee and members of the Central Audit Commission

2. Instruct the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU to prepare a draft resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On improving control over the implementation of directives of the party and government."

However, more than half a year passed before the decision to establish the Committee was made. The Presidium received one after another draft provisions on it, but they did not receive support. The situation changed dramatically at the November (1962) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The reason for the delay was, according to A. N. Shelepin, the resistance shown to this idea by A. N. Kosygin and A. I. Mikoyan.

Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU,

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR

FORMATION OF THE COMMITTEE

OF PARTY AND STATE CONTROL OF THE CPSU CC

AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR

Central Committee of the CPSU, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet

The USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR decide:

Form the Committee of Party and State Control of the Central Committee!

CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR

Central Presidium Council

Committee of the Supreme Ministers

CPSU of the USSR Soviet of the USSR

SP USSR, 1962, Yu~ 20, art. 159.

REGULATION 0 OF THE COMMITTEE

OF PARTY AND STATE CONTROL OF THE CPSU CC

AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR AND RELATED

LOCAL AUTHORITIES

[Extract]

The correct establishment of control and verification of fulfillment is the most important Leninist principle of the activity of the Communist Party and the Soviet state in building a new society, a powerful means of improving party and state leadership, strengthening the ties between the party and the people, and involving the masses in managing the affairs of society. As our country advances further towards communism, as the management of economic construction becomes more complicated and the productive forces develop gigantically, the role of mass control will grow more and more.

In pursuance of the directive of the XXII Congress of the CPSU, the November (1962) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided on a radical reorganization of the control system in the country, based on the Leninist idea of ​​​​combining party and state control, creating a system

At this plenum, Khrushchev objectively weakened the party apparatus by passing proposals for dividing it into rural and party apparatus, and for amalgamating the economic councils. And at the same time, a resolution "On the formation of the Committee of Party and State Control of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR" was adopted.

Speaking at the plenum, Khrushchev proposed appointing the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the head of the KGB, A. N. Shelepin, as chairman of the new committee. Khrushchev made a proposal to approve Shelepin as an additional deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. He will have to deal with ministers, with state bodies, Khrushchev said, and he must have the necessary powers.

Special evidence is not required to assert that the draft of this decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee was created in the environment of A. N. Shelepin, the then chief of the KGB, who aimed and got to the post of head of this control body. Shelepin in the eyes of Khrushchev fully met the necessary requirements. He made a career under Khrushchev and in this sense should have been personally obliged to him, as the chairman of the KGB, he already had considerable experience in controlling all aspects of the life of the country, finally, he had experience in the party apparatus, he was elected secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the XXII Congress ,

The creation of the Party and State Control Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was supposed to compensate for the growth of decentralization, which objectively emerged in the party and Soviet bodies. In the decision of the November plenum, it was written: “To form a single body of party and state control, the Committee of Party and State Control of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the corresponding local bodies. Consider the most important task of the party and state control bodies to assist the party and the state in the implementation of the CPSU Program organization of systematic verification of the fulfillment of the directives of the party and government, further improvement of the leadership of communist construction, observance of party and state discipline, and socialist legality.

The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU carefully considered the Provisions of the new committee. This was the subject of its meeting on December 18, 1962. In the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, it was written: “To instruct the commission consisting of: comrades Kozlov (convocation), Brezhnev, Mikoyan, Kosygin, Voronov, Suslov, Shelepin, to consider, in accordance with the exchange of views held on meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, draft documents submitted to the Central Committee on the structure and staff of the Committee of Party and State Control of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, as well as the draft Regulations on the Committee of Party and State Control of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR and relevant local bodies and submit their proposals to the Central Committee ".

Such attention of the top party leadership to the fate of the new committee is not accidental. A bureaucratic monster arose, actually duplicating both the sectoral departments of the CPSU Central Committee and the apparatus of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, besides endowed with great control powers. The committee members received the right to conduct special investigations in contact with administrative bodies.

A system of departments and sectors was created in the central apparatus of the committee, reproducing the structure of the national economy, social sphere, administrative and military bodies of the USSR.

There were, in particular: departments of party-state control: department of metallurgical industry and geology, heavy industry, sector of the fuel industry, sector of general engineering, sector of heavy industry, transport department of party-state control for transport and communications, sector for energy and electrification of heavy industry, the general engineering sector, the construction industry sector, the sector of urban and rural construction, architecture and design organizations, the food and fish industry sector, and so on and so forth. . .

To match this was the staffing. Instead of Khrushchev's 80-100 people, who, as he assumed, would work in the new control body, by the time of its inception, the committee already had 383 "responsible employees" and 90 technical workers on its staff. And this is only the central apparatus and only in the first days!

The creation of the committee became an essential part of the entire reform of the Party and Soviet organs. At a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on December 20, 1962, the issue of "On the reorganization of the leading party bodies in the regions, territories, autonomous and union republics" was considered. In the decision on this issue, it was written: "In accordance with the resolution of the November (1962) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU On the construction of party organizations from bottom to top according to the production principle, the Central Committee of the CPSU decides: . . . in the newly formed industrial and rural regional committees, regional committees and the party should there should be, as a rule, four secretaries of the regional committee, one of which is the head of the ideological department, and the other is the chairman of the party-state control, as well as the corresponding department.

The same system was duplicated at the level of local Soviets - the chairman of the regional committee of party and state control was also one of the deputy chairmen of the regional executive committee.

It was a truly unique situation! The Committee of Party and State Control at all its levels - from central to district, actually duplicated both the party and the Soviet system, having, moreover, the right to conduct investigations, impose penalties and fines on the guilty, refer cases to the prosecutor's office and court. In March-April 1963, the Committee of Party and State Control of the USSR received the right to control the armed forces, the Committee of State Security and the Ministry of Public Order.

Power slowly flowed from Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev to his protege - Alexander Nikolaevich Shelepin.

By April 1963, 3270 committees of party-state control were created in the country, including 15 republican, 216 regional and regional, 1057 city and district in cities, 348 - for zones, enterprises and construction sites, collective farms and state farms, 170 thousand groups and 270 thousand posts of people's control, where more than 2 million 400 thousand people were elected.

With all this, the huge machine was spinning without much result. There was no expected economic effect from the activities of the army of controllers. The shortcomings identified by the CPC in the production of tires at the Yaroslavl plant, registrations at the Minsk Radio Plant, facts of localism on the part of employees of the Council of National Economy of the RSFSR, abuses in the sale of cars in Moscow - all this clearly did not correspond to the scope and powers of the CPC.

The point, it seems to us, was something else. Khrushchev was beaten. He wanted to strengthen control, but he himself was blocked by the system that he himself proposed. The CPC was ideally suited to create the prerequisites for the organizational removal of Khrushchev. Shelepin's power turned out to be more real, better organized, and therefore more dangerous for any official, than the power of the very first secretary and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Khrushchev.

Let us also note another paradox: the CPC system itself became an additional irritating factor AGAINST Khrushchev. It is no coincidence that Brezhnev, shortly after the removal of Khrushchev, tried to get rid of the CCP.

Note

1. AP RF, f. 3, op. 55, d. 26
2. Khrushchev times. Pub. N. A. Barsukova // Unknown Russia. Issue. 1, M., 1992, p. 286
3. AP RF, f. 3, op. 55, d. 23, l. one
4. AP RF, f. 3, op. 55, d. 23, l. 3-5
5. There, l. 10-13
6. There, l. fourteen
7. There, l. 16
8. There, l. 17
9. There, l. 2
10. Khrushchev times. Recorded by N. A. Barsukov. // Unknown Russia. Issue. 1, M., 1992, p. 286
11. AP RF, f, 3, op. 55, d. 24, l. one
12. There, l. 48
13. There, l. fifty
14. AP RF, f. 3, op. 55, l. 106
15. There, ll. 151-160, 191-192

October coup

The circumstances of the direct preparations for the removal of Khrushchev will never be fully clarified. With a minimum of written evidence (moreover, edited with the participation of interested persons - participants in these events) and the presence of the memories of these same people, many "technical" details remain unclear. But the main events may well be reconstructed. It is clear that already in 1962 the failure of the main goals of the newly adopted new Program of the CPSU - the program of "full-scale construction of communism" - became obvious. Failure in the field of agriculture was inevitably associated with Khrushchev's personal defeat. In 1962 - 1963 food cards were introduced in most cities and workers' settlements of the country. Critical foodstuffs were in short supply. Food had to be urgently purchased from abroad. Funds were needed. From the state fund of the USSR in 1963, a record amount of gold for the entire post-war period was sold for export - 520.3 tons, of which 372.2 tons went directly to the purchase of food.

Attempts to create parity with the United States no longer in competition in agriculture, but in the military-political field, by deploying Soviet missiles in Cuba, failed, including because of Khrushchev's characteristic desire to "personalize" future success, to link the signing of Soviet the Cuban treaty with Khrushchev's upcoming visit to Cuba in November 1962. The result is known - the world is on the brink of war, the forced and public evacuation of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba and secret agreements on the withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey and Italy.

In the face of growing political problems, Khrushchev rushed about. His actions are inconsistent and contradictory. One gets the feeling that he, sorting through the options for organizing management, was trying to find for himself those of them that could stabilize the situation. Hence his proposals on the division of party organizations according to the production principle, the desire to strengthen control mechanisms through the creation of a Party-State Control Committee. Khrushchev is equally inconsistent with regard to the intelligentsia. On the one hand, demonstrative support for the anti-Stalinist works of A. T. Tvardovsky, A. I. Solzhenitsyn, E. Yevtushenko, on the other hand, the persecution of "formalists", the desire to strengthen the party leadership of culture in every possible way.

At the June (1963) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the official speaker - secretary of the Central Committee L.F. Ilyichev stated: "The enemies of socialism expected that, perhaps, along with the elimination of the consequences of the cult of personality, everything done by the party and the people would be crossed out, the correctness of of the historical path chosen by the people. Indeed, certain politically immature or embittered people fell for the bait of bourgeois propaganda ... Individual representatives of the intelligentsia, including insufficiently ideologically steadfast young people, picked up the fiction about the conflict of generations ... ". Ilyichev concluded his observations with the conclusion: "It is necessary to increase the revolutionary vigilance of the Soviet people." Examples of revolutionary vigilance at this plenum were successfully demonstrated by Khrushchev himself, who attacked the writer V. Nekrasov and demanded his expulsion from the party. At the same time, Khrushchev attacked scientists with insults, insisted on the termination of payment for academic degrees. One gets the impression that Khrushchev had a personal account, a personal disillusionment with science and scientific recommendations, which he was often given and which he often tried to turn into party-state policy.

Khrushchev was becoming redundant and burdensome. The isolation grew around him. A curious photograph has been preserved - awarding the first secretary of the Central Committee on April 17, 1964 in connection with his anniversary with another Golden Star. Photographer M. Kulikov filmed what seemed to be a protocol solemn ceremony - Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L. I. Brezhnev awards the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. S. Khrushchev. However, the camera lens captured something very different from this protocol scene. First of all, only two people, as can be seen in the photograph, are seriously engaged in this procedure - Brezhnev, reading out the Decree, solemn and full of awareness of the importance of the moment, and Khrushchev, listening to him, who seems embarrassed, half-smiling either bewildered or mournfully. On the other hand, the members and candidate members of the Presidium, the secretaries of the Central Committee, look different. Not a single smile, not even the most conditional expression of joy on this occasion. Judging by the photo, the other participants in the procedure can easily be divided into two groups. The first - the smallest - are people demonstrating their indifference, self-withdrawal from what is happening. Shvernik closed his eyes and threw back his head, Suslov lowered his gaze, looking at the chandeliers in the Ilyichev hall. Most of the top party and state leaders examined Khrushchev and Brezhnev, examined them carefully and intently, unfriendly, studying, evaluating.

Recalling these days, the then KGB leaders A. N. Shelepin and Semichastny, who replaced him, said: " Back in the spring, on the eve of his 70th birthday (in April), his entourage was outraged by his (that is, Khrushchev. - Auth.) intolerance. "Khrushchev was fed up. In addition, he became more and more uncomfortable and even dangerous. , which did not give a sense of stability to the party state apparatus, and dangerous, since the discontent of the population was directed against it (or, as it was written in the KGB reports, "against one leader of the party and government"), forced to receive food on cards, and get rid of "one of the leaders meant to reduce the level of discontent in the country.

In the summer of 1964, Khrushchev started a new reorganization of the system of government in the country. As always, agriculture was supposed to be the closest testing ground for its development. On July 11, 1964, 1964, at the plenum of the Central Committee, there should have been one question - about the appointment of A. I. Mikoyan to the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the related release from the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of L. I. Brezhnev. He was given the post of "second secretary" of the party. However, contrary to the agenda, Khrushchev delivered a long report at the plenum, in which he tried to justify the need to create the so-called specialized production departments, which were supposed to oust the party bodies from the management of agricultural production. Let me remind you that two years earlier Khrushchev had actually eliminated the most massive party bodies - rural district committees of the party, replacing them with party committees of production departments. Now it's their turn. In addition, Khrushchev sharply criticized the system of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Agricultural Academy for their inefficiency, threatened to close these academies, insisted on the transfer of agricultural scientific institutions from Moscow and Leningrad to the provinces.

A week later - on July 18 - Khrushchev sent a detailed note "On the management of agriculture in connection with the transition to the path of intensification" to the Presidium of the Central Committee. It contained a detailed argumentation of those provisions that were expressed by him at a recent plenum. This note exists in two editions. The first is more radical, containing proposals for the creation of a system of union-republican departments for the production of agricultural products - for the production of grain, sugar beets, cotton, vegetable oil, potatoes, vegetables, grapes and fruits, meat and milk, pork, poultry, mutton and wool. , animal feed, fur farming, beekeeping.

The first secretary of the Central Committee was true to the win-win-bureaucratic logic: if you want to solve a problem, create a special institution. Hence the direct consequence - to create a dozen chiefs and by this solve the problems of agriculture. Khrushchev sharply, almost insultingly criticized the then agricultural science, but, at the same time, called for an increase in the role of branch science focused on practical needs in the specialized departments he organized, and a reduction in the role of the party apparatus. In the second edition of this note, criticism is muted, although all the main provisions have been retained. A careful study of this note suggests that Khrushchev was preparing a new management reform that affected not only agriculture, but also other sectors of the economy. On July 20, 1964, at the Presidium of the Central Committee, it was decided to send Khrushchev's note to the localities in order to receive comments from there.

The Presidium of the Central Committee decided to hold a discussion of this note in November 1964. Another personnel shake-up was brewing. On the instructions of the Presidium of the Central Committee, D. Polyansky and V. Polyakov prepared in August 1964 a corresponding draft resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the management of agriculture in connection with the intensification and specialization of production" .

But this time the reform failed. The hunt for the main reformer began.

Information about the initial stage of the hunt for Khrushchev is based on the memoirs of the participants - A. N. Shelepin, V. E. Semichastny, N. G. Egorychev. They reported very important information, but it is difficult and impossible to hear the main thing from them: who, when and why decided to go over to "active actions" against Khrushchev. They unanimously call the main organizer of the "second secretary" - L. I. Brezhnev, and his main associate - N. V. Podgorny. In the memoirs of Semichastny, it was repeatedly reported that Brezhnev suggested that he, the chairman of the KGB, eliminate Khrushchev by using poison, a car or plane crash, and arrest him. But Semichastny, he said, rejected all these options. This version was also published in the book of the son of N. S. Khrushchev - S. N. Khrushchev.

This is one of those cases where historians are left with nothing but speculation. It is unlikely that any reliable and contemporary sources on this issue can be found. Although there are obvious contradictions in the memories of the participants who survived until it became possible to talk about the October 1964 plenum. Two people whose influence in the country was enormous - the chairman of the Party and State Control Committee Shelepin and the chairman of the KGB Semichastny tend to downplay their role in the preparation plenum. Both claimed that in July they were already openly speaking against Khrushchev.

Judging by some information, an extremely important role in the preparation of the conspiracy was played by the head of the department of administrative bodies of the Central Committee of the CPSU N. R. Mironov, who was directly connected with Shelepin and Semichastny, since by status he oversaw the army, state security agencies, the prosecutor's office, the judiciary and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the past, he was the secretary of the district committee of the party in Dnepropetrovsk, when Brezhnev was the secretary of the regional committee. Before being appointed to work in the Central Committee, he headed the KGB in Leningrad. Yegorychev, at that time the secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, recalls that it was Mironov who attracted him to participate in the conspiracy.

According to Shelepin, the plenum was prepared by Brezhnev and Podgorny. " Brezhnev and Podgorny talked with every member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, with every secretary of the Central Committee. They also held conversations with the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Union republics and other major organizations, up to the city committees. There was a conversation with Malinovsky, Kosygin. They also spoke to me. I agreed. The last impetus, the "call" for the convocation was a new note to Khrushchev, which he handed over before flying to Pitsunda on vacation, about the next reorganization - the division of management of the entire agricultural sector. . . "

The connection between the preparations for the overthrow of Khrushchev and the preparations for the plenum prepared by Khrushchev is quite obvious. More difficult with the role of Brezhnev. The same Shelepin, Semichastny, Yegorychev in every possible way emphasize Brezhnev's indecision, his desire to withdraw himself at the most critical moments. Shelepin was not embarrassed by the contradiction between the role he assigned to Brezhnev as the main conspirator and his obvious indecision: "Brezhnev showed cowardice - he left for the GDR. In his absence, they already spoke with Semichastny." Semichastny immediately began to significantly clarify his colleague: "Already on the eve of the celebration of Khrushchev's 70th birthday, there was talk that this could not be tolerated, that is, it was back in the spring of 1964. And I was among the first with whom they had a conversation ... ".

Beyond the information provided, the question remains: who conducted conversations with Shelepin and Semichastny with proposals to participate in a conspiracy against Khrushchev. Let me remind you that in the spring of 1964, Brezhnev was not "Second Secretary", but held the semi-decorative post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This assumption that behind the shadow of Brezhnev was hiding some other person - influential and decisive - is confirmed by Yegorychev's memoirs: "When Brezhnev was in the GDR - this is already on the eve of the Plenum - the official visit ended, but he still does not return. here. Went hunting. was instructed (by whom? - Auth.) call him there and say: "If you don't come, the Plenum will take place without you. Draw a conclusion from this." And then he immediately flew in."

The fact that the role of Brezhnev and Podgorny in the events connected with the removal of Khrushchev, in our opinion, is clearly exaggerated, is evidenced by simple chronological calculations: Brezhnev arrived from Berlin on October 11. Podgorny flew to Moscow from Chisinau, just before the meeting of the Presidium. Just because neither Brezhnev nor Podgorny was in Moscow immediately before the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee and before the plenum where Khrushchev was overthrown, they could not prepare a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee. But who cooked? Who could order the chairman of the KGB to call Brezhnev in Berlin and, in fact, threaten Brezhnev himself?

We believe that such a person was A. N. Shelepin, not a performer, but an organizer of the action to remove Khrushchev. The recent head of the KGB, he only strengthened his position in the leadership, becoming chairman of the Party-State Control Commission and actually subordinating the KGB, the army, and the party-state apparatus to himself. Such activity, as a rule, is always rewarded. Shelepin also received what he deserved, who was relatively soon removed from his post, and his Committee was reorganized and weakened. But in 1964, it was Shelepin who had the opportunity to become the true coordinator of the conspiracy and, in our opinion, became its central figure. And stories about the special villainous role of Brezhnev are most likely a way to ward off possible accusations in the future.

The members of the Presidium agreed in advance on the date of their meeting, which was to become the main link in the procedure for Khrushchev's removal from power. The deadlines were running out: the meeting was to be held before the November plenum, which could take place not only extremely, but extremely unpopular decisions to change the system of agricultural management, could achieve another change in the personal composition of the Presidium

On October 12, a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee was held. It was attended by members of the Presidium: G. I. Voronov, A. P. Kirilenko, A. N. Kosygin, N. V. Podgorny, D. S. Polyansky, M. A. Suslov, N. M. Shvernik, candidates for members of the Presidium - V. V. Grishin, L. N. Efremov, secretaries of the Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov, P. N. Demichev, L. F. Ilyichev, V. I. Polyakov, B. N. Ponomarev, A. P Rudakov, V. N. Titov, A. N. Shelepin. Leonid Brezhnev presided over the meeting. The meeting ended with the adoption of a resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee, which actually meant the beginning of the process of removing Khrushchev. However, the resolution was called quite innocently: "On the questions that have arisen about the upcoming Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the development of a long-term national economic plan for the new period."

Another thing is the content of this document.

The ruling reported; "1. In connection with the inquiries received by the Central Committee of the CPSU about the ambiguities that have arisen of a fundamental nature on the issues scheduled for discussion at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in November of this year, and in the development of a new five-year plan, recognize it as urgent and necessary to discuss them at the next meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee with the participation of Comrade Khrushchev.

Instruct tt. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov and Podgorny to contact Comrade Khrushchev by telephone and convey to him the present decision in order to hold a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee on October 13, 1964.

2. In view of the many ambiguities that arise in the localities according to Comrade Khrushchev’s note dated July 18, 1964 (Zh P1130) “On the management of agriculture in connection with the transition to the path of intensification”, sent to party organizations, and the confused instructions contained in it, withdraw the indicated note from the party organizations.

3. Taking into account the importance of the nature of the questions that have arisen and their forthcoming discussion, consider it expedient to summon to Moscow members of the CPSU Central Committee, candidates for membership in the CPSU Central Committee, and members of the Central Control Commission of the CPSU to report to the Plenum on the results of the discussion of issues at the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.

The question of the timing of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU to be decided in the presence of Comrade Khrushchev.

Khrushchev called. They called to Moscow. On the 13th, he flew to the capital and immediately went to the meeting of the Presidium, where everything was already prepared for the second act in this performance. Together with Khrushchev, A.I. Mikoyan flew in, who was resting with him in Pitsunda. Candidates for members of the Presidium also flew to Moscow for this meeting, the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties - Georgia - V.P. Mzhavanadze, Belarus - K.T. Mazurov, Uzbekistan - Sh.R. Rashidov, Ukraine - P.E. Shelest.

Judging by the memoirs of A. N. Shelepin, the meeting of the Presidium was led by Khrushchev. The meeting was well orchestrated, and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was assigned the role of an extra. Unfortunately, no verbatim record of this meeting of the Presidium has been identified and, possibly, does not exist. Shelepin was third or fourth. He sharply criticized Khrushchev's domestic and foreign policies. First of all, he got his activities in the management of agriculture. Recalling the past, Shelepin recalled his speech as follows: "The criticism of Khrushchev's agricultural policy, very reasoned, since I did not have fake data that the Central Statistical Service submitted, but true ones due to the fact that I was the Secretary of the Central Committee, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers - Chairman of the Committee of the Party - state control. This gave me great advantages over others in knowing the true state of things." (The italics are ours. Auth.).

Shelepin condemned Khrushchev for his proposal to divide the regional party committees into rural and industrial ones, describing it as "anti-Leninist", and even erroneous, since in addition to industry and agriculture there are also military men and students who do not fit into Khrushchev's division into rural and industrial; he criticized the first secretary of the Central Committee for the fact that personnel, military and political issues were never discussed in the Central Committee.

He pointed to the adventurism in Khrushchev's foreign policy, because of which our country stood on the brink of war three times (the Suez, Berlin and Caribbean crises). Shelepin was convinced that it was Khrushchev's fault that the Paris Summit Conference, which opened on May 16, 1960, was disrupted. At the very first meeting, Khrushchev sharply demanded that US President D. Eisenhower apologize for sending a spy plane into the airspace of the USSR. Eisehower did not apologize. The conference was cancelled. Khrushchev also got it for tactlessness in mixing state and family affairs - for awarding his son, Sergei, with the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the State Prize, for family trips abroad. I did not forget to recall how Khrushchev, by his own will, awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union not only to the President of Egypt, G. Nasser, but also, without prior agreement at all, Vice President of Egypt Amer.

According to Shelepin, Khrushchev was sharply criticized by other participants in the meeting. Mazurov spoke of forgetting theoretical work in the party, Kosygin - that Khrushchev replaced the Central Committee and the government with his notes. A few supporters of Khrushchev also got it - the agricultural department of Polyakov, the true author of the ill-fated note on improving the management of agriculture, Efremov, the first deputy of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the RSFSR. Khrushchev fought back. However, he was forced to sign a previously printed statement in which he asked to be relieved of the posts of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and First Secretary of the Central Committee "for health reasons."

Shelepin reproduced a speech at the Khrushchev Presidium. He said: "I'm not going to fight with you, and I can't." He apologized for being rude, said that he did not want to combine posts, "but you gave me these two posts!" will have to do." He disagreed with the assessment of his role in foreign policy, saying that he was proud of his role in the Suez and Berlin crises; the question of the deployment of missiles was discussed more than once. He expressed disagreement with criticism against the division of regional committees into rural and industrial ones. In fact, he did not agree with any of the accusations against him.

And in this most difficult situation, the 70-year-old Khrushchev was able to find the exact scale of what was happening, to give that assessment that turned his personal defeat into recognition of the victory of his main political course to change the situation in the CPSU. "I am now worried, but I am glad, because the period has come when members of the Presidium of the Central Committee began to control the activities of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and speak in full voice ... today's meeting of the Presidium is a victory for the party ... ". Khrushchev left defeated, but not defeated. The conspiracy, framed as a regular meeting of the Presidium, completely legitimate by the party, but immoral in essence, turned Khrushchev into a victim. And the victim in Russia often becomes a political legend, sympathetic and bears little resemblance to his real prototype.

The result of the meeting of the Presidium on October 13-14, 1964 was the adoption of a resolution stating that "as a result of Comrade Khrushchev's mistakes and wrong actions, violating the Leninist principles of collective leadership," an abnormal situation developed in the Presidium itself; that Khrushchev, having united the posts of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, began to get out of control of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The decision of the Presidium stated that "with the prevailing negative personal qualities as an employee, advanced age and deteriorating health, Comrade Khrushchev is not able to correct the mistakes made and non-party methods in work", Hence the conclusion: to accept Khrushchev's statement on the release from all party and state posts "due to advanced age and deteriorating health," to recognize it as inappropriate in the future to combine the posts of first secretary of the Central Committee and chairman of the Council of Ministers.

The resolution indicated that a plenum of the Central Committee was to be immediately convened. It is clear that it was possible to hold a meeting of the Presidium in two days and gather from all the republics, territories and regions of the Soviet Union only when enormous preparatory work had been carried out in advance.

On October 14, the plenum began its work. He was well rehearsed. In fact, the model for resolving organizational issues was used, which was used by Khrushchev himself against Marshal Zhukov in 1957. Brezhnev's short introductory speech, a detailed report of the "staff speaker" at such plenums - Suslov, which turned into an indictment against Khrushchev; Khrushchev himself did not speak at the plenum, the report was not discussed. Party extras - "voices from the hall" - said what they should have said: "Everything is clear. We propose not to open debate"; Brezhnev was elected first secretary of the Central Committee, Kosygin - chairman of the Council of Ministers; and with voices from the hall - "Long live our mighty Leninist party and its Central Committee" - the plenum finished its work.

Following the results of the plenum, a brief information was published in Pravda on October 16. More detailed information was sent to the regional and regional party committees. But there were no discussions. This time no "closed letters" were sent to ordinary communists. Experience in the mid 1950s was taken into account.

A month later, a new plenum of the Central Committee was held, at which the most odious decisions of Khrushchev were canceled. The division of party organizations into industrial and rural ones was eliminated, and the former territorial regional committees were restored.

Khrushchev's resignation demonstrated the victory of the course which was approved by Khrushchev himself: the course towards the autocracy of the party apparatus. The words, once said by Khrushchev in the summer of 1957, that the members of the Presidium were only servants of the plenum, were once again confirmed. The plenum - the highest link of the CPSU party apparatus - dismissed the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who interfered and complicated the life of this party apparatus with their actions. His successor was supposed to serve this apparatus, to guarantee its stability, continuity, the very impunity. This man was Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. Energetic young leaders - the same Shelepin - should have remained unclaimed. And so it happened.

Party Control Committee

Central Control Commission(abbreviated CCC) RCP (b), VKP (b), CPSU - the highest control body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1920-1934. and in 1990-1991. In 1920-1921. there was a single simply "Control Commission", which in 1921 was divided into the Central Committee (responsible for financial control) and the Central Control Commission (responsible for monitoring party discipline). According to the Charter, the composition of the Central Control Commission was elected by the Party Congress, members of the Central Control Commission could not be members of the Central Committee at the same time.

In 1934-1952. instead of the Central Control Commission there was Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in 1952-1990. - Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the CPSU. Unlike the former Central Control Commission, the composition of the CPC was not elected at the congress, but was approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU (in fact, by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU).

Until 1934, one of the authoritative members of the Politburo was appointed to the post of Chairman of the Central Control Commission for a period of 2-3 years (since membership in the Central Control Commission could not be combined with membership in the Central Committee). In 1934-1946. The Chairman of the CPC was part-time secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

At the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU in 1990, the CPC under the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Central Committee of the CPSU were merged into a single body - the Central Control Commission of the CPSU.

Leaders

In 1920-1923, the position of the head of the Central Control Commission did not exist; its activities at the all-Russian level were supervised by the People's Commissar of the RCT (JV Stalin).

Chairman of the Central Control Commission of the RCP (b) - VKP (b):

• Kuibyshev, Valerian Vladimirovich (1923-1926)
• Ordzhonikidze, Grigory Konstantinovich (1926-1930)
• Andreev, Andrey Andreevich (1930-1931)
• Rudzutak, Jan Ernestovich (1931-1934)

Chairman of the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks:

• Kaganovich, Lazar Moiseevich (1934-1935)
• Yezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich (1935-1939) (actually until 1938)
• Andreev, Andrey Andreevich (1939-1952)

Chairman of the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the CPSU:

• Shkiryatov, Matvey Fedorovich (1952-1954)
• position vacant (1954-1956)
• Shvernik, Nikolai Mikhailovich (1956-1966)
• Pelshe, Arvid Yanovich (1966-1983)
• Solomentsev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1983-1988)
• Pugo, Boris Karlovich (1988-1990)

Chairman of the Central Control Commission of the CPSU:

• Pugo, Boris Karlovich (1990-1991)
• Makhov, Evgeny Nikolaevich (1991)

• Its record-breaking membership (about 120 members) was elected at the 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1927. The Plenums of the Central Control Commission elected the Presidium of the Central Control Commission.

• On October 10, 1990, the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the CPSU was elected. It included G. G. Veselkov, A. I. Grienko, E. A. Eliseev, M. I. Kodin, N. I. Korablev, E. N. Makhov, B. K. Pugo, A. L. Radugin , P. P. Todorov.

Links

• S. A. Mesyats HISTORY OF THE HIGHEST BODIES OF THE CPSU

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See what the "Party Control Committee" is in other dictionaries:

Under the Central Committee of the CPSU (CPC), created in accordance with the Rules adopted by the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952, to replace the Party Control Commission (See Party Control Commission) under the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Organized by the Party Central Committee. The CCP will “a) verify compliance by members and candidates…

III.7.3.1. Party Control Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1934 - 91)- ⇑ III.7.3. CPSU and public organizations 1921 56 Central Control Commission (CCK) RCP (b). Aron Aleksandrovich Solts (secret 12/4/1921 07/6/1923). 07/06/1923 02/12/1934 merged with the bodies of the NK RKI of the USSR. Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich ... ... Rulers of the World

The Central Control Commission (abbreviated as CCC) of the RCP (b), VKP (b), CPSU is the highest control body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1920-1934. and in 1990 1991. In 1920 1921. there was a single simply "Control Commission", which ... Wikipedia

Under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (CPC), it was created by the 17th Party Congress (1934), which decided to transform the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (CPC) into a CPC elected by the Congress of the Party with an apparatus in the center and … … Great Soviet Encyclopedia

Under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (CPC) party organ. control, which existed since 1934 instead of the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b). In 1952 the CCP was reorganized into the Party Committee. control under the Central Committee of the CPSU, and in November. 1962 to the Party Commission under the Central Committee of the CPSU; simultaneously… … Soviet historical encyclopedia

This term has other meanings, see the State Security Committee. "KGB" request redirects here; see also other meanings. Check neutrality. The talk page should ... Wikipedia

USSR STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE (KGB)- one of the names of the party state body that performed the tasks of protecting the communist regime of Soviet Russia (USSR) from internal and external enemies. For these purposes, the KGB provided internal security and carried out foreign intelligence ... Legal Encyclopedia

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a single allied republican body of party and state control in the USSR, which existed from November 1962 to December 1965. Bodies of party state control were transformed into bodies ... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia

Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leader: Gennady Zyuganov Date of foundation: 1912 (RSDLP (b)) 1918 (RKP (b)) 1925 (VKP (b) ... Wikipedia

The request "Ministry of State Control of the USSR" is redirected here. This topic needs a separate article. Commission of the Soviet counter ... Wikipedia

Books

• Save the USSR Adaptation, Korolyuk M., Andrey Sokolov "hit", albeit of his own free will. . He made the first moves, and now both the KGB and the CIA are looking for him (he knows too, too much ...), as well as the Party Control Committee and personally "...

Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the CPSU (CPC), created in accordance with the Charter adopted by the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952, to replace Party Control Commissions under the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Organized by the Party Central Committee. The CPC "a) check the observance of party discipline by members and candidate members of the CPSU, hold accountable communists guilty of violating the Party Program and Charter, party and state discipline, as well as violators of party morality (deception of the party, dishonesty and insincerity before the party, slander, bureaucracy, everyday promiscuity, etc.); b) considers appeals against decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the union republics, territorial and regional committees of the party on expulsion from the party and party penalties” (Charter of the CPSU, 1972, p. 34).

The November plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1962) reorganized the entire system of control in the USSR. Was created Party and State Control Committee The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Party Commission under the Central Committee of the CPSU. The December plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1965) transformed the organs of party and state control into organs of people's control, the CPC was restored.

The CPC, strictly following VI Lenin's precepts on the purity of party ranks, analyzes issues related to strengthening party discipline and increasing the responsibility of communists for the implementation of party policy. In its work, the CPC observes the highest principle of party leadership - collectivity, which creates reliable guarantees for making correct, comprehensively considered, well-founded decisions. The most important decisions of the CPC on bringing to justice the Communists guilty of violating the Program and the Charter of the CPSU, party and state discipline, are published in the central organs of the party press. The CPC is led by a chairman; The committee consists of vice chairmen and CPC members. Since April 1966 A. Ya. Pel'she, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, has been chairman of the CPC.

L. K. Vinogradov.