Sn kovalev general designer of submarines. The ships will outlive me

Kovalev Sergey Nikitich (08/15/1919, Petrograd - 05/24/2011, St. Petersburg) - General Designer of Soviet strategic nuclear submarines. According to eight projects of Kovalev, 92 submarines were built.

Awards and titles: Twice Hero of Socialist Labor, Laureate of the Lenin and State Prizes of the USSR, Laureate of the State Prize of the Russian Federation, Full Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor.

(full text of the interview)

Following in the footsteps of Dr. Walter

Question: Sergey Nikitovich, tell us about your first submarine.

After the end of the war, as you know, all the armed forces of various directions, including rocket men, including us submariners, began to study the German experience. Well, you know, the German V-1, V-2, which were the prototype, the 1st prototype of our ballistic and cruise missiles ...

The Germans have been developing a submarine with a high underwater speed for a long time based on the idea of ​​engineer Walter. They built an experimental submarine of the 23rd series with a steam-gas turbine plant based on the idea of ​​Dr. Walter. The meaning of this installation is that hydrogen peroxide was used as an oxidizing agent. 80% hydrogen peroxide, which decomposed in a special chamber under the action of a catalyst into water with a large release of heat and oxygen. And it was not just water, it was superheated steam that entered the combustion chamber, where fuel was injected. This oxygen interacted with the fuel, and such a gas-vapor mixture was obtained. This mixture went to a high-speed turbine, and the turbine drove the propeller. Well, depending on the reserves of hydrogen peroxide, and there were about a hundred tons of them (I must say that the Kursk died from three tons of hydrogen peroxide, and we had a supply of hydrogen peroxide of 100 tons!), The submarine could develop speed , about 20 knots, within 6 hours. At the time, that was fantastic. Because, firstly, no diesel boat could give 20 knots, it gave at most, say, 10 knots and for no more than one hour. After that, the battery needed to be recharged. And here ... Of course, this was due to quite a lot of noise - the Germans understood this too. But the idea was that the hunters could track the submarine either on foot or at very low speeds so as not to have their own interference with the sonar station, so the submarine simply broke away from the hunters at high speed.

We were then engaged in "single engines". In our country and wartime, these are mainly engines associated with the operation of a diesel engine in a submerged position using liquid oxygen as an oxidizer. But this was the second direction in the creation of the so-called "single engines". Well, if the word “single engine” is completely suitable for a diesel engine, because it works both above water and under water, then a steam-gas turbine could also work above water, but it was useless. Therefore, it was the setting for such a forced underwater passage. And we built an experimental submarine of project 617. The chief designer of this submarine was Alexei Aleksandrovich Antipin, who was then the head of our bureau, and I was with him either as an assistant, or as a deputy, but in practice it was I who led the design of this submarine.

In 1947 we were in Germany, in the city of Blankenburg, in the foothills, about 250 kilometers from Berlin. So, there was a German bureau "Glukauw", where the projects of the submarine of the 26th series were developed. The Germans have already designed such a combat submarine under the number 26. The 26th series of boats, however, unfortunately, or fortunately, was not built. Some employees stayed, many fled to the West, but, nevertheless, we organized there, as it were, a Soviet-German design bureau, where, basically, we restored, so to speak, what the Germans had done. They didn’t design their own boat, the main goal there was to recreate this same combined-cycle turbine plant and some of what the Germans did on a submarine. Some German ideas related not only to the combined cycle turbine plant, but also to the submarine as a whole, we also, in general, used in our country. For example, "Achterschnebel" is such a counter-propeller that created a skewed flow of water to the propeller. But seriously speaking, we made our submarine unlike the German one. We also had big discussions on this topic: whether it is necessary to copy the German project or not. I was a supporter of what is not necessary. And this point of view then prevailed, and our submarine was fundamentally different from the German one, and with the preservation of the traditions that we have and existed in submarine shipbuilding. And for the steam-gas turbine plant based on Sudomekh, which is now part of the USC, we have created a full-scale stand. A storage facility for one hundred tons of hydrogen peroxide was created, which at that time was very risky both technically and politically. Because they looked at us, which means that we don’t want to blow up Vasilyevsky Island. Subsequently, the turbine plant worked out at the stand was transferred to a submarine and was successfully operated on it.

Question: Were the former allies interested in using combined-cycle turbines in submarines?

The Americans, however, did not build anything like this, and the British built as many as two submarines: the Explorer and the Excaliber. But the British brought Dr. Walter himself, and his deputy, Dr. Stateshny, worked for us. Then we brought the Germans to Leningrad, but we used them badly. If we say in America, Von Braun headed the missile direction and was in fact the main designer there, so to speak, like Korolev, then we used the Germans, in general, in our practical work on the submarine, and even on the installation, we used badly. We kept everything a terrible secret from them. For some reason, they drove to Sudomekh, almost blindfolded, in a car with curtained windows. Well, they thought like this: “Kovalev, is your submarine ready there already?” Well, I say: “What are you, what are you, what are you ...” That's why we used them later as memoirs, and this is no longer work. Well, we have grown up specialists who are quite well managed with this installation, they also understand the physical processes that take place there and, so to speak, have learned how to manage it. Very good were midshipmen, naval. The turbinist Smirnov, the electrician Karkotsky, who managed well, so to speak. And on them, in general, the control of this very installation was kept. And then, when already when Zhukov became Minister of Defense, they pressed the maintenance of midshipmen, they quit. Well, then we had difficulties with management, because the midshipman knew how, but the officers did not.

Question: And what is the fate of this project?

This submarine has been in service for many years. In the 56th year it was transferred to the Navy, we sailed a lot on it, and in a submerged position. And her fate was tragic, because hydrogen peroxide is very capricious in relation to any pollution. And the loading of hydrogen peroxide was carried out through fittings that were brought out onto the deck, and apparently, when hydrogen peroxide was loaded, some kind of pollution was introduced there. And there was such a case that in a submerged position there was an explosion in this hydrogen peroxide pipeline, a fire broke out in the compartment, it was under water, however, but we managed to surface. Simonov was the commander of the submarine.

Well, then work on nuclear installations began, and therefore the direction of single engines, so to speak, lost its relevance.

Question: Is what has been developed in the development of submarines with hydrogen peroxide engines relevant today?

Actual. Today, as you know, we are building not only nuclear, but also diesel submarines. And this shortcoming, so to speak, of a rechargeable battery, its limited capacity, is physics. You can't get away from her. The latest silver-zinc batteries were the most efficient, but still these are batteries with a limited capacity, so if, say, the speed there is about 20 knots on a diesel boat, then it will still be for no more than an hour. And then a long battery charging cycle. Therefore, today the issue is very relevant. Today we need to act differently. It is necessary to have oxygen, say, in a liquid state, for hydrogen there are various other options: either hydrogen in a bound state, or with the production of hydrogen directly on a submarine in various ways, or fuel, or with aluminum powder, or something else -then. In general, there are different options. In this electrochemical installation, in which an electric current is generated directly when hydrogen and oxygen are combined, without mechanics, it means that nothing is spinning, nothing is spinning, but simply hydrogen-oxygen is combined and we remove the electric current. This is relevant, we have such studies. Abroad, these installations are being introduced, they exist on submarines, but for some reason our Ministry of Defense, for the time being, does not pay much attention to this and these works are not funded yet. Well, much in our state is not clear why ...

First strategic

Question: Sergey Nikitovich, how did you come to design nuclear submarines?

I came to nuclear submarine shipbuilding because work on boats with Walther installations had stopped, and we did a lot of such projects, including project 643, it was supposed to be a two-shaft boat with a Voltaire installation, well, more advanced, with more armament. We had developed a technical design for such a submarine, well, as soon as the atomic era, so to speak, had already begun, these works were stopped. Well, I, it seems, was left out of work. And so I was assigned to deal with strategic nuclear submarines. The first generation of strategic nuclear submarines is project 658. The submarine was armed with 3 missiles of the D2 complex, launched from the surface. Well, royal liquid rockets, launched only from the surface. The nuclear power plant was also the so-called 1st generation, the one that was on the first submarines of the 627th project - these are nuclear multi-purpose submarines. With all its advantages and disadvantages. And the shortcomings were big, connected mainly with a very branched installation, with very long pipes of the primary circuit. And big pipes, and small ones. The meaning is this: there is a nuclear reactor, along the sides there are steam generators, which are equipped with a large number of pipes of the primary circuit, heat exchangers of the first office, which cooled the pumps of the primary circuit. Well, it was all built, made of stainless steel, which was also new. It was mainly ha18n10t, which was used for hydrogen peroxide on the 617 boat. Therefore, for nuclear submarines, stainless steel was originally used for the primary circuit. But, unfortunately, it let us down a lot, because such steel has a tendency to so-called intercrystalline chloride stress corrosion. This means that despite the fact that the first circuit is bidistilled, that is, twice as if distilled water, there are still chlorides there, and under certain conditions they settle in some places. The pipes are stressed, and that's where these very chlorides fall out, this very crystal-like corrosion occurs there.

The famous accident on the first submarine of the 658th project was due to the fact that a thin tube of the primary circuit burst. The boat also claimed human lives and, so to speak, received the nickname Hiroshima. There was only one way out: replace stainless steel with titanium. But we didn't have a titan. Special titanium production facilities were created, several variants of titanium alloys were created for certain purposes. When they switched to titanium, the very branched nuclear installation of the first generation began to work properly. This ill-fated Hiroshima sailed the most of the series of first-generation submarines and was decommissioned as the last of this series. She sailed 300 thousand miles on the surface, underwater, in general, for those times this is a record figure.

Question: And what, in general, is the role of titanium in underwater shipbuilding?

I believe that titanium saved nuclear power.

Question: Probably, the introduction of titanium was not easy?

Well, I have two reprimands from the minister. One reprimand for not using titanium for high pressure air cylinders, and a second reprimand for using titanium for high pressure air cylinders...

Question: And for cases?

Without the use of titanium, it is impossible to create deep-sea submarines. On such boats as the 705 project, the hulls were also titanium. From my point of view, they could have been made non-titanium, because there the depth of immersion is not so hot. And for such submarines as our "Komsomolets", which died with a kilometer diving depth, it can no longer be made from titanium. Because then, even if it is made of very high-strength steel, then the weight of the case becomes such that there are not enough weights for everything else. Therefore, the production of titanium was a very serious epic, so to speak. And we used titanium very widely later and still use it for outboard water pipelines. Because copper pipelines, under the operating conditions that exist today and at the speeds that exist, they could not withstand the impact of outboard water. Copper alloys, bronze ones, also, in general, behave poorly, they do not rust, I have already said, they are also not suitable at all, but titanium pipelines, they turned out to be what we need. Therefore, we still use titanium in a fairly large amount today.

Our Prometheus was engaged in welding with us, including titanium. Now Academician Gorynin, the director of this very Prometheus. The Central Research Institute of the TS was engaged in - this is the institute of shipbuilding technologies, they mainly developed all kinds of welding machines. Academician Paton, who is now the president of the Ukrainian Academy and thanks to whom we have, so to speak, normal relations with Ukraine in terms of science, played a big role in his time.

He introduced various methods of welding steel, including electron beam welding, where the edges are cut, just two sheets of steel are connected to each other with a small, small gap, very accurate, and this smallest gap is welded with an electron beam. It turns out very high-quality welding without additional reinforcements, it practically turns out like a monolithic sheet after welding.

658 project - this is the first nuclear, strategic missile carrier. But this is not the first strategic submarine, because the testing of ballistic missiles and their use on submarines was carried out first on diesel submarines. First, by re-equipping submarines for experimental purposes, existing submarines, say 611 of the project, and then new projects were developed - the 629th project, these were diesel boats armed with ballistic missiles. Therefore, as it were, the predecessors in the development of missile systems and their implementation on a submarine were those who were involved in these projects. Nikolai Nikitich Isanin supervised these works. An outstanding academician, an outstanding shipbuilder, a very erudite person. I talked a lot with him, including going on business trips to Makeev in Miass together, discussing things there, and resolving issues together. Well, communication with him was very useful, because he was a wise, knowledgeable person, and, in general, very friendly. It seemed to me that he didn’t have such a thing: that this is mine and with some kind of fence to fence off his diocese from all others and not let him get close. On the contrary, he treated it, so to speak, with understanding, benevolently. He had diesel submarines, and he understood that I would have a nuclear boat, and he favored this in every possible way.

The first Project 658 nuclear-powered strategic submarine, as I said, was armed with three rackets, which stood at the wheelhouse fence. That is, they pierced the hull with a mine and loaded up to the height of the felling fence. The rocket on a special table was raised on the surface, held by grips, much like we see missile launches from land-based firing ranges today. And the flight range was not very long. It is clear that such a submarine, in general, has no great strategic importance. Therefore, a rocket of the so-called D4 complex with an underwater launch was developed. And all our submarines of the 658th project were converted according to the 658m project for this missile. This, of course, was already a big step forward. First, so to speak, the underwater launch itself was worked out. Again, testing went on in parallel on diesel submarines. A submarine of the 629th project was specially built, armed with these missiles. But the rocket also had many shortcomings. Firstly, a relatively short range and not great flight accuracy, and, secondly, the tightness of this rocket was also relative. Therefore, these poisonous components (and, unfortunately, nature made it so that the more effective the components, the more toxic, more explosive, more poisonous they are), they affected. But I also breathed enough of them.

Question: How did this happen?

Well, simply, a submarine - just like a car: you refuel with a gun, and it stinks all around. That's about it.

Emergency resurfacing: Yankees vs. America

Question: Sergey Nikitovich, tell us about the creation of Project 667A, which ironically received the call sign "Yankee" in NATO.

... The situation was such that, as you know, the Soviet Union was surrounded by air bases of the United States. Pershing missiles were deployed in Europe, which could, say, fly to Moscow in a matter of minutes. Well, ground-based missiles with such a long flight range, which could, so to speak, fly from continent to continent, were just beginning. In aviation, we did not have air supremacy.

There was an atomic bomb, and therefore a serious question was how to deliver this atomic bomb, so to speak, to the target. Very important in this regard, importance was assigned to submarines with ballistic missiles, which in a relatively short time would reach the target already on the territory of the United States. The task was to create submarines that could approach the enemy's shores at a not very close distance and produce a hidden salvo. For this purpose, the current Makeev Design Bureau, located in the city of Miass, was engaged in the development of naval missile systems. Makeev once worked with Korolev and they, in general, from scratch in the city of Miass created an institute and a very pretty city around it. Very good specialists worked there, enthusiasts in their field, and, in fact, it was a very strong center of underwater rocket science. Well, that's all, our missiles of the first, second and third generations were created there. Now a rocket for boats of the 4th generation is no longer being created at this institute, but is being created at the Institute of Thermal Engineering in Moscow, which is headed by Solomonov.

Well, now, the task was to create a submarine that could confidently approach the shores of the United States and create a rocket that would not have the disadvantages of liquid rockets associated with their low tightness, for the reason that in those days we had effective solid fuels did not have. And I must say that few people remember this now - for that 667A submarine, a solid-propellant missile of the complex, the so-called d7, was originally developed. Well, during the development of this rocket, they became convinced that on those solid fuels that were then, nothing good, so to speak, in terms of ensuring range and ensuring a sufficient transportable load does not work.

And then Makeev proposed a so-called ampoule rocket. Liquid rocket, but ampoule. The rocket was not refueled at technical positions, not on a submarine, like the first D2 rocket. There, the oxidizer was loaded at a technical position, and the fuel was refueled directly on the submarine. And this rocket, therefore, was refueled with both fuel and oxidizer directly at the construction plant and ampouled. Well, that's why, we were told that here is a tin can for you, and what's inside: compote or stew - this does not concern you. Here it is soldered, and that's it. Well, life, in general, did not turn out quite like that, but the idea was like that. In any case, the rocket at that time was very good.

There were a lot of such progressive technical solutions. Well, the so-called "recessed" engine. The engine was housed as if in a fuel tank. At the same time, the length of the rocket was significantly saved. Well, it turned out, in general, a compact rocket, with a fairly large flight range at that time of two and a half thousand kilometers. The weight of the rocket was 15 tons. Well, even then they even said that all subsequent missiles, they would, so to speak, develop on the basis of this missile and by, so to speak, improving it. But life has shown that this is not so. But, nevertheless, technical solutions, let's say, the same "recessed" engine, they have already been used on all subsequent missiles too.

When we were developing the submarine, both we and Makeev had competitors, including Chelomey who came up with his ideas. The fact is that everyone wanted to have a rocket with an even greater range. And for this it was necessary to have a missile acceptable for a submarine length. Well, there were enthusiasts who picked up these ideas. Let's say a submarine has a long missile in a horizontal shaft, which is then tilted in a vertical position before launch. Or even such proposals that a rocket consisting of separate, so to speak, modules, is assembled right then on a submarine. There were ideas of towing missiles behind a submarine, which then got up to the starting position ...

There were quite a lot of such proposals, and there were chief designers who, so to speak, seemed to peck at this matter. We Kassatzier made proposals for rotary shafts. In the bureau, this question was worked out quite seriously - how to make, so to speak, this very turning shaft. In TsKB18, in the current Malachite, the chief designer, Shulzhenko, also came up with his own project of a submarine, which was attractive because in terms of displacement it was smaller than the submarine, 667a, which we developed. Then the project was simply 667. Well, over this number 667, so to speak, many practiced in various, so to speak, styles. But, nevertheless, somehow the version that was developed by us and which was called 667a was adopted.

Well, in general, if this boat had been entrusted not to Kovalev, but to Pushkin, not to mention Isanin, or Kassatsier, then in the end they would also come, they would indulge, indulge - and in the end they would also came to the only possible solution, where, therefore, the mines are stationary and the missiles are placed in these same mines.

A serious issue was the issue of depreciation of the rocket, because the rocket, in general, must withstand an underwater atomic explosion. Initially, these removable shock absorbers were lever-spring. This was due to weight, with very large dimensions and required a large gap between the rockets and the walls of the mine, where this whole very complex, so to speak, system was located. This was mainly done by our missile technology bureau KBSM. But the issue was resolved easier when Makeev offered rubber shock absorbers. Then the gap between the mine and the rocket was reduced, and this system was greatly simplified. These shock absorbers could be placed both on the rocket and in the mine. This scheme, invented then, has survived to this day, we have not yet invented anything better.

Question: Was the possibility of creating a missile carrier based on Project 705 not considered at that time?

Firstly, the 705th was later than the 667A, and, secondly, it was, I would say, an obsession.

In general, I have a special attitude towards the 705 project, because then the slogan was rich that we were creating a comprehensively automated submarine. Well, including saving on everything, so they believed that the reactor was not a water reactor, but a reactor with a liquid-metal carrier. This means that it will have less weight and smaller dimensions, and therefore a submarine can be made with a smaller displacement. Then there was the so-called idea of ​​shadow protection. This means protection in the bow from the reactor, it ensures, so to speak, the normal functioning of the personnel, and protection in the stern from the reactor, it is already weaker, because there is no constant watch. Well, and so on. For example, mechanisms: it was believed that what was worked out at the stand would not require maintenance on a submarine. Therefore, it means that special access is not needed there, and so on. It was not very clear why the same technique, in the same factories, on the same machines, from the same materials, for some makes a mechanism that requires maintenance, and for others it makes a mechanism that does not require. Well, in general, life has shown that, firstly, these submarines were built for an incredibly long time, worked out for an incredibly long time, and they didn’t play a practical role. Because, as multi-purpose submarines, they were later surpassed by boats of the 971st project, the chief designer Georgy Nikolayevich Chernyshov. These were real combat submarines, the level of automation there was no less than on the 705 project. Therefore, the 705 project was, in general, such an expensive experiment.

And titanium was used there, so to speak, to train the mind. It was good but very expensive. Well, among other things, there was such an obsession that this 705 project would be a base submarine, and all other boats for all other purposes, both with cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, would be built on the basis of these 705. But, these are such fantastic ideas .

Question: Sergey Nikitovich, how did you, a young designer, manage to win in all these discussions? Was there enough authority?

Well, in those days we weren't Heroes at all. Makeev was the first to become a Hero. Well, I ask him: “Viktor Petrovich, he received the title of hero, how is all this?” And he says: “You know, girls look better, but you have to pay more!” And I had very good business relations with Makeev.

Q: How did this affect your work?

They had a very correct, serious tool - this is the so-called Council of Chief, General Designers, which I regularly visited with our specialists, and not only Makeev was there, but the deputies were excellent, very strong. There was such a specialist in control systems, Boxar, who kept all the algorithms in his head. There were many, many such people who covered this very program and the control system of the missile complex, literally, how to say. Today, such specialists are already, perhaps, not to be found! Therefore, the bureau was very strong. And, of course, our questions somehow intersected on the ship. It was interesting to us that the rockets were somewhere smaller, so that the operating conditions would be better.

But with all the liquid-propellant rockets, well, there seemed to be a loud statement that this, then, is a sealed tin can and that's it. Well, then there were questions. Well, okay, but if, nevertheless, a micro-leak appears in this tin can, maybe. Well, is it technological, or, so to speak, will a hole appear there for some reason? Well, what should be done with it? So you need to irrigate the rocket, and if you irrigate it, then this very acid, diluted in water, it becomes even more aggressive, and it will make this hole even larger. And then, it means that there will be more spillage of the oxidizer into the mine, something needs to be done, the danger exists. Then let's make a system for pumping the oxidizer overboard. That is, in general, this rocket has acquired a huge number of such safety systems. And irrigation, and pumping, well, gas analysis, of course, which means that it smells there - it doesn’t smell. Therefore, despite the fact that it is ampulized, life has shown that, unfortunately, the systems had to be used in practice, and there were cases of rocket explosions in the mine.

- Question: Tell me, if possible,

In Kamchatka, they lost a hydrogen bomb there, then the fishermen found it for a barrel of alcohol. The fleet then used all the technical means that the fleet had, including underwater vehicles, television, in general, they did not find a damn thing. The fishermen were given a barrel of alcohol, they threw a net and pulled out this bomb.

Question: What about the accident on the K-219?

The 219th boat was lost, again due to a rocket explosion in the mine.

Q: There are different versions of this tragedy...

Unfortunately, the rocket was leaking in the base. The commander of the BCH-2 was there, as far as I know, he was not competent enough in these matters, and the experienced midshipman Chipizhenko was such, who, in general, knew that the rocket was whining. And to say that you can’t go to sea because the rocket is out of order - it’s kind of like combat patrols are disrupted through your own fault. Well, he decided that he would run a hose from the shaft into the latrine and pump out the water. Well, the commander of the BCH-5 went and said: “What stinks so much, and is there some kind of hose hanging out?” Well, that's when this thing showed up. That is why it happened...

- Question: Why didn't the Leningrad Arsenal's solid-propellant rocket launch?

Project 667A submarines were created. The first two submarines, the lead, 420 and the first serial 421, entered the fleet in the 67th year. And 34 of these boats were built, and it must be considered the beginning of the existence of naval strategic weapons, as already real, so to speak, this type of naval strategic nuclear forces - this is the 667th A. What you said here, here is the Leningrad "Arsenal", the main designer Tyurin, - created a solid-propellant rocket, which was put on one of the submarines of the 67th project. Well, in general, I liked it, it is, so to speak, a rocket compared to a liquid rocket, it is really much easier and much better to operate. But the trouble is that she was already at the limit of what she could in range. When the boats of the 667th project were created, the Americans realized that, in general, we are, so to speak, crushing them with this type of weapon, so to speak.

Question: Tell me, is the work of a designer associated with risk?

Well, there was a well-known case on the lead boat 667BDR when we crashed into a stone ridge on the White Sea at a depth of 200 meters at a speed of 20 knots. And it was fun there. The navigator approached me and asked that an underwater reverse be made - to check the navigation, how it would feel on the underwater reverse. I say: “Okay, we’ll do such an operation!” And left. It was about 5 pm - I went to the cabin, because all the time before that we were doing some kind of test. I’m lying in a cabin, and suddenly, our boat went like cobblestones! It's a very similar feeling when reversing from full forward. It's the same vibration. I think, bastards, they asked me to give a reverse, but they didn’t warn me that a reverse was given. I ran out into the corridor to swear at the central post, and at that time the same thing happened again, the same ride on cobblestones. Well, then I realized that this is no longer a reverse, but something else. That after two minutes there is no reverse.

It turned out that there is supposedly an analysis (and we were at a depth of 200 meters, which means at 20 knots) that, supposedly, there is a stone ridge not marked on the maps. And when I left (and commander Zhukov was there, he also changed), and the commander’s backup remained in the central post, as it turned out, even without independent access to management. And in my presence they reported to him under the keel a meter. So his reaction is to check the echo sounder! Half a meter under the keel, check the echo sounder! And somehow I calmly left the central post ...

I’m still executing myself, why didn’t I pay attention to this. It turned out that it was not the echo sounder, but it turned out that this was a stone ridge, into which we crashed!

Gave emergency blowing. I think to myself: “Damn, they will now forget about this very tuning blowing system of mine, which we specially worked out before, and now we will again have adventures when reaching the surface. And the delivery mechanic Pavlyuk did not forget about this very system. So, they blew into the superstructure. And we literally rovnenko, like a bayonet, jumped to the surface without any heel, without any trim. Well, the nose was turned.

Underwater Guinness

941st project. Well, despite the fact that a huge advantage of liquid components is their high efficiency, and therefore, during the entire second generation we managed to have missiles in terms of efficiency no worse than American ones in acceptable weights and dimensions, but this is their unpleasant property, associated with the toxicity of these components, there is nowhere to go from it.

Therefore, there were these same cases in the Far East, which you are talking about, and here with K-219. There were other troubles associated with the need to pump the oxidizer overboard. Therefore, the question arose very sharply that, in the end, to have our own domestic solid-propellant missile, which would not be inferior to the new Trident missiles that were being developed in the United States. So, at the 26th Party Congress, where I was a delegate, Brezhnev in his report said that the Americans were creating a new maritime system with Trident missiles, the lead submarine Ohio. We offered them to abandon this, so to speak, idea, so as not to start a new branch of the arms race. But the Americans did not agree with us, so we have no other choice but to create a new system in our country that would not be inferior to the American one.

We need to create a new missile in our country that is not inferior to the Trident missile, and, accordingly, a new submarine that could accommodate a large number of missiles - not 16. In my opinion, the Americans had 24, and initially we also had in mind 24. Therefore, in 1973, such a Government Decree was adopted on the development of a rocket, the development of a submarine. The Americans did this about a year earlier than we did. The d19 rocket was developed. This missile was in no way inferior to the Trident missiles: neither in flight range, nor in combat equipment (each missile carried 10 warheads), well, it was inferior to American missiles in terms of weight and dimensions. If American missiles were there 40-something tons, then our rocket was raked under 100 tons. But this can be explained objectively by the fact that, firstly, we did not have such experience with solid fuels, and therefore new components of solid fuels were created, institutes worked there for this purpose, but nevertheless, our solid fuels were still inferior in terms of efficiency of American solid fuels, and secondly, our structural materials, they were also to some extent inferior to American ones. Let's say the same Kevlar thread that the Americans had, here's a carbon thread, but the Americans had more stable qualities in terms of strength than, say, our thread, and the Americans' electronics were lighter than ours. Therefore, all this accumulated little by little and led to the fact that our rocket, having equal efficiency, had such huge, huge weights and dimensions.

Question: And how was the carrier created?

There were no such missile boats at all. We also made a project for 24 missiles. How to place 24 huge missiles on a submarine? Well, the only acceptable option turned out to be this option (we sucked it for a long time, did not immediately accept it), where the rocket is not traditionally placed inside the hull, but the shafts are located between two parallel strong hulls, so to speak, outside the hulls. Well, there are some difficulties associated with laying the cable, connected with supplying air there to inflate the rocket tanks, creating a microclimate in these mines, in general, the difficulties were very great. This was exactly what confused me, so I had a bad idea of ​​​​how we would be able to cope with this matter. Well, in fact, we had great adventures there. Therefore, such a submarine appeared, of a completely original architectural type. True, then Gorshkov said instead of 24 to make 20 missiles so that more could be built. Well, we didn’t reduce the boat, we have those 4, so to speak, places for missiles, remained as reserve ones and now we use them for tanks, for better balancing of the submarine, say in the periscope position and so on.

6 such submarines were built. I must say that this architecture turned out to be very successful, because in terms of reliability, survivability, this submarine is of a completely different class in relation to submarines of ordinary architecture.

In fact, we have two buildings, each of which has an autonomous power plant. And here we had a practical case, there was a fire, the cable of the turbogenerators in the turbine compartment caught fire. Typically, in a submarine, a compartment fire cuts the submarine in two. Aft of this fire, locked uninhabited compartments. There's nowhere to go, they can't get through the compartment. Well, here is a completely different situation. It is possible, through another building, to evacuate a compartment, personnel from this compartment, on the contrary, it is possible to send personnel there to fight for survivability, to fight this very thing, with a fire. That is, both bulkheads can be approached to the compartment.

Well, in terms of combat survivability, in terms of unsinkability, this boat has no analogues. On a boat of traditional architecture, such qualities, in principle, cannot be achieved, which were achieved on this boat. Well, not to mention the fact that life support and habitation conditions are completely different there. Here they swim just like at home. Beauty, even better!

Question: And how did solid-propellant rockets prove themselves in operation?

These d19 missiles showed themselves, in general, very well. Their development was lengthy, but, nevertheless, they showed themselves very well in operation, and we practically had very few failures in normal, so to speak, naval, combat firing. I don’t even remember that there were refusals, in my opinion there was never one at all. Well, it was meant that these submarines, well, like any submarines, will be put in for repairs, and will also be re-equipped with a d19 missile system, but UTTHA, the so-called improved tactics and technical characteristics.

Including there was an obsession that the rocket itself would pass through the ice, and for this, it means that engines must be installed there that would burn in the ice, which means a hole for this. Well, such a system was organized, although, so to speak, it did not go into action. But, nevertheless, in the ARS, in the “hat” on which the rocket hangs (the so-called ARS), such things were provided for there. Well, unfortunately, Viktor Petrovich had died by that time, and when we carried out three tests on the stand, three launches of this rocket, there were three explosions, right on the stand. Just because of pure sloppiness. I then called Velichko, the general designer, and I said: “Igor Ivanovich, don’t trust the military representatives, don’t trust the Quality Control Department, let your designers study this missile themselves and everyone should make sure that everything is done correctly in his part.”

And then it turned out that in this very ARS, which draws the rocket from the mine, holes were drilled, and the nozzles were not inserted at all. This led to an explosion, firstly, of those charges that were in this ars, and then, in fact, to the explosion of the entire rocket. For the same stupid reasons, there was a second explosion and a third.

It was already the beginning of the 90s, a lot had already changed, and then it was too expensive for the navy to maintain such a heavy large missile in production and operation. Therefore, the question arose: do we need to continue to follow the line of this most huge heavy rocket? Under the pressure, firstly, of these failures, secondly, under financial pressure, and thirdly, so to speak, Comrade Gorbachev had an ideology, as you remember, that we will defeat everyone not by force but by democracy, a decision was made to stop the rocket.

And the lead submarine 711 was already delivered to the plant for repairs, the first factory repair. At that time, inertia was still acting, and it was supposed to come out of repair somewhere in the 93rd year. In fact, funding was stopped, and therefore the boat was not out of repair in the 93rd year, but already in the 2000s. But, truth, repair was done very in large volume. Up to the point that even the turbine plant was replaced with a new one. Many mechanisms have been replaced, a new cable has been installed, including the trunk one.

The boat, in fact, came out of the repair as good as new. And it was decided to use this boat for testing the Bulova missile system. For this purpose, we showed the initiative and the initial decision was to hand over the boat to the fleet, having carried out sea tests of the missile from a submarine, and later to adapt it to the missile system. But then I came up with the fact that if, guys, we do this, then we will never hand over this boat at all. Therefore, if you adapt, then you need to now, while the boat is on the slipway. The director of the plant, Pashayev, supported this idea, and, in general, the plant, having no funding, and it cost about 500 million, did such a job.

We released the documentation, not yet having very precise and solid data from Solomonov, so to speak, on what the rocket will be like. And, nevertheless, at their own peril and risk, they released documentation on the alteration of the mine for new missiles. And the mine had to be put in a transitional glass. The aiming system has been redesigned. It means that the installation of all ship equipment of the missile system has been redone. Well, in fact, the 711 boat, it is ready to accept the entire missile system in full force, because nevertheless the mines have been redone and everything has been done so that, as soon as the ship equipment of the missile system is available, it can be put on submarine. Well, in the meantime, we are testing the rocket and we use two mines with telemetry equipment for this.

- Question: That is, Solomonov owes your 941 project the very opportunity to test the Bulova complex?

Yes, well, you see, it literally, so to speak, made us happy. Because if this boat did not exist, then there would be no place to test the Bulova missile system.

The standard scheme for testing the missile system is as follows. First, this is a submersible stand (Previously located in Balaklava near Sevastopol), then some experimental submarine is being converted in order to make a throw on the move, then tests from a ground stand, and only after that the rocket has a permit for a submarine . Well, after it has been carried out, n-th number of ground launches.

Well, that's not the case today. This means that there is no Balaklava, a ground stand, but it needs to be specially remade for this, there is no money for this either.

That is why we made, in general, a rather brave decision (many were afraid and doubted it) that the missile was tested directly from a submarine. And make a throw from a submarine at minimum speed. To do this, we have specially worked out a mode when a submarine, somewhere at a speed of 2 knots, is delayed and can fire a missile. Well, they decided that all types of missile tests should be carried out directly from the submarine. I was convinced that it was absolutely not dangerous for the submarine.

But there were doubts that the rocket would not leave the transport container. And it does not start from the mine, it starts from the transport container, in which it is loaded into the mine, and there the gaps are minimal. There were doubts that the rocket would warp, that it would touch the walls of this same container somewhere. Because the tests that were done in Miass, they showed that when a rocket leaves the rocket silo, it makes such complex pirouettes. But, nevertheless, how many of these launches we did, we were convinced that the launch of the rocket in the mine is absolutely perfect. She doesn't cling to anything. It leaves freely, goes into the air, having acceptable inclinations, the first stage engine starts. There were failures of such a technological plan. Therefore, many dramatize the situation that it doesn’t fly, it doesn’t fly. And where to go - she will fly.

Question: And what are the prospects for our surviving "Sharks"?

Now not one, but two boats are standing, 724th and 725th, this is the last and penultimate one. They are standing. First of all, they need to be repaired. Whatever they are used for, they need to be repaired. The current situation is as follows: firstly, there is no money for this repair, and secondly, there is nowhere to do it. Because the plant in Severodvinsk is trying to cope with the program that it has today. If you put this boat in Severodvinsk for repairs, then the fourth-generation boat program, which the plant is barely able to cope with, will fail. "Zvezdochka" is repairing the BDRM, well, it could probably put this boat in for repair, but there is no money for this yet. And we had various proposals for the use of these submarines as minelayers. I think the easiest option is to use them for cruise missiles. Well, such proposals are ours and design studies are in Moscow, but decisions on them have not yet been made.

Question: What design solutions from among those developed for your submarines were included in Rubin's new Borey missile carrier project?

First of all, I would say that our wealth of experience, which we have accumulated in the construction of second and third generation submarines, came into play. This is the main thing that is included. But there was an idea that the equipment should be unified, well, as it was before, for one generation the equipment is unified. Our Commander-in-Chief of the Navy strongly insisted on this. But if we began to act like this, then today we would be standing in line for "Ash" and it is not known when we would have something, most likely never.

Therefore, we did the right thing with the fact that the construction of these boats is carried out in such a way that we use the backlog that remains from the unfinished third-generation submarines: backlogs of hulls, backlogs of turbine installations, backlogs of the bow, stern, submarine of the RTM project, and the middle part submarine Antey 949th project. Our next boat will be entirely in Antey's hull. Such a case is ready-made, which can be used, of course, with large alterations. There is no need for a new one: there are backlogs of reactors, there are backlogs of turbines, therefore today they are provided with buildings and are provided with supplies of the main equipment. Well, the radio-electronic equipment is brand new. They said that we want to make a new boat out of old junk. This is not correct, because a body is a body. And we take the existing reactor, but we remake it to meet all the existing requirements for radiation safety, for noise. And the same thing - for the turbine installation. We also use it, but with certain equipment in terms of noise reduction. A lot of things have been done there, so although the old one has been touched, the technical content is already new. And the electronic equipment is brand new. Therefore, this boat is completely a 4th generation boat, but using the existing backlog. If we do not use this backlog in time, then, I repeat, today there would be no such boats. The lead boat was launched. It is already in Severodvinsk. This year we will go to sea.

Question: After the well-known events, there is a lot of talk about the safety of our submarines compared to a potential enemy...

You will get 24 percent security, it does not provide surface unsinkability according to our standards, they will get 13 percent. He has a single-hull boat, we have a double-hull boat, in general, it has nothing in common. Therefore, each, so to speak, has its own certain traditions. And even if we suddenly got all the American ones ... (we have more or less pictures, and if suddenly some intelligence officer brought us all the American drawings), then, frankly, they are of no use to us. And we would not repeat the American design, because in such a large structure (I understand that even atomic bombs could be reproduced at one time ...), then it is simply not possible to reproduce such a thing as a submarine! To do this, then, you need to have American industry, because what they can do, our industry cannot do, and vice versa. Therefore, our boat is our own, our national product.

St. Petersburg is a city of outstanding shipbuilders and artists. And one of them, Sergei Kovalev, a hereditary Petersburger, shared the fate of his fellow countrymen at literally every turn of the city's history.

On the morning of 1957, US President Eisenhower felt great. He still did not know anything, when suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, it struck: "Russians in space - a satellite." It was a shock. If a satellite is launched, then an atomic bomb can be launched. The Americans make a quick and unexpected decision to convert an almost finished nuclear-powered torpedo submarine into a missile submarine. The submarine was cut in half and a missile compartment inserted. She was named after America's first president, George Washington. The missile carrier was equipped with 16 underwater-launched Polaris solid-propellant missiles and sent to the coast of England in order to keep Moscow, Leningrad and other strategic cities at gunpoint from there.

There was nothing like it in the USSR. Very soon the time will come when the atomic muscles of the superpowers could be put to work. All that the councils had at that time was 5 submarines that could be needed by the time of the Caribbean crisis. The Americans also had 5 boats, but for missiles the score was 15 Soviet, against 80 American missiles. Moreover, the Americans were "on duty" off the coast of Great Britain under the cover of aviation and navy, and even fired from under the water. And in order to attack, Soviet submarines had to come closer to the shores of America, because the range of their missiles was only 650 km. Moreover, in order to fire, they had to appear on the surface of the water and conduct a long pre-launch preparation. But another problem was the reactor.

The low reliability of the reactor plant did not allow the command of the Soviet Navy to send nuclear submarines to the area of ​​the Cuban conflict, so diesel submarines patrolled. It became a lesson. Literally a year later, the submarines were remade, which began to launch missiles from under the water. But the missile power still remained 6 times less than the American one.

« Catch up and overtake”, - Khrushchev commanded and set unthinkably short deadlines by November 7, 1967. Sergey Nikitich Kovalev, whose father and grandfather served in the Navy, was appointed the chief designer of this task under the secret code "Navaga".

He was born on August 15, 1919 in Petrograd. He studied at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute, and then practiced at the Baltic Shipyard. During the war he survived the blockade. In 1943, while being evacuated in Przhevalsk, he graduated from the Nikolaev Shipbuilding Institute and was sent to TsKB-18 (now the Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering), where he worked as a senior designer. He participated in the creation of high-speed submarines of project 617 with a steam-gas turbine unit. During the tests, the first nuclear-powered missile carrier reached an underwater speed of 20 knots for the first time. Soon the new task of General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev fell upon him. There was no time for experiments, it was necessary to build everything at once.

The lead ship was laid down on November 4, 1964. There were 16 ballistic missile silos per boat, but there was a major problem. Sergei Kovalev designed the boat for a solid-propellant rocket, while Makeev's design bureau made only liquid-propellant rockets, which threatened with explosions, fires, and toxic hazards. In addition, they required the so-called "wet start", meaning the filling of the shaft with water before launch, which produced noise that made the boat a target. The solid-propellant rocket promised to be reliable and safe, and it was ordered to be made by the Arsenal design bureau.

However, later it turned out that the liquid rocket flies twice as far and this turned out to be decisive. was 30 percent complete when it was decided to install liquid rockets. I had to urgently make changes to the design of the submarine. The missile carrier was built at a frantic pace, there were not enough specialists, and the reason for this was a huge number of innovations, such as new reactor installations, a combat information-controlled system, a television compartment viewing system, and much more.

Finally, on July 9, 1967, under the leadership of chief designer Sergei Kovalev, the first cruiser entered sea trials. It was the "Anushka" submarine of project 667A. And already on November 5, the Soviet Navy, as promised, replenished the ship of a new class, which will later become the father of the family of all strategic submarines, and which will be created until the 90s. The submarine cruiser carried a destructive force equal to 100 Hiroshima. This forced the United States to abandon the dictator's policy towards the USSR.

5 years after the creation of strategic submarines, the Americans, as equals, signed the OSV-1 strategic offensive arms limitation treaty. It was a victory, both military and political. But from a scientific and technical point of view, the USSR had to make another breakthrough. The range of the new missiles was 2500 km, so the missile carriers had to go to the Atlantic to the US coast past Greenland and Iceland, where by that time the US Navy had installed sensitive underwater hydrophones that picked up the sounds of the sea.

Very soon, with the help of the most powerful computers, noise portraits of all Soviet submarines passing along this route were created. The system worked well. Immediately after the discovery of a domestic submarine, an American fighter submarine rushed towards it, ready to destroy the boat on the first order.

The new Soviet ones were good, except for the noise. In a hurry, they simply did not think about it. A lot of research has been done, everything that could produce noise has been studied, and yet they have managed to reduce the noise level by 30 times. This will make even the most sensitive hydrophones invisible.

Meanwhile, in the Urals, Makeev created sea-going intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Now Soviet submarines did not have to go to distant shores, overcoming the lines of anti-submarine defense. On the same boats, Sergei Kovalev was ahead of the Americans in speed. In 1990, 16 missiles were tested and fired in one salvo with an interval of 10 seconds each. Until now, no one in the world has repeated this.

For ten years, liquid rockets, with all their highest merits, have not become less dangerous, and still gave out a submarine before launch. There was a way out - the rocket must be transferred to solid fuel. Soon the design bureau developed a rocket, but with a weight of about 100 tons, which now had to be decided how to place it on a submarine. And the solution was found - it is necessary to create a catamaran boat, consisting of two hulls, and place 20 missiles between them.

In 1971, Sergey Nikitich Kovalev began designing and building the Typhoon Project 941 Akula nuclear submarine cruiser, armed with 20 solid-propellant ballistic missiles.

In the spring of 1981, the first Shark left the workshop of the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise. At this moment, the creator of Sergei Kovalev was frightened by the unknown and the question did not leave in his head: how would she behave? But the boat successfully passed state tests, and was put into service. It was . The hull length was 175 meters. The height of the building with a nine-story building. Sergei Kovalev was then 62 years old. According to this project, 6 were built, which became the basis of the nuclear power of the USSR at sea, as well as one of the decisive factors in ending the Cold War and establishing new political relations between the leading countries of the world.

In 1986, the era of glasnost and perestroika began, as well as the eve of the meeting between the USSR and the USA in Reykjavik. These days, on the last pages of the central newspapers, between sports and weather news, a small TASS message appeared. A nuclear submarine is in distress in the Atlantic Ocean. It was another liquid rocket accident - the aggressive component of rocket fuel spilled into the mine. The boat could not be saved. Another tragedy, another loss.

Makeev still improved his liquid-propellant rocket and achieved his goal by making a system unique in its characteristics and as safe as possible.

And Kovalev created for her a special submarine cruiser based on his beloved Anushka, the same boat that overtook and overtook the American George Washington class submarine. He completed work on the last boat for liquid rockets a year after the Shark's world triumph.

Makeev managed to see how his last brainchild was leaving for the sky and soon left himself - forever. And then the USSR was gone forever. Work on liquid rockets was finally closed. Many supplier enterprises suddenly found themselves abroad, the production of submarines practically ceased. Those were difficult times.

In order to survive, the Rubin Central Design Bureau began to design offshore oil and gas platforms, and here the talent of the designer Sergey Kovalev was needed, whose work was of interest overseas. Once it happened that the birthday of Sergei Nikitich coincided with the time of his business trip to the United States. The Americans knew who Kovalev was and presented him with a cake in the form of a submarine. Sergey Nikitich Kovalev never hoped to meet his birthday at the main point of his aiming.

In 2002, after reconstruction, the Akula submarine was launched with the name Dmitry Donskoy, and new boats are being built. Today, the 4th generation missile carriers "Yuri Dolgoruky" and "Alexander Nevsky" have already been built.

Of his 85 years, Sergei Kovalev devoted more than half a century to the navy. According to his eight projects (658, 658M, 667A, 667B, 667BD, 667BDR, 667BDRM), 92 submarines with a total displacement of about 900 thousand tons, armed with ballistic missiles, were built.

Soon, the outstanding talent of Sergei Kovalev, in addition to engineering and scientific activities, surprisingly generously manifested itself in painting. His work in this area clearly demonstrated the undoubted involvement of engineering work in art. But, unfortunately, the heart of a talented person Sergei Nikitich Kovalev stopped on February 25, 2011.

I think that many will agree with me, it was thanks to this submarine designer that the Soviet Union received the most powerful strategic deterrent weapon.

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Sergei Nikitich Kovalev(August 15, Petrograd - February 24, St. Petersburg) - General Designer of Soviet strategic nuclear submarines.

Sergei Nikitich Kovalev died in St. Petersburg at the age of 92. On the evening of February 24, 2011, he felt unwell. Relatives called an ambulance, death occurred on the way to the hospital.

On March 1, a civil memorial service was held at the Rubin Central Clinical Hospital of the Transport Ministry and a funeral service was held at St. Nicholas Cathedral. Kovalev was buried at the Red Cemetery in St. Petersburg.

Awards

honorary titles

• , - twice Hero of Socialist Labor
• July 7, 2003 - Honorary citizen of Severodvinsk

Orders and medals

Prizes

• - Lenin Prize - for managing the work on the creation of boats of project 658v.
• - State Prize of the USSR - for the management of work on the creation of ships of project 667BDR.
• - Prize named after A.N. Krylov of the Government of St. Petersburg - for a great contribution to the development of domestic shipbuilding and the strengthening of industry ties with the Russian Academy of Sciences.
• - State Prize of the Russian Federation - for the design, creation and development of three generations of nuclear submarine missile carriers.

Memory

Footnotes and sources

Write a review on the article "Kovalev, Sergey Nikitich"

Links

• on the official website of the Russian Academy of Sciences
• Denis Nizhegorodtsev.

An excerpt characterizing Kovalev, Sergey Nikitich

Creator of domestic submarines. Chief designer of the following boats:
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- SSBN project 658 / 658M;
- SSBN project 667A;
- SSBN project 667B;
- SSBN pr.667BD;
- SSBN project 667BDR;
- ;
- ;
- ;
Sergey Nikitich Kovalev - general designer of strategic nuclear submarines, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the Lenin and State Prizes of the USSR, laureate of the State Prize of the Russian Federation, full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, doctor of technical sciences, professor.

Born on August 15, 1919 in Petrograd. He studied at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute in 1937-1942.

In 1943, while being evacuated in the city of Przhevalsk, he graduated from the Nikolaev Shipbuilding Institute and was sent to TsKB-18 (now the Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering), where he worked as a designer, then as a senior designer. Between 1948 and 1958 as an assistant, then deputy and, finally, chief designer, he led the development and construction of a Project 617 submarine with a combined cycle gas turbine unit. During the tests of this submarine, for the first time, an underwater speed of 20 knots was achieved.

Since 1958, he headed the work on the creation of a nuclear submarine of project 658 armed with ballistic missiles, and since then he has been the Chief and then General Designer of all nuclear submarines and strategic submarine cruisers armed with ballistic missiles (projects 658, 658M, 667A, 667B, 667BD, 667BDR, 667BDRM).

In 1971, S.N. Kovalev began designing and building a Project 941 heavy nuclear submarine armed with 20 solid-propellant ballistic missiles. These submarines, the world's largest and most effective in terms of the power of their weapons, became the core of the naval component of Russia's nuclear forces, one of the decisive factors in ending the Cold War. A total of 92 submarines with a total displacement of about 900 thousand tons were built according to 8 projects by S.N. Kovalev.

Numerous scientific works of S.N. Kovalev in the field of design, theory of underwater shipbuilding and structural mechanics of ships, successful development of the most complex problems in the field of hydrodynamics and energy have become a significant contribution to domestic science and technology. Since 1973 - Doctor of Technical Sciences, since 1981 - full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, since 1984 - Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Leningrad Scientific Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Since 1983 - General Designer (the first General Designer in military shipbuilding).

The huge contribution of S.N. Kovalev in the development of domestic shipbuilding is highly appreciated by the state. For the development of new submarines, Sergei Nikitich was twice awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor (in 1963 and in 1974). The development of the 658M project in 1965 was awarded the Lenin Prize, and the 667BDR project in 1978 was awarded the USSR State Prize. He was awarded four Orders of Lenin (in 1963, in 1970, in 1974 and in 1984), the Order of the October Revolution (in 1979), the medal of the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, II degree (in 1999 .), the Order of Naval Merit (in 2003). Laureate of the State Prize of the Russian Federation (in 2007).

In 2010, S.N. Kovalev worked on the further development of the naval strategic weapons system - the construction of a series of Project 955 submarine missile carriers. -energy complex of our state. The unique experience of S.N. Kovalev helps to develop a new industry of offshore oil and gas production, which is important for Russia. The outstanding talent of Sergei Nikitich Kovalev, in addition to engineering and scientific fields of activity, is surprisingly generous in painting. His work in this area clearly demonstrated the undoubted involvement of engineering work in art. Passion for painting greatly expanded the possibilities of self-expression of the many-sided and bright personality of Sergei Nikitich Kovalev. The landscapes painted during the hours of rest brought him the well-deserved recognition of art lovers. S.N. Kovalev was an honorary member of the Union of Artists.

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