Summary of the Patriotic War of 1812. Patriotic War (briefly)

The official reason for the war was the violation of the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit by Russia and France. Russia, despite the blockade of England, received its ships under neutral flags in its ports. France annexed the Duchy of Oldenburg to its possessions. Napoleon considered it insulting to himself the demand of Emperor Alexander for the withdrawal of troops from the Duchy of Warsaw and Prussia. The War of 1812 was becoming inevitable.

Here is a summary of the Patriotic War of 1812. Napoleon, at the head of a huge army of 600,000, crossed the Neman on June 12, 1812. The Russian army, numbering only 240 thousand people, was forced to retreat deep into the country. In the battle of Smolensk, Bonaparte failed to win a complete victory and defeat the united 1st and 2nd Russian armies.

In August, Kutuzov M.I. was appointed commander in chief. He not only possessed the talent of a strategist, but also enjoyed respect among soldiers and officers. He decided to give a general battle to the French near the village of Borodino. The positions for the Russian troops were chosen most successfully. The left flank was protected by flushes (earth fortifications), and the right flank by the Koloch River. In the center were the troops of Raevsky N.N. and artillery.

Both sides fought desperately. 400 guns were fired at the flushes, which were courageously guarded by the troops under the command of Bagration. As a result of 8 attacks, the Napoleonic troops suffered huge losses. They managed to capture the batteries of Raevsky (in the center) only at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, but not for long. The attacking impulse of the French was held back thanks to a bold raid by the lancers of the 1st Cavalry Corps. Despite all the difficulties to bring into battle the old guard, elite troops, Napoleon did not dare. Late in the evening the battle was over. The losses were huge. The French lost 58, and the Russians 44 thousand people. Paradoxically, both commanders declared their victory in the battle.

The decision to leave Moscow was made by Kutuzov at a council in Fili on September 1. It was the only way to keep a combat-ready army. September 2, 1812 Napoleon entered Moscow. While waiting for an offer of peace, Napoleon stayed in the city until 7 October. As a result of fires, most of Moscow perished during this time. Peace with Alexander 1 was never concluded.

Kutuzov stopped 80 km away. from Moscow in the village of Tarutino. He covered Kaluga, which has large stocks of fodder and the arsenals of Tula. The Russian army, thanks to this maneuver, was able to replenish its reserves and, importantly, upgrade equipment. At the same time, French foragers were subjected to guerrilla attacks. Detachments of Vasilisa Kozhina, Fyodor Potapov, Gerasim Kurin delivered effective strikes, depriving the French army of the opportunity to replenish food. In the same way, special detachments of Davydov A.V. and Seslavina A.N.

After leaving Moscow, Napoleon's army failed to break through to Kaluga. The French were forced to retreat along the Smolensk road, without fodder. Early severe frosts exacerbated the situation. The final defeat of the Great Army took place in the battle near the Berezina River on November 14-16, 1812. Of the 600,000-strong army, only 30,000 hungry and frozen soldiers left Russia. The manifesto on the victorious end of the Patriotic War was issued by Alexander 1 on December 25 of the same year. The victory of 1812 was complete.

In 1813 and 1814, the campaign of the Russian army took place, liberating the European countries from the domination of Napoleon. Russian troops acted in alliance with the armies of Sweden, Austria, Prussia. As a result, in accordance with the Treaty of Paris on May 18, 1814, Napoleon lost his throne, and France returned to the borders of 1793.

The War of 1812, also known as the Patriotic War of 1812, the war with Napoleon, the invasion of Napoleon is the first event in the national history of Russia, when all layers of Russian society rallied to repel the enemy. It was the popular character of the war with Napoleon that allowed historians to give it the name of the Patriotic War.

Cause of the war with Napoleon

Napoleon considered England to be his main enemy, an obstacle to world domination. He could not crush it with military force for geographical reasons: Britain is an island, a landing operation would cost France very dearly, in addition, after the battle of Trafalgar, England remained the only mistress of the seas. Therefore, Napoleon decided to strangle the enemy economically: to undermine the trade of England by closing all European ports for her. However, the blockade did not bring benefits to France either, it ruined its bourgeoisie. “Napoleon understood that it was the war with England and the blockade associated with it that prevented a radical improvement in the economy of the empire. But in order to end the blockade, it was first necessary to get England to lay down her arms. However, the victory over England was hindered by the position of Russia, which in words agreed to comply with the conditions of the blockade, in fact, Napoleon was convinced, did not comply with it. “English goods from Russia, along the entire vast western border, seep into Europe and this nullifies the continental blockade, that is, destroys the only hope of “bringing England to its knees.” The Great Army in Moscow means the obedience of the Russian Emperor Alexander, this is the complete implementation of the continental blockade, therefore, victory over England is possible only after victory over Russia.

Subsequently, in Vitebsk, already during the campaign against Moscow, Count Daru frankly told Napoleon that neither the army, nor even many in the emperor’s entourage, understood why this difficult war was being waged with Russia, because because of the trade in English goods in Alexander’s possessions, fight not worth it. (However) Napoleon saw in the successive economic strangulation of England the only way to finally ensure the stability of the existence of the great monarchy he had created.

Background to the War of 1812

  • 1798 - Russia, together with Great Britain, Turkey, the Holy Roman Empire, the Kingdom of Naples, created a second anti-French coalition
  • 1801, September 26 - Treaty of Paris between Russia and France
  • 1805 - England, Russia, Austria, Sweden formed the third anti-French coalition
  • 1805, November 20 - Napoleon's defeat of the Austro-Russian troops at Austerlitz
  • 1806, November - the beginning of the war between Russia and Turkey
  • 1807, June 2 - the defeat of the Russian-Prussian troops at Friedland
  • 1807, June 25 - Tilsit peace treaty between Russia and France. Russia pledged to join the continental blockade
  • 1808, February - the beginning of the Russian-Swedish war, which lasted a year
  • 1808, October 30 - Erfur Allied Conference of Russia and France, confirming the Franco-Russian alliance
  • Late 1809-early 1810 - unsuccessful courtship of Napoleon to the sister of Alexander the First Anna
  • 1810, December 19 - the introduction in Russia of new customs tariffs, favorable for English goods and disadvantageous for French
  • 1812, February - peace agreement between Russia and Sweden
  • 1812, May 16 - Peace of Bucharest between Russia and Turkey

“Napoleon later said that he should have abandoned the war with Russia already at the moment when he learned that neither Turkey nor Sweden would fight Russia”

Patriotic War of 1812. Briefly

  • 1812, June 12 (old style) - the French army invaded Russia by crossing the Neman

The French did not see a single soul in the entire boundless space beyond the Neman until the very horizon, after the guard Cossacks disappeared from view. “In front of us lay a desert, a brown, yellowish land with stunted vegetation and distant forests on the horizon,” recalled one of the participants in the campaign, and the picture seemed even then “ominous”

  • 1812, June 12-15 - in four continuous streams, the Napoleonic army along three new bridges and the fourth old one - at Kovno, Olitt, Merech, Yurburg - regiment after regiment, battery after battery, crossed the Neman in a continuous stream and lined up on the Russian coast.

Napoleon knew that although he had 420 thousand people at hand, ... but the army was far from being equal in all its parts, that he could rely only on the French part of his army (in total, the great army consisted of 355 thousand subjects of the French Empire, but among them far from all were natural Frenchmen), and even then not entirely, because young recruits cannot be placed next to the seasoned warriors who have been on his campaigns. As for the Westphalians, Saxons, Bavarians, Rhenish, Hanseatic Germans, Italians, Belgians, Dutch, not to mention the forced allies - the Austrians and Prussians, whom he dragged for purposes unknown to them to death in Russia and of whom many hate not at all Russians, but himself, then they are unlikely to fight with special fervor

  • 1812, June 12 - the French in Kovno (now - Kaunas)
  • 1812, June 15 - The corps of Jerome Bonaparte and Y. Poniatovsky advanced to Grodno
  • 1812, June 16 - Napoleon in Vilna (Vilnius), where he stayed for 18 days
  • 1812, June 16 - a short battle in Grodno, the Russians blew up bridges across the Lososnya River

Russian generals

- Barclay de Tolly (1761-1818) - From the spring of 1812 - commander of the 1st Western Army. At the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812 - Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army
- Bagration (1765-1812) - Chief of the Life Guards of the Jaeger Regiment. At the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812, the commander of the 2nd Western Army
- Bennigsen (1745-1826) - cavalry general, by order of Kutuzaov - chief of the General Staff of the Russian army
- Kutuzov (1747-1813) - Field Marshal General, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army during the Patriotic War of 1812
- Chichagov (1767-1849) - admiral, naval minister of the Russian Empire from 1802 to 1809
- Wittgenstein (1768-1843) - Field Marshal, during the war of 1812 - commander of a separate corps in the St. Petersburg direction

  • 1812, June 18 - the French in Grodno
  • 1812, July 6 - Alexander the First announced the recruitment into the militia
  • 1812, July 16 - Napoleon in Vitebsk, the armies of Bagration and Barclay retreat to Smolensk
  • 1812, August 3 - the connection of the armies of Barclay to Tolli and Bagration near Smolensk
  • 1812, August 4-6 - Battle of Smolensk

At 6 am on August 4, Napoleon ordered a general bombardment and assault on Smolensk. Violent fighting broke out, lasting until 6 pm. Dokhturov's corps, which defended the city together with the division of Konovnitsyn and the Prince of Württemberg, fought with bravery and perseverance that amazed the French. In the evening, Napoleon called on Marshal Davout and categorically ordered the next day, no matter what the cost, to take Smolensk. He had already had earlier, and now the hope has grown stronger that this Smolensk battle, in which allegedly the entire Russian army participates (he knew about the final connection between Barclay and Bagration), will be that decisive battle, from which the Russians have so far evaded, giving up him without a fight huge parts of his empire. On August 5, the battle resumed. The Russians offered heroic resistance. Night came after the bloody day. The bombardment of the city, by order of Napoleon, continued. And suddenly there were terrible explosions one after another on Wednesday night, shaking the earth; The fire that started spread throughout the city. It was the Russians who blew up the powder magazines and set fire to the city: Barclay gave the order to retreat. At dawn, French scouts reported that the city had been abandoned by the troops, and Davout entered Smolensk without a fight.

  • August 8, 1812 - Instead of Barclay de Tolly, Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief
  • 1812, August 23 - Scouts reported to Napoleon that the Russian army had stopped and taken up positions two days before, and that fortifications had also been built near the village, visible in the distance. When asked what the name of the village was, the scouts answered: "Borodino"
  • 1812, August 26 - Battle of Borodino

Kutuzov knew that Napoleon would be ruined by the impossibility of a long war several thousand kilometers from France, in a deserted, scarce, hostile vast country, a lack of food, an unusual climate. But he knew even more precisely that they would not allow him to give up Moscow without a general battle, despite his Russian surname, just as Barclay was not allowed to do this. And he decided to give this battle, unnecessary, according to his deepest conviction. Strategically redundant, it was morally and politically inevitable. In the 15 o'clock Battle of Borodino, more than 100,000 people dropped out from both sides. Napoleon later said: “Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French in it showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible ... "

The most frank school linden concerns the French losses in the Battle of Borodino. European historiography admits that Napoleon missed 30 thousand soldiers and officers, of which 10-12 thousand were killed. Nevertheless, on the main monument, installed on the Borodino field, 58,478 people were engraved in gold. As the connoisseur of the era Alexei Vasiliev admits, we owe the “mistake” to Alexander Schmidt, a Swiss who, at the end of 1812, really needed 500 rubles. He turned to Count Fyodor Rostopchin, posing as a former adjutant of Napoleon's Marshal Berthier. Having received the money, the "adjutant" from the lantern compiled a list of losses in the corps of the Great Army, attributing, for example, 5 thousand killed to the Holsteiners, who did not participate in the Battle of Borodino at all. The Russian world was glad to be deceived, and when documentary refutations appeared, no one dared to initiate the dismantling of the legend. And it has not been decided so far: in textbooks for decades, the figure has been wandering, as if Napoleon lost about 60 thousand fighters. Why deceive children who can open a computer? (“Arguments of the Week”, No. 34 (576) of 08/31/2017)

  • 1812, September 1 - Council in Fili. Kutuzov ordered to leave Moscow
  • 1812, September 2 - The Russian army passed through Moscow and entered the Ryazan road
  • 1812, September 2 - Napoleon in Moscow
  • 1812, September 3 - the beginning of a fire in Moscow
  • 1812, September 4-5 - Fire in Moscow.

On September 5, in the morning, Napoleon walked around the Kremlin and from the windows of the palace, wherever he looked, the emperor turned pale and silently looked at the fire for a long time, and then said: “What a terrible sight! They set fire to it themselves... What determination! What people! These are the Scythians!”

  • 1812, September 6 - September 22 - Napolen sent truce envoys to the tsar and Kutuzov three times with an offer of peace. Didn't wait for an answer
  • 1812, October 6 - the beginning of the retreat of Napoleon from Moscow
  • 1812, October 7 - The victorious battle of the Russian army of Kutuzov with the French troops of Marshal Murat near the village of Tarutino, Kaluga region
  • 1812, October 12 - the battle of Maloyaroslavets, which forced Napoleon's army to retreat along the old Smolensk road, already completely devastated

Generals Dokhturov, Raevsky attacked Maloyaroslavets, occupied the day before by Delzon. Eight times Maloyaroslavets changed hands. Losses on both sides were heavy. The French lost about 5,000 men alone. The city burned to the ground, catching fire even during the battle, so that many hundreds of people, Russians and French, died from fire in the streets, many wounded were burned alive

  • 1812, October 13 - In the morning, Napoleon with a small retinue left the village of Gorodny to inspect the Russian positions, when suddenly Cossacks with peaks at the ready flew at this group of riders. Two marshals who were with Napoleon (Murat and Bessieres), General Rapp and several officers huddled around Napoleon and began to fight back. The Polish light cavalry and the guards chasseurs who came to the rescue saved the emperor
  • October 15, 1812 - Napoleon ordered a retreat to Smolensk
  • 1812, October 18 - frosts began. Winter came early and cold
  • 1812, October 19 - Wittgenstein's corps, reinforced by the St. Petersburg and Novgorod militias and other reinforcements, drove out the troops of Saint-Cyr and Oudinot from Polotsk
  • October 26, 1812 - Wittgenstein occupied Vitebsk
  • 1812, November 6 - Napoleon's army arrived in Dorogobuzh (a city in the Smolensk region), only 50 thousand people remained ready for battle
  • 1812, early November - The southern Russian army of Chichagov, who arrived from Turkey, rushed to the Berezina (a river in Belarus, the right tributary of the Dnieper)
  • 1812, November 14 - Napoleon left Smolensk, having only 36 thousand people under arms
  • 1812, November 16-17 - a bloody battle near the village of Krasny (45 km south-west of Smolensk), in which the French suffered huge losses
  • 1812, November 16 - Chichagov's army occupied Minsk
  • November 22, 1812 - Chichagov's army occupied Borisov on the Berezina. There was a bridge across the river in Borisov
  • 1812, November 23 - the defeat of the vanguard of Chichagov's army from Marshal Oudinot near Borisov. Borisov went over to the French again
  • 1812, November 26-27 - Napoleon ferried the remnants of the army across the Berezina and took them to Vilna
  • 1812, December 6 - Napoleon left the army, going to Paris
  • 1812, December 11 - the Russian army entered Vilna
  • 1812, December 12 - the remnants of Napoleon's army arrived in Kovno
  • 1812, December 15 - the remnants of the French army crossed the Neman, leaving the territory of Russia
  • December 25, 1812 - Alexander I issued a manifesto on the end of the Patriotic War

“... Now, with heartfelt joy and bitterness to God, We declare gratitude to Our dear loyal subjects that the event has surpassed even Our very hope, and that what We announced, at the opening of this war, has been fulfilled beyond measure: there is no longer a single enemy on the face of Our land; or better to say, they all stayed here, but how? Dead, wounded and captured. The proud ruler and their leader himself could hardly ride away with his most important officials from here, losing all his army and all the guns he brought with him, which are more than a thousand, not counting those buried and sunk by him, recaptured from him, and are in Our hands ... "

Thus ended the Patriotic War of 1812. Then foreign campaigns of the Russian army began, the purpose of which, according to Alexander the First, was to finish off Napoleon. But that is another story

Reasons for Russia's victory in the war against Napoleon

  • The nationwide character of the resistance
  • Mass heroism of soldiers and officers
  • High skill of military leaders
  • Napoleon's indecisiveness in declaring anti-serfdom laws
  • Geographical and natural factors

The result of the Patriotic War of 1812

  • The growth of national consciousness in Russian society
  • The beginning of the decline of Napoleon's career
  • The growth of Russia's prestige in Europe
  • The emergence in Russia of anti-serfdom, liberal views

The Napoleonic Wars are a glorious page in Russian history, but not a single war happens just like that. It is impossible to speak briefly about the causes of the Patriotic War of 1812, because they are deep and multifaceted.

Causes of the Patriotic War of 1812

The era of the Napoleonic Wars began long before 1812, and even then Russia was in confrontation with France. In 1807, the Treaty of Tilsit was concluded, according to which St. Petersburg was to support Paris in the continental blockade of Great Britain. This agreement was considered temporary and forced in the upper classes, because it undermined the economy of the country, which received large cash injections from trade with England. Alexander I was not going to suffer losses from the blockade, and Napoleon regarded Russia as one of the main rivals in achieving world domination.

Rice. 1. Portrait of Alexander I.

Table "The main causes of the war between France and Russia"

In addition to the above reasons, another was Napoleon's long-standing dream of recreating the Commonwealth within the former borders. At the expense of the territory of Austria and Prussia, he had already created the Duchy of Warsaw. To complete the idea, he needed the western lands of Russia.

It is also worth noting that the Napoleonic troops occupied the Duchy of Oldenburg, which belonged to the uncle of Alexander I, which angered the Russian emperor, causing him a personal insult.

Rice. 2. Map of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 19th century.

From 1806, Russia waged a protracted war with the Ottoman Empire. Peace was concluded only in 1812. The protracted nature of the hostilities with the Ottoman Empire, which was not as strong as before, may have pushed Napoleon to take more decisive action against Russia.

France strongly supported the Ottoman Empire in the fight against Russia, seeing it as an opportunity to pull the Russian forces to the south, diverting them from the French threat. And although Napoleon did not directly intervene in the course of hostilities of the Russian-Turkish war, he exerted all possible influence in order to drag out hostilities and inflict as much damage on Russia as possible.

Rice. 3. Portrait of Napoleon Bonaparte.

As a result, mutual hostility began to grow between Russia and France from 1807 to 1812. Napoleon gradually carried out a military build-up along the western borders of Russia, increasing his army through allied pacts with Prussia. But Austria subtly hinted to Russia that they would not actively help.

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The fate of Sweden in the political game of Russia and France is interesting. Napoleon offered the Swedes Finland, which they had recently lost in the war with Russia, and Alexander I promised to help Sweden conquer Norway. The Swedish king chose Russia, and not only because of this. It was separated from France by the sea, and Russian troops could reach it by land. In January 1812, Napoleon occupied Swedish Pomerania, putting an end to diplomatic preparations for a war with the Russians.

Patriotic War of 1812

Russian empire

Almost complete destruction of Napoleon's army

Opponents

Allies:

Allies:

England and Sweden did not participate in the war on the territory of Russia

Commanders

Napoleon I

Alexander I

E. McDonald

M. I. Kutuzov

Jerome Bonaparte

M. B. Barclay de Tolly

K.-F. Schwarzenberg, E. Beauharnais

P. I. Bagration †

N.-Sh. Oudinot

A. P. Tormasov

K.-W. Perrin

P. V. Chichagov

L.-N. Davout

P. H. Wittgenstein

Side forces

610 thousand soldiers, 1370 guns

650 thousand soldiers, 1600 guns 400 thousand militias

Military casualties

About 550 thousand, 1200 guns

210 thousand soldiers

Patriotic War of 1812- military operations in 1812 between Russia and the army of Napoleon Bonaparte that invaded its territory. Napoleonic studies also use the term " Russian campaign of 1812"(fr. campagne de Russie pendant l "année 1812).

It ended with the almost complete destruction of the Napoleonic army and the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Poland and Germany in 1813.

Napoleon originally called this war second Polish, because one of the goals of the campaign proclaimed by him was the revival of the Polish independent state in opposition to the Russian Empire with the inclusion of the territories of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. In pre-revolutionary literature, there is such an epithet of war as "the invasion of twelve languages."

background

Political situation on the eve of the war

After the defeat of the Russian troops in the battle of Friedland in June 1807. Emperor Alexander I concluded the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon, according to which he pledged to join the continental blockade of England. By agreement with Napoleon, in 1808 Russia took Finland from Sweden and made a number of other territorial acquisitions; Napoleon, however, untied her hands to conquer all of Europe, with the exception of England and Spain. After an unsuccessful attempt to marry the Russian Grand Duchess, in 1810 Napoleon married Marie-Louise of Austria, daughter of the Austrian Emperor Franz, thus strengthening his rear and creating a foothold in Europe.

French troops, after a series of annexations, moved close to the borders of the Russian Empire.

On February 24, 1812, Napoleon signed an alliance treaty with Prussia, which was supposed to field 20 thousand soldiers against Russia, as well as provide logistics for the French army. Napoleon also concluded on March 14 of the same year a military alliance with Austria, according to which the Austrians pledged to field 30,000 soldiers against Russia.

Russia also diplomatically prepared the rear. As a result of secret negotiations in the spring of 1812, the Austrians made it clear that their army would not go far from the Austro-Russian border and would not be zealous at all for the good of Napoleon. In April of the same year, on behalf of Sweden, the former Napoleonic Marshal Bernadotte (the future King Charles XIV of Sweden), who was elected crown prince in 1810 and actually headed the Swedish aristocracy, gave assurances of his friendly position towards Russia and concluded an alliance treaty. On May 22, 1812, the Russian ambassador Kutuzov (the future field marshal and winner of Napoleon) managed to conclude a profitable peace with Turkey, ending the five-year war for Moldavia. In the south of Russia, the Danube army of Chichagov was released as a barrier against Austria, forced to be in alliance with Napoleon.

On May 19, 1812, Napoleon left for Dresden, where he held a review of the vassal monarchs of Europe. From Dresden, the emperor went to the "Great Army" on the Neman River, which separated Prussia and Russia. On June 22, Napoleon wrote an appeal to the troops, in which he accused Russia of violating the Tilsit agreement and called the invasion a second Polish war. The liberation of Poland became one of the slogans that made it possible to attract many Poles to the French army. Even the French marshals did not understand the meaning and goals of the invasion of Russia, but they habitually obeyed.

At 2 am on June 24, 1812, Napoleon ordered the crossing to the Russian bank of the Neman through 4 bridges above Kovno.

Causes of the war

The French infringed on the interests of Russians in Europe, threatened to restore an independent Poland. Napoleon demanded that Tsar Alexander I tighten the blockade of England. The Russian Empire did not observe the continental blockade and taxed French goods. Russia demanded the withdrawal of French troops from Prussia, stationed there in violation of the Treaty of Tilsit.

The armed forces of the opponents

Napoleon was able to concentrate about 450 thousand soldiers against Russia, of which the French themselves made up half. Italians, Poles, Germans, Dutch, and even Spaniards mobilized by force also took part in the campaign. Austria and Prussia allocated corps (30 and 20 thousand, respectively) against Russia under allied agreements with Napoleon.

Spain, having connected about 200 thousand French soldiers with partisan resistance, provided great assistance to Russia. England provided material and financial support to Russia, but its army was involved in the fighting in Spain, and the strong British fleet could not influence land operations in Europe, although it was one of the factors that tilted Sweden's position in favor of Russia.

Napoleon had the following reserves: about 90,000 French soldiers in the garrisons of central Europe (of which 60,000 were in the 11th reserve corps in Prussia) and 100,000 in the French National Guard, which, by law, could not fight outside France.

Russia had a large army, but could not quickly mobilize troops due to poor roads and vast territory. The blow of Napoleon's army was taken over by the troops stationed on the western border: the 1st Army of Barclay and the 2nd Army of Bagration, a total of 153 thousand soldiers and 758 guns. Even further south in Volhynia (north-west of Ukraine), the 3rd Army of Tormasov (up to 45 thousand, 168 guns) was located, which served as a barrier from Austria. In Moldova, the Danube army of Chichagov (55 thousand, 202 guns) stood against Turkey. In Finland, the corps of the Russian general Steingel (19 thousand, 102 guns) stood against Sweden. In the Riga area there was a separate Essen corps (up to 18 thousand), up to 4 reserve corps were located away from the border.

According to the lists, irregular Cossack troops numbered up to 110 thousand light cavalry, but in reality up to 20 thousand Cossacks took part in the war.

Infantry,
thousand

Cavalry,
thousand

Artillery

Cossacks,
thousand

garrisons,
thousand

Note

35-40 thousand soldiers,
1600 guns

110-132 thousand in the 1st army of Barclay in Lithuania,
39-48 thousand in the 2nd army of Bagration in Belarus,
40-48 thousand in the 3rd army of Tormasov in Ukraine,
52-57 thousand on the Danube, 19 thousand in Finland,
the rest of the troops in the Caucasus and around the country

1370 guns

190
Outside Russia

450 thousand invaded Russia. After the start of the war, another 140 thousand arrived in Russia in the form of reinforcements. In the garrisons of Europe, up to 90 thousand + the National Guard in France (100 thousand)
Also not listed here are 200,000 in Spain and 30,000 allied corps from Austria.
The values ​​given include all troops under Napoleon, including soldiers from the German states of the Confederation of the Rhine, Prussia, the Italian kingdoms, Poland.

Strategic plans of the parties

From the very beginning, the Russian side planned a long organized retreat in order to avoid the risk of a decisive battle and the possible loss of the army. Emperor Alexander I said to the French ambassador to Russia, Armand Caulaincourt, in a private conversation in May 1811:

« If Emperor Napoleon starts a war against me, then it is possible and even likely that he will beat us if we accept the battle, but this will not give him peace yet. The Spaniards were repeatedly beaten, but they were neither defeated nor subdued. And yet they are not as far from Paris as we are: they have neither our climate nor our resources. We won't take risks. We have vast space behind us, and we will keep a well-organized army. […] If the lot of arms decides the case against me, then I would rather retreat to Kamchatka than give up my provinces and sign treaties in my capital, which are only a respite. The Frenchman is brave, but long hardships and a bad climate tire and discourage him. Our climate and our winter will fight for us.»

Nevertheless, the original plan of the campaign, developed by the military theorist Pfuel, proposed defense in the Drissa fortified camp. During the course of the war, the Pfuel plan was rejected by the generals as impossible to carry out under the conditions of modern mobile warfare. Artillery depots for supplying the Russian army were located in three lines:

  • Vilna - Dinaburg - Nesvizh - Bobruisk - Polonne - Kyiv
  • Pskov - Porkhov - Shostka - Bryansk - Smolensk
  • Moscow - Novgorod - Kaluga

Napoleon desired a limited campaign for 1812. He told Metternich: The triumph will be the lot of the more patient. I will open the campaign by crossing the Neman. I will finish it in Smolensk and Minsk. There I will stop.» The French emperor hoped that the defeat of the Russian army in the general battle would force Alexander to accept his conditions. Caulaincourt in his memoirs recalls the phrase of Napoleon: " He spoke of Russian nobles who, in the event of war, would be afraid for their palaces and, after a major battle, would force Emperor Alexander to sign peace.»

Napoleon's offensive (June-September 1812)

At 6 am on June 24 (June 12, old style), 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered Russian Kovno (modern Kaunas in Lithuania), crossing the Neman. The crossing of 220 thousand soldiers of the French army (1st, 2nd, 3rd infantry corps, guards and cavalry) near Kovno took 4 days.

On June 29-30, near Prena (modern Prienai in Lithuania), a little south of Kovno, the Neman crossed another group (79 thousand soldiers: 6th and 4th infantry corps, cavalry) under the command of Prince Beauharnais.

At the same time, on June 30, even further south near Grodno, the Neman crossed 4 corps (78-79 thousand soldiers: the 5th, 7th, 8th infantry and 4th cavalry corps) under the general command of Jerome Bonaparte.

To the north of Kovno, near Tilsit, the Neman crossed the 10th Corps of the French Marshal MacDonald. In the south of the central direction from Warsaw, the Bug River was crossed by a separate Austrian corps of Schwarzenberg (30-33 thousand soldiers).

Emperor Alexander I learned about the beginning of the invasion late in the evening on June 24 in Vilna (modern Vilnius in Lithuania). And already on June 28, the French entered Vilna. Only on July 16, Napoleon, having arranged state affairs in occupied Lithuania, left the city after his troops.

From the Neman to Smolensk (July - August 1812)

North direction

Napoleon sent the 10th Corps of Marshal MacDonald, consisting of 32 thousand Prussians and Germans, to the north of the Russian Empire. His goal was to capture Riga, and then, connecting with the 2nd Corps of Marshal Oudinot (28 thousand), strike at St. Petersburg. The skeleton of MacDonald's corps was the 20,000th Prussian corps under the command of General Gravert (later York). MacDonald approached the fortifications of Riga, however, having no siege artillery, he stopped at the distant approaches to the city. The military governor of Riga, Essen, burned the suburbs and locked himself in the city with a strong garrison. Trying to support Oudinot, MacDonald captured the abandoned Dinaburg on the Western Dvina and stopped active operations, waiting for siege artillery from East Prussia. The Prussians of Macdonald's corps tried to avoid active combat clashes in this alien war for them, however, if the situation threatened the "honor of the Prussian weapons", the Prussians offered active resistance, and repeatedly beat off the Russian attacks from Riga with heavy losses.

Oudinot, having occupied Polotsk, decided to bypass Wittgenstein's separate corps (25 thousand), allocated by Barclay's 1st Army during the retreat through Polotsk, from the north, and cut it off from the rear. Fearing a connection between Oudinot and MacDonald, on July 30 Wittgenstein attacked Oudinot's corps, which was not expecting an attack and was weakened by the march, in the battle of Klyastitsy and threw it back to Polotsk. The victory allowed Wittgenstein to attack Polotsk on August 17-18, but Saint-Cyr's corps, timely sent by Napoleon to support Oudinot's corps, helped repulse the attack and restore balance.

Oudinot and Macdonald were bogged down in sluggish fighting, remaining in place.

Moscow direction

Parts of Barclay's 1st Army were scattered from the Baltic to Lida, the headquarters was located in Vilna. In view of the rapid advance of Napoleon, the divided Russian corps faced the threat of being defeated piecemeal. Dokhturov's corps found itself in an operational encirclement, but was able to break out and arrive at the Sventsyany assembly point. At the same time, Dorokhov's cavalry detachment turned out to be cut off from the corps and united with Bagration's army. After the 1st Army connected, Barclay de Tolly began to gradually retreat to Vilna and further to Drissa.

On June 26, Barclay's army left Vilna and on July 10 arrived at the Drissa fortified camp on the Western Dvina (in northern Belarus), where Emperor Alexander I planned to fight off the Napoleonic troops. The generals managed to convince the emperor of the absurdity of this idea put forward by the military theorist Pful (or Ful). On July 16, the Russian army continued its retreat through Polotsk to Vitebsk, leaving the 1st Corps of Lieutenant General Wittgenstein to defend Petersburg. In Polotsk, Alexander I left the army, convinced to leave by the persistent requests of dignitaries and family. The executive general and cautious strategist Barclay retreated under the onslaught of superior forces from almost all of Europe, and this greatly annoyed Napoleon, who was interested in an early general battle.

The 2nd Russian army (up to 45 thousand) under the command of Bagration at the beginning of the invasion was located near Grodno in the west of Belarus, about 150 kilometers from the 1st army of Barclay. First, Bagration moved to connect with the main 1st Army, but when he reached Lida (100 km from Vilna), it was too late. He had to leave the French to the south. In order to cut off Bagration from the main forces and destroy him, Napoleon sent Marshal Davout to cut off Bagration with forces of up to 50 thousand soldiers. Davout moved from Vilna to Minsk, which he occupied on July 8. On the other hand, from the west, Jerome Bonaparte advanced on Bagration with 4 corps that crossed the Neman near Grodno. Napoleon sought to prevent the connection of the Russian armies in order to smash them piece by piece. Bagration broke away from the troops of Jerome with swift marches and successful rearguard battles, now Marshal Davout became his main opponent.

On July 19, Bagration was in Bobruisk on the Berezina, while on July 21 Davout occupied Mogilev on the Dnieper with advanced units, that is, the French were ahead of Bagration, being in the northeast of the 2nd Russian army. Bagration, having approached the Dnieper 60 km below Mogilev, sent on July 23 the corps of General Raevsky against Davout in order to push the French back from Mogilev and reach the direct road to Vitebsk, where the Russian armies were supposed to join. As a result of the battle near Saltanovka, Raevsky delayed Davout's advance east to Smolensk, but the path to Vitebsk was blocked. Bagration was able to force the Dnieper in the town of Novoe Bykhovo without interference on July 25 and headed for Smolensk. Davout no longer had the strength to pursue the Russian 2nd Army, and the troops of Jerome Bonaparte, hopelessly behind, were still overcoming the wooded and swampy territory of Belarus.

On July 23, Barclay's army arrived in Vitebsk, where Barclay wanted to wait for Bagration. To prevent the advance of the French, he sent the 4th Corps of Osterman-Tolstoy towards the enemy's vanguard. On July 25, 26 miles from Vitebsk, a battle took place at Ostrovno, which continued on July 26.

On July 27, Barclay retreated from Vitebsk to Smolensk, having learned about the approach of Napoleon with the main forces and the impossibility for Bagration to break through to Vitebsk. On August 3, the Russian 1st and 2nd armies joined near Smolensk, thus achieving the first strategic success. There was a small respite in the war, both sides put their troops in order, tired of incessant marches.

Upon reaching Vitebsk, Napoleon made a stop to rest the troops, upset after a 400 km offensive in the absence of supply bases. Only on August 12, after long hesitation, Napoleon set out from Vitebsk to Smolensk.

South direction

The 7th Saxon Corps under the command of Rainier (17-22 thousand) was supposed to cover the left flank of Napoleon's main forces from the 3rd Russian army under the command of Tormasov (25 thousand under arms). Rainier took up a cordon position along the Brest-Kobrin-Pinsk line, spraying a small corps over 170 km. On July 27, Tormasov surrounded Kobrin, the Saxon garrison under the command of Klengel (up to 5 thousand) was completely defeated. Brest and Pinsk were also cleared of the French garrisons.

Realizing that the weakened Rainier would not be able to keep Tormasov, Napoleon decided not to involve the Austrian corps of Schwarzenberg (30 thousand) in the main direction and left him in the south against Tormasov. Rainier, gathering his troops and linking up with Schwarzenberg, attacked Tormasov on August 12 at Gorodechna, forcing the Russians to retreat to Lutsk (northwestern Ukraine). The main battles take place between the Saxons and the Russians, the Austrians try to limit themselves to artillery fire and maneuvers.

Until the end of September, sluggish fighting was carried out in the south in a sparsely populated swampy area in the Lutsk region.

In addition to Tormasov, in the southern direction was the 2nd Russian reserve corps of Lieutenant General Ertel, formed in Mozyr and providing support to the blockaded garrison of Bobruisk. For the blockade of Bobruisk, as well as to cover communications from Ertel, Napoleon left the Polish division of Dombrovsky (10 thousand) from the 5th Polish corps.

From Smolensk to Borodino (August-September 1812)

After the connection of the Russian armies, the generals began to insistently demand a general battle from Barclay. Taking advantage of the scattered position of the French corps, Barclay decided to defeat them one by one and marched on August 8 to Rudnya, where Murat's cavalry was quartered.

However, Napoleon, using the slow advance of the Russian army, gathered his corps into a fist and tried to go behind Barclay, bypassing his left flank from the south, for which he crossed the Dnieper west of Smolensk. On the path of the vanguard of the French army was the 27th division of General Neverovsky, covering the left flank of the Russian army near Krasnoe. The stubborn resistance of Neverovsky gave time to transfer the corps of General Raevsky to Smolensk.

By August 16, Napoleon approached Smolensk with 180 thousand. Bagration instructed General Raevsky (15 thousand soldiers), in whose 7th Corps the remnants of Neverovsky's division had joined, to defend Smolensk. Barclay was against the battle, which in his opinion was unnecessary, but at that time the actual dual command reigned in the Russian army. At 6 am on August 16, Napoleon began the assault on the city from the march. The stubborn battle for Smolensk continued until the morning of August 18, when Barclay withdrew troops from the burning city in order to avoid a big battle with no chance of victory. Barclay had 76 thousand, another 34 thousand (Bagration's army) covered the withdrawal route of the Russian army to Dorogobuzh, which Napoleon could cut with a roundabout maneuver (similar to the one that failed near Smolensk).

Marshal Ney pursued the retreating army. On August 19, in a bloody battle near Valutina Gora, the Russian rear guard detained the marshal, who suffered significant losses. Napoleon sent General Junot to go behind Russian lines in a detour, but he failed to complete the task, burying himself in an impenetrable swamp, and the Russian army left in perfect order towards Moscow to Dorogobuzh. The battle for Smolensk, which destroyed a considerable city, marked the deployment of a nationwide war between the Russian people and the enemy, which was immediately felt by both ordinary French suppliers and Napoleon's marshals. Settlements along the route of the French army were burned, the population left as far as possible. Immediately after the battle of Smolensk, Napoleon made a disguised offer of peace to Tsar Alexander I, while from a position of strength, but received no answer.

Relations between Bagration and Barclay after leaving Smolensk became more and more tense with each day of retreat, and in this dispute the mood of the nobility was not on the side of the cautious Barclay. As early as August 17, the emperor gathered a council that recommended that he appoint a general from infantry, Prince Kutuzov, as commander-in-chief of the Russian army. On August 29, Kutuzov received the army in Tsarevo-Zaimishche. On this day, the French entered Vyazma.

Continuing in general the strategic line of his predecessor, Kutuzov could not avoid a general battle for political and moral reasons. The battle was demanded by Russian society, although it was superfluous from a military point of view. By September 3, the Russian army retreated to the village of Borodino, further retreat meant the surrender of Moscow. Kutuzov decided to give a general battle, as the balance of power shifted to the Russian side. If at the beginning of the invasion Napoleon had a threefold superiority in the number of soldiers over the opposing Russian army, now the numbers of the armies were comparable - 135 thousand for Napoleon against 110-130 thousand for Kutuzov. The problem of the Russian army was the lack of weapons. While the militia provided up to 80-100 thousand warriors from the Russian central provinces, there were no guns to arm the militias. The warriors were given lances, but Kutuzov did not use people as "cannon fodder".

On September 7 (August 26 according to the old style) near the village of Borodino (124 km west of Moscow) the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 took place between the Russian and French armies.

After an almost two-day battle, which was an assault by the French troops on the fortified Russian line, the French, at the cost of 30-34 thousand of their soldiers, pushed the Russian left flank from the position. The Russian army suffered heavy losses, and Kutuzov ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk on September 8 with the firm intention of preserving the army.

At 4 pm on September 13, in the village of Fili, Kutuzov ordered the generals to meet for a meeting on a further plan of action. Most of the generals were in favor of a new general battle with Napoleon. Then Kutuzov interrupted the meeting and announced that he was ordering a retreat.

On September 14, the Russian army passed through Moscow and entered the Ryazan road (southeast of Moscow). Toward evening, Napoleon entered the deserted Moscow.

Capture of Moscow (September 1812)

On September 14, Napoleon occupied Moscow without a fight, and already at night of the same day the city was engulfed in fire, which increased so much by the night of September 15 that Napoleon was forced to leave the Kremlin. The fire raged until September 18 and destroyed most of Moscow.

Up to 400 lower-class citizens were shot by a French court-martial on suspicion of arson.

There are several versions of the fire - organized arson when leaving the city (usually associated with the name of F. V. Rostopchin), arson by Russian spies (several Russians were shot by the French on such charges), uncontrolled actions of the invaders, an accidental fire, the spread of which was facilitated by general chaos in the abandoned city. There were several sources of fire, so it is possible that all versions are true to some extent.

Kutuzov, retreating from Moscow south to the Ryazan road, made the famous Tarutinsky maneuver. Having knocked Murat off the trail of the pursuing cavalrymen, Kutuzov turned west from the Ryazan road through Podolsk to the old Kaluga road, where he left on September 20 in the Krasnaya Pakhra region (near the modern city of Troitsk).

Then, convinced of the disadvantage of his position, by October 2, Kutuzov transferred the army south to the village of Tarutino, which lies along the old Kaluga road in the Kaluga region not far from the border with Moscow. With this maneuver, Kutuzov blocked the main roads to Napoleon in the southern provinces, and also created a constant threat to the rear communications of the French.

Napoleon called Moscow not a military, but a political position. From here, he makes repeated attempts to reconcile with Alexander I. In Moscow, Napoleon found himself in a trap: it was not possible to spend the winter in the city devastated by fire, foraging outside the city was not successful, the French communications stretched for thousands of kilometers were very vulnerable, the army, after suffering hardships, began to decompose. On October 5, Napoleon sent General Lauriston to Kutuzov for a pass to Alexander I with the order: “ I need the world, I need it absolutely no matter what, save only honor". Kutuzov, after a short conversation, sent Loriston back to Moscow. Napoleon began to prepare for a retreat not yet from Russia, but to winter quarters somewhere between the Dnieper and the Dvina.

Retreat of Napoleon (October-December 1812)

Napoleon's main army cut deep into Russia like a wedge. At the time when Napoleon entered Moscow, Wittgenstein's army hung over his left flank in the north in the Polotsk region, held by the French corps of Saint-Cyr and Oudinot. The right flank of Napoleon was trampling near the borders of the Russian Empire in Belarus. Tormasov's army connected the Austrian corps of Schwarzenberg and the 7th Renier corps with its presence. The French garrisons along the Smolensk road guarded Napoleon's line of communication and rear.

From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets (October 1812)

On October 18, Kutuzov attacked the French barrier under the command of Murat, who was following the Russian army near Tarutino. Having lost up to 4 thousand soldiers and 38 guns, Murat retreated to Moscow. The Tarutino battle became a landmark event that marked the transition of the Russian army to the counteroffensive.

On October 19, the French army (110 thousand) with a huge convoy began to leave Moscow along the old Kaluga road. Napoleon, on the eve of the coming winter, planned to get to the nearest major base, Smolensk, where, according to his calculations, supplies were stocked for the French army, which was experiencing hardships. It was possible to get to Smolensk in Russian off-road conditions by a direct route, the Smolensk road, along which the French came to Moscow. Another route led the southern route through Kaluga. The second route was preferable, as it passed through undestroyed places, and the loss of horses from a lack of fodder in the French army reached alarming proportions. Due to the lack of horses, the artillery park was reduced, large French cavalry formations practically disappeared.

The road to Kaluga to Napoleon was blocked by Kutuzov's army, located near Tarutino on the old Kaluga road. Not wanting to break through a fortified position with a weakened army, Napoleon turned in the area of ​​the village of Troitskoye (modern Troitsk) onto the new Kaluga road (modern Kiev highway) in order to bypass Tarutino.

However, Kutuzov transferred the army to Maloyaroslavets, cutting off the French retreat along the new Kaluga road.

On October 24, a battle took place near Maloyaroslavets. The French managed to capture Maloyaroslavets, but Kutuzov took a fortified position outside the city, which Napoleon did not dare to storm. Kutuzov's army by October 22 consisted of 97 thousand regular troops, 20 thousand Cossacks, 622 guns and more than 10 thousand militia warriors. Napoleon had at hand up to 70 thousand combat-ready soldiers, the cavalry practically disappeared, the artillery was much weaker than the Russian one. The course of the war was now dictated by the Russian army.

On October 26, Napoleon ordered a retreat north to Borovsk-Vereya-Mozhaisk. The battles for Maloyaroslavets turned out to be in vain for the French and only delayed their retreat. From Mozhaisk, the French army resumed its movement towards Smolensk along the same road along which it had advanced on Moscow.

From Maloyaroslavets to the Berezina (October-November 1812)

From Maloyaroslavets to the village of Krasnoy (45 km west of Smolensk), Napoleon was pursued by the vanguard of the Russian army under the command of Miloradovich. From all sides, the retreating French were attacked by Platov's Cossacks and partisans, without giving the enemy any opportunity for supplies. The main army of Kutuzov slowly moved south parallel to Napoleon, making the so-called flank march.

On November 1, Napoleon passed Vyazma, on November 8 he entered Smolensk, where he spent 5 days waiting for the stragglers. On November 3, the Russian avant-garde badly battered the closing corps of the French in the battle of Vyazma. At the disposal of Napoleon in Smolensk there were up to 50 thousand soldiers under arms (of which only 5 thousand cavalry), and about the same number of unfit soldiers who were wounded and lost their weapons.

Parts of the French army, greatly thinned on the march from Moscow, entered Smolensk for a whole week with the hope of rest and food. There were no large supplies of provisions in the city, and what they had was plundered by crowds of unruly soldiers of the Great Army. Napoleon ordered the execution of the French quartermaster Sioff, who, faced with the resistance of the peasants, failed to organize the collection of food.

Napoleon's strategic position deteriorated greatly, Chichagov's Danube army was approaching from the south, Wittgenstein was advancing from the north, whose vanguard captured Vitebsk on November 7, depriving the French of food supplies accumulated there.

On November 14, Napoleon with the guard moved from Smolensk following the avant-garde corps. Ney's corps, which was in the rearguard, left Smolensk only on November 17th. The column of French troops was greatly extended, since the difficulties of the road precluded a compact march of large masses of people. Kutuzov took advantage of this circumstance, cutting off the French retreat in the Krasnoye area. On November 15-18, as a result of the battles near Red, Napoleon managed to break through, losing many soldiers and most of the artillery.

The Danube army of Admiral Chichagov (24 thousand) captured Minsk on November 16, depriving Napoleon of the largest rear center. Moreover, on November 21, Chichagov's vanguard captured Borisov, where Napoleon planned to cross the Berezina. The vanguard corps of Marshal Oudinot drove Chichagov from Borisov to the western bank of the Berezina, but the Russian admiral with a strong army guarded possible crossing points.

On November 24, Napoleon approached the Berezina, breaking away from the armies of Wittgenstein and Kutuzov pursuing him.

From the Berezina to the Neman (November-December 1812)

On November 25, with a series of skillful maneuvers, Napoleon managed to divert Chichagov's attention to Borisov and south of Borisov. Chichagov believed that Napoleon intended to cross in these places in order to take a short cut to the road to Minsk and then head to join the Austrian allies. In the meantime, the French built 2 bridges north of Borisov, along which on November 26-27 Napoleon crossed to the right (western) bank of the Berezina, rejecting the weak outposts of the Russians.

Realizing the error, Chichagov attacked Napoleon with the main forces on November 28 on the right bank. On the left bank, the French rear guard, defending the crossing, was attacked by the approaching corps of Wittgenstein. The main army of Kutuzov lagged behind. Without waiting for the crossing of the entire huge crowd of French stragglers, which consisted of the wounded, frostbite, lost weapons and civilians, Napoleon ordered the bridges to be burned on the morning of November 29. The main result of the battle on the Berezina was that Napoleon avoided complete defeat in the face of a significant superiority of Russian forces. In the memoirs of the French, the crossing of the Berezina occupies no less place than the largest Battle of Borodino.

Having lost up to 30 thousand people at the crossing, Napoleon, with 9 thousand soldiers remaining under arms, moved to Vilna, joining French divisions operating in other directions along the way. The army was accompanied by a large crowd of incompetent people, mostly soldiers from the allied states who had lost their weapons. The course of the war at the final stage, a 2-week pursuit by the Russian army of the remnants of Napoleon's troops to the border of the Russian Empire, is described in the article "From the Berezina to the Neman". Severe frosts, which hit even during the crossing, finally destroyed the French, already weakened by hunger. The pursuit of the Russian troops did not allow Napoleon to gather at least a little force in Vilna, the flight of the French continued to the Neman, which separated Russia from Prussia and the buffer state of the Duchy of Warsaw.

On December 6, Napoleon left the army, going to Paris to recruit new soldiers to replace those who died in Russia. Of the 47,000 elite guards that entered Russia with the emperor, several hundred soldiers remained six months later.

On December 14, in Kovno, the miserable remnants of the "Great Army" in the amount of 1600 people crossed the Neman to Poland, and then to Prussia. Later they were joined by the remnants of troops from other directions. The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the almost complete annihilation of the invading "Great Army".

The last stage of the war was commented by the impartial observer Clausewitz:

Northern direction (October-December 1812)

After the 2nd battle for Polotsk (October 18-20), which took place 2 months after the 1st, Marshal Saint-Cyr retreated south to Chashniki, dangerously bringing Wittgenstein's advancing army closer to Napoleon's rear line. During these days, Napoleon began his retreat from Moscow. Marshal Viktor's 9th Corps was immediately sent to help from Smolensk, arriving in September as Napoleon's reserve from Europe. The combined forces of the French reached 36 thousand soldiers, which roughly corresponded to the forces of Wittgenstein. The oncoming battle took place on October 31 near Chashniki, as a result of which the French were defeated and rolled back even further south.

Vitebsk remained uncovered, a detachment from Wittgenstein's army stormed this city on November 7, capturing 300 soldiers of the garrison and food supplies for the retreating army of Napoleon. On November 14, Marshal Victor, near the village of Smolyany, tried to throw Wittgenstein back behind the Dvina, but to no avail, and the parties maintained their positions until Napoleon approached the Berezina. Victor then, linking up with the main army, retreated to the Berezina as Napoleon's rearguard, holding back Wittgenstein's pressure.

In the Baltics near Riga, a positional war was fought with occasional Russian sorties against MacDonald's corps. The Finnish corps of General Steingel (12 thousand) approached on September 20 to help the garrison of Riga, however, after a successful sortie on September 29 against the French siege artillery, Steingel was transferred to Wittgenstein in Polotsk to the theater of the main hostilities. On November 15, MacDonald, in turn, successfully attacked the Russian positions, almost destroying a large Russian detachment.

The 10th Corps of Marshal MacDonald began to withdraw from Riga towards Prussia only on December 19, after the miserable remnants of Napoleon's main army had left Russia. On December 26, MacDonald's troops had to engage in battle with Wittgenstein's vanguard. On December 30, the Russian General Dibich concluded an armistice agreement with the commander of the Prussian corps, General York, known at the place of signing as the Taurogen Convention. Thus, MacDonald lost his main forces, he had to hastily retreat through East Prussia.

South direction (October-December 1812)

On September 18, Admiral Chichagov with an army (38 thousand) approached from the Danube to the sedentary southern front in the Lutsk region. The combined forces of Chichagov and Tormasov (65 thousand) attacked Schwarzenberg (40 thousand), forcing the latter to leave for Poland in mid-October. Chichagov, who took over the main command after Tormasov's recall, gave the troops a 2-week rest, after which on October 27 he moved from Brest-Litovsk to Minsk with 24,000 soldiers, leaving General Saken with a 27,000-strong corps against the Schwarzenberg Austrians.

Schwarzenberg chased Chichagov, outflanking the positions of Saken and hiding from his troops by the Saxon corps of Rainier. Renier failed to hold onto Sacken's superior forces, and Schwarzenberg was forced to turn on the Russians from Slonim. Together, Rainier and Schwarzenberg drove Saken south of Brest-Litovsk, however, as a result, Chichagov's army broke through to the rear of Napoleon and occupied Minsk on November 16, and on November 21 approached Borisov on the Berezina, where the retreating Napoleon planned to cross.

On November 27, Schwarzenberg, on the orders of Napoleon, moved to Minsk, but stopped in Slonim, from where on December 14 he retreated through Bialystok to Poland.

Results of the Patriotic War of 1812

Napoleon, a recognized genius of military art, invaded Russia with forces three times superior to the Western Russian armies under the command of generals not marked by brilliant victories, and after six months of the company his army, the strongest in history, was completely destroyed.

The destruction of almost 550 thousand soldiers does not fit even modern Western historians. A large number of articles are devoted to the search for the causes of the defeat of the greatest commander, the analysis of the factors of war. The following reasons are most often cited - bad roads in Russia and frost, there are attempts to explain the rout by the poor harvest of 1812, which made it impossible to ensure normal supply.

The Russian campaign (in Western terms) received the name Patriotic in Russia, which explains the defeat of Napoleon. A combination of factors led to his defeat: the nationwide participation in the war, the mass heroism of soldiers and officers, the military talent of Kutuzov and other generals, and the skillful use of natural factors. The victory in the Patriotic War caused not only a rise in national spirit, but also a desire to modernize the country, which ultimately led to the Decembrist uprising in 1825.

Clausewitz, analyzing Napoleon's campaign in Russia from a military point of view, comes to the conclusion:

According to Clausewitz's calculations, the army of the invasion of Russia, together with reinforcements during the war, consisted of 610 thousand soldier, including 50 thousand soldiers of Austria and Prussia. While the Austrians and Prussians, operating in secondary directions, mostly survived, from the main army of Napoleon gathered behind the Vistula by January 1813, only 23 thousand soldier. Napoleon lost in Russia over 550 thousand trained soldiers, the entire elite guard, over 1200 guns.

According to the estimates of the Prussian official Auerswald, by December 21, 1812, 255 generals, 5111 officers, 26950 lower ranks, "in a miserable condition and mostly unarmed" passed through East Prussia from the Great Army. Many of them, according to the testimony of Count Segur, died of disease, reaching safe territory. To this number must be added about 6 thousand soldiers (who returned to the French army) from the corps of Renier and MacDonald, who operated in other directions. Apparently, from all these returning soldiers, 23 thousand (mentioned by Clausewitz) gathered later under the command of the French. The relatively large number of surviving officers allowed Napoleon to organize a new army, calling on the recruits of 1813.

In a report to Emperor Alexander I, Field Marshal Kutuzov estimated the total number of French prisoners in 150 thousand man (December, 1812).

Although Napoleon managed to raise fresh forces, their fighting qualities could not replace the dead veterans. The Patriotic War in January 1813 turned into the "Foreign campaign of the Russian army": the fighting moved to the territory of Germany and France. In October 1813, Napoleon was defeated in the Battle of Leipzig and in April 1814 abdicated the throne of France (see the article War of the Sixth Coalition).

The historian of the middle of the 19th century, M. I. Bogdanovich, traced the replenishment of the Russian armies during the war according to the records of the Military Scientific Archive of the General Staff. He counted the replenishment of the Main Army at 134 thousand people. The main army at the time of the occupation of Vilna in December had 70 thousand soldiers in its ranks, and the composition of the 1st and 2nd Western armies by the beginning of the war was up to 150 thousand soldiers. Thus, the total loss by December is 210 thousand soldiers. Of these, according to Bogdanovich, up to 40 thousand wounded and sick returned to service. The losses of the corps operating in secondary directions, and the losses of the militias can be approximately the same 40 thousand people. Based on these calculations, Bogdanovich estimates the losses of the Russian army in World War II at 210,000 soldiers and militias.

Memory of the War of 1812

On August 30, 1814, Emperor Alexander I issued a Manifesto: December 25, let the day of the Nativity of Christ be from now on also the day of a thanksgiving feast under the name in the church circle: the Nativity of our Savior Jesus Christ and the remembrance of the deliverance of the Church and the Russian Power from the invasion of the Gauls and with them twenty languages».

The highest manifesto, on bringing thanks to the Lord God for the liberation of Russia 12/25/1812

God and the whole world is a witness to this, with what desires and forces the enemy entered our beloved Fatherland. Nothing could avert his evil and stubborn intentions. Firmly relying on his own and the terrible forces he had gathered against Us from almost all European Powers, and driven by the greed of conquest and the thirst for blood, he hastened to break into the very chest of Our Great Empire in order to pour out on it all the horrors and disasters not accidentally generated, but long since devastating war prepared for them. Knowing from experience the boundless lust for power and the impudence of his enterprises, the bitter cup of evils prepared from him for Us, and seeing him with indomitable fury entered Our limits, We were forced with a painful and contrite heart, calling on God for help, to draw our sword, and to promise Our Kingdom that We will not put her in the vagina, as long as one of the enemies remains armed in Our land. We made this promise firmly in our hearts, hoping for the strong valor of the people entrusted to Us by God, in which we were not deceived. What an example of bravery, courage, piety, patience and firmness Russia showed! The enemy who had broken into her chest with all unheard-of cruelty and fury could not reach the point that she even once sighed about the deep wounds inflicted on her by him. It seemed that with the shedding of her blood, the spirit of courage multiplied in her, with the fires of her city, her love for the Fatherland was inflamed, with the destruction and desecration of the temples of God, faith was affirmed in her and irreconcilable revenge arose. The army, the nobles, the nobility, the clergy, the merchants, the people, in a word, all the state ranks and states, sparing neither their property nor their lives, made up a single soul, a soul together courageous and pious, as much burning with love for the Fatherland, as much with love for God. . From this universal consent and zeal, consequences soon arose, hardly incredible, hardly ever heard of. Let them imagine the terrible forces gathered from 20 Kingdoms and peoples, united under a single banner, with what power-hungry, arrogant victories, a ferocious enemy entered Our land! Half a million foot and cavalry soldiers and about one and a half thousand guns followed him. With this huge militia, he penetrates into the very middle of Russia, spreads, and begins to spread fire and devastation everywhere. But barely six months have passed since he entered Our borders, and where is he? Here it is proper to say the words of the sacred Song-Singer: “The sight of the wicked is exalted and exalted, like the cedars of Lebanon. And they went past, behold, they did not, and sought him, and did not find his place. Truly, this lofty saying was accomplished in all the power of its meaning over Our proud and impious enemy. Where are his troops, like a cloud of black clouds driven by the winds? They crumbled like rain. A great part of them, having drunk the earth with blood, lies, covering the space of the Moscow, Kaluga, Smolensk, Belorussian and Lithuanian fields. Another great part in various and frequent battles was taken prisoner with many Commanders and Generals, and in such a way that after repeated and strong defeats, finally, their entire regiments, resorting to the generosity of the victors, bowed their weapons before them. The rest, an equally great part, in their swift flight, driven by our victorious troops and met with scum and famine, covered the path from Moscow itself to the borders of Russia with corpses, cannons, carts, shells, so that the smallest, insignificant part of the exhausted and unarmed warriors, hardly half-dead can come to their country, in order to tell them to the eternal horror and trembling of their fellow earthmen, since a terrible execution befalls those who dare with swearing intentions to enter the bowels of mighty Russia. Now, with heartfelt joy and ardent gratitude to God, We announce to Our dear loyal subjects that the event has surpassed even Our very hope, and that what We announced, at the opening of this war, has been fulfilled beyond measure: there is no longer a single enemy on the face of Our land; or better to say, they all stayed here, but how? dead, wounded and captured. The proud ruler and their leader himself could hardly ride away with his most important officials from here, losing all his army and all the guns he brought with him, which are more than a thousand, not counting those buried and sunk by him, recaptured from him and are in Our hands. The spectacle of the death of his troops is incredible! You can hardly believe your own eyes! Who could do this? Not taking away worthy glory from either the famous Commander in Chief of our troops, who brought immortal merits to the Fatherland, or from other skillful and courageous leaders and military leaders who marked themselves with zeal and zeal; nor in general with all our brave army, we can say that what they have done is beyond human strength. And so, let us recognize in this great work the providence of God. Let us bow down before His Holy Throne, and seeing clearly His hand that punished pride and wickedness, instead of vanity and arrogance about Our victories, let us learn from this great and terrible example to be meek and humble of the laws and will of His executors, not like these defilers who have fallen away from the faith. temples of God, Our enemies, whose bodies in myriad quantities are lying around as food for dogs and crows! Great is the Lord Our God in His mercies and in His wrath! Let us go by the goodness of deeds and the purity of Our feelings and thoughts, the only way leading to Him, to the temple of His holiness, and there, crowned by His hand with glory, let us give thanks for the bounty poured out on us, and let us fall down to Him with warm prayers, may He prolong His mercy over Nami, and stopping wars and battles, He will send victories to Us; desired peace and quiet.

The Christmas holiday was also celebrated as modern Victory Day until 1917.

To commemorate the victory in the war, many monuments and memorials were erected, of which the most famous are the Cathedral of Christ the Savior and the ensemble of Palace Square with the Alexander Column. In painting, a grandiose project has been implemented, the Military Gallery, which consists of 332 portraits of Russian generals who participated in the Patriotic War of 1812. One of the most famous works of Russian literature was the epic novel "War and Peace", where L. N. Tolstoy tried to comprehend global human issues against the backdrop of war. The Soviet film War and Peace, based on the novel, won an Oscar in 1968; large-scale battle scenes in it are still considered unsurpassed.

Russia's war for freedom and independence against the aggression of France and its allies.

It was the result of deep political contradictions between the France of Emperor Napoleon I Bonaparte, striving for European domination, and the Russian Empire, which opposed its political and territorial claims.

On the part of France, the war was of a coalition character. The Confederation of the Rhine alone supplied 150,000 men to the Napoleonic army. 8 army corps were made up of foreign contingents. There were about 72 thousand Poles, over 36 thousand Prussians, about 31 thousand Austrians, a significant number of representatives of other European states in the Great Army. The total number of the French army was about 1200 thousand people. More than half of it was intended for the invasion of Russia.

By June 1, 1812, the Napoleonic invasion forces included the imperial guard, 12 infantry corps, cavalry reserve (4 corps), artillery and engineering parks - a total of 678 thousand people and about 2.8 thousand guns.

As a springboard for the attack, Napoleon I used the Duchy of Warsaw. His strategic plan was to quickly defeat the main forces of the Russian army in a general battle, capture Moscow and impose a peace treaty on the terms of France on the Russian Empire. The enemy invasion forces were deployed in 2 echelons. The 1st echelon consisted of 3 groups (a total of 444 thousand people, 940 guns), located between the Neman and Vistula rivers. The 1st grouping (troops of the left wing, 218 thousand people, 527 guns) under the direct command of Napoleon I concentrated at the Elbing (now Elblag), Thorn (now Torun) line for an offensive through Kovno (now Kaunas) to Vilna (now Vilnius) . The 2nd grouping (gen. E. Beauharnais; 82 thousand people, 208 guns) was intended for an offensive in the zone between Grodno and Kovno in order to separate the Russian 1st and 2nd Western armies. The 3rd grouping (under the command of the brother of Napoleon I - J. Bonaparte; troops of the right wing, 78 thousand people, 159 guns) had the task of moving from Warsaw to Grodno to pull back the Russian 2nd Western Army to facilitate the offensive of the main forces . These troops were to surround and destroy the Russian 1st and 2nd Western armies in parts with enveloping strikes. On the left wing, the invasion of the 1st group of troops was provided by the Prussian corps (32 thousand people) of Marshal J. MacDonald. On the right wing, the invasion of the 3rd group of troops was provided by the Austrian corps (34 thousand people) of Field Marshal K. Schwarzenberg. In the rear, between the rivers Vistula and Oder, there were troops of the 2nd echelon (170 thousand people, 432 guns) and a reserve (corps of Marshal P. Augereau and other troops).

The Russian Empire, after a series of anti-Napoleonic wars, remained in international isolation by the beginning of World War II, experiencing, moreover, financial and economic difficulties. In the two pre-war years, its spending on the needs of the army amounted to more than half of the state budget. Russian troops at the western borders had about 220 thousand people and 942 guns. They were deployed in 3 groups: the 1st Western Army (general of infantry; 6 infantry, 2 cavalry and 1 Cossack corps; about 128 thousand people, 558 guns) made up the main forces and was located between the Rossiens (now Raseiniai, Lithuania) and Lida; The 2nd Western Army (an infantry general; 2 infantry, 1 cavalry corps and 9 Cossack regiments; about 49 thousand people, 216 guns) concentrated between the Neman and Bug rivers; The 3rd Western Army (Cavalry General A.P. Tormasov; 3 infantry, 1 cavalry corps and 9 Cossack regiments; 43 thousand people, 168 guns) was stationed in the Lutsk region. In the Riga region there was a separate corps (18.5 thousand people) of Lieutenant General I. N. Essen. The nearest reserves (corps of Lieutenant General P. I. Meller-Zakomelsky and Lieutenant General F. F. Ertel) were located in the areas of the cities of Toropets and Mozyr. In the south, in Podolia, the Danube army (about 30 thousand people) of Admiral P.V. Chichagov was concentrated. All armies were led by the emperor, who was with his main apartment at the 1st Western Army. The commander-in-chief was not appointed, but Barclay de Tolly, being the minister of war, had the right to issue orders on behalf of the emperor. The Russian armies stretched out on the front with a length of over 600 km, and the main enemy forces - 300 km. This put the Russian troops in a difficult position. By the beginning of the enemy invasion, Alexander I accepted the plan proposed by the military adviser - the Prussian General K. Ful. According to his plan, the 1st Western Army, retreating from the border, was to take refuge in a fortified camp, and the 2nd Western Army to go to the flank and rear of the enemy.

According to the nature of military events in the Patriotic War, 2 periods are distinguished. The 1st period - from the invasion of the French troops on June 12 (24) to October 5 (17) - includes defensive actions, the flank Tarutinsky march-maneuver of the Russian troops, their preparation for the offensive and partisan operations on enemy communications. 2nd period - from the transition of the Russian army to the counteroffensive on October 6 (18) to the defeat of the enemy and the complete liberation of the Russian land on December 14 (26).

The pretext for attacking the Russian Empire was the alleged violation by Alexander I of the main, according to Napoleon I, provision - "to be in eternal alliance with France and at war with England", which manifested itself in the sabotage of the continental blockade by the Russian Empire. On June 10 (22), Napoleon I, through the ambassador in St. Petersburg, Zh. A. Loriston, officially declared war on Russia, and on June 12 (24) the French army began crossing the Neman on 4 bridges (near Kovno and other cities). Having received news of the invasion of French troops, Alexander I made an attempt to resolve the conflict peacefully, calling on the French emperor to "withdraw his troops from Russian territory." However, Napoleon I rejected this proposal.

Under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the 1st and 2nd Western armies began to retreat inland. The 1st Western Army left Vilna and retreated to the Drissa camp (near the city of Drissa, now Verhnedvinsk, Belarus), increasing the gap with the 2nd Western Army to 200 km. The main enemy forces rushed into it on June 26 (July 8), occupying Minsk and creating the threat of defeating the Russian armies one by one. The 1st and 2nd Western armies, intending to unite, retreated in converging directions: the 1st Western Army from Drissa through Polotsk to Vitebsk (the corps of a lieutenant general was left to cover the St. Petersburg direction, from November the general of infantry P. Kh. Wittgenstein), and the 2nd Western Army from Slonim to Nesvizh, Bobruisk, Mstislavl.

The war stirred up the entire Russian society: peasants, merchants, commoners. By mid-summer, self-defense units began to be spontaneously created in the occupied territory to protect their villages from French raids. foragers and looters (see Looting). Assessing the importance, the Russian military command took measures to expand and institutionalize it. For this purpose, army partisan detachments were created in the 1st and 2nd Western armies on the basis of regular troops. In addition, according to the manifesto of Emperor Alexander I of July 6 (18), in Central Russia and the Volga region recruitment was carried out into the people's militia. Its creation, acquisition, financing and supply was led by a Special Committee. A significant contribution to the fight against foreign invaders was made by the Orthodox Church, which called on the people to protect their state and religious shrines, collected about 2.5 million rubles for the needs of the Russian army (from the church treasury and as a result of donations from parishioners).

On July 8 (20), the French occupied Mogilev and prevented the Russian armies from joining in the Orsha region. Only thanks to stubborn rearguard battles and maneuver did the Russian armies unite near Smolensk on July 22 (August 3). By this time, Wittgenstein's corps retreated to the line north of Polotsk and, having pinned down the enemy's forces, weakened his main grouping. The 3rd Western Army after the battles on July 15 (27) near Kobrin, and on July 31 (August 12) near Gorodechnaya (now both cities are in the Brest region, Belarus), where it inflicted heavy damage on the enemy, defended itself on the river. Styr.

The outbreak of war upset the strategic plan of Napoleon I. The Grand Army lost up to 150 thousand people in killed, wounded, sick and deserters. Its combat effectiveness and discipline began to decline, the pace of the offensive slowed down. Napoleon I was forced on July 17 (29) to give an order to stop his army for 7-8 days in the area from Velizh to Mogilev to rest and wait for the approach of reserves and rears. Obeying the will of Alexander I, who demanded active action, the military council of the 1st and 2nd Western armies decided to take advantage of the dispersed position of the enemy and break the front of his main forces with a counterattack in the direction of Rudnya and Porechye (now the city of Demidov). On July 26 (August 7), Russian troops launched a counteroffensive, but due to poor organization and lack of coordination, it did not bring the expected results. The battles that began near Rudnya and Porechye were used by Napoleon I to suddenly cross the Dnieper, threatening to take Smolensk. The troops of the 1st and 2nd Western armies began to retreat to Smolensk in order to reach the Moscow road before the enemy. During the Battle of Smolensk in 1812, the Russian armies, by active defense and skillful maneuvering of reserves, managed to avoid the general battle imposed by Napoleon I in unfavorable conditions and retreat to Dorogobuzh on the night of August 6 (18). The enemy continued to advance on Moscow.

The duration of the retreat caused a murmur among the soldiers and officers of the Russian army, general discontent in Russian society. The departure from Smolensk aggravated hostile relations between P. I. Bagration and M. B. Barclay de Tolly. This forced Alexander I to establish the post of commander-in-chief of all active Russian armies and appoint general of infantry (from August 19 (31) field marshal) M. I. Kutuzov, head of the St. Petersburg and Moscow militias. Kutuzov arrived in the army on August 17 (29) and took over the main command.

Having found a position near Tsarev Zaimishch (now the village of the Vyazemsky district of the Smolensk region), where Barclay de Tolly on August 19 (31) intended to give the enemy a battle, unprofitable, and the army’s forces were insufficient, Kutuzov withdrew his troops to several crossings to the east and stopped in front of Mozhaisk, near the village Borodino, on a field that made it possible to advantageously position troops and block the Old and New Smolensk roads. Arrived reserves under the command of an infantry general, the Moscow and Smolensk militias made it possible to bring the forces of the Russian army to 132 thousand people and 624 guns. Napoleon I had a force of about 135 thousand people and 587 guns. None of the parties achieved their goals: Napoleon I was unable to defeat the Russian army, Kutuzov - to block the path of the Great Army to Moscow. The Napoleonic army, having lost about 50 thousand people (according to French data, over 30 thousand people) and most of the cavalry, was seriously weakened. Kutuzov, having received information about the losses of the Russian army (44 thousand people), refused to continue the battle and gave the order to retreat.

Departing to Moscow, he hoped to partially make up for the losses incurred and give a new battle. But the position chosen by the cavalry general L. L. Bennigsen near the walls of Moscow turned out to be extremely unfavorable. Taking into account the fact that the first actions of the partisans showed high efficiency, Kutuzov ordered to take them under the control of the Main Headquarters of the army in the field, entrusting their leadership to the duty general of the headquarters, General.-l. P. P. Konovnitsyna. At a military council in the village of Fili (now within the boundaries of Moscow) on September 1 (13), Kutuzov ordered that Moscow be left without a fight. Most of the population left the city with the troops. On the very first day of the entry of the French into Moscow, fires began, which lasted until September 8 (20) and devastated the city. While the French were in Moscow, partisan detachments surrounded the city in an almost continuous mobile ring, not allowing the enemy foragers to move further from it for 15-30 km. The most active were the actions of army partisan detachments, I. S. Dorokhov, A. N. Seslavin and A. S. Figner.

Leaving Moscow, Russian troops retreated along the Ryazan road. After walking 30 km, they crossed the Moskva River and turned west. Then, with a forced march, they crossed to the Tula road and on September 6 (18) concentrated in the Podolsk region. After 3 days they were already on the Kaluga road and on September 9 (21) camped near the village of Krasnaya Pakhra (since 1.7.2012 within Moscow). Having made 2 more crossings, Russian troops on September 21 (October 3) concentrated near the village of Tarutino (now the village of Zhukovsky district of the Kaluga region). As a result of a skillfully organized and executed march maneuver, they broke away from the enemy and took up an advantageous position for a counteroffensive.

The active participation of the population in the partisan movement turned the war from a confrontation between regular armies into a nationwide war. The main forces of the Great Army and all its communications from Moscow to Smolensk were threatened by Russian troops. The French lost their freedom of maneuver and activity in action. For them, the paths were closed in the province south of Moscow, not devastated by the war. The “small war” launched by Kutuzov further complicated the position of the enemy. The bold operations of the army and peasant partisan detachments disrupted the supply of the French troops. Realizing the critical situation, Napoleon I sent General J. Lauriston to the headquarters of the Russian commander in chief with peace proposals addressed to Alexander I. Kutuzov rejected them, saying that the war was just beginning and would not stop until the enemy was completely driven out of Russia.

The Russian army, located in the Tarutinsky camp, reliably covered the south of the country: Kaluga with military reserves concentrated there, Tula and Bryansk with weapons and foundries. At the same time, reliable communications were provided with the 3rd Western and Danube armies. In the Tarutinsky camp, the troops were reorganized, understaffed (their number was increased to 120 thousand people), supplied with weapons, ammunition and food. Artillery now had 2 times more than the enemy, cavalry outnumbered 3.5 times. The provincial militias numbered 100 thousand people. They covered Moscow in a semicircle along the lines of Klin, Kolomna, Aleksin. Under Tarutin, M. I. Kutuzov developed a plan to encircle and defeat the Great Army in the interfluve of the Western Dvina and Dnieper with the main forces of the army in the field, the Danube army of P. V. Chichagov and the corps of P. Kh. Wittgenstein.

The first blow was struck on October 6 (18) against the vanguard of the French army on the Chernishnya River (Battle of Tarutino 1812). The troops of Marshal I. Murat in this battle lost 2.5 thousand killed and 2 thousand prisoners. Napoleon I was forced to leave Moscow on October 7 (19), and on October 10 (22) advanced detachments of Russian troops entered it. The French lost about 5 thousand people and began to retreat along the Old Smolensk road, which they had devastated. Tarutinsky battle and the battle near Maloyaroslavets marked a radical turning point in the war. The strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Russian command. Since that time, the combat operations of the Russian troops and partisans have become active and included such methods of armed struggle as parallel pursuit and encirclement of enemy troops. The persecution was carried out in several directions: north of the Smolensk road, a detachment of Major General P.V. Golenishchev-Kutuzov was operating; along the Smolensk road - the Cossack regiments of the general from the cavalry; south of the Smolensk road - the vanguard of M. A. Miloradovich and the main forces of the Russian army. Having overtaken the rearguard of the enemy near Vyazma, Russian troops defeated him on October 22 (November 3) - the French lost about 8.5 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, then in the battles near Dorogobuzh, near Dukhovshchina, near the village of Lyakhovo (now the Glinsky district of Smolensk region) - more than 10 thousand people.

The surviving part of the Napoleonic army retreated to Smolensk, but there were no food supplies and reserves there. Napoleon I began to hastily withdraw his troops further. But in the battles near Krasnoye, and then near Molodechno, Russian troops defeated the French. Scattered parts of the enemy retreated to the river on the road to Borisov. The 3rd Western Army also approached the connection with the corps of P. H. Wittgenstein. Its troops occupied Minsk on November 4 (16), and on November 9 (21) P. V. Chichagov’s army approached Borisov and, after a battle with a detachment of General Y. Kh. Dombrovsky, occupied the city and the right bank of the Berezina. Wittgenstein's corps, after a stubborn battle with the French corps of Marshal L. Saint-Cyr, captured Polotsk on October 8 (20). Having crossed the Western Dvina, Russian troops occupied Lepel (now the Vitebsk region, Belarus) and defeated the French at Chashniki. With the approach of Russian troops to the Berezina, a “bag” was formed in the Borisov region, in which the retreating French troops were surrounded. However, Wittgenstein's indecisiveness and Chichagov's mistakes made it possible for Napoleon I to prepare a crossing over the Berezina and avoid the complete annihilation of his army. Having reached Smorgon (now the Grodno region, Belarus), on November 23 (December 5), Napoleon I left for Paris, and the remnants of his army were almost completely destroyed.

On December 14 (26), Russian troops occupied Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk (now Brest), completing the liberation of the territory of the Russian Empire. M. I. Kutuzov on December 21, 1812 (January 2, 1813), in an order for the army, congratulated the troops on the expulsion of the enemy from the country and urged "to complete the defeat of the enemy on his own fields."

The victory in the Patriotic War of 1812 preserved the independence of Russia, and the defeat of the Great Army not only dealt a crushing blow to the military power of Napoleonic France, but also played a decisive role in the liberation of a number of European states from French expansion, intensified the liberation struggle of the Spanish people, etc. As a result of the Russian army of 1813 -14 and the liberation struggle of the peoples of Europe, the Napoleonic empire collapsed. At the same time, the victory in the Patriotic War was used to strengthen the autocracy both in the Russian Empire and in Europe. Alexander I led the Holy Alliance created by European monarchs, whose activities were aimed at suppressing the revolutionary, republican and liberation movements in Europe. The Napoleonic army lost in Russia over 500 thousand people, all the cavalry and almost all the artillery (only the corps of J. MacDonald and K. Schwarzenberg survived); Russian troops - about 300 thousand people.

The Patriotic War of 1812 is notable for its large spatial scope, intensity, and variety of strategic and tactical forms of armed struggle. The military art of Napoleon I, which surpassed the military art of all the armies of Europe at that time, collapsed in a clash with the Russian army. The Russian strategy surpassed the Napoleonic strategy, designed for a short-term campaign. M. I. Kutuzov skillfully used the popular character of the war and, taking into account political and strategic factors, implemented his plan to fight the Napoleonic army. The experience of the Patriotic War helped to consolidate the tactics of columns and loose formation in the actions of the troops, to increase the role of aimed fire, to improve the interaction of infantry, cavalry and artillery; the form of organization of military formations - divisions and corps - was firmly entrenched. The reserve became an integral part of the battle order, and the role of artillery in battle increased.

The Patriotic War of 1812 occupies an important place in the history of Russia. She demonstrated the unity of all classes in the fight against foreigners. aggression, was the most important factor in the formation of self-consciousness in Rus. people. Under the influence of the victory over Napoleon I, the ideology of the Decembrists began to take shape. The experience of the war was generalized in the works of domestic and foreign military historians, the patriotism of the Russian people and the army inspired the work of Russian writers, artists, composers. The victory in the Patriotic War is associated with the construction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, numerous churches throughout the Russian Empire; military trophies were kept in the Kazan Cathedral. The events of the Patriotic War are captured in numerous monuments on the Borodino field, in Maloyaroslavets and Tarutino, are reflected in the triumphal arches in Moscow and St. Petersburg, in the paintings of the Winter Palace, in the Borodino Battle panorama in Moscow, etc. A huge memoir literature has been preserved about the Patriotic War.

Additional literature:

Akhsharumov D.I. Description of the war of 1812 St. Petersburg, 1819;

Buturlin D.P. The history of the invasion of Emperor Napoleon on Russia in 1812, 2nd ed. SPb., 1837-1838. Ch. 1-2;

Okunev N.A. Discourse on the great hostilities, battles and battles that took place during the invasion of Russia in 1812, 2nd ed. SPb., 1841;

Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky A.I. Description of the Patriotic War of 1812, 3rd ed. SPb., 1843;

Bogdanovich M.I. History of the Patriotic War of 1812 according to reliable sources. SPb., 1859-1860. T. 1-3;

Patriotic War of 1812: Materials of the Military Scientific Archive. Dep. 1-2. SPb., 1900-1914. [Issue. 1-22];

Patriotic war and Russian society, 1812-1912. M., 1911-1912. T. 1-7;

Great Patriotic War: 1812 St. Petersburg, 1912;

Zhilin P.A. The counteroffensive of the Russian army in 1812, 2nd ed. M., 1953;

he is. The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia. 2nd ed. M., 1974;

he is. Patriotic War of 1812 3rd ed. M., 1988;

M. I. Kutuzov: [Documents and materials]. M., 1954-1955. T. 4. Ch. 1-2;

1812: Sat. articles. M., 1962;

Babkin V.I. People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812 M., 1962;

Beskrovny L.G. Patriotic War of 1812. M., 1962;

Korneichik E.I. Belarusian people in the Patriotic War of 1812 Minsk, 1962;

Sirotkin V.G. Duel of two diplomats: Russia and France in 1801-1812. M., 1966;

he is. Alexander the First and Napoleon: a duel on the eve of the war. M., 2012;

Tartakovsky A.G. 1812 and Russian memoirs: The experience of source studies. M., 1980;

Abalikhin B.S., Dunaevsky V.A. 1812 at the crossroads of opinions of Soviet historians, 1917-1987. M., 1990;

1812. Memoirs of the soldiers of the Russian army: From the collection of the Department of Written Sources of the State Historical Museum. M., 1991;

Tarle E.V. Napoleon's invasion of Russia, 1812. M., 1992;

he is. 1812: Chosen. works. M., 1994;

1812 in the memoirs of contemporaries. M., 1995;

Gulyaev Yu.N., Soglaev V.T. Field Marshal Kutuzov: [Historical and biographical essay]. M., 1995;

Russian archive: History of the Fatherland in evidence and documents of the 18th-20th centuries. M., 1996. Issue. 7;

Kirkheyzen F. Napoleon I: In 2 vols. M., 1997;

Chandler D. Napoleon's Military Campaigns: The Triumph and Tragedy of the Conqueror. M., 1999;

Sokolov O.V. Napoleon's army. SPb., 1999;

Shein I.A. War of 1812 in Russian historiography. M., 2002.