Battle at Prokhorovka station. Great Tank Battle

Exactly 70 years ago, in 1943, on the very same days when this note was written, one of the largest battles in the entire history of mankind was going on in the region of Kursk, Orel and Belgorod. The "Kursk Bulge", which ended in the complete victory of the Soviet troops, became the turning point of the Second World War. But the assessments of one of the most famous episodes of the battle - the tank battle near Prokhorovka - are so contradictory that it is very difficult to figure out who actually emerged victorious from it. They say that the real, objective history of any event is written not earlier than 50 years after it. The 70th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk is an excellent opportunity to find out what really happened near Prokhorovka.

The "Kursk Bulge" was a ledge on the front line about 200 km wide and up to 150 km deep, which was formed as a result of the winter campaign of 1942-1943. In mid-April, the German command developed an operation code-named "Citadel": it was planned to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in the Kursk region with simultaneous attacks from the north, in the Orel region, and from the south, from Belgorod. Further, the Germans were to advance again to the east.

It would seem that it is not so difficult to predict such plans: an attack from the north, an attack from the south, an envelopment in “pincers” ... In fact, the “Kursk Bulge” was not the only such ledge on the front line. In order for the German plans to be confirmed, it was necessary to use all the forces of Soviet intelligence, which this time turned out to be on top (there is even a beautiful version that all operational information was supplied to Moscow by Hitler's personal photographer). The main details of the German operation near Kursk were known long before it began. The Soviet command knew exactly the day and hour appointed for the German offensive.

Battle of Kursk Battle scheme.

They decided to meet the "guests" in an appropriate way: for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army built a powerful, deeply echeloned defense in the alleged directions of the enemy's main attacks. It was necessary to wear down the enemy in defensive battles, and then go on the counterattack (Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky are considered the main authors of this idea). The Soviet defense with an extensive network of trenches and minefields consisted of eight lines with a total depth of up to 300 kilometers. The numerical superiority was also on the side of the USSR: more than 1300 thousand personnel against 900 thousand of the Germans, 19 thousand guns and mortars against 10 thousand, 3400 tanks against 2700, 2172 aircraft against 2050. True, here we must take into account the fact that the German army received a significant "technical" replenishment: tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", assault guns "Ferdinand", Focke-Wulf fighters of new modifications, bombers "Junkers-87 D5". But the Soviet command had a certain advantage due to the favorable location of the troops: the Central and Voronezh fronts were supposed to repel the offensive, the troops of the Western, Bryansk and South-Western fronts could come to their aid if necessary, and another front was deployed in the rear - Stepnoy, the creation of which the Nazi commanders, as they later admitted in their memoirs, missed it completely.

The Junkers 87 bomber, modification D5, is one of the samples of new German technology near Kursk. Our aircraft received the nickname "lappet" for a non-retractable landing gear.

However, preparing to repel a blow is only half the battle. The second half is to prevent fatal miscalculations in combat conditions, when the situation is constantly changing and plans are being adjusted. To begin with, the Soviet command used a psychological technique. The Germans were to launch their offensive at 3 am on 5 July. However, at exactly this hour, a massive fire of Soviet artillery fell on their positions. Thus, already at the very beginning of the battle, the Nazi commanders received a signal that their plans had been revealed.

The first three days of the battle, for all their magnitude, can be described quite briefly: the German troops were bogged down in a dense Soviet defense. On the northern face of the "Kursk Bulge", at the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 kilometers in the direction of Olkhovatka. But on July 9 the situation changed. Having decided that it was enough to hit the wall with their foreheads, the Germans (first of all, the commander of Army Group South E. von Manstein) tried to concentrate all their forces in one, southern direction. And here the German offensive was stopped after a large-scale tank battle at Prokhorovka, which I will consider in detail.

The battle, perhaps, is unique in its own way in that the points of view on it among modern historians differ literally in everything. From the recognition of the unconditional victory of the Red Army (the version entrenched in Soviet textbooks) to talk about the complete defeat by the Germans of the 5th Guards Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov. As proof of the latter thesis, the figures of the losses of Soviet tanks are usually cited, as well as the fact that the general himself almost fell under the tribunal for these losses. However, the position of the "defeatists" also cannot be accepted unconditionally for several reasons.

General Pavel Rotmistrov - Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

Firstly, the battle near Prokhorovka is often considered by supporters of the "defeatist" version outside the general strategic situation. But the period from July 8 to 12 was the time of the most intense fighting on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. The main goal of the German offensive was the city of Oboyan - this important strategic point made it possible to combine the forces of Army Group South and the 9th German Army advancing in the north. To prevent a breakthrough, the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. Vatutin concentrated a large tank grouping on the right flank of the enemy. If the Nazis had immediately tried to break through to Oboyan, Soviet tanks would have hit them from the Prokhorovka area to the flank and rear. Realizing this, the commander of the 4th German tank army Goth decided to first take Prokhorovka, and then continue moving north.

Secondly, the very name “battle of Prokhorovka” is not entirely correct. The fighting on July 12 took place not only directly near this village, but also to the north and south of it. It is the clashes of tank armadas along the entire width of the front that make it possible to more or less objectively assess the results of the day. It is also not difficult to trace where the promoted (in modern terms) name "Prokhorovka" came from. It began to appear on the pages of Russian historical literature in the 1950s, when Nikita Khrushchev became the General Secretary of the CPSU, who - what a coincidence! - in July 1943 he was on the southern face of the Kursk ledge as a member of the military council of the Voronezh Front. It is not surprising that Nikita Sergeevich needed vivid descriptions of the victories of the Soviet troops in this area.

Scheme of a tank battle near Prokhorovka. The three main German divisions are designated by abbreviations: "MG", "AG" and "R".

But back to the fighting on July 10-12. By the 12th, the operational situation at Prokhorovka was extremely tense. The Germans had no more than two kilometers to the village itself - it was one thing to attack decisively. If they managed to take Prokhorovka and gain a foothold in it, part of the tank corps could calmly turn north and break through to Oboyan. Over the two fronts - Central and Voronezh - in this case, there would be a real threat of encirclement. Vatutin had at his disposal the last significant reserve - the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov, which numbered about 850 vehicles (tanks and self-propelled artillery guns). The Germans had three tank divisions, which included a total of 211 tanks and self-propelled guns. But, assessing the balance of power, it must be borne in mind that the Nazis were armed with the latest heavy Tigers, as well as modernized fourth Panzers (Pz-IV) with enhanced armor protection. The main strength of the Soviet tank corps was the legendary "thirty-four" (T-34) - excellent medium tanks, but for all their merits, they could not compete on equal terms with heavy equipment. In addition, Nazi tanks could fire over long distances, had better optics and, accordingly, firing accuracy. Taking into account all these factors, Rotmistrov's advantage was very insignificant.

The heavy tank "Tiger" is the main strike unit of the German tank forces near Kursk.

However, one cannot write off several mistakes made by Soviet generals. The first was made by Vatutin himself. Having set the task of advancing on the Germans, at the last moment he moved the time of the offensive from 10 am to 8.30. The question of the quality of reconnaissance involuntarily arises: the Germans stood in position in the morning and themselves waited for the order to attack (as it became known later, it was scheduled for 9.00), and their anti-tank artillery was deployed in battle formation in case of Soviet counterattacks. To deliver a preemptive strike in such a situation was a suicidal decision, which was shown by the further course of the battle. Surely Vatutin, if he had been accurately informed about the German location, would have preferred to wait for the Nazis to attack.

The second mistake behind the “authorship” of P.A. Rotmistrov himself concerns the use of T-70 light tanks (120 vehicles in two corps of the 5th Guards Army, which launched a morning attack). Under Prokhorovka, the T-70s were in the forefront and were especially hard hit by the fire of German tanks and artillery. The roots of this mistake are quite unexpectedly found in the Soviet military doctrine of the late 1930s: it was believed that light tanks were intended primarily for “reconnaissance in force”, while medium and heavy tanks were intended for a decisive strike. The Germans, on the other hand, acted exactly the opposite: their heavy wedges broke through the defenses, and light tanks and infantry followed, “clearing” the territory. Undoubtedly, to Kursk, the Soviet generals were familiar with the tactics of the Nazis in detail. What made Rotmistrov make such a strange decision is a mystery. Perhaps he was counting on the effect of surprise and hoped to crush the enemy with numbers, but, as I wrote above, a surprise attack did not work.

What actually happened near Prokhorovka, and why did Rotmistrov barely manage to avoid the tribunal? At 8.30 in the morning, Soviet tanks began to attack the Germans, who were in good positions. In parallel, an air battle ensued, where, apparently, neither side gained the upper hand. The first ranks of Rotmistrov's two tank corps were shot by fascist tanks and artillery. Closer to noon, in the course of violent attacks, part of the vehicles broke through to the positions of the Nazis, but failed to push the enemy. After waiting for the offensive impulse of Rotmistrov's army to dry up, the Germans themselves went on the attack, and ... It would seem that they should have easily won the battle, but no!

General view of the battlefield near Prokhorovka.

Speaking about the actions of the Soviet military leaders, it should be noted that they competently disposed of the reserves. On the southern sector of the front, the SS Reich division advanced only a couple of kilometers and was stopped mainly due to anti-tank artillery fire with the support of ground attack aircraft. The division "Adolf Hitler", exhausted by the attacks of the Soviet troops, remained in the same place. To the north of Prokhorovka, the “Dead Head” tank division was operating, which, according to German reports, did not meet Soviet troops at all that day, but for some reason it only covered 5 kilometers! This is an unrealistically small figure, and we can rightfully assume that the delay of the "Dead Head" is on the "conscience" of Soviet tanks. Moreover, it was in this area that a reserve of 150 tanks of the 5th and 1st Guards Tank Armies remained.

And one more thing: the failure in the morning clash near Prokhorovka in no way detracts from the merits of the Soviet tankers. The crews of tanks fought to the last shell, showing miracles of courage, and sometimes purely Russian ingenuity. Rotmistrov himself recalled (and it is unlikely that he invented such a vivid episode) how the commander of one of the platoons, Lieutenant Bondarenko, on whom two “tigers” were moving, managed to hide his tank behind a burning German car. The Germans decided that Bondarenko's tank had been hit, turned around, and one of the "tigers" immediately received a shell in the side.

Attack of the Soviet "thirty-fours" with the support of the infantry.

The losses of the 5th Guards Army that day amounted to 343 tanks. The Germans, according to modern historians, lost up to 70 vehicles. However, here we are talking only about irretrievable losses. Soviet troops could pull up reserves and send damaged tanks for repairs. The Germans, who had to advance at all costs, did not have such an opportunity.

How to evaluate the results of the battle at Prokhorovka? From a tactical point of view, and also taking into account the ratio of losses - a draw, or even a minor victory for the Germans. However, if you look at the strategic map, it is obvious that the Soviet tankers were able to complete the main task - to slow down the German offensive. July 12 was a turning point in the Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel failed, and on the same day, a counter-offensive of the Red Army began north of Orel. The second stage of the battle (Operation Kutuzov, primarily by the forces of the Bryansk and Western fronts) was successful for the Soviet troops: by the end of July, the enemy was driven back to their original positions, and already in August the Red Army liberated Orel and Kharkov. The military power of Germany was finally broken, which predetermined the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War

Broken Nazi equipment near Kursk ..

Curious fact. It would be unfair not to give the floor to one of the initiators of the Soviet operation near Kursk, so I give the version of the events of Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov: “In his memoirs, the former commander of the 5th tank army, P. A. Rotmistrov, writes that the decisive role in the defeat of the armored forces armies "South" was played by the 5th Panzer Army. This is immodest and not entirely true. The troops of the 6th and 7th Guards and 1st Tank Armies, supported by the artillery of the reserve of the High Command and the air army during the fierce battles of July 4-12, bled and exhausted the enemy. The 5th Panzer Army was already dealing with an extremely weakened grouping of German troops, which had lost faith in the possibility of a successful fight against the Soviet troops.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov.

The tank battle near Prokhorovka (took place on July 12, 1943), as an episode of the Battle of Kursk during the operation "Citadel" by the German troops. It is considered one of the largest battles in military history using armored vehicles (?). On July 10, faced with stubborn resistance in their movement to Oboyan, the Germans changed the direction of the main attack on the Prokhorovka railway station, 36 km southeast of Oboyan.

The outcome of this battle is still hotly debated today. The amount of equipment and the scale of the operation are being called into question, which, according to the versions of individual historians, were exaggerated by Soviet propaganda.

Side forces

The main participants in the tank battle near Prokhorovka were the 5th Panzer Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov, and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, commanded by SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser.

According to one version, the 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th tank army, which attacked the positions of the Germans, included 190 medium tanks T-34, 120 light T-70, 18 English heavy Mk-4 "Churchill" and 20 self-propelled artillery mounts (ACS) - a total of 348 combat vehicles.

On the part of the Germans, historians give a figure of 311 tanks, although in the official Soviet historiography there is a figure of 350 only destroyed enemy armored vehicles. But modern historians speak of a clear overestimation of this figure, in their opinion, only about 300 tanks could take part from the German side. It was here that the Germans first used telewedges.

Approximate data in numbers: the II SS Panzer Corps had three motorized divisions. As of July 11, 1943, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler motorized division had 77 tanks and self-propelled guns in service. The motorized division of the SS "Dead Head" had 122 and the motorized division of the SS "Das Reich" had 95 tanks and self-propelled guns of all types. Total: 294 cars.

From documents that were declassified at the end of the 20th century, it can be assumed that about 1000 armored vehicles took part in the battle from both sides. This is approximately 670 Soviet and 330 German vehicles.

Not only tanks participated in this battle. Historians insist on the term armored forces, which also includes wheeled or tracked vehicles, motorcycles.

The course of the battle near Prokhorovka

July 10 - the attack on Prokhorovka began. Thanks to the very effective support of their attack aircraft, the Germans by the end of the day managed to capture an important defensive point - the Komsomolets state farm - and gain a foothold in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Krasny Oktyabr. The next day, German troops continued to push the Russians around the Storozhevoye farm and surrounded the units that defended the villages of Andreevka, Vasilievka and Mikhailovka.

Only 2 km remained before Prokhorovka without any serious fortifications. Realizing that Prokhorovka would be taken on July 12 and the Nazis would turn to Oboyan, having at the same time reached the rear of the 1st Tank Army, Nikolai Vatutin, the front commander, hoped only for a counterattack by the 5th Tank Army, which could turn the tide. There was practically no time left to prepare a counterattack. The troops had only a few hours of daylight and a short summer night to carry out the necessary regrouping and positioning of artillery. Moreover, both gunners and Rotmistrov's tanks experienced a shortage of ammunition.

Vatutin, at the last moment, decided to move the offensive time from 10.00 to 8.30. As he believed, this should have made it possible to preempt the Germans. In fact, this decision led to fatal consequences. German troops were also preparing for the attack scheduled for 0900. By the morning of July 12, their tanks were in their original positions, awaiting orders. Anti-tank artillery was deployed to repel a possible counterattack.

When the tanks of the Rotmistrov army moved into battle, they came under the destructive fire of artillery and tanks of the SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" prepared for battle. Already after the first minutes of the battle, dozens of medium Soviet tanks T-34 and light T-70 were blazing on the field.

Only at 12:00 did our tanks manage to approach the German positions, but they were subjected to a powerful air raid by attack aircraft armed with 37-mm cannons. Soviet tank crews, among whom were many untrained and almost the first time crews who entered the battle, fought heroically literally to the last shell. They were forced to fight under fatally accurate German fire and air attacks, without, for their part, proper support from aviation and artillery. They tried to shorten the distance, the tanks that broke through, having shot all the ammunition, went to ram, but the miracle did not happen.

In the afternoon, German troops launched a counterattack, concentrating their main efforts north of Prokhorovka, in the zone of the Totenkopf division. There they were opposed by about 150 tanks from Rotmistrov's army and the 1st Panzer Army. The Germans were able to stop mainly due to the excellent anti-tank artillery.

Losses

As for the losses, the greatest damage to our troops was inflicted by the artillery of the Germans. The number of equipment destroyed in the battle of Prokhorovka is very different in various sources. It is likely that the most plausible and documented figures are about 160 German cars; 360 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns.

And yet, the Soviet troops were able to slow down the German offensive.

The feast day of the holy apostles Peter and Paul, after whom the temple in Prokhorovka is named, falls on July 12 - the day of the legendary battle.

The Soviet T-34 tanks that participated in the battle had an advantage over all German tanks in speed and maneuverability. Because of what the Germans regularly used captured T-34s. In the battle of Prokhorovka, eight of these tanks took part in the SS Panzer Division Das Reich.

The Soviet T-34 tank commanded by Pyotr Skripnik was hit. The crew, having pulled out their commander, tried to take cover in the funnel. The tank was on fire. The Germans took notice of him. The German tank moved towards our tankers to crush them with caterpillars. Then the mechanic, saving his comrades, rushed from the saving shelter. He ran to his burning tank, and sent it to the German "Tiger". Both tanks exploded.

In Soviet times, there was a popular version that Soviet tanks were attacked by German Panthers. But according to the latest research, there were no Panthers at all in the battle of Prokhorov. And there were "Tigers" and .... "T-34", captured vehicles.

These three myths are among the most painful in war mythology. They have existed for a long time, actually since the war. In the post-war period, our military leaders, as well as party leaders, overdid it on these topics so seriously and on a large scale that God forbid! True, neither science nor public opinion has been brought closer to the truth. Until now, despite the fact that there are already excellent fundamental works on these issues based on 99% of archival documents, it is still impossible to dot all the “i” to the end. These myths are extremely controversial on any aspect, especially on the issue of tank losses. As a matter of fact, it is this - the problem of losses in these battles - that is the essence of myths, disputes around which reach the point of rabid and even turn into litigation. For example, the notorious Shakespeare scholar from the History of the Great Patriotic War, B. Sokolov, who was extremely “famous” for his, how to put it mildly, arch-tolerable “calculations” of various losses of the Red Army and other “near-scientific exploits”, has already been dragged to court for libel. Just on the issue of tank losses during the battle of Prokhorovka. So you can imagine the intensity of passions. And yet, as they say, he took up the tug, then if you please don’t say that it’s not hefty. And the only chance to prove it is to turn to the solid works of the most serious authors. Today there are two such authors - Lev Lopukhovsky and Valery Zamulin. Here to their works - respectively "Prokhorovka. Nonclassified"(M., 2007), as well as "Kursk fracture. The decisive battle of the Patriotic War"(M., 2007) and The Secret Battle of Kursk. Unknown documents testify"(M., 2007) - and let's turn. As noted above, all these myths, not to mention their "creators", are tightly fixated on the problem of losses. Well, the problem of losses, so the problem of losses. In war, unfortunately, there are no casualties.

"AND. V. Stalin, when he found out about our losses,- noted the Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov, who in 1943 commanded the 5th Guards Tank Army, - he was furious: after all, according to the Stavka plan, the tank army was intended to participate in the counteroffensive and was aimed at Kharkov. And here - again it is necessary to replenish it significantly. The Supreme Commander decided to remove me from my post and almost put me on trial. A. M. Vasilevsky told me this. He also reported in detail to I.V. Stalin the situation and conclusions about the disruption of the entire summer German offensive operation. I. V. Stalin calmed down somewhat and did not return to this issue again. And now, as it should be in the history of Russia, there are only two questions: 1. Why was Stalin so indignant? 2. Why did Stalin then calm down and not put Rotmistrov on trial?!

1. Few people know that with the results of the Battle of Kursk, especially the combat activities of the Voronezh Front, as well as the 5th Guards led by Rotmistrov. TA and the tank battle near Prokhorovka were examined by a special commission chaired by GKO member and Politburo Malenkov. The result of her work was hundreds of pages of various materials that are still stored in the highly secret Archive of the President of the Russian Federation and are not declassified, because it contains such a detailed analysis of the failed tactics and strategy that our generals demonstrated during the Battle of Kursk, especially near Prokhorovka, that , obviously, it is considered that it is better for these documents to lie in the archive for half a century. However, the general conclusion of that commission is nevertheless known: the fighting of the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of P. A. Rotmistrov on July 12, 1943 near Prokhorovka is characterized as "Sample of failed operation" . Not in the eyebrow, but right in the eye!

Is such an assessment objective? Did the commission go too far in its party zeal?! Not at all. Only on July 12, 1943, that is, on the main day of the tank battle near Prokhorovka, which, in fact, appears most of all in historical research, according to the highly professional calculations of L. Lopukhovsky, the irretrievable losses of the parties in armored vehicles on this day correlate approximately as 6: 1 not in favor of the 5th Guards. TA under the command of Rotmistrov. The ratio of irretrievable losses during the seven-day Prokhorov battle is 5: 1 . To put it simply, these figures can be stunned ...

According to the data of his respected colleague V. Zamulin, who even more unprecedentedly strictly relied only and exclusively on 642 units of armored vehicles of the 5th Guards. TA Rotmistrova (total in service on the indicated day in this army was 808 units armored vehicles), who took part in the fighting near Prokhorovka July 12, 1943, 340 fell into the category of losses. Of them 194 burned down, 146 hit. Losses - 53% of those who took part in the battle in just one day !

And now take a look at the table “Losses of the Voronezh Front in manpower, weapons and military equipment in the period from 5 to 22.07.43 according to various data” compiled by L. Lopukhovsky mainly on the basis of archival information:

Despite the more than strange unimaginable discrepancy even between the data of the front commander and the chief of his own staff, the figures indicate terrible losses. The fighting was extremely brutal. If, for example, we derive the arithmetic mean for tank losses based on the data of the front commander, his chief of staff and Manstein, it turns out that for the period indicated in the table title, Soviet troops lost on average 1586 tanks!

By the way, even before the official reports of the commanders, Stalin was already aware of the huge losses in tanks. On July 13, Marshal Vasilevsky reported to Stalin that he himself was personally convinced that the 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards. TA Rotmistrova lost "irretrievable and temporarily out of order up to 60% of tanks". By the way, it is curious that Vasilevsky was very close to the truth in this assessment, although it is inaccurate. According to esteemed colleague V. Zamulin, from 215 available to July, 12 in this corps of tanks in battle July, 12 199 tanks took part, and the losses amounted to 153 tanks, of which 103 burned down, 50 were knocked out, the total percentage of losses from those who took part in the battle was 77%.

So it should be quite clear that Stalin had something to soar in indignation at Rotmistrov. Naturally, the main conclusion of the Malenkov commission against such a background was all the more justified. However, not only against such a background, but in principle, it was more than justified. And here the author is literally physically forced to repeat what he already wrote when analyzing the myth about who is the best ace - German or Soviet tankers.

The main reason for the origin of the ratio indicated by a respected colleague L. Lopukhovsky is that the Wehrmacht tank troops had a much greater power of anti-tank artillery, which our generals by no means wanted to see, notice, and even more so take into account. And therefore, in the literal sense of the word, pearls on the unsuppressed or at least insufficiently suppressed enemy defense, not so much even saturated as - there is every reason to use such an expression - oversaturated anti-tank weapons. Furthermore. If necessary, during the battles, the Germans very competently and quickly switched to temporary defense, in which they effectively used the full power of both the anti-tank artillery of tank units and the power of the tank artillery itself, which in this case acted as anti-tank. Even during the fierce tank battles on the Kursk Bulge, for some reason, our generals did not want to accept this circumstance. And only on the fact of huge losses in the tank units, they were forced to admit it. The fact is that after the Battle of Kursk, the engineering services of the Red Army carefully examined all Soviet wrecked tanks and measured the diameter of the holes on them. It must be assumed that they did this at the direct suggestion of Stalin and the Malenkov commission - they got painfully thorough results. As a result, it was found that:

33.5% of the holes were left by 50mm shells from German anti-tank guns (possibly also guns of T-III tanks), 40.5% of holes were left by 75mm shells from German anti-tank guns (possibly also guns from T-IV and T-V tanks) and 26% of the holes were left by the 88-mm shell of the German anti-aircraft guns, which were successfully used in the Wehrmacht as anti-tank guns (possibly also the guns of the T-VI tanks).

There is nothing surprising in these figures. Dear colleague L. Lopukhovsky, in one of the notes in his wonderful book, pointed out that:

“... the maximum thickness of the armor of the T-34 tank, produced in 1942, the main type of tanks of the 5th Guards. TA was 65 mm. All four main samples of 75-mm and 88-mm anti-tank and tank guns of the German army with a barrel length of 48, 50, 70 and 71 caliber at a distance of 2 km with an anti-tank projectile at an angle of 60 degrees pierced the armor plate from 63 to 148 mm "!

Given the terrible losses in the tanks, there was nowhere to go, and the generals recognized this fact. Moreover, and you can’t refuse them this, they did this unpleasant thing for themselves quite objectively. Apologizing for the forced but much-needed re-quoting, I ask you to once again carefully read the excerpt from a letter dated August 20, 1943 by Rotmistrov himself addressed to Marshal Zhukov:

“... When the Germans, with their tank units, go on the defensive, at least temporarily, they thereby deprive us of our maneuvering advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the aiming range of their tank guns, being at the same time almost completely out of reach from our aimed tank fire ... Thus, in a collision with German tank units that have gone on the defensive, we, as a general rule, suffer huge losses in tanks and have no success.

That's right - that's exactly what happened!

But it would be better if he did not write such. To put it mildly, this should not have been trusted on paper at all. At least for reasons of their own authority. Especially when you yourself actually become the founding father of the whole myth. After all, whatever one may say, it was Rotmistrov who inflated the analyzed myths, especially about the tank battle near Prokhorovka (this will be discussed separately below). Meanwhile, manuscripts, as is known, not only do not burn, but also have an unpleasant for many, but programmed by History itself, the ability to autonomously "surface" to the surface with all the ensuing consequences for their authors! That is what happened in this case as well.

For what Rotmistrov wrote, in essence, is his voluntary written recognition (fortunately, not in Smersh) by him of the fact that the previous two-plus years of fierce battles with the Wehrmacht, including with its tank units, did not became a serious lesson for our command. Including for him personally! Simply put, it (including Rotmistrov himself) did not learn any lessons, although, at the direction of Stalin and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, both the GRU and the analytical unit of the General Staff continuously carried out a deep analysis of past battles and battles, constantly generalized the experience of fighting with the German troops and constantly sent their recommendations to the army in the field. And the effect is zero point tenths! And every time, as soon as the Germans switched to at least temporary defense, they simply began to shoot our tanks from distant positions! And during those battles, for the results of which Stalin almost brought Rotmistrov to justice, the attacks on the enemy were simply suicidal only because proper measures were not taken to maximally suppress the enemy’s defenses oversaturated with anti-tank weapons. Naturally, the Germans simply shot at Soviet tanks from a long distance - as in an exercise! Moreover, they then also had “tigers”, “panthers”, as well as “Ferdinands”.

2. Why did Stalin then calm down and not put Rotmistrov on trial?!

Let us turn to the purely professional opinion of a respected colleague L. Lopukhovsky. And let's start with his global assessment of the results of the Battle of Kursk, especially its first, defensive stage. It is in the depths of these results that the roots are hidden not only of Stalin's reassurance, but also of the just recognition of the Battle of Kursk as having finally broken the back of the Nazi beast, thus symbolizing the final radical change in the war.

So, “why, after all, despite all the mistakes and mistakes, did our troops manage to achieve ultimate success in the defensive operation? First of all, because the strategic leadership of the armed forces and the country turned out to be at its best. The balanced and well-thought-out decision to switch to deliberate defense fully justified itself. Having inflicted losses on the enemy, knocking out to a large extent his tanks and bringing reserves into battle, our troops launched a strategic counteroffensive, which developed into a general offensive along a front of up to 2 thousand kilometers.

Fundamentally fully agreeing with this conclusion, which is absolutely adequate to the historical realities, I cannot but pay attention to one circumstance. This balanced and well-thought-out decision to shift to a deliberate defense was based on impeccable intelligence information, which was provided in abundance by the top leadership of both Soviet foreign and Soviet military intelligence, as well as partisans and Smersh's off-front intelligence. Not to mention their initial contribution to the adoption of such a decision is simply unacceptable. Because intelligence in this case once again demonstrated the highest class, because the obtained information showed the entire process of the genesis of the German strategic plan associated with the Battle of Kursk, from its inception, detailed formation and final development up to setting specific goals. After all, data were established not only about the date, forces and planned specific actions of the German command, but also the further plans of the Reich High Command closely related to them. In particular, it was found that in case of success near Kursk, it was planned to launch a major offensive operation in the south in the general direction of Kupyansk (Operations Panther and Hawk), as well as in other directions north of the Kursk salient. Furthermore. It was found that the German command was planning, if successful, also a new attack on Leningrad. In short, their plans included defeating more than a quarter of the divisions of the Red Army and in fact carried out the defeat of the entire southern strategic wing of the Soviet front. So the decision is a decision, but we should not forget that neither Stalin, nor the Headquarters, nor the General Staff could have made such a decision if they did not have such exclusive intelligence information of a super-extra class.

It was intelligence that made it possible not only to make such a balanced and well-thought-out decision on deliberate defense, but, more importantly, to organize this deliberate defense itself, which now appears in many studies almost as a standard. For example, when analyzing the tragedy of June 22, 1941, they very often mention that “ideally, the formation of the grouping of Soviet troops near the western borders should have been the same as it was two years later in the Battle of Kursk. Then they created a defense in depth (eight defensive lanes to a depth of 300 km), which made it possible to repel the enemy offensive, bleed his troops, and then go on a decisive strategic offensive. But then, in 41st, it didn't work out". We have already talked enough about the tragedy of 1941 in the second volume of this five-volume book. So we will only talk about the defense on the Kursk Bulge.

On the Kursk Bulge, the general front line was 550 km, therefore, at the then chosen depth of defense in 300 km, an area in 165 thousand sq. km! On the Kursk Bulge, only rifle trenches and trenches for anti-tank rifles were opened 167 824! The length of the trenches and communications on the Kursk Bulge alone amounted to 8480 km. Command and observation posts on the Kursk Bulge were created 10 644 . Shelters and dugouts, respectively - 35 010 and 385 110! Wire barriers on the Kursk Bulge were delivered 1186 km. Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines on the Kursk Bulge were installed 1 275 000 pcs. Up to 300 thousand people workers and collective farmers. Not to mention that and 1 million 336 thousand people in the troops not only encouraged them with cheers. Not to mention the fact that the enormous forces of the Red Army are concentrated in advance on the Kursk salient. All this was provided by intelligence - with its pre-exclusive super-extra-class information.

As a result, in terms of its scope and intensity, the Kursk defensive operation, the first stage of the Battle of Kursk, was one of the largest battles not only of the Great Patriotic War, but of the Second World War as a whole. During the defensive battles, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts bled and then stopped the offensive of the Wehrmacht strike groups. Furthermore. Favorable conditions were created for the transition to a counteroffensive in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kursk directions. It was not only Hitler's plan to defeat the Soviet troops in the Kursk Salient that suffered a complete collapse - the entire plan of the Wehrmacht's summer campaign suffered an unconditional collapse. As General of the Army SM. Shtemenko, formulating certain provisions of the congratulatory order to the troops who defeated the enemy in the Battle of Kursk, Stalin specifically dictated the following insert: “Thus, the legend is exposed that the Germans always succeed in the offensive in the summer, and the Soviet troops are supposedly forced to retreat.” And then Stalin explained: “We must say this. The Nazis, led by Goebbels, after the winter defeat near Moscow, are constantly rushing around with this legend. And rightly so, what they said. Because, firstly, as it turned out later, already on July 19, 1943, a forced confession appeared in the combat diary of the OKW command: “Due to the strong offensive of the enemy, the further holding of the“ Citadel ”(code name for the Wehrmacht operation on the Kursk Bulge. - A.M.) does not seem possible". And Hitler was forced to stop Operation Citadel. Secondly, already in the post-war period, the same Manstein - the main opponent of our troops in the Battle of Kursk - admitted that "in the Battle of Kursk, where the troops advanced with a desperate determination to win or die ... the best parts of the German army died." After the Battle of Kursk, the strategic initiative on the Soviet-German front passed forever into the hands of the Soviet command, and the Nazis were forced to switch to defensive strategy and tactics.

So, it was the global victorious outcome of the Battle of Kursk that calmed Stalin, sharply weakening the intensity of his indignation at the actions of Rotmistrov, who, by the way, managed to provoke the wrath of the Supreme Commander twice in less than a year. The first time was during the Battle of Stalingrad, where his actions were also analyzed by the Malenkov commission. However, this is beyond the scope of our study.

And when Orel and Belgorod were liberated on August 5, Stalin, who had become rather cheerful, fell into an exceptionally benevolent mood and began to develop a system of salutes in honor of the victories of Soviet troops on the fronts of World War II. On the same day, the first of 363 salutes was fired during the war years.

However, it was precisely this victorious global outcome of the Battle of Kursk that gave rise to a chance for our generals to lacquer the course of this fierce battle, in which both sides suffered severe losses, so that in the end, either consciously or unconsciously, they managed to conceive the main outlines of the analyzed myths. . As L. Lopukhovsky notes:

“... in the post-war period, especially with the publication of the book by P. A. Rotmistrov “The Tank Battle of Prokhorovka” in 1960, the flow of praises to the tank army and its command intensified (this began on July 25 and 29, 1943 with articles in the newspaper "Red Star". - A.M.) and continued to grow with each anniversary of the Battle of Kursk. The funds of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense were closed. And Pavel Alekseevich, relying on his authority as Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces and Assistant Minister of Defense (1964–1968), formed a point of view on the events of July 12 near Prokhorovka, which, given the lack of information and the strict requirements of military censorship, was not so easy to criticize. At the same time, he tried to forget about the proceedings of the Malenkov commission, and about his more sober and adequate assessment of the events in a letter addressed to G.K. Zhukov, written on August 20, 1943. This is how myths and legends were created.

By the way, L. Lopukhovsky gives a very curious revelation of the myth about the tank battle near Prokhorovka:

“Here it is impossible not to quote the opinion of a person who devoted a lot of effort to the study of the Prokhorov battle. Retired Lieutenant Colonel V. N. Lebedev, a researcher at the Belgorod Museum of Local Lore, writes: “...by July 12, 1943, near Prokhorovka, the 5th Guards Tank Army destroyed 150 enemy tanks in three days, and not 400, as the commander of the 5th Army proclaimed th Guards. TA. Yes, and these battles were called at that time a counterattack, and then they began to be called an oncoming tank battle. But until July 12, every day of battle was more ferocious than Prokhorovka. How can you push back to the backyard? the events that took place in the Oboyan direction north of Belgorod, where the Nazis’ plan to break through on the southern flank of the arc was thwarted? After all, the fighters and commanders of the 6th Guards Army of General Chistyakov and the 1st Tank Army of General Katukov, together with other branches of the military, in the most severe battles, suffering huge losses and showing unprecedented heroism, blocked the Nazis from the road to Kursk! The press, radio and television reduced the success of the Soviet troops to the success of the 5th Guards. tank army "".

And, finally, about empty allegations about some kind of mistake, that is, about the alleged ignoring of the need for a preemptive strike on the Kursk Bulge, which would have helped to avoid huge losses. I will again turn to the purely professional opinion of a respected colleague Lopukhovsky:

“... In connection with the heavy losses in a defensive operation, the idea is sometimes expressed that it was better, using our superiority in forces, to forestall the enemy in going over to a strategic offensive and that going over to a deliberate defense was a mistake. It is easiest to give estimates now, when the consequences of a decision are known.

Supporters of preemptive strikes can only be advised to once again comprehensively analyze the situation that developed in the spring of 1943 in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. We must not forget that the Kursk ledge was formed not only as a result of the offensive of the Soviet troops, but also as a result of the failures of the Central Front and the defeat of the troops of the Voronezh. The Soviet military and political leadership had to take into account the enemy's ability to conduct successful large-scale operations. The Germans, just three weeks after the crushing defeat at Stalingrad, were able to launch a counteroffensive in the Donbass and in the Kharkov direction. Having thrown back the troops of the South-Western Front and the Left Wing of the Voronezh Fronts by 150-200 km, they again seized the strategic initiative, imposing their will on the Soviet command.

Our troops went on the defensive not due to a lack of forces and means, as was envisaged by the existing theoretical views on strategic defense, but deliberately, having superiority over the enemy ...

... It is impossible to reduce the matter only to the quantitative ratio in forces and means. Yes, the fronts received a large number of tanks and aircraft, but, as it turned out, they were inferior in quality to the German ones (“Alaverdi” generals - and what were they thinking, because intelligence, including military intelligence, continuously reported that the Germans were systematically modernizing their weapons and military equipment, develop new types, etc.? A.M.). Judging by the reports of numerous commissions that checked the tactical and special training of personnel and materiel of formations for combat operations, not all was well in this regard. All this had to be taken into account by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

Supporters of a preemptive strike usually confine themselves to general arguments about the advantage of the offensive over the defense. Indeed, only an offensive can achieve the final defeat of the enemy. But it was necessary to carefully consider what the transition to the offensive could give under the given concrete conditions. And above all, give answers to the questions - when, where and with what forces to attack? In April, the troops of the Voronezh Front had not yet had time to recover from the defeat. In May? But by this time they had not yet managed to accumulate stocks of material resources due to the same mudslide. Strategic reserves were not created either. And Manstein was already ready to attack. He, like other German generals, subsequently explained his defeat by the fact that Hitler, contrary to their proposals, postponed the offensive from May to July.

If in June, then where? On which strategic direction or on two at once? Is there enough strength? It may be enough to break through the tactical zone. Although the tenacity of the German troops in defense is known. After July 17, our troops, possessing a huge superiority in strength, experienced the strength of the resistance of the fairly battered enemy troops on the defensive. And what about the mobility and striking power of tank divisions, already ready for the offensive? How a clash with them in the operational depth would have ended can be judged by the events near Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka. On August 18, the enemy launched a counterattack on the 27th Army, pushing it back 24 km, and again captured Akhtyrka. On August 24, an entry appeared in the diary of the OKH headquarters: “In the area south of Akhtyrka, the remnants of the encircled enemy grouping were destroyed. At the same time, 299 tanks and 188 guns were captured, as well as 1,800 prisoners.

A small comment by A. B. Martirosyan.In his new book “Battles on the military-historical front”, Army General M. A. Gareev, referring to the German historian V. Adam, indicates that “seventeen German tank divisions, reinforced by 60-ton Tiger tanks and 70-ton self-propelled artillery installations "Ferdinand", launched an offensive on a front section of 70 kilometers. This means that one tank division accounted for four kilometers of the front! Nowhere else has the Wehrmacht concentrated so much offensive power in a limited space. .

Pay special attention to this fact. The fact is that, according to the charter of the tank troops of the Wehrmacht, they were supposed to go into the breakthrough for twice or two and a half times the width of the front. If we proceed from the average staffing of the Wehrmacht tank division before the start of such an important, in the opinion of the Nazi command, operation of 172 tanks, then 43 tanks per kilometer of the offensive front come out. And then there are also reinforced tanks. Well, what would happen to our troops if they foolishly stumbled on such a force? But do not forget that the Wehrmacht tank division was strong not only and not even so much with tanks, but with exceptionally competent and skillful use of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, and the latter knocked out tanks in defense no worse than purely anti-tank.

If all this is taken into account, it turns out that the supporters of a preemptive strike, either consciously or unconsciously, which is most likely passionately, are trying retrospectively to impose a terrible pogrom on the Red Army, like those that took place in June 1941?! What for?! Why so voluptuously desire the defeat of their own troops, especially in retrospect ?! Well, isn't it time to calm down?! If only because History does not tolerate the subjunctive mood...

In this regard, it is worth returning to Vatutin's considerations on the preparation of an offensive operation, expressed by him in a report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on June 21, 1943 - two weeks before the start of Operation Citadel:

“According to all available data, the enemy is apparently improving the defense of the area, preparing a second defensive line and understaffing its infantry and tank divisions to the state. The intentions of the enemy were not revealed. I assume that the enemy is currently waiting and he himself is afraid of our offensive.

At the end of the report, Vatutin outlines the needs of the front in material resources in the interests of conducting an offensive operation (very impressive numbers) and asks:

“... give an additional front: two combined arms armies, two tank armies, two separate tank corps, seven breakthrough tank regiments, two artillery corps, three 152-mm self-propelled artillery regiments, two anti-aircraft divisions, 1000 aircraft, of which 600 fighters and 400 attack aircraft and bombers, 1500 cars, 300 the Studebakers and 300 "jeeps"".

According to Vatutin's plan, the Southwestern Front was supposed to participate in the operation, which also had to be strengthened. He took 15 days to prepare for the operation. It was supposed to lead to the encirclement and defeat of 30 enemy divisions, including 10 tank divisions. But where to get so much manpower and resources? To be completely without strategic resources? The Stavka could not agree to this.

The option proposed by Vatutin to preempt the enemy in going over to the offensive with a main blow around the Sumy, Mirgorod, Poltava region (having a powerful grouping of Manstein’s troops on the flank, already ready for the offensive) would only play into the hands of the enemy. We already stepped on this rake in May 1942 in the area of ​​​​the Barvensky ledge.

The entire experience of the war shows that the combination of offensive and defense is an objective law of military art, which cannot be disregarded. In our opinion, the mistake was not that they switched to deliberate defense, but that they failed to use its advantages to the full.

This is, briefly, the more than difficult True Truth about the Battle of Kursk and the tank battle near Prokhorovka. However, under no circumstances will it be able to belittle the historically unprecedented greatness of the feat of our soldiers and officers, who, despite the losses suffered, managed to break the back of the Nazi beast. And if only for the sake of elementary respect for the memory of those who created this feat, it’s time for the myth-makers to shut up, and the existing negative in the history of not only this battle, but also in the history of the war in general, should be disassembled calmly and in professional circles of military historians, without arranging a PR show in the media with " sensational revelations of Stalinism. After all, you live, by no means gentlemen, only thanks to the feat of our ancestors, including those who fought and won on the Kursk Bulge!

Notes:

RGVA. F. 4. Op. 11. D. 74. L. 200–201.

Simonov K. M. Collected works: In 10 volumes, M., 1981, v. 5, p. 48–49.

Note by I. Pykhalov and A. Dyukov: Russian Archive: Great Patriotic War. T. 13 (2–2): Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, June 22, 1941 - 1942. M., TERRA, 19917, p. 156.

Lopukhovsky L. Prokhorovka. Nonclassified. M., 2007, p. 11, p. 11.

Lopukhovsky A. Prokhorovka. Nonclassified. M., 2007, p. 540–541. RGASPI. F. 83. Op. 1. D. 16. L. 61–65. Zamulin V.N. Prokhorov battle. Essay on the book “PROKHOROVKA - a look through decades. Book of memory of those killed in the battle of Prokhorovka in 1943. M., 2002, p. 320.

Zamulin V. Secret Battle of Kursk. Unknown documents testify. M., 2007, p. 770–771, Table No. 8. I cannot but draw the readers' attention to the fact that, in the literal sense, every figure, every line in this table is strictly documented by archival data. Just a fantastic confirmation of literally everything.

Mellentine F. Armored fist of the Wehrmacht. M., 1999, p. 202.

Hardly anyone of his contemporaries knows that the system of those salutes was really developed personally by Stalin. Moreover, despite the fact that it was very different from the established international rules, due to its exceptional harmony, clarity and logic, it was recognized without any reservations throughout the world. The marshals and generals of the Victory knew about this, but not one of them even hinted about it in his memoirs! Everyone mentions only the fact that Stalin made a decision to hold fireworks. Strange vow of silence...

Lopukhovsky A. Prokhorovka. Nonclassified. M., 2007, p. 567.

Ibid, p. 566 and also: Samsonov A. M. Know and remember. Face the truth. Letter from V. N. Lebedev. M., 1989, p. 170.

Lopukhovsky L. Prokhorovka. Nonclassified. M., 2007, p. 562.

Gareev M. A. Battles on the military-historical front. M., 2008, p. 322. Gareev refers to: Adam Wilhelm. Difficult decision, M., 1967, p. 398.

Lopukhovsky L. Prokhorovka. Nonclassified. M., 2007, p. 562, as well as TsAMORF.F. 16. Op. 1720. D. 14, L. 7–22.

Lopukhovsky A. Prokhorovka. Nonclassified. M., 2007, p. 560–563.

The State Military Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskoye Pole" was opened on the site of the legendary tank battle of the Great Patriotic War, which became the greatest battle of armor and shells in the history of mankind. About a thousand tanks and self-propelled guns converged here, on a relatively small area of ​​flat Central Russian land. And today, traces of those battles are found here every day: the earth is overflowing with burnt metal.

TANKS ROOMED ALONG THE FIELD ...

The Battle of Prokhorovka is considered one of the largest battles in military history involving the use of armored forces.

Prokhorovka would have remained an ordinary village in the Russian hinterland if there had not been an event here that some historians consider decisive in the entire Second World War.

On July 12, 1943, during the Battle of Kursk near Prokhorovka, the largest tank battle in the Second World War - and in the entire history of the world - was played out. Up to 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns participated on both sides.

In the history of the country, the Prokhorovka field is called the Third military field of Russia along with Kulikov and Borodino.

The battle of Prokhorov unfolded in the southern sector of the Kursk Bulge, where the German command decided to direct the main blow. The Germans threw the best forces into the offensive: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which included the elite divisions "Dead Head", "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and "Reich". An armored wedge consisting of up to 300 tanks and assault guns broke through two lines of fortifications of the Soviet troops and reached the third, which was created 10 km southwest of the Prokhorovka station (in parallel, other German units developed the offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge: west and east of the Prokhorovka direction , which created a threat to the environment - it was necessary to hurry).

On July 11, the enemy managed to break the defenses of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 183rd Rifle Division of the Red Army and approached the outskirts

Prokhorovka. At the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops stopped the Germans. A situation was created when the outcome of a grandiose battle was no longer decided by hours, but by minutes. The Soviet command decided to carry out a powerful counterattack and destroy the enemy troops that had penetrated the defenses. It was decided to strike on the morning of July 12 by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov (1901-1982). The army was reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps. In total - more than 700 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations of self-propelled guns.

At 08:30 on July 12, after a 15-minute artillery preparation, a counterattack was launched, after which the tank formations moved towards each other. The battle took place on a small - for such an incredible number of tanks and self-propelled guns - a territory from 3 to 8 km wide between the railway and the bend of the Psyol River.

The armor of Soviet tanks was not as powerful as that of the German ones, but they wedged into the battle formations of the German troops, gaining an advantage due to speed and maneuverability, and shot the enemy at close range into the side armor. Combat at short range deprived the Germans of the opportunity to use the advantage of powerful guns. As a result, the battle formations mixed up, and tank duels ensued.

Toward evening, the "Dead Head" division, having received the support of aviation and artillery, managed to break through the defenses of the Soviet rifle units. This was given to the Germans at the cost of huge losses, which weakened their combat capabilities. The offensive fizzled out.

On July 16, the German army stopped the attack and began to retreat towards Belgorod, the Soviet troops pursued the retreating.

The result of the tank battle near Prokhorovka was the failure of the German plan on the Kursk Bulge "Citadel" and significant losses in the tank forces of the German army. The tank battle near Prokhorovka was a prologue to the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk (July 5 - August 23, 1943), which became a turning point in the entire Second World War.

The State Military Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskoe Pole" is located in the north of the Belgorod region, near the source of the Psel River, and is an area with memorial structures and monuments, the main one is the Victory Monument "Belfry".

QUIET FIELD

There is silence over the Prokhorovka field, as befits in the place where thousands of soldiers fell. And it is hard to believe that relatively recently tank armies met here in a deadly battle.

On April 26, 1995, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the President of the Russian Federation signed the Decree "On the establishment of the State Military Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskoye Pole"" "in order to perpetuate the memory of those who died defending the Fatherland in the Battle of Kursk arc and in connection with the completion of the creation of the museum-memorial complex "Prokhorovka field"".

In 2010, a museum complex with a cultural and historical center "The Third Military Field of Russia" Prokhorovskoe Field "" was opened.

In the center of the square in front of the museum there is a sculptural and artistic composition “Tank battle near Prokhorovka. Ram". The composition is very emotional, as the veterans said, fully conveying the intensity of the battle.

On the square in front of the museum there is a Candle of Memory. At the entrance to the museum there are six stelae - a kind of stone book about the Battle of Kursk.

In the museum itself, in the center of the hall dedicated directly to the battle of Prokhorova, a genuine T-34 tank froze.

Fragments of Soviet and German defensive fortifications have been recreated behind the museum building: dugouts, trenches, trenches, communication passages, observation posts, artillery platforms and shelters for tanks. The museum forms a single architectural ensemble with the Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, built with public donations. The temple was opened in 1995 in memory of those killed near Prokhorovka and on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. The names of 7382 soldiers who died on this earth are inscribed on the walls of the temple.

On the annual Day of the Battle of Prokhorovka, divine services are held in the church of Peter and Paul in memory of the fallen soldiers.

The center of the museum complex is the Victory Monument "Belfry". It is a stylized old Russian belfry, which was set up two kilometers from the outskirts of Prokhorovka, at an altitude of 252.2, where the epicenter of the Prokhorovka tank battle was located. It was also opened on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War in 1995.

The walls of the Belfry are four white marble pylons separated from each other, symbolizing the four years of the war. In the upper part of the “Belfry”, on a copper plate, the words from the Bible in Church Slavonic are fixed: “No one has more sowing love, but who will lay down his life for his friends” (There is no greater love than to lay down life for your friends). The alarm bell of the "Belfry" sounds after 20 minutes - three times an hour: the first time - about the heroes of the Kulikovo field, the second - about the soldiers of Borodin, the third - in memory of the Prokhorov battle.

Near the Belfry, episodes of the beginning of the attack of a tank company of the 5th Guards Tank Army were recreated. Every year on July 12, on the day of the tank battle near Prokhorovka, a rally of thousands takes place near the Belfry. The urban-type settlement Prokhorovka, located next to the museum, has been known since the 17th century, although under different names. Currently - the administrative center of the Prokhorovsky district of the Belgorod region of Russia. This is a rather large settlement with a population of about 10 thousand people. and several industrial enterprises.

CURIOUS FACTS

■ In the old days, the settlement was called Ilyinskaya Sloboda after its founder, the Polish gentry Cyril Ilyinsky (Korchak). In the 1860s was renamed in honor of the reigning Emperor Alexander II in the village of Aleksandrovskoe. In the 1880s near the village, a line of the Kursk-Kharkov-Azov railway was laid and the Prokhorovka station was built, named after the railway engineer V. I. Prokhorov, who supervised the construction. Later, the village itself began to be called by the name of the station.

■ On the part of the German troops, medium tanks T-IV of modification G and H (hull armor thickness - 80 mm, towers - 50 mm), as well as heavy tanks T-VIE "Tiger" (hull armor thickness - 100 mm, towers - 110 mm). Both tanks were armed with long-barreled guns of 75 and 88 mm caliber, which pierced the armor of Soviet tanks almost anywhere at a distance of more than 500 m. The only exception was the heavy tank IS-2.

■ The Soviet T-34 tanks that took part in the battle had an advantage over all German tanks in terms of speed and maneuverability. And because of this, the Germans regularly used captured T-34s. In the battle of Prokhorovka, 8 such vehicles participated in the SS Panzer Division Das Reich.

■ In the battles near Prokhorovka on July 11, senior sergeant of the 2nd tank corps MF Borisov distinguished himself, knocking out seven enemy tanks from his gun and was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for this feat.

■ Externally, the building of the museum "The Third Military Field of Russia" resembles a semicircle (symbolizing the Kursk Bulge), the main facade of the building is made in the form of tank tracks, and the ends - in the form of tank armor.

■ The feast day of the holy apostles Peter and Paul, after whom the temple in Prokhorovka was named, falls on July 12, the day of the famous battle.

■ Belfry - in old Russian architecture - a building for hanging bells, usually located near the church. It can also denote a particularly memorable place.

■ At the foot of the Belfry there is a monument to the sculptor Vyacheslav Klykov (1939-2006), its main author. As conceived by the creators of the monument, the sculptor considers the result of his work.

ATTRACTION

■ Museum complex "The Third Military Field of Russia" (2010).
■ Victory Monument "Belfry" (1995).
■ Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul (1995).
■ Monument "Candle of Memory".
■ Sculptural composition "The Great Commanders of the Three Military Fields of Russia - Dmitry Donskoy, Mikhail Kutuzov, Georgy Zhukov" (2008).
■ Exhibition of armored vehicles of the Great Patriotic War.
■ Bell of the Unity of the Slavic Peoples (2000).
■ Monument to the sculptor Vyacheslav Klykov, the main author of the Belfry.

NUMBERS

The forces of the participants in the battle of Prokhorovka: USSR (5th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov) - 699 (according to other data 714) tanks and 21 self-propelled guns, Germany (2nd tank corps of SS Oberstgruppen Fuhrer Paul Hausser) - 232 tanks and 70 self-propelled guns .
Losses of the parties: the USSR - about 300 tanks and self-propelled guns, Germany - about 100 tanks and assault guns.
The forces of the parties in the Battle of Kursk: USSR - about 2 million people, about 5000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 3500 aircraft, up to 30 thousand guns and mortars, Germany - about 850 thousand people, more than 2500 tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 2000 aircraft and up to 8000 guns.
Museum complex "Third military field of Russia": total area - 5000 m2.
The total number of museum exhibits: around 20,000.
Monument of Victory "Belfry": height - 59 m, the weight of the alarm bell - 3.5 tons, the height of the domed figure of the Virgin on the top of the Belfry - 7 m.
Distance: 56 km from Belgorod.

Atlas. The whole world is in your hands №282

After five days of defensive battles south of Kursk, the command of the Voronezh Front reported to the Headquarters that the German offensive was running out of steam and the time had come to move on to active operations.

In the evening, the command of the Voronezh Front received an order from the Headquarters to conduct a counterattack against a large group of German searchers. Accumulated in the Mal. Beacons, Ozerovsky. To conduct a counterattack, the front was reinforced by two armies, the 5th Guards, under the command of A. Zhadov, and the 5th Guards Tank, under the command of P. Rotmistrov. transferred from the Steppe Front. The plan for the counterattack, developed at the headquarters of the Voronezh Front with the participation of the representative of the Stavka A. Vasilevsky VI, the commanders of the armies, was as follows. The main core of the 5th Guards Tank Army, reinforced by two breakthrough tank regiments, with the support of two self-propelled artillery regiments and a regiment of guards rocket launchers and all available assault aircraft, was supposed to cut in two the SS tank corps, whose forces seemed to have dried up in previous laziness. At the same time, it was planned to reach the Pokrovka-Yakovlevo line. then turn to the East and West, cutting off the retreat routes for the German troops and encircling the resolvable groups with the assistance of units of the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 2nd Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.

However, the preparation of a counterattack, which began on July 10-11, was thwarted by the Germans, who themselves inflicted powerful blows on our defense in this section of the bottom. One - in the direction of Oboyan, and the second - to Prokhorovka. The first strike, according to the Germans, was more of a distraction, and yet, its strength and surprise led to the fact that some units of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies retreated 1-2 km in the direction of Oboyan.

In different sectors, an offensive began in the direction of Prokhorovka, when the II battalion of the SS tank regiment "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" (LSSAH), together with the III battalion under the command of I. Peiper, captured a height of 252.2, dominating the Teterevino-Prokhorovka road. After 10 minutes, the "Tigers" company of the "Dead Head" (Totenkopf) division began to force the Psel River, trying to expand the bridgehead between the villages of Krasny Oktyabr and Mikhailovka.

Southwest of Prokhorovka in the direction of the village. Yasnaya Polyana led the offensive of the SS division "Das Reich" (Das Reich). Due to the sudden unorganized withdrawal of some infantry units of the 5th Guards Army and the 2nd Tank Corps, the artillery preparation of the Soviet counteroffensive, which began on July 10, was disrupted. Many batteries were left without infantry cover and suffered losses both in deployment positions and on the move. The front was in a very difficult position.

Only the rapid entry into battle of the 42nd Infantry Division, as well as the transfer of all available artillery to direct fire, made it possible to stop the advance of German tanks.

The Kempf group consisted of the 6th and 19th tank divisions, which included about 180 tanks, which were opposed by 100 domestic tanks. On the night of July 11, the Germans launched a surprise attack from the Melehovo region to the north and northwest in order to break through to Prokhorovka. The infantry units of the 9th Guards and 305th Rifle Divisions, which were defending in this direction, did not expect such a powerful blow, withdrew. To cover the exposed section of the front, on the night of July 11-12, 10 IPTABr were transferred from the Stanki reserve. In addition, the 1510th IPTAP and a separate PTR battalion were involved in this area. These forces, together with the infantry units of the 35th Guards Rifle Corps, did not allow the development of the offensive in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka. In this area, the Germans managed to break through only to the Sev River. Donets near Novo-Oskonnoe.

July 12, 1943. Decisive day.

Opponents' plans for the decisive day.

The commander of the SS Panzer Corps, Paul Hausser, assigned the following tasks to his three divisions:

LSSAH - bypass the village. Watchtower from the north and go to the line of Petrovka - st. Prokhorovka. at the same time strengthening their positions at a height of 252.2.

Das Reich - push back the opposing Soviet troops to the line east of Ivanovka.

Totenkopf - conduct an offensive along the Prokhorovka-Kartashovka road.

It was an offensive in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka from three directions, in order to overcome the last line of Soviet defense and prepare the "gates" for entering the reserves of Army Group "South" into the breakthrough.

At the same time, the Command of the Voronezh Front, considering the German offensive thwarted and the crisis overcome, was about to launch the planned counteroffensive on Luchki and Yakovlev. By this time, the 5th hectare, tank army began to concentrate two tank corps, which included about 580 tanks, P. Rotmistrov chose the line of deployment of the first echelon of the army to the west and southwest of st. Prokhorovka at the front 15 km. Units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps also prepared for the ular.

By 5 o'clock in the morning. German distraction from the south.At this time, the German troops of the Kempf group, trying to develop their offensive in a northerly direction, struck in the defense zone of the 69th Army. By 5 o'clock in the morning, units of the 81st and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions of the 69th Army were driven back from the defensive line near the river. Northern Donets - Cossack and the Germans managed to capture the villages of Rzhavets, Ryndinka, Vypolzovka. There was a threat to the left flank of the unfolding 5th Guards Tank Army, and by order of the representative of the Stavka A. Vasilevsky, the front commander N. Vatutin ordered to send the mobile reserve of the 5th Guards Tank Army to the defense zone of the 69th Army.

At 8 a.m.The reserve group under the command of General Trufanov in a counterattack on the broken units of the German troops of the Kempf group.

Thanks to the staunch defense of the Red Army units, the Germans' 3rd Panzer Corps (300 tanks and 25 assault guns) failed to break through to Rotmistrov's positions from the south.

At 7:45.Just after dawn on July 12, light rain began, which slightly delayed the start of the German offensive on Prokhorovka, but did not prevent the Soviet 18th Tank Corps of General Bakharov, with the help of one tank brigade, from launching an attack by the II LSSAH battalion on the outskirts of the Oktyabrsky state farm. Up to 40 Soviet tanks launched an attack on the village of Mikhailovka, but were repulsed by an assault gun battalion and retreated.

From 8 o'clock in the morningLuftwaffe aircraft began an intensive bombardment of Soviet positions near Prokhorovka.

AT 8:30the main forces of the German troops as part of the tank divisions "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", "Das Reich" and "Totenconf". numbering and singing up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns (including 42 Tiger tanks), went on the offensive in the direction of st. Prokhorovka in the strip of highway and railway. This grouping was supported by all available air forces. However, only up to half of the armored forces available to the German troops were involved in the first hit of this offensive - one battalion of the LSSAH and Das Reich divisions, two Tiger companies and one T-34 company, totaling about 230 tanks. 70 assault guns and 39 Marder anti-tank self-propelled guns.

At 9:00after a 15-minute artillery preparation, the German group, in turn, was attacked by the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The 18th tank corps of General Bakharov broke through to the Oktyabrsky state farm at high speed, and despite heavy losses, captured it. However, near the villages of Andreevka and Vasilievka, he met an enemy tank grouping, in which there were 15 Tiger tanks and a battalion of assault guns. Two platoons of "Tigers" (H. Vendarf and M. Wittmann) opened fire on Soviet tanks from a distance of 1000-1200 m. Assault guns, maneuvering, fired from short stops. Having lost about 40 tanks, parts of the 18th since. they were able to capture Vasilievka, but they were not able to develop the offensive further and at 18 o’clock went on the defensive. From their fire, the Germans lost one Tiger and seven assault guns, as well as three Tigers *, six medium tanks and up to 10 self-propelled guns, destroyed and damaged.

Around 11:30The 29th Panzer Corps began the battle for Hill 252.5, where it was met by the tanks of the SS Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler". Throughout the day, the corps fought a maneuverable battle, but after 16 hours was pushed back by the approaching tanks of the SS division "Totenkopf" and after dark went on the defensive.

At 14.30The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, advancing in the direction of Kalinin, suddenly collided with the advancing SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" for the command. For the reason that. that the 29th Panzer Corps was stuck in battles for Hill 252.5. the Germans delivered a blow to the 2nd Guards Tank Corps on the exposed flank and forced it to withdraw to its original position. During these battles, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost 24 of the 41 tanks put into battle, knocked out and damaged. Of these, 12 cars burned down.

The 2nd Tank Corps, which provided a junction between the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 29th Tank Corps, was able to somewhat push the German units in front of them, but came under fire from assault and anti-tank guns pulled up from the second line, suffered losses and stopped.

12 a.m. German attack from the north.

By noon on July 12, it became clear to the German command that the frontal attack on Prokhorovka had failed. Then they decided, after Psel was forced, to withdraw part of the forces north of Prokhorovka to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, for which the 11th Tank Division and the remaining units of the tank superfluous SS Totemkopf * were allocated (96 tanks and self-propelled guns. Regiment of motorized infantry, up to 200 MOTORCYCLISTS). The grouping broke through the battle formations of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and by 1300 captured Hill 226.6.

But on the northern slopes of the height, the Germans stumbled upon the stubborn resistance of the 95th Guards Rifle Division, Colonel Lyakhov. The division was hastily reinforced with an anti-tank artillery reserve, consisting of one IPTAP and two separate divisions of captured guns (one division was equipped with 88-mm anti-aircraft guns). Until 18:00, the division successfully defended itself against the advancing tanks. But at 20:00. after a powerful air raid, due to the lack of ammunition and heavy losses of personnel, the division, under the blows of approaching German motorized rifle units, withdrew beyond the village of Polezhaev. Artillery reserves were already deployed here and the German offensive was stopped.

The 5th Guards Army also failed to complete its tasks. Faced with massive fire from German artillery and tanks, the infantry units moved forward a distance of 1-3 km, after which they went on the defensive. In the offensive zones of the 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army. The 69th Army and the 7th Guards Army did not achieve any decisive success either.

From 13 to 15 JulyGerman units continued to conduct offensive operations, but by that time they had already lost the battle. On July 13, the Fuhrer informed the commanders of Army Group South (Field Marshal von Manstein) and Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Kluge) that he had decided to abandon the continuation of Operation Citadel. This decision was also influenced by the successful landing of the Allies in Sicily, which took place during the days of the Battle of Kursk.

CONCLUSIONS:

The battles near Prokhorovka and the post-war years were declared "the largest tank battle of the Second World War." At the same time, most authors, describing it, agreed that "on a small field near Prokhorovka, more than 1,000 tanks 'came together' in hand-to-hand combat." Today, this field is even shown to passing tourists, but an analysis of even domestic wartime documents proves that this legend correlates with them, to put it mildly, very approximately.

The so-called "tank battle near Prokhorovka" did not take place on any separate field, as was commonly believed. The operation was carried out on a front with a length of more than 35 km (and, taking into account the southern direction, even more) and was a series of separate battles with the use of tanks by both sides. In total, according to the estimates of the command of the Voronezh Front, 1500 tanks and self-propelled guns from both sides participated here. Moreover, the 5th Guards Tank Army, which operated in a strip 17-19 km long, together with attached units, by the beginning of the fighting, consisted of 680 to 720 tanks and self-propelled guns. and the German group - up to 540 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The main events here took place on July 12, which accounted for the maximum loss of materiel and personnel on both sides. In the battles of July 11-13, the Germans lost to the west and south-west of Prokhorovka, according to reports from the front command, about 320 tanks and assault guns (according to other sources - from 180 to 218) knocked out, abandoned and destroyed, the Kempf group - 80 tanks, and the 5th Guards Tank Army (excluding the losses of General Trufanov's group) - 328 tanks and self-propelled guns (see table). For unknown reasons, the report of the front does not contain accurate information about the losses of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps operating here, which are estimated at 55-70 vehicles knocked out and destroyed. Despite the large concentration of tanks on both sides, the main losses were inflicted on them by no means by enemy tanks, but by enemy anti-tank and assault artillery.

The counterattack of the troops of the Voronezh Front did not end with the destruction of the wedged German grouping and therefore immediately after completion was considered a failure, but since it allowed the German offensive to bypass the city of Oboyan to Kursk to be thwarted, its results were later recognized as a success. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the number of German tanks participating in the battle and their losses, given in the report of the command of the Voronezh Front (commander N. Vatutin, member of the military council - N. Khrushchev), are very different from the reports of the commanders of their subordinate units . And from this we can conclude that the scale of the so-called "Prokhorov battle" could be greatly inflated by the front command. to justify the heavy losses of personnel and materiel of the front units during the failed offensive.