Losses of the USSR after the Second World War. World War II statistics

Loss.ru

Chapter 11

................................................. ........... CONCLUSIONS From the above, it should be concluded that the fire superiority of the Red Army over the German army. Moreover, this fire superiority cannot be explained by quantitative superiority in gun barrels. Moreover, as a result of poor transport equipment, the Red Army made little use of its mortar weapons at the battalion and regimental level. After all, an 82 mm mine weighs 3 kg, and 30 pieces are fired per minute. For 10 minutes of shooting, you need 900 kg of ammunition for a mortar. Of course, the transport was provided primarily by artillery, not mortars. It turned out that a maneuverable, light artillery weapon was tied to ammunition points, and could not work in the interests of the battalions. The problem was solved by mixing mortars into mortar regiments, where they could be supplied with ammunition centrally. But as a result, the battalion, regimental and even divisional level turned out to be weaker than the German one, because mortars made up half of the trunks in the division in the pre-war states. The anti-tank artillery of the Soviet rifle divisions was weaker than the German one. As a result, three-inch light artillery regiments rolled out for direct fire. There were not enough air defense systems. We had to divert heavy machine guns and anti-tank rifles from the first line for these purposes. Due to what was fire superiority achieved from the first days of the war? Fire superiority by the Red Army was achieved through skill and courage. This is confirmed not only by the calculations of personnel losses, but also by the losses of military equipment, property, and transport.

Here is Halder's entry dated 11/18/41 says that out of 0.5 million vehicles that were in the German army on 06/22/41, 150 thousand were irretrievably lost and 275 thousand needed repair, and 300 thousand were needed for this repair. tons of spare parts. That is, about 1.1 tons of spare parts are needed to repair one car. What condition are these cars in? From them, only the frames remained! If we add to them those cars from which there are not even frames left, it turns out that all cars produced by German car factories in a year burn out in Russia in less than six months. So Hitler was worried about this circumstance, so Halder was forced to discuss these issues with General Bule.

But cars are not fighting in the first line of troops. What happened in the first line? Hell is hell! Now we need to compare all this with the losses of auto-tractor equipment in the Red Army. With the outbreak of war, the production of cars and tractors was sharply reduced in favor of tanks, and the production of artillery tractors ceased altogether. Nevertheless, by the autumn of 1942, the Soviet Union had lost only half of the pre-war fleet of artillery tractors, mainly in encirclement, and then, until the very victory, used the remaining half, with practically no losses in them. If the Germans in the first six months of the war lost almost all the vehicles that they had in the army at the beginning of the war, then the Soviet army lost 33% of the available and received vehicles over the same period. And for the whole of 1942, 14%. And by the end of the war, car losses were reduced to 3-5%.

But these losses repeat, according to the form of the loss graph, the irretrievable losses of the personnel of the Red Army, with the only difference being that the average monthly loss of vehicles is 10-15 times less. But after all, the number of cars at the front was just as many times less. It can be assumed that the loss of vehicles from enemy fire in 1941 in the Red Army was no more than 5-10%, and 23-28% of losses were due to maneuvering actions of German troops, encirclement. That is, the loss of vehicles can also serve to characterize the loss of personnel. Because they also reflect the fire capabilities of the parties. That is, if the fascist troops lose 90% of vehicles in 1941, then almost all of these losses are losses from the fire of the Soviet troops, and this is 15% of losses per month. It can be seen that the Soviet army is at least 1.5-3 times more effective than the German army.

In an entry dated December 9, 1941, Halder writes about the irretrievable average daily loss of 1,100 horses. Considering that horses were not put in the battle line and that horses at the front are 10 times less than people, the figure of 9465 people of average daily irretrievable losses for December 1941 from table 6 receives additional confirmation.

German losses in tanks can be estimated based on their availability at the beginning and end of the period of interest. As of June 1941, the Germans had about 5,000 of their own and Czechoslovak vehicles. In addition, Halder's entry dated December 23, 1940 indicates the figure of 4930 captured vehicles, mostly French. There are about 10,000 cars in total. At the end of 1941, the German tank forces were equipped with tanks by 20-30%, that is, about 3000 vehicles remained in stock, of which about 500-600 captured French, which were then transferred from the front to protect the rear areas. Halder also writes about this. Even without taking into account the tanks produced by the German industry in six months, without taking into account Soviet captured tanks used by the Germans, Soviet troops irretrievably destroyed about 7,000 German vehicles, not counting armored cars and armored personnel carriers, in the first 6 months of the war. In four years, this will amount to 56,000 vehicles destroyed by the Red Army. If we add here 3,800 tanks produced by the German industry in 1941 and 1,300 captured Soviet tanks captured by the Germans at storage bases, we get more than 12,000 destroyed German vehicles in the first six months of the war. During the war years, Germany produced about 50,000 vehicles, and the Germans had 10,000 vehicles before the war, as we calculated. The allies of the USSR could destroy 4-5 thousand tanks or so. Soviet troops lost about 100,000 tanks and self-propelled guns during the war, but it must be understood that the operational life of Soviet tanks was significantly less. Here there is a different approach to life, to technology, to war. Different ways to use tanks. Different tank ideology. The Soviet principles of tank building are well described in the trilogy by Mikhail Svirin under the general title "The History of the Soviet Tank 1919-1955", Moscow, "Yauza", "Eksmo", ("The armor is strong, 1919-1937", "Stalin's armor shield, 1937-1943 "," Stalin's Steel Fist, 1943-1955"). Soviet wartime tanks were calculated for one operation, had a resource of 100-200 km at the beginning of the war, up to 500 km by the end of the war, which reflected views on the operational use of tanks and the military economy. After the war, the resource of tanks had to be increased by a number of measures to 10-15 years of service, based on the needs of the peacetime economy and the new concept of the accumulation of weapons. Thus, tanks were initially conceived not to be spared. This is a weapon, why spare it, they need to fight. That is, the losses in the tanks of the USSR are 1.5-2 times higher, and the losses of people are 1.5-2 times lower.

In this case, it should be borne in mind that the Germans could restore up to 70% of the wrecked tanks within a week, according to Guderian. This means that if out of a hundred German tanks that entered the battle at the beginning of the month, 20 vehicles remained by the end of the month, then with irretrievable losses of 80 vehicles, the number of hits may exceed 250. And such a figure will appear in the reports of the Soviet troops. However, the Soviet General Staff, more or less accurately, corrected the reports of the troops, taking into account this circumstance. Therefore, in the operational report for December 16, 1941, announced by the Soviet Information Bureau, it is said that the Germans lost 15,000 tanks, 19,000 guns, about 13,000 aircraft and 6,000,000 people killed, wounded and captured in the first five months of the war. These figures are quite consistent with my calculations and quite accurately reflect the real losses of the German troops. If they are overpriced, then not very much, given the then situation. In any case, the Soviet General Staff assessed the situation much more realistically than the German General Staff even in 1941. In the future, the estimates became even more accurate.

The losses of aircraft by the German side are considered in the book by Kornyukhin G.V. "Air War over the USSR. 1941", LLC "Publishing House" Veche ", 2008. There is a table of calculations of the losses of German aircraft without taking into account training machines.

Table 18:

* The number of aircraft surrendered after the surrender
** According to the reference book "Soviet Aviation in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 in Figures"
*** An attempt to calculate the "squeeze" from the documents of the quartermaster general of the Luftwaffe, carried out by R. Larintsev and A. Zabolotsky.
**** For 1945, the Quartermaster General's papers could not be found, apparently he was tired of preparing propaganda opuses. It is unlikely that the Quartermaster General quit his job and went on vacation, rather, he quit the secondary work that the Ministry of Propaganda entrusted to him.

Table 18 shows that modern ideas about German losses in aviation are completely untrue. It can also be seen that the Soviet data differ significantly from the theoretically calculated values ​​only in 1945 and 1941. In 1945, the discrepancies are due to the fact that half of the German aviation refused to fly, and was abandoned by the Germans at the airfields. In 1941, the discrepancy was formed from the poorly organized by the Soviet side accounting for downed German aircraft in the first two or three months of the war. And in the post-war history, the estimated figures from the time of the war, voiced by the Soviet Information Bureau, were ashamed to enter. Thus, 62936 German aircraft destroyed by the Soviet side are clearly visible. The combat losses of the Soviet Air Force amounted to 43,100 combat vehicles during the war. However, non-combat losses of combat vehicles of the Soviet Air Force are practically the same as combat ones. Here again the difference in the quality of technology and the attitude towards it is visible. This difference was fully recognized by the Soviet leadership; the USSR could compete with united Europe in the volume of military production only if it had a completely different view of the quality, nature and use of these products. Soviet vehicles, especially fighters, wore out very quickly in wartime conditions. Nevertheless, plywood-linen aircraft with engine life for several flights successfully resisted all-duralumin aviation with German-quality engines.

Hitler not for nothing believed that the Soviet industry would not be able to make up for the loss of weapons, and could not, if it had strived for a symmetrical response to the German challenge. Having 3-4 times fewer workers, the Soviet Union could produce 3-4 times less labor costs.

At the same time, one should not draw a conclusion about the mass death of Soviet pilots or tankers from the imperfection of technology. Such a conclusion will not find confirmation either in memoirs, or in reports, or in statistical studies. Because he is unfaithful. It's just that in the USSR there was a technical culture different from European, a different technogenic civilization. The book cites the losses of Soviet military equipment, including decommissioned equipment that has used up its resource, which is irreparable due to a lack of spare parts and a weak repair base. It should be remembered that in terms of the development of production, the USSR had a base of only two, albeit heroic, five-year plans. Therefore, the response to European technical equipment was not symmetrical. Soviet technology was designed for a shorter, but more intensive period of operation. Rather, it was not even calculated, but it turned out like this by itself. Lendliz cars did not last long in Soviet conditions either. To produce repair forces means to tear people away from production, from war, and to produce spare parts means to occupy those capacities that can produce finished machines. Of course, all this is necessary, the question is the balance of opportunities and needs. Considering the fact that in battle all this work can burn out in a minute, and all produced spare parts and repair shops will remain out of work. Therefore, when, for example, Shirokorad in the book "Three Wars of Great Finland" complains about the unsuitability of Budenovka or about the differences in the quality of the uniforms of the fighters and commanders of the Red Army, the question arises, did he think well? In order to pursue European quality, one must have a European industry, such was Germany, and not the USSR. Budyonovka or bogatyrka is a mobilization version of a headdress, they were invented at the end of the First World War, just because production was weak. As soon as the opportunity arose, they were replaced with normal hats. Who is to blame that such an opportunity appeared only in 1940? Honorary saint and honorary pope of our kingdom, Tsar Nicholas the bloody and his satraps. Democrats from the Kerensky gang. As well as the now sung white bandits. At the same time, the Germans wore winter caps. When Shirokorad in the book "The March on Vienna" complains that the gun turrets on armored boats were installed from tanks, and were not specially designed, he does not take into account that tank turrets were mass-produced at tank factories, and specially designed turrets should have been produced in a medium series at factories shipbuilding. Does a specialist in the history of technology not see the difference? Rather, he is looking for cheap sensations where there are none. And so it is with everything. Aircraft were produced at furniture factories, and cartridges at tobacco factories. Armored cars were produced at the crushing equipment plant in Vyksa, and PPS wherever there was a cold stamping press. The anecdote about the vertical take-off harvester, famous in Soviet times, is more suitable for Stalin's time than for later times.

The labor heroism of the Soviet people played a decisive role, but one should not forget about the merits of the Soviet government, personally Stalin, who correctly set priorities in the scientific, technical, industrial and military spheres. Now it is fashionable to complain that there were few walkie-talkies and a lot of tanks, but would it be better if there were fewer tanks and more walkie-talkies? The radios don't fire. Although they are needed, but where to get the funds for everything? Where necessary, there were walkie-talkies.

In this regard, I want to focus on a key moment in the history of the war, on the preparation of pre-war industry for mobilization in wartime. Special samples and modifications of all weapons were developed for release in wartime. Special technologies were developed for implementation in non-core industries, specialists were trained to implement these technologies. Since 1937, the army began to receive modern, domestic weapons, to replace the alterations and modifications of pre-revolutionary and licensed samples. Artillery and automatic rifles were the first to be introduced. Then priority was given to tanks and combat aircraft. Their production began to unfold only in 1940. New machine guns and automatic cannons were introduced during the course of the war. It was not possible to develop the automotive and radio industries to the required extent before the war. But they set up a lot of steam locomotives and wagons, and this is much more important. The capacity of specialized factories was sorely lacking, and the mobilization of non-core enterprises, prepared even before the war, gives the right to assert that Stalin deserved the title of generalissimo even before the war, even if he had done nothing more to win. And he did a lot more!

On the anniversary of the start of the war, the Soviet Information Bureau published operational reports summarizing the results of hostilities since the start of the war on an accrual basis. It is interesting to summarize these data in a table that will give an idea of ​​the views of the Soviet command, of course, adjusted for some, forced, propaganda element in relation to their own casualties. But the nature of Soviet propaganda of that period is interesting in itself, because now it can be compared with the published data of the work.

Table 19:

Table 19 shows that the Soviet government concealed from the Soviet people only one figure - the loss of the missing in the encirclement. During the entire war, the losses of the USSR as missing and captured amounted to about 4 million people, of which less than 2 million people returned from captivity after the war. These figures were hidden in order to reduce the fears of the unstable part of the population before the German advance, to reduce the fear of encirclement among the unstable part of the military. And after the war, the Soviet government considered itself guilty before the people, for being unable to foresee and avoid such a development of events. Therefore, after the war, these figures were not advertised, although they were no longer hidden. After all, Konev quite openly declared after the war about more than 10,000,000 irretrievable losses of Soviet troops. He said it once, and there was nothing more to repeat, to reopen wounds.

The rest of the numbers are generally correct. During the entire war, the USSR lost 61,500 field artillery barrels, 96,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, but no more than 65,000 of them for combat reasons, 88,300 combat aircraft, but only 43,100 of them for combat reasons. About 6.7 million Soviet soldiers died in battle (including non-combat losses, but excluding those who died in captivity) during the entire war.

The losses of the enemy are also indicated correctly. Enemy personnel losses have been greatly underestimated since 1942, and in 1941 they are correctly indicated at 6,000,000 total losses. Only the losses of German tanks are perhaps slightly overestimated, by about 1.5 times. This is naturally related to the difficulty of accounting for the number of repaired and reused machines. In addition, in the reports of the troops, along with damaged tanks and self-propelled guns, other armored vehicles could also be indicated. The Germans had a lot of different combat vehicles on both half-track and wheeled chassis, which can be called self-propelled guns. Then the losses of the Germans in armored vehicles are also indicated correctly. A slight overestimation of the number of downed German aircraft is not significant. The loss of guns and mortars of all calibers and purposes for the Red Army amounted to 317,500 pieces during the war, and for Germany and its allies, the loss of 289,200 pieces is indicated in the work. But in the 12th volume of the "History of the Second World War", in table 11, it is said that Germany alone produced and lost 319900 pieces of guns, and the same Germany produced mortars and lost 78800 pieces. In total, the loss of guns and mortars in Germany alone will amount to 398,700 barrels, and it is not known whether rocket systems are included here, most likely they are not. In addition, this figure definitely does not include guns and mortars produced before 1939.

Since the summer of 1942, there has been a tendency in the Soviet General Staff to underestimate the number of Germans killed. Soviet military leaders began to assess the situation more carefully, fearing to underestimate the enemy at the final stage of the war. In any case, one can speak of special, propaganda loss figures published by the Sovinformburo only in relation to the number of captured and missing Soviet servicemen. Otherwise, the same figures were published that the Soviet General Staff used in their calculations.

The course and outcome of the war cannot be understood if we exclude from consideration the European fascist atrocities in relation to the peaceful Soviet population and prisoners of war. These atrocities constituted the purpose and meaning of the war for the German side and all of Germany's allies. The fighting was only a tool to ensure the unhindered implementation of these atrocities. The only goal of Europe united by the Nazis in World War II was to conquer the entire European part of the USSR, and to destroy most of the population in the most brutal way, in order to intimidate and enslave the rest. These crimes are described in Alexander Dyukov's book "For what the Soviet people fought", Moscow, "Yauza", "Eksmo", 2007. 12-15 million Soviet civilians, including prisoners of war, became victims of these atrocities throughout the war, but we must remember that only during the first war winter, the Nazis planned to kill more than 30 million peaceful Soviet citizens in the occupied territories of the USSR. Thus, we can talk about the salvation by the Soviet army and partisans, the Soviet government and Stalin of more than 15 million lives of Soviet people planned for destruction already in the first year of the occupation, and about 20 million planned for destruction in the future, not counting those saved from fascist slavery, which often was worse than death. Despite numerous sources, this point is extremely poorly covered by historical science. Historians simply avoid this topic, limiting themselves to rare and common phrases, and yet these crimes exceed in the number of victims all other crimes in history combined.

In a note dated November 24, 1941, Halder writes about the report of Colonel-General Fromm. The general military-economic situation is represented as a falling curve. Fromm believes that a truce is necessary. My conclusions confirm Fromm's conclusions.

It also indicates that the loss of personnel at the front is 180,000 people. If this is a loss of combat strength, then it is easily covered by recalling vacationers from vacation. Not to mention the conscription of the contingent born in 1922. Where is the falling curve here? Why, then, in the entry dated November 30, it says that 50-60 people remained in the companies? To make ends meet, Halder claims that 340,000 men make up half of the infantry fighting force. But this is ridiculous, the combat strength of the infantry is less than a tenth of the army. In fact, it should be read that the loss of troops at the front is 1.8 million people on 11/24/41 in combat strength and 3.4 million in the total number of troops of the "Eastern Front" on 11/30/41, and the regular number of troops " Eastern Front "6.8 million people. This is probably the right thing to do.

Perhaps someone will not believe my calculations about German losses, especially in 1941, when, according to modern ideas, the Red Army was completely defeated and supposedly the German army did not suffer losses in some cunning way. That's bullshit. You can't forge victory out of defeats and losses. The German army was defeated from the very beginning, but the Reich leadership hoped that the USSR was having an even worse situation. Hitler spoke directly about this in the same diary of Halder.

The situation of the border battle was best conveyed by Dmitry Egorov in the book "June 41st. Defeat of the Western Front.", Moscow, "Yauza", "Eksmo", 2008.

Of course, the summer of 1941 was terribly difficult for the Soviet troops. Endless battles with no visible positive results. Endless environments where the choice was often between death and captivity. And many chose captivity. Maybe even the majority. But it must be borne in mind that mass surrenders began after one or two weeks of intense struggle in the environment, when the fighters ran out of ammunition even for small arms. The commanders, desperate to win, gave up command of the troops, sometimes even on a front-line scale, fled from their fighters and in small groups either tried to surrender or go to their east. The fighters fled from their units, dressed in civilian clothes or, left without leadership, huddled in crowds of thousands, hoping to surrender to the German detachments clearing the area. And yet the Germans were beaten. There were people who chose a more reliable position for themselves, stocked up on weapons and accepted their last battle, knowing in advance how it would end. Or they organized disorderly crowds of encircled people into combat detachments, attacked German cordons and broke through to their own. Sometimes it worked. There were commanders who kept control of their troops in the most difficult situations. There were divisions, corps and entire armies that attacked the enemy, inflicted defeats on the enemy, staunchly defended themselves, evaded German attacks and beat themselves. Yes, they beat me so much that it was 1.5-2 times more painful. Each blow was answered with a double blow.

This was the reason for the defeat of the fascist hordes. The irretrievable demographic losses of the German army amounted to about 15 million people. The irretrievable demographic losses of other Axis armies amounted to 4 million people. And in total, up to 19 million enemies of different nationalities and states had to be killed to win.

The losses incurred during the Second World War are estimated differently by specialists in the field of history. In this case, different methods of initial data and methods of calculation are used. Today in Russia, the data provided by the research group, which worked as part of a project conducted by the specialists of the Military Memorial, are recognized as official.

As of 2001, when the research data were once again clarified, it is generally accepted that during the years of the war against Nazi fascism, the Soviet Union lost 6.9 million military personnel. Almost four and a half million Soviet soldiers and officers were taken prisoner or went missing. The most impressive is the total human losses of the country: taking into account the dead civilians, they amounted to 26 million 600 thousand people.

The losses of fascist Germany turned out to be significantly lower and amounted to a little more than 4 million military personnel. The total losses of the German side as a result of the actions are estimated at 6.6 million people; this includes the civilian population. Allied Germany lost less than a million soldiers killed. The overwhelming number of deaths on both sides of the military confrontation amounted to.

Losses of the Second World War: questions remain

Earlier, completely different official data on their own losses were adopted in Russia. Almost until the end of the existence of the USSR, there were practically no serious studies on this issue, since most of the data were closed. In the Soviet Union, after the end of the war, estimates of losses, named by I.V. Stalin, who determined this figure to be 7 million people. After coming to power N.S. Khrushchev, it turned out that the country had lost about 20 million people.

When a team of reformers led by M.S. Gorbachev, it was decided to create a research, at the disposal of which documents from the archives and other reference materials were provided. Those data on losses in the Second World War that are used were made public only in 1990.

Historians of other countries do not dispute the results of the research of their Russian colleagues. The total human losses suffered by all countries that participated in the Second World War in one way or another are practically impossible to calculate exactly. Numbers from 45 to 60 million people are called. Some historians believe that as new information is found and calculation methods are refined, the top total losses of all warring countries may be up to 70 million people.

The Soviet Union suffered the most significant losses in World War II - about 27 million people. At the same time, the division of the dead along ethnic lines was never welcomed. However, such statistics exist.

History of counting

For the first time, the total number of victims among Soviet citizens in World War II was named by the Bolshevik magazine, which published in February 1946 the figure of 7 million people. A month later, Stalin gave the same figure in an interview with the Pravda newspaper.

In 1961, at the end of the post-war population census, Khrushchev announced corrected data. “How can we sit back and wait for a repeat of 1941, when the German militarists unleashed a war against the Soviet Union, which claimed two tens of millions of lives of Soviet people?” wrote the Soviet Secretary General to Swedish Prime Minister Fridtjof Erlander.

In 1965, on the 20th anniversary of the Victory, the new head of the USSR, Brezhnev, declared: “No nation has suffered such a cruel war that the Soviet Union endured. The war claimed more than twenty million lives of Soviet people.

However, all these calculations were approximate. Only in the late 1980s, a group of Soviet historians led by Colonel-General Grigory Krivosheev was allowed access to the materials of the General Staff, as well as the main headquarters of all branches of the Armed Forces. The result of the work was the figure of 8 million 668 thousand 400 people, reflecting the losses of the power structures of the USSR throughout the war.

The final data of all human losses of the USSR for the entire period of the Great Patriotic War was published by the state commission, which worked on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 26.6 million people: this figure was announced at the solemn meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 8, 1990. This figure turned out to be unchanged, despite the fact that the methods of calculating the commission were repeatedly called incorrect. In particular, it was noted that the final figure included collaborators, "Khivi" and other Soviet citizens who collaborated with the Nazi regime.

By nationality

For a long time, no one was engaged in counting the dead in the Great Patriotic War on a national basis. Such an attempt was made by the historian Mikhail Filimoshin in the book “Casualties of the Armed Forces of the USSR”. The author noted that the lack of a nominal list of the dead, dead or missing with an indication of nationality greatly complicated the work. Such a practice was simply not provided for in the Report Card of Urgent Reports.

Filimoshin substantiated his data with the help of proportionality coefficients, which were calculated on the basis of reports on the payroll of the Red Army military personnel according to socio-demographic characteristics for 1943, 1944 and 1945. At the same time, the researcher failed to establish the nationality of approximately 500,000 conscripts called up in the first months of the war for mobilization and missing along the way to the unit.

1. Russians - 5 million 756 thousand (66.402% of the total number of irretrievable losses);

2. Ukrainians - 1 million 377 thousand (15.890%);

3. Belarusians - 252 thousand (2.917%);

4. Tatars - 187 thousand (2.165%);

5. Jews - 142 thousand (1.644%);

6. Kazakhs - 125 thousand (1.448%);

7. Uzbeks - 117 thousand (1.360%);

8. Armenians - 83 thousand (0.966%);

9. Georgians - 79 thousand (0.917%)

10. Mordva and Chuvash - 63 thousand each (0.730%)

The demographer and sociologist Leonid Rybakovsky in his book "The USSR's Human Losses in the Great Patriotic War" separately calculates civilian casualties using the ethno-demographic method. This method includes three components:

1. Death of civilians in combat areas (bombing, shelling, punitive operations, etc.).

2. Non-return of part of the Ostarbeiters and other population who voluntarily or under duress served the occupiers;

3. an increase in the death rate of the population above the normal level from hunger and other deprivations.

According to Rybakovsky, Russians lost 6.9 million civilians in this way, Ukrainians - 6.5 million, Belarusians - 1.7 million.

Alternative estimates

Historians of Ukraine give their own methods of counting, which relate primarily to the losses of Ukrainians in the Great Patriotic War. The researchers of Nezalezhnaya refer to the fact that Russian historians adhere to certain stereotypes when counting victims, in particular, they do not take into account the contingent of corrective labor institutions, where a significant part of the dispossessed Ukrainians were located, whose sentence was replaced by being sent to penal companies.

Head of the Research Department of the Kyiv "National Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" Lyudmila Rybchenko refers to the fact that Ukrainian researchers have collected a unique fund of documentary materials on accounting for the human military losses of Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War - funerals, lists of missing persons, correspondence on the search for the dead, loss records.

In total, according to Rybchenko, more than 8.5 thousand archival files were collected, in which about 3 million personal testimonies about the dead and missing soldiers called up from the territory of Ukraine. However, the museum worker does not pay attention to the fact that representatives of other nationalities also lived in Ukraine, which could well be included in the number of 3 million victims.

Belarusian experts also give independent estimates of the number of losses during the Second World War. Some believe that every third inhabitant of 9 million Belarus became a victim of Hitler's aggression. One of the most authoritative researchers of this topic is Professor of the State Pedagogical University, Doctor of Historical Sciences Emmanuil Ioffe.

The historian believes that in total 1 million 845 thousand 400 inhabitants of Belarus died in 1941-1944. From this figure, he subtracts 715,000 Belarusian Jews who became victims of the Holocaust. Among the remaining 1 million 130 thousand 155 people, in his opinion, about 80% or 904 thousand people are ethnic Belarusians.

There are various estimates of the losses of the Soviet Union and Germany during the war of 1941-1945. The differences are related both to the methods of obtaining the initial quantitative data for different groups of losses, and to the calculation methods.

In Russia, official data on losses in the Great Patriotic War are those published by a group of researchers led by Grigory Krivosheev, a consultant at the Military Memorial Center of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, in 1993. According to updated data (2001), the losses were as follows:

• The human losses of the USSR - 6.8 million soldiers killed, and 4.4 million captured and missing. General demographic losses (including dead civilians) - 26.6 million Human;
• German casualties - 4.046 million servicemen dead, dead from wounds, missing (including 442.1 thousand who died in captivity) 910.4 thousand returned from captivity after the war;
• The casualties of Germany's allied countries - 806 thousand military personnel who died (including 137.8 thousand who died in captivity) 662.2 thousand returned from captivity after the war.
• Irretrievable losses of the armies of the USSR and Germany (including prisoners of war) - 11.5 million and 8.6 million people (not to mention 1.6 million prisoners of war after May 9, 1945) respectively. The ratio of irretrievable losses of the armies of the USSR and Germany with the satellites is 1,3:1 .

History of calculation and official state recognition of losses

The study of the losses of the Soviet Union in the war actually began only in the late 1980s. with the advent of publicity. Prior to that, in 1946, Stalin announced that the USSR had lost during the war years 7 million people. Under Khrushchev, this figure rose to "more than 20 million". Only in 1988-1993. A team of military historians led by Colonel General G. F. Krivosheev conducted a comprehensive statistical study of archival documents and other materials containing information about casualties in the army and navy, border and internal troops of the NKVD. In this case, the results of the work of the commission of the General Staff to determine the losses, headed by General of the Army S. M. Shtemenko (1966-1968) and a similar commission of the Ministry of Defense under the leadership of General of the Army M. A. Gareev (1988) were used. The team was also admitted to the declassified in the late 1980s. materials of the General Staff and the main headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, the border troops and other archival institutions of the former USSR.

The final figure of casualties in the Great Patriotic War was for the first time made public in rounded form (" almost 27 million people”) at the solemn meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 8, 1990, dedicated to the 45th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. In 1993, the results of the study were published in the book Classified Removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Combat Actions and Military Conflicts: A Statistical Study”, which was then translated into English. In 2001, a reprint of the book “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century. Losses of the Armed Forces: A Statistical Study".

To determine the scale of human losses, this team used various methods, in particular:

• accounting and statistical, that is, by analyzing the available accounting documents (primarily, reports on the losses of personnel of the Armed Forces of the USSR),
• balance, or the method of demographic balance, that is, by comparing the size and age structure of the population of the USSR at the beginning and end of the war.

In the 1990-2000s. both papers have appeared in the press suggesting corrections to official figures (in particular, due to the refinement of statistical methods), and completely alternative studies with very different loss data. As a rule, in works of the latter type, the estimated human losses far exceed the officially recognized 26.6 million people.

For example, the modern Russian publicist Boris Sokolov estimated the total human losses of the USSR in 1939-1945. in 43,448 thousand people, and the total number of deaths in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1941-1945. in 26.4 million people (of which 4 million people died in captivity). According to his calculations about the loss 2.6 million German soldiers on the Soviet-German front, the loss ratio reaches 10:1. At the same time, the total human losses in Germany in 1939-1945. he appreciated in 5.95 million people (including 300 thousand Jews, gypsies and anti-Nazis who died in concentration camps). His estimate of the dead soldiers of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS (including foreign formations) is 3 950 thousand Human). However, it must be borne in mind that Sokolov also includes demographic losses in the losses of the USSR (that is, those who could have been born, but were not born), but does not conduct such a calculation for Germany. The calculation of the total losses of the USSR is based on frank falsification: the population of the USSR in the middle of 1941 was taken at 209.3 million people (12-17 million people higher than the real one, at the level of 1959), at the beginning of 1946 - at 167 million (by 3, 5 million more than the real one) - which in total just gives the difference between the official and Sokolov's figures. B. V. Sokolov’s calculations are repeated in many publications and the media (in the NTV film “Victory. One for All”, interviews and speeches by writer Viktor Astafyev, I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada’s book “Russia on the eve of the 21st century”, etc.)

human losses

Overall rating

A group of researchers led by G. F. Krivosheev estimates the total human losses of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War, determined by the demographic balance method, in 26.6 million people. This includes all those who died as a result of military and other actions of the enemy, who died as a result of an increased mortality rate during the war in the occupied territory and in the rear, as well as persons who emigrated from the USSR during the war years and did not return after its end. For comparison, according to the estimates of the same team of researchers, the decline in the population of Russia during the First World War (losses of military personnel and civilians) amounted to 4.5 million people, and a similar decline in the Civil War - 8 million people.

As for the sex composition of the deceased and the dead, the overwhelming majority, of course, were men (about 20 million). On the whole, by the end of 1945, the number of women between the ages of 20 and 29 was twice the number of men of the same age in the USSR.

Considering the work of the group of G. F. Krivosheev, American demographers S. Maksudov and M. Elman come to the conclusion that the estimate of human losses given to her at 26-27 million is relatively reliable. However, they indicate both the possibility of underestimating the number of losses due to incomplete accounting of the population of the territories annexed by the USSR before the war and at the end of the war, and the possibility of overestimating losses due to not taking into account emigration from the USSR in 1941-45. In addition, official calculations do not take into account the fall in the birth rate, due to which the population of the USSR by the end of 1945 should have been approximately 35-36 million people more than in the absence of war. However, this figure is recognized by them as hypothetical, since it is based on insufficiently rigorous assumptions.

According to another foreign researcher M. Haynes, the figure of 26.6 million, obtained by the group of G. F. Krivosheev, sets only the lower limit of all the losses of the USSR in the war. The total population decline from June 1941 to June 1945 amounted to 42.7 million people, and this figure corresponds to the upper limit. Therefore, the real number of military casualties is in this interval. However, he is objected to by M. Harrison, who, on the basis of statistical calculations, comes to the conclusion that even taking into account some uncertainty in assessing emigration and declining birth rates, the real military losses of the USSR should be estimated within 23.9 to 25.8 million people.

military personnel

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, irretrievable losses during the fighting on the Soviet-German front from June 22, 1941 to May 9, 1945 amounted to 8,860,400 Soviet military personnel. The source was data declassified in 1993 - 8,668,400 military personnel and data obtained during the search work of the Memory Watch and in historical archives. Of these (according to 1993 data):

• Killed, died from wounds and diseases, non-combat losses - 6,885,100 people, including
• Killed - 5,226,800 people.
• Died from inflicted wounds - 1,102,800 people.
• Died from various causes and accidents, shot - 555,500 people.

According to M.V. Filimoshin, during the Great Patriotic War, 4,559,000 Soviet servicemen and 500,000 conscripts called up for mobilization, but not included in the lists of troops, were captured and went missing.

According to the data of G. F. Krivosheev: during the Great Patriotic War, 3,396,400 servicemen were missing and taken prisoner; returned from captivity 1,836,000 military personnel, did not return (died, emigrated) - 1,783,300.

Civilian population

A group of researchers led by G.F. Krivosheev estimated the losses of the civilian population of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War at approximately 13.7 million people. The final figure is 13.684.692 people. consists of the following components:

• was deliberately exterminated in the occupied territory - 7.420.379 people.
• died and died from the cruel conditions of the occupation regime (hunger, infectious diseases, lack of medical care, etc.) - 4,100,000 people.
• died in forced labor in Germany - 2.164.313 people. (another 451,100 people did not return for various reasons and became emigrants)

However, the civilian population also suffered heavy losses from the combat impact of the enemy in the front-line areas, besieged and besieged cities. There are no complete statistical materials on the considered types of civilian casualties.

According to S. Maksudov, about 7 million people died in the occupied territories and in besieged Leningrad (1 million of them in besieged Leningrad, 3 million were Jewish victims of the Holocaust), and about 7 million more died as a result of increased mortality in unoccupied territories.

Property losses

During the war years, 1,710 cities and urban-type settlements and more than 70,000 villages and villages, 32,000 industrial enterprises were destroyed on Soviet territory, 98,000 collective farms and 1,876 state farms were destroyed. The State Commission found that material damage amounted to about 30 percent of the national wealth of the Soviet Union, and in the areas subjected to occupation - about two-thirds. In general, the material losses of the Soviet Union are estimated at about 2 trillion. 600 billion rubles. For comparison, the national wealth of England decreased by only 0.8 percent, France - by 1.5 percent, and the United States, in essence, avoided material losses.

Losses of Germany and their allies

human losses

In the war against the Soviet Union, the German command involved the population of the occupied countries by recruiting volunteers. Thus, separate military formations appeared from among the citizens of France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Croatia, as well as from the citizens of the USSR who were captured or in the occupied territory (Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijani, Muslim, etc.). How exactly the losses of these formations were taken into account, there is no clear information in the German statistics.

Also, a constant obstacle to determining the real number of losses of personnel of the troops was the mixing of losses of military personnel with losses of the civilian population. For this reason, in Germany, Hungary, and Romania, the losses of the armed forces are significantly reduced, since some of them are counted among the civilian casualties. (200 thousand people lost military personnel, and 260 thousand civilians). For example, in Hungary this ratio was "1:2" (140 thousand - the loss of military personnel and 280 thousand - the loss of the civilian population). All this significantly distorts the statistics on the losses of the troops of the countries that fought on the Soviet-German front.

A German radiotelegram dated 22 May 1945 from the Wehrmacht Loss Records Department addressed to the Quartermaster General of the OKW provides the following information:

According to the certificate of the organizational department of the OKH dated May 10, 1945, only the ground forces, including the SS troops (without the Air Force and Navy), for the period from September 1, 1939 to May 1, 1945, lost 4 million 617.0 thousand people.

Two months before his death, Hitler announced in one of his speeches that Germany had lost 12.5 million killed and wounded, of which half were killed. With this message, he, in fact, refuted the estimates of the scale of human losses made by other fascist leaders and government bodies.

General Jodl after the end of hostilities said that Germany, in total, lost 12 million 400 thousand people, of which 2.5 million were killed, 3.4 million were missing and captured and 6.5 million were wounded, of which approximately 12-15% did not return to service for one reason or another.

According to the annex to the law of the Federal Republic of Germany “On the preservation of burial sites”, the total number of German soldiers buried in the USSR and Eastern Europe is 3.226 million, of which the names of 2.395 million are known.

Prisoners of war of Germany and its allies

Information on the number of prisoners of war of the armed forces of Germany and its allied countries, recorded in the camps of the NKVD of the USSR as of April 22, 1956

Alternative theories

In the 1990s-2000s, publications appeared in the Russian press with data on losses that differed greatly from those accepted by historical science. As a rule, the estimated Soviet losses far exceed those given by historians.

For example, a modern Russian publicist Boris Sokolov estimated the total human losses of the USSR in 1939-1945 at 43,448 thousand people, and the total number of deaths in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1941-1945. 26.4 million people (of which 4 million people died in captivity). According to his calculations about the loss of 2.6 million German soldiers on the Soviet-German front, the loss ratio reaches 10:1. At the same time, he estimated the total human losses of Germany in 1939-1945 at 5.95 million people (including 300 thousand Jews, gypsies and anti-Nazis who died in concentration camps). His estimate of the dead soldiers of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS (including foreign formations) is 3,950 thousand people). However, it must be borne in mind that Sokolov also includes demographic losses in the losses of the USSR (that is, those who could have been born, but were not born), but does not conduct such a calculation for Germany. The calculation of the total losses of the USSR is based on frank falsification: the population of the USSR in the middle of 1941 was taken at 209.3 million people (12-17 million people higher than the real one, at the level of 1959), at the beginning of 1946 - at 167 million (by 3, 5 million below the real one), which in total just gives the difference between the official and Sokolov's figures. B. V. Sokolov’s calculations are repeated in many publications and the media (in the NTV film “Victory. One for All”, interviews and speeches by writer Viktor Astafyev, I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada’s book “Russia on the eve of the 21st century”, etc.)

In contrast to the highly controversial publications of Sokolov, there are works by other authors, many of which are driven by the establishment of a real picture of what was happening, and not by the requirements of the current political situation. The work of Garibyan Igor Ludwigovich stands out from the general series. The author uses open official sources and data, clearly pointing out inconsistencies in them, focuses on the methods used to manipulate statistics. The methods that he used for his own assessment of Germany's losses are interesting: the female preponderance in the sex and age pyramid, the balance method, the method of assessing the structure of prisoners and the assessment of the rotation of army formations. Each method gives similar results - from 10 before 15 million people of irretrievable losses, excluding the losses of the satellite countries. The results obtained are often confirmed by indirect and sometimes direct facts from official German sources. The paper deliberately makes a bias towards the indirectness of multiple facts. It is more difficult to falsify such data, because it is impossible to foresee the totality of facts and their ups and downs during falsification, which means that attempts at fraud will not stand the test under different methods of assessment.

At the same time, as the study of the balance of power on the world stage and the review of the role of all those who participated in the coalition against Hitler proceeds, the quite reasonable question more and more often arises: "How many people died in World War II?" Now all modern media and some historical documents continue to support the old ones, but at the same time create new myths around this topic.

One of the most hardened says that the Soviet Union won only thanks to colossal losses that exceeded the loss in enemy manpower. The latest, most modern myths that are being imposed on the whole world by the West include the opinion that without the help of the United States, victory would have been impossible, allegedly all this is only because of their skill in waging war. However, thanks to statistics, it is possible to conduct an analysis and still find out how many people died in World War II and who made the main contribution to the victory.

How many fought for the USSR?

Undoubtedly, he suffered huge losses, brave soldiers sometimes went to their deaths with understanding. Everyone knows this. In order to find out how many people died in World War II in the USSR, it is necessary to turn to dry statistical figures. According to the 1939 census, approximately 190 million people lived in the USSR. The annual increase was about 2%, which amounted to 3 million. So, it is easy to calculate that by 1941 the population was 196 million people.

We continue to argue and back up everything with facts and figures. So, any industrialized country, even with full total mobilization, could not afford such a luxury as to call for more than 10% of the population to fight. Thus, the approximate number of Soviet troops should have been 19.5 million. Based on the fact that at first men born in the period from 1896 to 1923 and further to 1928 were called up, it is worth adding another one and a half million each year, from which follows that the total number of all the military for the entire period of the war was 27 million people.

How many of them died?

In order to find out how many people died in World War II, it is necessary to subtract about 2 million from the total number of soldiers on the territory of the Soviet Union for the reason that they fought against the USSR (in the form of various groups, such as the OUN and the ROA).

25 million remain, of which 10 were still in service at the end of the war. Thus, approximately 15 million soldiers left the army, but it should be borne in mind that not all of them were dead. For example, about 2.5 million were released from captivity, and some more were simply commissioned due to injury. Thus, the official figures are constantly fluctuating, but it is still possible to derive an average value: 8 or 9 million people died, and these are precisely the military.

What really happened?

The problem is that not only the military were killed. Now consider the question of how many people died in World War II precisely among the civilian population. The fact is that official data indicate the following: out of 27 million people in total losses (offered to us by the official version), it is necessary to subtract 9 million military men, whom we calculated earlier using simple arithmetic calculations. Thus, it turns out the figure of 18 million is the civilian population. Now let's look at it in more detail.

In order to calculate how many people died in World War II in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Poland, it is necessary to turn again to dry, but irrefutable statistics, which indicate the following. The Germans occupied the territory of the USSR, in which, after the evacuation, about 65 million people lived, which was one third.

Poland lost about one-fifth of the population in this war, despite the fact that the front line passed on its territory many times, etc. During the war, Warsaw was practically destroyed to the ground, which makes up about 20% of the dead population.

Belarus has lost about a quarter of the population, and this despite the fact that fierce battles and partisan activities took place on the territory of the republic.

On the territory of Ukraine, the losses amounted to approximately one-sixth of the entire population, and this despite the fact that a huge number of punishers, partisans, resistance units and various fascist "rabble" roaming the forests acted.

Losses among the population in the occupied territory

What percentage of casualties among the civilian population should be characteristic of the entire occupied part of the territory of the USSR? Most likely, no higher than about two-thirds of the total population of the occupied part of the Soviet Union).

Then you can take the number 11 as a basis, which turned out when two-thirds were taken away from the total 65 million. Thus, we get the classic 20 million total losses. But even this figure is gross and inaccurate to the maximum. Therefore, it is clear that in the official report on how many people died in World War II among the military and civilians, the figures are exaggerated.

How many people died in World War II in the USA

The United States of America also suffered losses in both equipment and manpower. Of course, they were insignificant compared to the USSR, so after the end of the war they could be calculated quite accurately. Thus, the figure turned out to be 407.3 thousand dead. As for the civilian population, there were almost none among the dead citizens of America, since no hostilities were conducted on the territory of this country. Losses total 5 thousand people, mostly passengers of passing ships and sailors of the merchant fleet, who were hit by German submarines.

How many people died in World War II in Germany

As for the official figures regarding German losses, they look at least strange, since the number of missing people is almost the same as the dead, but in fact everyone understands that they are unlikely to be found and return home. If we add together all the missing and killed, we get 4.5 million. Among civilians - 2.5 million. Isn't it strange? After all, then the number of losses of the USSR turns out to be doubled. Against this background, there are some myths, conjectures and misconceptions about how many people died in World War II in Russia.

Myths about German losses

The most important myth that stubbornly spread throughout the Soviet Union after the end of the war is the comparison of German and Soviet losses. Thus, the figure of German losses was also taken into circulation, which remained at the level of 13.5 million.

In fact, the German historian general Bupkhart Müller-Hillebrand voiced the following figures, which were based on a centralized account of German losses. During the war years, they amounted to 3.2 million people, 0.8 million died in captivity. In the East, about 0.5 million did not survive captivity, and another 3 died in battle, in the West - 300 thousand.

Of course, Germany, together with the USSR, waged the most cruel war of all times and peoples, which did not mean a drop of pity and compassion. Most of the civilians and prisoners on both sides were dying of starvation. This was due to the fact that neither the Germans nor the Russians could provide food for their prisoners, since hunger would then starve their own peoples even more.

Outcome of the war

Historians still cannot calculate exactly how many people died in World War II. In the world, different figures are being voiced every now and then: it all started with 50 million people, then 70, and now even more. But the same losses that, for example, Asia suffered from the consequences of the war and outbreaks of epidemics against this background, which claimed a huge number of lives, will probably never be possible to calculate. Therefore, even the above data, which were collected from various authoritative sources, is far from conclusive. And it will most likely never be possible to get an exact answer to this question.