Aircraft carriers of the USSR. history and combat use (31 photos)
Original taken from mikhaelkatz to Soviet aircraft-carrying cruisers
The design and construction of aircraft-carrying ships in the Soviet Union steadily brought the country to a new strategic level. However, with the collapse of the USSR, this direction came into complete decline. And once upon a time, Soviet aircraft-carrying cruisers were very serious combat units. I remember how, as a kid, I saw the Novorossiysk aircraft carrier in an episode of the film Solo Voyage, and then I was bursting with pride for our Soviet fleet. Unfortunately, today almost all of these achievements have long been lost.
Original taken from felix_edmund
in Where do TAKRs go? What happened to the aircraft carrier fleet of the USSR Navy
In the Soviet Union, aircraft carriers received the abbreviation TAKR (Heavy Aircraft Carrier Rocket Cruiser). At the time of the collapse of the USSR, the fleet had 7 TAKR aircraft carriers in service and in varying degrees of readiness. In the top photo, in the harbor of the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolaev, the Tbilisi aircraft carrier and the unfinished Riga aircraft carrier. Let's start the review with the cruisers that were in service in various fleets of the USSR Navy.
The lead cruiser of Project 1143 was TAKR "Kyiv"(as part of the USSR Navy 1977-1993):
TAKR "Kyiv"
Project 1143 heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser "Kyiv" - heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy (USSR Navy).
Built from 1970 to 1975 at a shipyard in Nikolaev (Black Sea Shipyard, director Gankevich). First ship built USSR in this class ( Project 1143 "Krechet").
Displacement (surface/submerged): 42,000 tons.
Dimensions: length - 273 m, width - 31 m, draft - 8.2 m
Speed: 32 knots (59.3 km/h)
Powerplant: 134,225 kW (182,500 hp)
Air group: 12 aircraft (vertical take-off and landing), 12 helicopters
TAKR "Kyiv" and TAKR "Minsk" on patrol in the Mediterranean Sea, March 1979.
In 1977-1982 "Kyiv" repeatedly served in combat Atlantic and on Mediterranean Sea. By the end of 1977, in the 1st naval assault air regiment, from which the air group was staffed TAKR "Kyiv", 34 naval pilots have already flown. During the hike from December 15, 1978 to March 28, 1979 on airplanes Yak-38 355 flights were carried out from the ship. In 1982-1984. TAKR underwent a medium repair at ChSZ. While on a hike in May 1985 to visit Algeria, its crew learned about the ship being awarded for success in combat training Order of the Red Banner. Long hikes "Kieva" continued until the end of 1991.
TAKR "Kyiv"
In 1993, due to a lack of funds for operation and repair, significant depletion of weapons, mechanisms and equipment, it was withdrawn from the fleet, then disarmed and sold to the government. China. In early 1994 it was towed to Qinhuangdao, where it was converted into a museum. In September 2003 "Kyiv" towed to Tianjin. Today the cruiser has been turned into a floating ship.
Two years later in 1972 it was founded TAKR "MINSK"(as part of the USSR Navy 1978-1993):
TAKR "Minsk"
Heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser project 1143 "Minsk" heavy aircraft carrier cruiser Black Sea Fleet of the USSR Navy, and later - the Russian Navy. "Minsk" was launched on Nikolaev September 30, 1975. Came into operation in 1978. In November 1978 would have been included in the Pacific Fleet.
Displacement (surface/underwater): 42,000 t
Dimensions: length - 273 m, width - 31 m
Speed: 32 knots (59 km/h)
Cruising range: over water - 8590 miles
Powerplant: PTU 4x50500 hp.
Armament: 4x2 launchers for the anti-aircraft missile system "Basalt" (16 missiles), 2x2 launchers for the air defense missile system "Storm" (96 missiles), 2x2 launchers for the air defense missile system "Osa-M", 2x2-76 mm AK-726 and 8x6-30 mm AK-630M guns, 2x12 RBU-6000, 2x5 533 mm TA, 2x2PU RPK "Vikh"
Air group: 26 aircraft, 26 helicopters
Crew: 1435 people
TAKR "Minsk"
In February-July 1979, the ship made the transition from Sevastopol around Africa in Vladivostok with visits to Luanda, Manila And Port Louis. In the summer of 1980, a military campaign in Vietnam, port "Kam Ran" During military service campaigns in December 1982 "Minsk" paid a visit Bombay, in July 1986 - Wonsan.
TAKR "Minsk"
Preparations began in early 1991 "Minsk" to the transition to Nikolaev for carrying out on ChSZ urgent average repairs that were not carried out. In 1993, a decision was made to disarmament "Minsk", his exclusion from the composition Russian Navy with transfer to OFI for dismantling and sale. In August 1994, after the ceremonial lowering of the Naval flag, it was disbanded.
TAKR "Minsk" in Shenzhen
At the end of 1995 "Minsk" was towed to South Korea for cutting its body into metal. Afterwards the aircraft carrier was resold to a Chinese company Shenzhen Minsk Aircraft Carrier Industry Co Ltd. In 2006, when the company went bankrupt, "Minsk" became part of the Minsk World military park in Shenzhen.
The third ship is TAKR "Novorossiysk", aircraft carrier of the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets of the USSR Navy in 1978-1991:
TARK "Novorossiysk"
The project was developed in January 1975 (head A. N. Marinich), approved in July 1975. Compared to previous projects, it was planned to increase the air group and abandon torpedoes. For the first time in USSR the aircraft carrier was designed to accommodate troops on board, receive heavy transport helicopters and host fighters Yak-38P.
TARK "Novorossiysk"
Built from 1975 to 1978 at a shipyard in Nikolaev(Black Sea Shipyard, director Gankevich). Changes made to the project during construction delayed the commissioning date until 1982. Since 1978, it was launched and completed floating.
On August 15, 1982, the Naval flag was solemnly raised on the ship USSR, and on November 24 he was included in the Red Banner Pacific Fleet.
TAKR "Novorossiysk"
Specifications:
The power plant consisted of 8 steam boilers KVN-98/64 and 4 GTZA TV-12-3, divided into two echelons. To generate electricity, 6 turbogenerators and 4 diesel generators with a total capacity of 15 MW were used.
There were two squadrons on board: anti-submarine helicopters Ka-27 and airplanes Yak-38P, their total number increased to 36 (more than aircraft carriers "Kyiv" And "Minsk"). The aircraft were located in a hangar under the flight deck; they managed to place 24 aircraft there. They were lifted onto the flight deck using two lifts: the aircraft lift is located in the midsection area, and the helicopter lift is located behind the superstructure.
The armament consists of 4 P-500 Basalt installations (16 missiles), 2 installations of the M-11 "Storm" air defense system (96 missiles), 2 AK-726 artillery installations and 8 30-mm AK-630 installations, 1 installation of the RPK- anti-submarine complex 1 (16 82R missile torpedoes), 2 RBU-6000 rocket launchers (120 RSL-60 depth charges)). There were no torpedo tubes.
TAKR "Novorossiysk" in the Pacific Ocean
Although the ship was assigned to Pacific Fleet, at first he performed tasks as part of Black Sea Fleet.
On May 9, 1983, he took part in the parade on the roadstead Sevastopol.
May 14-June 7, as part of the group, made the transition to Severomorsk. There in the composition Northern Fleet took part in the exercises.
From October 17, 1983 to February 27, 1984, as part of a group, he made the transition around Europe, Africa and Asia to Vladivostok. Along the way, he made visits to Luanda (Angola), Victoria (Socotra Island), Maputo (Mozambique), Madras (India).
In 1984, he took part in the Blue Arrow and Long Autumn exercises.
In March-April 1985, he participated in the exercises of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian Islands.
In 1986, partial repairs were carried out in Dalzavod, Zolotoy Rog Bay. Vladivostok, then in the floating dock.
May 12-16, 1988 paid a visit to the city. Wonsan(DPRK).
In 1988-1990 undergone a mid-life repair "Dalzavod".
The last trip took place in May 1991.
In total, during its service, 1,900 aircraft flights and 2,300 helicopter flights were carried out from the deck of the ship.
Due to funding cuts, in 1991 it was laid up in Postovaya Bay near Sovetskaya harbor.
In January 1993, there was a fire on the ship. She was docked for repairs, but on June 30, 1993, a decision was made to exclude her from the fleet.
In 1994 sold to a South Korean company "Young Distribution Company" behind $4.314 million. In January 1996, towed to the port Busan(South Korea).
The fourth and last cruiser of project 1143.4 TAKR "Baku"(as part of the USSR Navy 1987-1991, as part of the Russian Navy 1991 -2004)
TAKR "Baku"
Cruiser "Baku" was called that until October 4, 1990, then renamed "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov",
Installation of the superstructure of the TAKR "Baku" on a slipway using two 900-ton cranes, October 1981
Pawned on Black Sea Shipyard V Nikolaev December 26, 1978. Passed mooring tests in Nikolaev in June-November 1986, in December 1986 transferred to Sevastopol, then - running and state tests (January-December 1987). December 30, 1987 included in the composition KSF.
Launching of the "Baku" aircraft carrier, March 31, 1982, at the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolaev
Displacement (surface/underwater): standard 44,720 t full 48,500 t maximum 53,000 t
Dimensions: length - overall 273.08 m, width - 31.0 m at the waterline, 52.9 m, maximum, height - 60.30 m, draft - standard 9.8 m, maximum 11.5 m
Travel speed: maximum 30.5 knots economical 18.6 knots
Powerplant: Steam turbines: 4x50000 hp Turbogenerators: 9x1500 kW Diesel generators: 6x1500 kW
Armament: Artillery 2x1 100mm AK-100 gun, 8x6 30mm auto. AK-630M, 2 salute guns. Torpedo and mine weapons, 2 KT-153 launchers of the Udav system Missile weapons 6 × 2 Bazalt anti-ship missile launchers, 4 × 6 Kinzhal air defense missile systems (192 missiles)
Crew: 1610 (of which 383 officers) + 430 hours.
Air group: 36 aircraft and helicopters according to the project: 14 × VTOL aircraft Yak-41M, 6 × VTOL Yak-38M, 10× Ka-27PL, 2 × Ka-27PS, 4× Ka-27RLD
Launch of the Yak-38 aircraft using the VKR method from the deck of the Baku aircraft carrier
TAKR "Baku"
In 1991, there was a plane crash. February 3, 1992 put for repairs at SRZ-35 in Rost Murmansk, after which he never went to sea again. On February 7, 1994, a steam pipeline accident killed 6 people. In July 1999, the aircraft-carrying cruiser was towed to Severodvinsk to undergo modernization ordered by the Indian Navy.
TAKR "Baku", in the Mediterranean Sea, 1988
In 1994, negotiations began on the sale of the ship India. The documents were signed in October 2000, but the contract amount remained subject to negotiation until 2002. The agreement signed on January 29, 2004 provided for the allocation $974 million for restoration and modernization "Admiral Gorshkov" And $530 million for the supply of 16 fighters MiG-29K and naval anti-submarine helicopters Ka-31 And Ka-27. Ship named "Vikramaditya" should have been delivered to the customer at the end of 2008. Having paid out approximately $458 million since January 2007 India suspended further payments under the contract. In November 2007, the Russian side raised the issue of underestimating the volume of work. In December 2008, after the visit of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev to India, the Indian government's security committee approved the start of negotiations on a new price for modernizing the cruiser.
These were Soviet aircraft carriers project 1143. The next two aircraft carriers were built according to project 1143.5 And 1143.6 , this is a deep modernization of the previous project.
The first ship of the updated project 1143.5 was (as part of the USSR Navy in 1991, as part of the Russian Navy since 1991)
TAKR "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov"
The fifth heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser USSR — "Tbilisi" was laid on a slipway in Nikolaev, September 1, 1982. It differed from its predecessors in the ability for the first time to provide takeoffs and landings of traditional aircraft, modified versions of land Su-27, MiG-29 And Su-25. To achieve this, it had a significantly enlarged flight deck and a springboard for aircraft take-off. Construction for the first time in USSR was carried out using a progressive method of forming a body from large blocks weighing up to 1400 tons.
TAKR "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov"
Displacement (surface/underwater): 60,000 t
Dimensions: length - 302.3 m, width - 71 m, draft - 10.4 m
Speed: 29 knots
Cruising range: over water - 45 days
Powerplant: Steam turbines: 4×50,000 hp. Turbogenerators: 9×1500 kW Diesel generators: 6×1500 kW
Armament: Missile armament 12 Granit anti-ship missiles 60 Udav-1 missiles Anti-aircraft weapons Klinok air defense system (192 missiles, 24 launchers
Electronic weapons: BIUS "Lesorub", Communication complex "Buran-2", SJSC "Polynom-T", GAS "Zvezda-M1", electronic warfare complex "Sozvezdie-BR"
Aviation group: 50 airplanes and helicopters, according to the project: 26 × MiG-29K or Su-27K, 4 × Ka-27RLD, 18 × Ka-27 or Ka-29, 2 × Ka-27PS Actual: 14 × Su-33, 2 × Su-25UTG, 10 × MiG-29K, 4 × MiG-29KUB
Crew: 1960 people
Renaming
Even before the end of the assembly, after death Leonid Brezhnev, on November 22, 1982, the cruiser was renamed in his honor to "Leonid Brezhnev". It was launched on December 4, 1985, after which its completion continued afloat.
Launching of the Leonid Brezhnev aircraft carrier at the Black Sea Shipyard, Nikolaev, 1985.
On August 11, 1987, renamed "Tbilisi". On June 8, 1989, its mooring tests began, and on September 8, 1989, the crew began settling in. On October 21, 1989, the unfinished and understaffed ship was put out to sea, where it conducted a series of flight tests of aircraft intended to be based on board. As part of these tests, the first takeoffs and landings of aircraft were carried out on it. On November 1, 1989, the first landings were made MiG-29K, Su-27K And Su-25UTG. The first takeoff was made from it MiG-29K on the same day and Su-25UTG And Su-27K the next day, November 2, 1989. After completing the test cycle, on November 23, 1989 he returned to the plant for completion. In 1990, she went to sea many times to conduct factory and state tests.
On October 4, 1990, it was renamed once again and became known as "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov".
TAKR "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov"
On December 25, 1990, 8 years, 3 months and 24 days after the laying, the acceptance certificate for the cruiser was signed. On January 20, 1991, he was officially enrolled in the Northern Fleet, On January 20, the naval flag was raised on it. After the breakup USSR due to fears of claims being made against him from the Ukrainian side, on December 1, 1991, he was urgently and secretly withdrawn from Sevastopol and began the transition to Northern Fleet. On December 21 the ship arrived in Vidyaevo. In 1992-1994, various tests of the ship, its weapons and air group continued, the cruiser spends three to four months a year at sea and participates in exercises. In 1993, the first production units began to arrive for his air group. Su-33. In the winter of 1994-1995, the main boilers were repaired.
The sixth Soviet aircraft carrier of project 1143.6 TAKR "Riga", laid down in 1985, launched in 1988.
TAKR "Riga" at the Black Sea Shipyard, Nikolaev
Project 1143.6 heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser was developed in Nevsky Design Bureau under the direction of V. F. Anikieva. On August 21, 1985, he was added to the list of ships Navy and on December 6, 1985 laid down on Black Sea Shipyard V Nikolaev(serial number 106), launched November 25, 1988.
Workers of the Black Sea shipyard in Nikolaev walk past the unfinished aircraft-carrying cruiser "Varyag"
In 1993, under an agreement between Ukraine and Russia TARK "Varyag" went to Ukraine. In 1992, with 67% technical readiness, construction was suspended, the ship was mothballed and subsequently sold China.
In April 1998 sold to the company Chong Lot Travel Agency Ltd behind $20 million.
TAKR "Varyag" passes the Bosphorus, 2001.
Today TAKR "Varyag" bears the name "Liaolin" and is in service Chinese Navy
Displacement (surface/underwater): 59,500 t.
Dimensions: length - 304.5 m, width - 38 m, (flight deck 75 m), draft - 10.5 m
Speed: 29 knots (54 km/h)
Cruising range: over water - 8000 miles
Powerplant: PTU, 4x50,000 hp.
Armament: Artillery (according to the project) 6x6 30-mm AK-630M guns Missile weapons 12 4K-80 launchers of the Granit anti-aircraft missile system, 4x6 launchers of the Kinzhal air defense missile system (192 missiles), 8 dirk launchers, 2x10 RBU-1200
Crew: 1980 people. (520 officers)
The pinnacle of the evolution of Soviet aircraft carriers was the seventh ATAVKR "Ulyanovsk" with a nuclear power plant (YSU) project 1143.7, it was founded in 1988.
Laying down the ATAVKR "Ulyanovsk" at the Black Sea Shipyard, Nikolaev, 1988.
Development of a heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser project 1143.7 "Ulyanovsk", which was supposed to become the flagship Navy, started in Nevsky Design Bureau in 1984 under the leadership L. V. Belova(later replaced by Yu. M. Varfolomeev). Development experience was taken into account when designing project 1160. "Ulyanovsk" was planned as the first of four ships of the same type.
ATAVRK" "Ulyanovsk"
June 11, 1986 Main Directorate of ShipbuildingNavy issued Black Sea plant an order for the construction of a Project 11437 ship, the construction contract for which was concluded on December 30, 1987. October 4, 1988 new ATAVKR entitled "Ulyanovsk" was enlisted in the Navy USSR. Its official laying took place on November 25, 1988 on the slipway Black Sea Shipyard, immediately after launching TAVKR "Riga" (then "Varyag"). At the time of laying, the cost of construction was determined to be 800 million rubles, and the total cost, including weapons and design costs, amounted to a colossal sum of two billion Soviet rubles at that time. The slipway period was determined to be 2.6 years, About 600 factories were involved in the creation of the ship . In December 1995, the lead nuclear aircraft carrier "Ulyanovsk" was supposed to go into operation.
Construction of the ship proceeded at an intensive pace: by mid-1991, structures with a total mass of about 27,000 tons were installed, and readiness was brought to 18.3%.
Construction of ATAVKR "Ulyanovsk" at the Black Sea Shipyard, Nikolaev, 1988.
November 1, 1991 ATAVKR "Ulyanovsk" was expelled from the team Navy, funding for the project has ceased. For some time, the plant carried out installation and assembly at its own expense, but at the beginning of 1992, after the collapse USSR Both Russia and Ukraine finally abandoned further construction of the aircraft carrier. In accordance with Decree No. 69-R dated February 4, 1992, signed by the First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine K. Masik, cutting of hull structures began on February 5, 1992 ATAVKR "Ulyanovsk". The costs of this work amounted to 80 percent of the labor intensity of what was done.
Construction of ATAVKR "Ulyanovsk" at the Black Sea Shipyard, Nikolaev, 1988.
Displacement (surface/underwater): 75,000 t
Dimensions: length - 320 m, width - 40 m (flight deck 72 m), draft - 12 m
Speed: 30 knots
Engines: 4 nuclear reactors KN-34 PPU OK-900, power 280,000 hp.
Navigation autonomy: 120 days
Armament: 16 launchers of the anti-ship missile missile system "Granit", 4x6 launchers of the SM-9 air defense missile system, 8 launchers of the "Kortik" launcher, 8x6 30-mm guns AK-630M,
Air group: 70 aircraft and helicopters, 2 catapults
Crew: 3,800 people
In 1988, simultaneously with the laying of the first of four aircraft carriers of the class "Ulyanovsk" V Murmansk, on the base Shipyard No. 82 Construction of the dry dock began. It was intended to serve large-capacity ships and aircraft carriers of the "Ulyanovsk", but was never completed.
Shipyard No. 82, Murmansk, site of unfinished dry dock construction
I consider it necessary to explain why for the ship to fully function as an aircraft carrier it needs Yasu
An aircraft carrier is the only type of surface ship that vitally needs a nuclear propulsion system (YaSU). In addition to such an undoubtedly useful attribute as unlimited range (of course, within reasonable limits), Yasu has another important property - enormous steam productivity. Only Yasu is capable of providing the aircraft carrier's catapults with the required amount of energy, which most directly affects the number of sorties per day, and, consequently, the effectiveness of the aircraft carrier's combat service. Atomic "Enterprise" provided for 150…160
combat sorties per day, while his “colleague” like "Kitty Hawk" with a conventional power plant, no more 100
in a day. And that's not all - catapults "Enterprise" consumed no more than 20% of the steam produced by I SU, whereas during intensive flights of carrier-based aircraft "Kitty Hawk" was forced to sharply reduce speed - there was not enough steam for either the sailors or the pilots.
By the way, there is a legend that Yasu saves the ship's displacement, allowing it to accept a larger supply of aviation fuel and ammunition. It is not true, Yasu take up the same amount of space as conventional power units. Yasu thousands of tons of diesel fuel are not required, but in addition to the nuclear reactor itself and the steam-producing plant, they need several circuits with their own biological protection and an entire sea water desalination plant. Agree, it is stupid to increase fuel autonomy while having limited supplies of fresh water on board. Secondly, bidistillate is vital for the operation of reactors. Therefore atomic "Enterprise" had no advantages over non-nuclear "Kitty Hawk" on aviation fuel reserves.
Summarizing all of the above, the presence on a Soviet aircraft-carrying cruiser Yasu gave the ship completely different combat qualities. For the first time in the history of the Russian Navy on the corner deck "Ulyanovsk" two 90-meter steam steamboats appeared catapult "Mayak"
Assembly of Mayak catapults for ATAVRK "Ulyanovsk"
Such is the fate of the aircraft carrier fleet USSR. Time of reign Yeltsin was marked by catastrophic consequences in all spheres of the functioning of the state in the economic and social spheres, a catastrophe occurred, the population of the country during Yeltsinism decreased by 20 million people, hundreds of thousands of technologies were lost, 100 thousand enterprises were destroyed (during the Great Patriotic War, the Nazis destroyed 31 thousand enterprises throughout the USSR). The Navy, including the aircraft carrier fleet, did not escape the tragic fate.
In August 1953, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Nikolai Kuznetsov, presented a report to the USSR Minister of Defense Nikolai Bulganin, in which he outlined his views on the tasks and development of the fleet, and also formulated proposals for the construction of new warships. The report emphasized that “in post-war conditions, without the presence of aircraft carriers in the Navy, the solution to the main tasks of the fleet cannot be ensured.”
More than 50 years have passed since that time, and the Russian fleet has a single undermanned aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, and the lifespan of the Russian navy on the high seas in the event of a real war is calculated in minutes. Arkady Morin, chief designer of the preliminary design of the Project 1160 nuclear aircraft carrier, deputy chief designer of the Project 1153 aircraft carrier and heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers, told Popular Mechanics about the tragic fate of the domestic aircraft carrier fleet.
Decline of battleships
Having appeared in the 20s of the last century, aircraft carriers were initially considered exclusively as means of supporting combat operations of the main striking force of the fleet - battleships. That was until December 7, 1941, when the Japanese carrier fleet sank American battleships at Pearl Harbor. Immediately after the attack, the Americans laid down a series of 24 Essex-class aircraft carriers - such large series of such large warships have never been seen before or since in the history of world shipbuilding. Seventeen aircraft carriers from the series managed to enter service during the war and allowed the United States to win the battle in the Pacific. It is noteworthy that the most powerful battleship ever built, the Japanese Yamato with nine 457 mm guns, which throughout the war failed to inflict serious damage on enemy ships, was sunk in April 1945 by aircraft from American aircraft carriers.
1927 Project for converting the training ship "Komsomolets" into an aircraft carrier. Back in 1925, the command of the Naval Forces of the Red Army came up with a proposal to convert the unfinished battle cruiser Izmail and the battleship Poltava into aircraft carriers. However, this was beyond the capabilities of a post-war country. The ship was supposed to carry up to 42 fighters and bombers in the hangar and on the flight deck.
After the war, it became clear to all countries that new unchallenged masters had appeared in the sea - aircraft carriers. Everyone except the USSR. However, in our country there was also an ardent supporter of the new type of ship - the flagship of the fleet of the 2nd rank Nikolai Kuznetsov, appointed in April 1939 as People's Commissar of the Navy. Thanks to his efforts, the plans of the third five-year plan of 1938-1942 included the laying of two aircraft carriers, one each for the Northern and Pacific fleets. However, already in January 1940, the Navy's plan was cut in half, and aircraft carriers were not included in it. Stalin had an inexplicable passion for huge battleships, and few people dared to object to him. But Kuznetsov did not let up - on his instructions, in TsKB-17 under the leadership of V.V. Ashika continued the development of aircraft carriers. The work was carried out in two directions: a large aircraft carrier with a two-tier hangar for 62 aircraft (Project 72) and a small one, with a single-tier hangar for 32 aircraft (Project 71). It was planned to replace the carrier-based fighter with a ship-based modification of the famous Yakovlev Yak-9K fighter; the Tupolev Design Bureau was to develop ship-based torpedo bombers PT-M71. The main method of aircraft take-off from aircraft carriers was a free take-off run on the flight deck; the use of catapults was envisaged only at maximum take-off weight and unfavorable weather conditions.
1939 Project of aircraft carrier 71a based on a light cruiser. In February 1938, the Main Headquarters of the Navy approved the requirements for the future Soviet aircraft carrier to operate on the high seas and off enemy coasts for reconnaissance, bombing and anti-aircraft purposes. It was to carry 45 fighters and light bombers, eight 130 mm guns and eight twin anti-aircraft guns. Based on these performance characteristics, TsNII-45 prepared a project for the small aircraft carrier 71a.
The commission created by Kuznetsov in early 1945 to select the necessary types of ships for the post-war formation of the fleet came to the need to create, first of all, two types of aircraft carriers: squadron (large) for the Northern and Pacific fleets and small ones for the Baltic and Black Sea. Based on the conclusions of the commission, the Main Naval Staff, when developing proposals for a long-term plan for the post-war development of the Navy, provided for the construction of nine large aircraft carriers (six for the Quiet and three for the Northern Fleet) and six small ones for the Northern Fleet. When considered by the government, the number of aircraft carriers was reduced to four, and Stalin drew the line: “Okay, we’ll build two small ones.” But they also disappeared from the final version of the plan: the leaders of the People's Commissariat of Sustainable Industry stated that “they are not yet ready to build such fundamentally new ships.” The paradox was that without such ships, the construction of others lost all meaning. So the USSR began to build a meaningless fleet.
Budget aircraft carrier
According to the plan of the great strategist, during the ten post-war years it was planned to build four heavy and 30 light cruisers, and in 1953-1956 to lay down three more heavy and seven light cruisers. At the same time, Stalin was going to continue the construction of one of the three battleships of Project 23 laid down before the war and begin in 1955 the construction of two more according to the more advanced Project 24. All over the world such plans would be considered idiotic, in the USSR they were called brilliant.
In this regard, work on the project 72 squadron aircraft carrier was stopped, and instead the restless Kuznetsov approved a new technical specification for the development of a small squadron aircraft carrier that could, in the coastal zone, perform the tasks of air defense of a formation, participate in anti-submarine defense, escort convoys and support landings.
Such a “budget” aircraft carrier was supposed to carry 30-40 aircraft in hangars. To facilitate the launch, it was planned to install one catapult at the bow. As an option, the project of completing the heavy cruiser Kronstadt as an aircraft carrier or completing the captured German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin was considered. “Kronstadt” was in low technical readiness (10-15%), its completion required about five years, and in the end it was scrapped. The German aircraft carrier could have been completed in less than three years, but the Allies, whose area of responsibility included a lot of ready-made equipment and weapons for the Graf Zeppelin, strongly opposed the implementation of this plan and insisted on the destruction of the equipment. The negotiations of the triple commission led nowhere, and the Graf was shot as a floating target by aviation and the navy on August 16, 1947. Even before this, in January 1947, Kuznetsov was removed from the post of commander-in-chief of the Navy due to false denunciations, and work on aircraft carriers in the USSR stopped again.
Very small aircraft carrier
In 1951, Kuznetsov was again appointed Minister of the Navy of the USSR and he again revived the aircraft carrier theme. But all his reports had no success either before or after Stalin's death. The only thing he managed to achieve was the preservation of the light aircraft carrier (Project 85) in terms of ship design for 1955-1960.
The third heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser of Project 1143 was laid down in 1975 under the name "Baku", continuing the tradition of naming aircraft-carrying ships in honor of the capitals of the Union republics. However, later, at the suggestion of Defense Minister Grechko, the cruiser was renamed “Novorossiysk” in honor of Leonid Ilyich’s book “Malaya Zemlya”. The ship, created for the new Yak-41 aircraft, at the time of delivery was forced to be equipped with outdated Yak-38. In 1983, the Yak-38 was discontinued, and the new Yak-41 never appeared. As a result, the ship served out its term in the Pacific Ocean as a simple helicopter carrier. The last time Novorossiysk went to sea took place in May 1991.
Meanwhile, the era of jet aviation had arrived. The projected light aircraft carrier was supposed to carry 40 jet fighters, two helicopters, have a standard displacement of 24,000 tons and a cruising range of 5,000 miles. But the creation of such a ship required the pooling of resources not only of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry and the Ministry of Heavy Machinery, but also of the Ministry of Aviation Industry, which sabotaged the project. In April 1955, Kuznetsov directly turned to Khrushchev with a request to involve the design bureaus of Yakovlev, Mikoyan and Sukhoi in the project. This was Kuznetsov’s last attempt to save the aircraft carrier - a month later he suffered a heart attack, and was then removed from his post by Defense Minister Zhukov “for unsatisfactory leadership of the fleet” and demoted. Only 14 years after his death, the talented naval commander was given back the title of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union.
The aircraft carriers were left without protection. The new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, was completely absorbed in the only task - to retain his own position (and he succeeded - he remained Commander-in-Chief for exactly thirty years), so he preferred not to quarrel with anyone. And under Khrushchev, missile weapons came into fashion, which were designed to solve almost all problems - from the destruction of enemy ships to air defense. Work on aircraft carriers was interrupted, and instead TsKB-16 was entrusted with the development of an air defense missile ship (Project 81), which, by the way, was also not built. The military shipbuilding program developed by Gorshkov for 1958–1965 provided for the protection of ships from enemy aircraft in the ocean exclusively with missile weapons. The program, illiterate from a military point of view, was brilliant from a career point of view - Khrushchev was crazy about missiles. The word “aircraft carrier” has become taboo.
1942 German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin. The German aircraft carrier laid down at the end of 1938 was quite different from its analogues. The ship had a “cruising” armored deck with bevels, a structural inclusion of the flight deck to ensure the overall strength of the hull, and extensive vertical armor of variable thickness along the length of the hull. The launch of deck vehicles was supposed to be carried out exclusively with the help of two pulley-pneumatic catapults located in the bow of the flight deck. Before takeoff, the planes were installed on special take-off trolleys, which after takeoff were returned to the hangar on monorails.
Underground workers
Nevertheless, there were people who understood that the fleet would be nowhere without aircraft carriers. In 1959-1960, TsKB-17 (now Nevskoye PKB), on behalf of the State Committee for Shipbuilding, carried out the design study of a “floating base for fighter aircraft” (PBIA), since using the term “aircraft carrier” could easily lose your job. The PBIA was supposed to operate in tandem with an air defense ship, mutually complementing each other. The “base” with a displacement of about 30,000 tons carried 30 fighters, four radar patrol aircraft and two helicopters and performed the following tasks: searching for formations of enemy ships, destroying enemy aircraft at distant approaches, detecting low-flying targets over the horizon. However, the study did not have any support from related industries and rather served as a trainer of design personnel for further work on aircraft carriers, the appearance of which most naval experts did not doubt. But they underestimated Gorshkov - this outstanding strategist in his publications trashed aircraft carriers as “weapons of aggression,” inflating, on the one hand, their exorbitant cost, and on the other, attributing to them an imaginary vulnerability from missile weapons, including ballistic ones. The main focus of his doctrine was on the strategic submarine fleet and naval strategic aviation.
1944 Aircraft carrier project 72. The heavy aircraft carrier project was developed by TsKB-17 in the middle of the war, taking into account the flight performance characteristics of serial front-line aircraft produced in 1943 for a fighter and foreign analogues for a carrier-based torpedo bomber. A modification of the Yak-9K was planned as a fighter, and the ship-borne torpedo bomber PT-M71 was to be developed by the Tupolev Design Bureau. A two-tier hangar would allow the aircraft carrier to accommodate 62 aircraft. The main method of take-off is a free run on the take-off deck. Catapults were intended to be used only for takeoff of aircraft with maximum load or in poor weather conditions.
Unlucky boat hunters
On November 15, 1960, the nuclear-powered missile submarine George Washington, armed with 16 Polaris A1 nuclear ballistic missiles, went on its first combat patrol - the first in the series of American missile-carrying submarines of the same name. Given the short range (“Polaris A1” - 1200 miles, “Polaris A3” - 2500 miles) of the missiles, the patrol areas were in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. To combat them, according to Gorshkov’s plan, search and strike groups were created, consisting of patrol ships, submarine hunters, and missile destroyers, whose task was to protect the patrol ships. Gorshkov’s special pride was the missile destroyers of the 58th series - “Grozny”, “Admiral Fokin”, “Admiral Golovko” and “Varyag”, which, by the strong-willed decision of the commander in chief, were renamed “cruisers”, which gave the right to declare the creation of “the world’s first missile cruisers , which had no foreign analogues." By the way, American destroyers of the 1970s were almost twice as large as our cruisers in displacement. But this is not the main thing - the watchdogs chronically failed to cope with their task.
1945 Conversion of the Project 69 heavy cruiser into an aircraft carrier. Back in the middle of the war, the Naval Academy conducted an analysis of the actions of fleets at sea, making recommendations for the development of domestic shipbuilding. Based on them, the Scientific and Technical Committee proposed to complete the Kronstadt-class heavy cruisers laid down in 1939 as aircraft carriers. The proposal did not meet with support.
By this time, Khrushchev was replaced by Brezhnev and Andrei Grechko became Minister of Defense. Gorshkov immediately changed his course 180 degrees and returned to Kuznetsov’s ideas for creating an ocean-going fleet - albeit in a peculiarly truncated version. In 1967, the Black Sea Fleet was replenished with another “unparalleled in the world” creation of Gorshkov - the anti-submarine cruiser (ASC) Moskva, a long-range anti-submarine defense ship with group-based helicopters. The below-deck hangar accommodated 14 helicopters, which coped with the tasks of searching for submarines much more efficiently than patrol ships. The main task of the Moskva was to search for boats around the clock, for which four helicopters were constantly in the air, at a distance of 50 km from the ship. A year later, the flag was raised on the same type of anti-ship missile "Leningrad". The very first long-distance voyages of the Moscow and Leningrad showed that these ships are not capable of counteracting American submarines due to the increased combat qualities of the latter. In addition, American aircraft carrier groups in the Mediterranean behaved extremely brazenly, defiantly flying over the very decks of our helicopter carriers, and even provoking direct collisions between ships.
One of the most interesting trophies of the Soviet troops is the almost completed German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin. During the assault on Stettin in April 1945, where this ship was stationed in the roadstead, Soviet troops failed to prevent it from being blown up by German sappers. Properly placed charges made the aircraft carrier unsuitable for restoration.
Turboplanes
In July 1967, at an air parade at Domodedovo Airport, an amazing aircraft was shown, which was first seen not only by ordinary citizens, but also by many military personnel - the Yak-36 vertical take-off and landing aircraft, the successor to the experimental “turbo planes” of the 1950s. Initially, the Yak-36 was developed as a front-line attack aircraft that could provide support to troops in the conditions of destroyed front-line airfields, taking off directly from forest clearings. Army aviation was not satisfied with the aircraft, and Yakovlev tried to attach it to the fleet, fortunately, back in 1963, pilot Bill Bralford made a vertical landing on the English experimental Hawker Siddeley P.1127 (predecessor of the Harrier) on the deck of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, which was plowing the waters of La. Mansha. Yakovlev was supported by Dmitry Ustinov (at that time deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR), and Gorshkov could not resist - the construction of the third ship of the Moscow series (they had already begun cutting metal for it) in Nikolaev was suspended. In return, it was decided to begin construction of the 1143 “Kyiv” series anti-ship missiles with vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft. Moreover, to scare away American aircraft carriers, six launchers of giant P-500 Basalt anti-ship missiles were provided. The technical design of the new ship was completed in the shortest possible time by April 1970, and in December 1972 the Kiev was launched. Gorshkov also came up with a new name for the new ship - heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser, TAVKR. Of course, the USSR created the world's first TAVKR. And in the summer of 1976, this TAVKR with five combat serial VTOL Yak-Z6M and one training Yak-Z6MU made the transition around Europe to its home base in the Northern Fleet. The first Yak-Z6M flights outside the USSR took place in the Mediterranean Sea near the island of Crete. This time the Americans stayed away from the ship - they were warned that it might have special combat units for the Basalts.
Three years later, a twin, the Minsk TAVKR, went to the Pacific Ocean, bypassing Africa, with more advanced aircraft, the Yak-38. Flights in the tropics finally dispelled the myths about VTOL aircraft - in conditions of high temperature and humidity, the lifting engines stopped starting. And even when they were launched, they could only fly with their weapons removed and incompletely refueled. Nevertheless, the construction of these expensive ships continued: in 1982, the Novorossiysk TAVKR was launched, and in 1987, the Baku. Only the death of Ustinov in 1984 and the subsequent resignation of the great naval commander Gorshkov a year later led to a stop in the production of TAVKRs - the Soviet miracle ships.
Read the continuation of the history of Soviet aircraft carriers in the next issue
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During the First World War, a new class of ships was developed - aircraft carriers. The Russian Imperial Navy included several seaplane transports (hydrocruisers). During the Civil War, both warring sides had hydroaviation floating bases as part of their river military flotillas. The fleets of major maritime powers began to include aircraft carriers adapted to receive wheeled aircraft.
At the Washington Conference on Arms Limitation, a new type of naval weapon was limited according to a number of parameters. According to 712 articles, the maximum displacement of an aircraft carrier could not exceed 27,000 tons, artillery with a caliber of no more than 10 inches (203 mm), anti-aircraft artillery - 127 mm. The requirement was specifically stated: not to build ships for third countries that exceed these restrictions. On February 6, 1922, the treaty was signed by the USA, Great Britain, Italy, France and Japan. The restrictions expired on December 31, 1936.
The Workers 'and Peasants' Red Fleet, which was recovering after the events of the revolution and civil war, did not ignore this type of ship. In March 1925, work began on options for converting the unfinished battle cruiser Izmail into an aircraft carrier. The tactical and technical elements were assumed to be the following: displacement 22,000 tons, speed 27 knots; air group: 27 fighters, 12 torpedo bombers, six reconnaissance aircraft and five spotters; armament: 8 183-mm guns, 8 102-mm guns, four five-barreled 40-mm guns. The hull's armor was preserved; the flight deck was protected by 5,164 mm of armor. In a similar way, they were going to rebuild the battleship Poltava, which was damaged by a fire, and subsequently they intended to transfer it to the Black Sea.
The proposed Soviet aircraft carriers fell within the restrictions imposed by the Washington Treaty. But the work never got to the point where they did not even draw up a preliminary design. “Izmail” was dismantled for scrap metal, and “Poltava”, renamed “Frunze”, was going to be turned into a battle cruiser.
By 1927, there was a proposal to convert the training ship “Komsomolets” into a training aircraft carrier. The parameters of the future ship were to be: displacement 12,000 tons, speed 15 knots; air group: 26 fighters and 16 attack aircraft; armament: eight two-gun mounts with a caliber of 102 mm and two five-barreled guns with a caliber of 40 mm. In terms of its characteristics, this project is reminiscent of the English aircraft carrier Hermes, which entered service in 1924, with a certain similarity in appearance.
Without a doubt, such a proposal could be implemented; they even created a prototype of a carrier-based attack aircraft - the SHON aircraft. The lack of funds for the re-equipment of the ship and the development of a technical project, as well as the desire to carry out any work in this direction, predetermined the fate of this project. He had no results. The construction of the fleet according to the concept of the “Small Fleet” excluded any possibility of building aircraft carriers. For ten years they disappear from shipbuilding plans.
Training aircraft carrier "Komsomolets". Preliminary design. USSR, 1927
In the mid-30s, work began on plans for the construction of a large modern fleet. Development was carried out by the Directorate of the Red Army Naval Forces under the leadership of V.M. Orlova and I.M. Ludry. In parallel, the General Staff of the Red Army worked under the leadership of A.I. Egorova. As a result, two plans for the construction of the “Big Fleet” appeared, each of which featured aircraft carriers. The UVMS plan provided for two such ships, and the General Staff for six, of which two for the Northern and four for the Pacific fleet. Considered during 1936, they did not receive approval in full; aircraft carriers were excluded, but not for long.
The leadership of the Navy changed twice, and the People's Commissariat of the Navy was formed in 1937. New plans were developed by L.M. Galler and I.S. Isakov. The final version of the “Great Shipbuilding Program” featured two aircraft carriers - one in each of the ocean theaters.
Cruiser-aircraft carrier, preliminary design. USSR, 1935
It is generally accepted that the Soviet Navy in the second half of the 1930s underestimated the importance of aircraft carriers in naval warfare. This is not true. The presence of such ships in the fleet was considered necessary to create balanced formations. This point of view was not something carefully hidden: in 1939, the book “Ways of Development of Shipbuilding in the Third Five-Year Plan” was published, containing this position.
At the meeting of representatives of the Main Naval Staff, naval aviation and the Naval Academy held on October 7-14, 1940, there were no discussions on the issue of aircraft carriers; their necessity was understood as a matter of course. The need for air cover for ships at sea was also beyond doubt. In the speech of Aviation Major General S.E. Stolyarsky (the only one present who had experience operating from floating aircraft carriers) made a proposal
“to build the deck of a standard aircraft carrier, pilots need to be trained on it, aircraft need to be tested on it.”
Thus, a ship was required that was capable of operating together with the squadron, providing its air cover (fighters). At first, this was how a hybrid of a battleship and an aircraft carrier was seen. Projects for ships of this type have been developed at TsKBS-1 since 1935. With a displacement of 29,800 tons, the engine power is 210,000 liters. s., speed 35–39 knots, armament: 9 305 mm guns, 16 130 mm guns, 18 45 mm guns and an air group of 60 vehicles, the ship had 200 mm side and 125 mm deck armor. The data is clearly overestimated, especially in terms of speed and protection. Quite quickly it became clear that the Soviet shipbuilding industry was not able to build a ship of such a complex design; in addition, doubts arose about the very idea of a hybrid ship.
Since 1937, designs for battleship aircraft carriers have been developed in the United States based on Soviet technical specifications. The most interesting was the Gibbs and Cox battleship of Project 10581 (options “A”, “B” and “C”). The project was created by the owner of the company V.F. Gibbs, who had never done such work before. It is not surprising that the result was a very extravagant ship: with a displacement of 73,003 tons, engine power of 304,160 hp, speed of 34 knots, armament of 8,457 mm / 12,406 mm guns, 28 127 mm guns, 32 28 mm guns, 36 wheeled and four ejection seaplanes, two catapults; armor: sides 330 mm, decks 197 mm.
There was no technical support for such a grandiose ship: there were no slipways or docks, there were no main caliber guns and turrets, or a machine-boiler installation. They did not pay attention to the issues of the ship's aerodynamics: the superstructures and gun turrets, combined with the angular contours of the flight deck, were supposed to create powerful air turbulence that would interfere with takeoff and landing operations. To solve this problem, Soviet designers had to create a particularly streamlined deck in their project and study a number of models in TsAGI wind tunnels. (The author has information about the availability of such models).
Battleship-aircraft carrier pr.10581 (option “C”). USA, 1938
Attempts to create a ship of acceptable displacement (option “C”) did not give a positive result; the Soviet side was completely disappointed in hybrid ships. This is not surprising, since they looked good only on paper: the construction of such a “battleship-aircraft carrier” required the same costs as two separate ships, combat stability seems very doubtful: in a battle of artillery ships, there is a high probability of failure of the flight deck and fire of the aircraft fuel; when attacked from the air, it is a large and vulnerable target.
Simultaneously with foreign designers, the Soviets worked on a project for an aircraft carrier of a normal design. By mid-1939, TsNII-45 had developed a preliminary design of a small aircraft carrier, which received No. 71. This project was most consistent with the Navy's ideas about an aircraft carrier and the capabilities of the shipbuilding industry. The following data was proposed: displacement 11,300 tons, mechanical power 126,500 hp. s., speed 33 knots; armament: 8 100 mm universal artillery guns, 16 37 mm artillery guns, 20 12.7 mm machine guns; air group: ten multi-role aircraft and 20 fighters, two catapults. The base was the hull of the light cruiser Project 68, with a machine-boiler installation; this facilitated the development of a new type of ship by industry. Work was carried out to create the most advantageous appearance, from an aerodynamic point of view. Most ship systems and assemblies, artillery installations and fire control devices, with the exception of aviation equipment, were mastered by industry. Plant No. 199 in Komsomolsk-on-Amur was chosen as the construction site, with the construction of the first ship beginning in 1942.
It is curious that in the directory "Jane's Fighting Ships" for 1938-1939, the aircraft carrier "Red Banner" appears, which, together with another ship of this type, is supposed to be laid down in Leningrad in 1939-1940. Its characteristics are similar to Project 71 : displacement 12,000 tons, speed 30 knots, armament 12 100-mm guns and 40 aircraft. What served as the basis for such a successful assumption is unknown, but the Soviet side, according to the 1937 treaty, was obliged to provide the British with information about the laying of ships being carried out, about nothing I did not report anything like this due to the absence of the fact itself.
Aircraft carrier pr.71. USSR, 1939
Visited Germany in 1939-1940. Soviet trade and purchasing commission under the leadership of the People's Commissar of the shipbuilding industry I.T. Tevosyan, which included a representative of 1DNII-45, showed some interest in German aircraft carriers. Having visited the Graf Zeppelin under construction, Soviet representatives expressed a proposal to purchase it, or, if this was not possible, to purchase an order for the construction of a second ship, which by that time had received the name Peter Strasser, for the Soviet fleet. The German side showed no desire to sell aircraft carriers and offered only anti-aircraft artillery fire control system devices.
Aircraft carrier "Graf Zeppelin". Germany, 1940
German experience was not used in the design work of Soviet designers, despite the fact that after the war they had the opportunity to study the captured ship in detail. The aircraft of the ship's air group did not arouse interest either, which seems very strange, since there were no carrier-based aircraft of our own in the projects.
The entry of the USSR into the Second World War did not allow the construction of aircraft carriers, Project 71, to begin. The preliminary design continued: in 1944, TsNII-45 developed a new project under No. 72. The basis for it was the pre-war project 71-B. In appearance and tactical and technical characteristics, Project 72 was very similar to the British Implecable-class aircraft carriers. Displacement 28,800 tons, power of the main power plant 144,000 liters. s., speed 30 knots, armament: 16 130-mm universal guns, 16 85-mm guns, 24 37-mm guns, 48 25-mm guns, 30 aircraft, two catapults, armor: side 90 mm, flight deck 30 mm , hangar 55 mm, hangar 30 mm. Representatives of the fleet considered the ship's air group too small for such a displacement, rework began, but everything was limited to the project.
Aircraft carrier pr.72. USSR, 1944
In 1944-1945 To summarize the experience of the past war and develop requirements for aircraft carriers, a commission was created under the leadership of Vice Admiral V.F. Chernysheva. The proposals she compiled served as the basis for developing requirements for aircraft carriers in a new ten-year fleet construction program (1946–1955). People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov proposed building six large and small aircraft carriers. After discussing the composition of the program at a meeting with I.V. Stalin had only two small ones left for the Northern Fleet.
It is generally accepted that Stalin underestimated the role of aircraft carriers in naval warfare, which resulted in the abandonment of their construction. This is not entirely true. The construction of the Navy, as requiring large financial costs and coordinated efforts over a long period of time, cannot be ignored by the actual head of state. Stalin did not make decisions without first clarifying all the circumstances surrounding the issue. The leadership of the USSR Navy lacked unity of views on aircraft carriers both pre-war and after the war. The maximum desired is to provide carrier-based fighters to cover ships in ocean theaters. The shipbuilding industry was delayed in development for 5-10 years, and aircraft carriers underwent a number of changes after the Second World War. The displacement increased, artillery and radio-electronic weapons became more complex, and carrier-based jet aircraft appeared. It is clear that before spending money on the construction of new classes of ships, the backlog had to be eliminated. There was no specialized design organization for the design of aircraft carriers. Thus, the decisions of I.V. Stalin relied on knowledge of the real capabilities of industry and the navy.
Aircraft carrier Implecable. Great Britain, 1944
Aircraft carrier pr.85. USSR, 1954
N.G. proved himself to be a strong supporter of aircraft carriers. Kuznetsov, returned to the post of commander-in-chief of the Navy in 1951, after almost five years of disgrace. Since 1953, according to the Navy's OTZ approved by Kuznetsov for a light aircraft carrier, the development of a preliminary design design has been underway, which has received the number 85. By the end of 1954, TsNIIVK presented a preliminary version. It was proposed to carry out a large complex of research and development work on aviation equipment and aircraft. It was proposed to equip the ship with a corner flight deck. Tactical and technical elements: displacement 28,400 tons, power plant 144,000 liters. s., speed 32 knots; weapons: 16 100-mm universal guns, 24 57-mm guns, 16 25-mm guns, 40 fighters and two helicopters, two catapults.
From mid-1955, PKB-16 began work on a preliminary design, while at the same time it was planned to build nine ships of Project 85 in the next ten years. A change in policy regarding large surface ships and the removal of N.G. Kuznetsov from his post led to the complete cessation of work on Project 85.
In thirty years of designing aircraft-carrying ships, only twice, in 1941 and 1955, did Soviet shipbuilding have a real opportunity to begin their construction. During the same period, a view was formed on the aircraft carrier as a ship exclusively necessary to provide air defense for formations far from its coast. Foreign experience, given the specifics of the concept, found almost no application.
This is the alternative......
It was assumed that this article will continue the series “Russian Navy. A sad look into the future.” But when it became clear that the only domestic aircraft carrier, “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov” (hereinafter referred to as “Kuznetsov”), was so huge that it categorically did not want to fit into one article, the author decided to highlight the history of the emergence of the first domestic TAKR - a carrier of horizontal take-off aircraft and planting - in a separate material.
In this article we will try to understand the reasons that prompted the USSR to begin building an aircraft carrier fleet.
The history of the creation of the Kuznetsov began when, for the first time in the history of the USSR, the development of a preliminary design for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier with ejection takeoff was included in the military shipbuilding plan for 1971-1980. However, we can also take 1968 as a starting point, when the Nevsky Design Bureau (PKB) of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, in parallel with the creation of the Project 1143 aircraft-carrying cruiser, began developing the promising Project 1160 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.
How did it happen that the Russian Navy suddenly became closely interested in “aggression”? The fact is that in the 60s, a comprehensive research project “Order” was launched, dedicated to the prospects for the development of ships with aircraft weapons. Its main conclusions were formulated in 1972 and boiled down to the following:
1) Aviation support for the Navy is a paramount, urgent task, since it affects the development of naval strategic nuclear forces; Without air cover, given the dominance of anti-submarine aviation of a potential enemy, we will not be able to ensure not only combat stability, but also the deployment of our submarines, both with ballistic missiles and multi-purpose ones, which are the main striking force of the Navy;
2) Without fighter cover, the successful operation of coastal missile-carrying, reconnaissance and anti-submarine aviation, the second most important strike component of the Navy, is impossible;
3) Without fighter cover, more or less acceptable combat stability of large ships is impossible.
As an alternative, the deployment of powerful land-based naval fighter aviation was considered, but it turned out that to provide air coverage even in the coastal zone, to a depth of 200-300 km, would require such an increase in the aircraft fleet and its basing structure in addition to the existing one, that their cost will exceed all conceivable limits. Most likely, the land-based aviation was let down by its reaction time - an aircraft carrier accompanying a naval group does not have to constantly keep the air group in the air, since it can limit itself to one or two patrols and quickly lift the necessary reinforcement into the air. At the same time, aircraft from land airfields simply do not have time to take part in repelling an air attack and therefore can only rely on those forces that are in the patrol area at the time it begins. However, the author of this article has not read the “Warrant” in the original and does not know for sure.
The “Warrant” carefully took into account the experience of the Second World War. The conclusions of Grand Admiral K. Doenitz, who called the main reason for the defeat of the German submarine fleet “lack of air cover, reconnaissance, target designation, etc.,” were fully confirmed during the “Order” research project.
Based on the results of the “Order”, technical specifications for the aircraft carrier were prepared - it had to have a displacement of 75,000 - 80,000 tons, be nuclear-powered, have four steam catapults and support an air group of at least 70 aircraft and helicopters, including fighters, attack and anti-submarine aircraft , as well as RTR, electronic warfare, and AWACS aircraft. It is interesting that the developers did not intend to deploy 1160 anti-ship missiles on the project; they were added there later, at the request of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S.G. Gorshkova. The technical specifications were transferred to the Nevsky Design Bureau for further work.
In 1973, preliminary project 1160 was approved by the commanders-in-chief of the Navy and Navy, the ministers of shipbuilding and aviation industry, but then the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee D.F. intervened. Ustinov. He demanded to consider the possibility of building another heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser (the third in a row, after Kiev and Minsk) according to Project 1143, but with the placement of catapults and MiG-23A fighters on it. This turned out to be impossible, so D.F. Ustinov demanded:
“Make a new project for 36 aircraft, but in the dimensions of Kyiv”
This also turned out to be impossible; in the end, they “agreed” on a new project for 36 aircraft, but in increased dimensions. He was assigned the code 1153, and in June 1974, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy approved the specifications for the new ship. But at the beginning of 1975 D.F. Ustinov intervenes again with the demand to decide what exactly to develop - ejection aircraft carriers or aircraft-carrying VTOL cruisers. Naturally, D.F. himself Ustinov believed that aircraft carriers with VTOL aircraft were needed. Nevertheless, the sailors still managed to insist on their position, and in 1976 a decree was issued by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers on the creation of “large cruisers with aircraft weapons”: two ships of Project 1153 were to be built in 1978-1985.
Project 1153 was a “step back” from the concept of a full-fledged aircraft carrier of Project 1160 (both of them had the code “Eagle”). The new ship was smaller (about 60,000 tons), carried a more modest air group (50 aircraft), and fewer catapults - 2 units. But still, at least it remained atomic. Nevertheless, when the preliminary design of Project 1153 was completed in 1976, the verdict follows:
“The preliminary design must be approved. Stop further design of the ship."
Project 1153 TAKR model
By this time, “Kiev” was already part of the fleet, “Minsk” was being completed, “Novorossiysk” was laid down a year ago, and design work on “Baku” was at such a stage that it was clear: if a return to catapults and horizontal take-off aircraft would take place at all , then this will only be on the fifth domestic TAKR, which now again had to be designed from scratch. In the next TTZ, the number of aircraft was reduced to 42, the nuclear plant was abandoned, but at least the catapults were retained. The TAKR was supposed to carry 18-28 aircraft and 14 helicopters, and it was assumed that the “aircraft” component would include 18 Su-27K, or 28 MiG-29K, or 12 MiG-29K and 16 Yak-141. The helicopter squadron was supposed to be composed of Ka-27 helicopters in anti-submarine and search and rescue versions, as well as in a radar patrol modification.
But then another opponent of the aircraft carrier fleet arose - Deputy General Staff of the Armed Forces N.N. Amelko. He considered aircraft carriers unnecessary, and proposed building anti-submarine helicopter carriers instead on the basis of a civilian container ship. However, the project N.N. Amelko "Khalzan" turned out to be completely unsuitable, and was ultimately rejected by D.F. Ustinov (at that time - the Minister of Defense), however, Project 1153 was also given up.
Model of the helicopter carrier "Khalzan"
Now the sailors were asked to develop an aircraft carrier “with the necessary improvements,” but with a displacement of no more than 45,000 tons, and most importantly, catapults were anathema. There is an opinion that this is the fault of the OKB im. Sukhoi - its chief designer M.P. Simonov stated that his planes do not need a catapult, but that a ski-jump will suffice. But most likely, M.P. Simonov made his statement after a springboard was chosen for the fifth heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser so that the Su-27 would not end up “overboard” the aircraft carrier.
The sailors still managed to “beg” for another 10,000 tons of displacement when D.F. Ustinov arrived on the Kyiv aircraft carrier for the Zapad-81 exercise. After stories about the real combat effectiveness of the Kyiv air wing, D.F. Ustinov “became emotional” and allowed the displacement of the fifth TAKR to be increased to 55,000 tons. As a matter of fact, this is how the first and only domestic aircraft carrier appeared.
There is no doubt that the United States was extremely concerned about the aircraft carrier construction program in the USSR and diligently “dissuaded” us from it. As V.P. writes Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky:
“Foreign publications of those years concerning the development of aircraft carriers “almost synchronously” accompanied our work, as if pushing us away from the general course that they themselves followed. Thus, with the advent of VTOL aircraft, Western naval and aviation magazines almost immediately “choked with delight” about the exciting prospects for the development of this direction, which almost all military aviation should supposedly follow. We began to increase the displacement of aircraft carrier ships - they immediately began to publish publications about the inexpediency of developing such supergiants as the Nimitz, and that it was preferable to build “smaller” aircraft carriers, and besides, not with nuclear, but with conventional energy. We took up the catapult - they began to praise the springboards. Information often flashed about the cessation of their construction of aircraft carriers.”
It must be said that the author of this article himself came across similar publications (translated articles by American authors in the Foreign Military Review of the 80s).
Perhaps today, “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov” remains the most controversial ship of the Russian Navy; the assessments expressed about it are as numerous as they are contradictory. And this is not to mention the fact that the need to build aircraft carriers for the USSR Navy and the Russian Navy is constantly disputed and is the subject of heated debate, and the history of their development is overgrown with a lot of legends and speculation. Before assessing the potential of the first Soviet TAKR, from the deck of which horizontal take-off and landing aircraft could take off, let's look at at least some of them.
1. The fleet did not need aircraft carriers, but their construction was lobbied by a group of surface admirals led by Navy Commander-in-Chief Gorshkov.
Contrary to popular belief, the need for full-fledged aircraft carriers in the USSR fleet was by no means a voluntaristic decision “from above” or “a whim of the admirals,” but the result of serious research work that lasted several years. The “Order” research project was started in the 60s, the author of this article was unable to find out the exact date of its start, but even if it was 1969, it doesn’t matter, it was not fully completed even in 1972. In addition, The history of the development of Soviet aircraft carriers clearly indicates that the most consistent opponent of S.G. Gorshkova - D.F. Ustinov was not at all against the construction of aircraft carriers, as such. The need for large aircraft-carrying ocean-going ships was obvious to him. In essence, the contradiction between S.G. Gorshkov and D.F. Ustinov was not that one wanted to build aircraft carriers, and the second did not, but that S.G. Gorshkov considered it necessary to build classic aircraft carriers (in many ways comparable to the American Nimitz), while D.F. Ustinov hoped that their tasks could be carried out by smaller ships - VTOL carriers. Perhaps the only “pure” opponent of aircraft carriers, who completely denied the usefulness of carrier-based aircraft, was Admiral Amelko, who promoted the construction of anti-submarine helicopter carriers instead of TAKR, but it was he who did not leave behind not only scientific, but generally any intelligible justifications for your position. But in his case, it is indeed easy to suspect purely opportunistic, “undercover” actions, because he was considered an opponent of S.G. Gorshkova.
2. Supporters of the construction of aircraft carriers for the USSR Navy did not take into account the experience of World War II, which demonstrated the advantage of a submarine over aircraft-carrying ships.
In fact, during the “Order” research project, the experience of the most effective submarine fleet, the German one, was carefully studied. And it was concluded that submarines can be successful in the face of strong enemy opposition only if their deployment and operations are supported by aviation.
3. Aircraft carriers are not needed for the defense of the near sea zone.
As the research project "Order" has shown, providing air cover for a naval group with land-based aircraft, even at a distance of 200-300 km from the coastline, turns out to be much more expensive than an aircraft carrier.
4. Aircraft carriers were needed, first of all, as a means of neutralizing the air wings of American aircraft carriers. With the advent of long-range anti-ship missiles "Basalt", "Granit" and their underwater carriers, the task of countering the US AUG was solved. Submarine missile cruisers and a space reconnaissance and target designation system have nullified the power of the US AUG.
In order to understand the fallacy of this statement, it is enough to remember that according to the “Order” research project, without air cover we could not even guarantee combat stability, we could not even guarantee the deployment of multi-purpose nuclear submarines. And, importantly, this conclusion was made in 1972, when the flight design tests of the Basalt anti-ship missile system were underway, and the prototypes of the US-A satellites, carriers of the Legend MRRC radar, were being tested in space. In other words, the conclusion about the need for aircraft carriers was formulated at a time when we already had a very good idea of the potential capabilities of the Basalt anti-ship missile system and the Legend ICRC.
5. D.F. Ustinov was right, and we needed to abandon the construction of ships that would support horizontal take-off and landing aircraft in favor of VTOL aircraft.
The debate about the advantages and disadvantages of VTOL aircraft is endless, but without a doubt, aviation achieves its greatest effect when using fighters, electronic warfare aircraft and AWACS together. But basing the latter on TAKRs not equipped with catapults turned out to be impossible. Thus, even if we accept on faith the thesis that “a little more time and money - and the Yakovlev Design Bureau would present to the world an analogue of the MiG-29, but with vertical take-off and landing,” we still understand that in terms of efficiency, TAKR VTOL aircraft will lose to the air wing of a classic aircraft carrier.
Without a doubt, one can argue about how necessary an aircraft carrier fleet is for the Russian Federation today, because almost 50 years have passed since the “Order” research project and during this time technology has stepped far forward. The author of this article believes that it is needed, but recognizes the existence of room for discussion. At the same time, the need to create an aircraft carrier fleet in the USSR in the early 70s does not raise any doubts, and the USSR, albeit not immediately, began its construction.
This aspect is also interesting. Formed as a result of the research work “Order”, the TK and project 1160 “Eagle” presented themselves as a “copycat” of an American strike aircraft carrier - its air group should have included not only fighters (or dual-purpose fighters/bombers), but also purely attack aircraft, which could be created planned on the basis of the Su-24. In other words, Project 1160 was a multi-purpose aircraft carrier. But later, and quite quickly, the air group of the promising TAKR lost its attack aircraft - starting, perhaps, from 1153 we should talk about designing not a multi-purpose aircraft carrier, in the image and likeness of the American ones, but about an air defense aircraft carrier, the primary task of which was air cover for strike forces (surface ships, submarines, missile-carrying aircraft). Does this mean that the “Order” research project confirmed the effectiveness of the American development of naval power to spite ours? It is impossible to say this for sure without reading the “Order” reports. But we can state the fact that the USSR, while designing and creating aircraft carriers, did not copy the American fleet in its development.
The United States has become firmly convinced of the priority of air power over sea power - not counting strategic SSBNs, of course. Otherwise, almost the entire range of “fleet against fleet” and “fleet against shore” tasks was supposed to be solved by carrier-based aircraft. Thus, the United States created its surface fleet “around” aircraft carriers, their destroyers and cruisers were, first of all, escort ships that were supposed to provide air defense/anti-aircraft defense for the aircraft carrier, and secondly, carriers of cruise missiles for action against the coast. But the task of destroying enemy surface ships was practically not assigned to destroyers and cruisers; deck installations of anti-ship “Harpoons” were for them a very situational weapon “just in case.” When it was necessary to save money, the Harpoons were sacrificed first. For a long time, the new destroyers of the US Navy were not equipped with anti-ship weapons at all, and the Americans did not see anything wrong with this, although then they nevertheless became concerned with the development of anti-ship missiles capable of “fitting” into the Arly Berkov and Ticonderoga UVPs. The American submarine fleet was quite numerous, but still multi-purpose nuclear submarines, rather, complemented the AUG’s capabilities in terms of anti-submarine defense, and also solved the problem of destroying Soviet SSBNs in those areas where US carrier-based aircraft could not establish their dominance.
At the same time, in the Soviet Navy (not counting SSBNs), the main task was considered to be “fleet against fleet”, and it was supposed to be solved by land-based missile-carrying aircraft, submarines, as well as large surface ships carrying heavy anti-ship missiles “Basalt” and “Granit”. The USSR aircraft carrier was not the “backbone” around which the rest of the fleet was built, and whose carrier-based aircraft were supposed to solve “all problems.” Soviet TAKRs were viewed merely as a means of ensuring the stability of the fleet's strike forces; the role of their air wings was reduced to neutralizing the air threat posed by American carrier-based aircraft.
And here we come to another very common misconception, which can be formulated as follows:
6. "Kuznetsov" is not an aircraft carrier, but a aircraft carrier. Unlike a classic aircraft carrier, which is a defenseless airfield, a Kuznetsov-class ship has a full range of weapons that allow it to operate independently, without resorting to the protection of numerous surface ships.
Let's look at the main characteristics of "Kuznetsov".
Displacement. It must be said that information about him differs in different sources. For example, V. Kuzin and G. Nikolsky claim that the standard displacement of the TAVR is 45,900 tons, and the full displacement is 58,500 tons, but S.A. Balakin and Zablotsky give, respectively, 46,540 and 59,100 tons. At the same time, they also mention the “largest” displacement of the ship - 61,390 tons.
The Kuznetsov TAKR is equipped with a four-shaft boiler-turbine power plant with a capacity of 200,000 hp, which was supposed to provide a speed of 29 knots. The steam was produced by eight KVG-4 boilers, with increased steam capacity compared to the KVN 98/64 boilers used on the previous Baku aircraft carrier (on which 8 boilers provided a power of 180,000 hp).
Armament: its basis, of course, was the air group. According to the project, Kuznetsov was supposed to provide basing for 50 aircraft, including: up to 26 Su-27K or MiG-29K aircraft, 4 Ka-25RLD AWACS helicopters, 18 Ka-27 or Ka-29 anti-submarine helicopters and 2 search and rescue helicopters. rescue helicopter Ka-27PS. To house the air group, a hangar 153 m long, 26 m wide and 7.2 m high was provided, but it, of course, could not accommodate the entire air group. It was assumed that the hangar could accommodate up to 70% of the air group, the rest of the vehicles were supposed to be on the flight deck.
An interesting attempt is to base Yak-44RLD AWACS aircraft on a TAKR. Apparently, this was the case - in 1979, when the Yakovlev Design Bureau received an order to design this aircraft, no one had yet intended to deprive our TAKRs of catapults and it was planned to develop an ejection aircraft, but after the decision to make do with a springboard, it was also necessary to “cut” and air group - its basis was to be the Yak-141, and all other aircraft, including the MiG-29 and Su-27 - only if they could be adapted for non-ejection takeoff from a ski-jump, and the same applied to the Yak-44. But if in the case of 4th generation fighters, which had a high thrust-to-weight ratio, this turned out to be possible, then the creation of an AWACS aircraft capable of launching from a ski-jump encountered certain difficulties, so its creation “stalled” and accelerated only after it became clear that that the seventh aircraft carrier of the USSR - Ulyanovsk - will still have catapults. It is also interesting that at some point the fleet put forward a requirement to base a vertical take-off and landing radar aircraft on the future Kuznetsov! But in the end they limited themselves to AWACS helicopters.
The TAKR was equipped with strike weapons - 12 under-deck Granit anti-ship missile launchers. Anti-aircraft missile weapons are represented by the Kinzhal complex - 24 launchers with 8 silos each, for a total of 192 missiles. In addition, 8 Kortik air defense systems and the same number of AK-630M were installed on the Kuznetsov. Two RBU-12000 “Boas” are not so much an anti-submarine system as an anti-torpedo system. The principle of its operation is the same as that of anti-submarine RBU, but the ammunition is different. Thus, in a “Boa Constrictor” salvo, the first two shells carry decoys to distract homing torpedoes, and the rest form a “minefield” through which torpedoes will have to pass through, “not wanting” to be distracted by traps. If this is also overcome, then conventional ammunition is already used, representing rockets - depth charges.
Active countermeasures are complemented by passive ones, and here we are talking not only about electronic warfare systems and setting false targets, etc. The fact is that the ship, for the first time on domestic aircraft carriers, has implemented underwater structural protection (PKZ), which is a modern analogue of the PTZ of the World War II era. The depth of the PKZ is 4.5-5 m. However, even when overcoming it, the capabilities of the TAKR are impressive - it must remain afloat when any five adjacent compartments are flooded, while the hangar deck must remain at least 1.8 m above the water surface. The ammunition and fuel storage areas received “box-shaped” armor; unfortunately, its thickness is unknown.
Thus, we see a large, heavy ship equipped with a variety of weapons. However, even the most cursory analysis shows that the armament of the Kuznetsov aircraft carrier is not at all self-sufficient, and can “open up” to its fullest extent only when interacting with other warships.
The Kuznetsov air group can provide air defense or anti-aircraft defense for the ship, but not both at the same time. The fact is that, according to the rules of the Russian Navy, refueling or arming aircraft in a hangar is strictly prohibited, and this is understandable - there is also the danger of concentration of kerosene vapors in a closed room, and in general - an enemy missile that landed on the hangar deck and caused the prepared aircraft ammunition to detonate , will cause severe damage to the ship, and, perhaps, even lead to its destruction. Such an incident on the flight deck, no doubt, would also be extremely unpleasant, but it would not threaten the destruction of the ship.
Accordingly, the TAKR can only use those aircraft that are located on its flight deck - those that are in the hangar still need to be lifted, refueled and armed. And there is not too much space on the flight deck - fighters can be placed there, and then the ship will perform air defense functions, or helicopters, then the TAKR will be able to implement anti-aircraft defense functionality, but not both at the same time. That is, you can, of course, roll out a mixed air group, but the number of fighters and helicopters will be such that it will not be able to solve air defense and anti-aircraft defense missions with proper efficiency.
As a result, if we focus on air defense, then the capabilities for searching for enemy nuclear submarines will not exceed those of the large Project 1155 anti-submarine ship (Polynom State Joint Stock Company and a couple of helicopters), and this is completely insufficient for such a huge ship with a rather large air group. The Project 1155 BOD is, of course, a formidable opponent for a 3rd generation nuclear submarine, but in a battle with such a nuclear submarine it can, of course, die itself. This is an acceptable risk for a ship with a displacement of 7,000 tons, but forcing a giant TAKR, six times the displacement of a BOD, and with dozens of planes and helicopters on board, to confront a nuclear submarine with the same chances of success is an unimaginable waste. At the same time, if we focus on solving anti-aircraft defense problems and force the deck with helicopters, then the ship’s air defense will be critically weakened. Yes, the TAKR is equipped with quite numerous Kinzhal air defense systems, but it should be understood that this air defense system has a range of destruction of air targets of 12 kilometers, at an altitude of 6,000 m, that is, it is aimed at fighting not so much with enemy aircraft, but with the missiles and guided missiles they use air bombs. In essence, both the Kinzhal air defense system, the Kortik air defense system, and the AK-630 installed on the Kuznetsov are weapons that finish shooting the few missiles whose carriers did break through the TAKR fighters. By themselves, they will not provide air defense for the ship.
Now - strike weapons. Yes, Kuznetsov is equipped with a dozen Granit anti-ship missiles, but... this is not enough. According to the calculations of the Russian Navy, in order to “break through” the air defense of the AUG, at least 20 missiles in a salvo were required, which is why our heavy nuclear-powered missile cruisers carried 20 Granites, and the Project 949A Antey submarine SSGNs even carried 24 such missiles, so to speak, with a guarantee.
A completely different matter is the situation when a domestic TAKR operates together with the Project 1164 Atlant RKR and a pair of BODs. Together with the RKR, the TAKR could provide a 30-missile salvo, which would not be to the taste of any AUG, while, when performing the tasks of the Daggers and Dirks PLOs, the Kuznetsov would be supplemented by the S-300F air defense system, thereby forming a layered Air defense. And vice versa, when performing air defense missions, a pair of BODs with helicopters based on them would complement the capabilities of the TAKR and could well guarantee the ASW of such a formation.
All of the above indicates that, although the domestic TAKR could be used independently, but only at the cost of a significant reduction in efficiency and at the risk of excessive risk. In general, as we said above, the USSR TAKR is not a “one-man warrior”, but a support ship for surface, underwater and air strike groups equipped with guided missile weapons and designed to destroy large forces of a potential enemy’s fleet. But it would be wrong to see in the domestic TAKR a kind of “written bag”, to ensure the protection of which half of the fleet had to be diverted. The TAKR complemented the strike forces of the fleet, making it possible to carry out missions to defeat the enemy with a smaller number of forces and with a lower level of losses. That is, the creation of TAKR saved us money that otherwise would have needed to be spent on creating additional SSGNs, missile cruisers, and missile-carrying aircraft. And of course, the lives of the sailors and pilots serving on them.
To be continued...
Today, only ten countries have aircraft carriers, among them the United States, with 11 floating air bases, is the undisputed leader. Russia is represented by only one vessel of this class. But in the eighties, the USSR was only two times inferior to the United States in these indicators - 7 versus 14.
Unfortunately, the collapse of the Soviet Union made its own adjustments. By the time independent states were formed on the territory of the former USSR, no one needed aircraft carriers, primarily because of the high cost of maintenance. The exception was the aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov, which relocated from Sevastopol to Murmansk: the only one that is still part of the Russian Navy.
The remaining aircraft carriers, which could remain formidable weapons, gradually turned into heaps of scrap metal. Subsequently, the fleet of aircraft carriers, divided between Russia and Ukraine, was sold off. Three ships ended up in India, two each in China and South Korea. One of them, the aircraft carrier Varyag, which was never put into operation, is now operated as a training and experimental ship of the Chinese Navy, another ship, Admiral Gorshkov, is a combat unit of the Indian Navy.
Answer to the West
The aircraft-carrying cruiser "Varyag", which the Kremlin was going to oppose to the West, like other aircraft carriers, was built at the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolaev (ChSZ) - the only enterprise of the Union that was able to carry out such projects. On the world market, a ship of this class could be valued at 2-3 billion dollars, but it was sold to China for a ridiculous 20 million.
"Varyag" was supposed to be a worthy response to American aircraft carriers. The Chinese delegation, which visited this ship as a potential buyer, was impressed by what they saw. The Chinese noted that this is a completely new ship from armor to filling. “Varyag is not just a mountain of iron. These are high technologies that are classified as unique,” notes Valery Babich, who from 1979 to 1990 was the head of the design bureau for aircraft-carrying ships at ChSZ.
Unlike their American counterparts, Soviet aircraft carriers, in addition to aircraft, also carried powerful anti-ship missile weapons, which brought them closer to cruisers. However, the use of this name is also connected with another factor. According to international convention, the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits were a closed zone for aircraft carriers, and this ban did not apply to cruisers.
Missed moment
Projects for the construction of aircraft carriers in the USSR arose even before World War II, but with the outbreak of hostilities, for obvious reasons, they were frozen. After 1945, the Soviet command decided that it was much more important for the fleet to develop battleships and cruisers.
And in the ensuing Cold War, the Kremlin relied on ballistic missiles and submarines. In conditions of strengthening of coastal and missile-carrying aviation, the importance of aircraft carriers in delivering strategic strikes became secondary.
While Moscow was arrogant about American aircraft carriers, viewing them as a window dressing instrument of the aggressive policy of the imperialists, which, due to its low maneuverability, would be destroyed in the first hours of the global conflict, the United States was constantly working to modernize aircraft-carrying ships.
The USSR professed a defensive doctrine, while the Pentagon was preparing for local mini-wars, where the use of aircraft carriers provided undeniable advantages. According to American aviation and naval historian Norman Polmar, the US Navy's ability to quickly deliver 60-70 aircraft anywhere in the world, which did not require permission to overfly the territory of other countries and did not require land airfields, made aircraft carriers an ideal weapon.
Very soon the Soviet Union became convinced that strengthening the role of the surface and submarine fleets, as well as its long-range aviation, required the use of aircraft carriers. Only with the help of this craft was it possible to maintain air supremacy by deploying air groups anywhere in the world's oceans.
Chasing the enemy
Only in the first half of the 1970s did the USSR decide to follow the path of the Americans, but by that time it was hopelessly behind - the US aircraft carrier fleet already included 15 powerful attack ships, three of which were nuclear. In total, they could accommodate over a thousand aircraft.
The concept of American ships was as follows: they deployed carrier-based fighters, reconnaissance, anti-submarine and other winged vehicles. Special steam catapults helped the planes to shorten the run, which accelerated the 35-ton aircraft to 250 km/h in 2.5 seconds over a distance of 100 meters. When landing, the plane was slowed down by special halyards stretched across the deck, to which the fighters clung with aerofinishing hooks.
At the first stage, the Soviet fleet abandoned the American version, preferring the Yak-38 vertical take-off aircraft. They did not need a long runway, and this in turn made it possible to make the ship more compact. Leonid Brezhnev considered the Yak-38 the pride of Soviet aviation.
Taking into account the characteristics of Yakov, the first Soviet aircraft-carrying cruisers were built in the 1970s and 80s - Kyiv, Minsk, Novorossiysk and Admiral Gorshkov. However, after the aircraft carriers were launched, it became clear that the Yak-38 could not compete on equal terms with American carrier-based aircraft. The Soviet vehicle turned out to be less maneuverable; its takeoff and landing consumed much more fuel, which limited both its range and combat load.
The Americans reacted arrogantly to the appearance of Soviet aircraft carriers, believing that it was not a ship, but “an unknown thing,” noted Arkady Morin, a Russian historian of shipbuilding and the fleet. According to him, during training flights, American McDonnell FH-1 Phantom carrier-based fighters, simulating an attack on Soviet ships, tried not to fly close to the clumsy and difficult to control Yakov, for fear of accidental collisions. And these fears were not in vain. 15% of all Yak-38s built, says Morin, crashed during service.
"Admiral Kuznetsov" vs "George Washington"
Analyzing its shortcomings, the USSR decided to settle on a classic aircraft carrier, without giving up powerful anti-ship missile systems. The first-born among the new generation of aircraft carriers was the Admiral Kuznetsov, launched in 1987. Initially, the ship was conceived as an analogue of the American nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, but with reduced funding, not nuclear, but conventional engines were installed on it.
Instead of steam catapults, the ship now has a springboard - a raised bow end of the deck. This was enough for independent takeoffs of MiG-29k and Su-33 class fighters, which were superior to their American counterparts in flight and combat characteristics.
The length of the Kuznetsov was 306 meters with a displacement of 61 thousand tons and a power of 50 thousand liters. With. The ship reached speeds of up to 29 knots. The giant's crew numbered almost 2 thousand people; the aviation group on the ship could reach 50 planes and helicopters.
The size of the Admiral Kuznetsov amazed eyewitnesses. It was the height of a 20-story building, and its corridors stretched a total of 20 km. The interior space of the ship was so large that some of the ordinary crew members may never have met each other during their military service.
It is interesting to compare Admiral Kuznetsov with the American Nimitz-class aircraft carrier George Washington, which was launched in 1990. The length of the ship was 332 meters, displacement 97 thousand tons, power 260 thousand liters. s., speed 30 knots. The ship's technical capabilities allowed it to carry up to 90 aircraft; the ship's crew numbered about 3,200 people.
In all respects, the American ship was superior to the Soviet one, except for the most important detail that distinguished Soviet aircraft carriers. If the George Washington had only 3 missile launchers, then on the Admiral Kuznetsov their number reached 44. According to experts, Soviet missiles had a range of up to 500 km and could carry nuclear warheads.
In another important component - the ability to be away from the base for a long time - the Soviet aircraft carrier was inferior to the American one, due to the latter having a large number of repair units and workshops that resembled small repair factories. But this minus turned into a plus. The cost of building a Soviet ship was noticeably lower.
Efficiency
As for the effectiveness of Soviet aircraft carriers, it was, as domestic experts admitted, inferior to their American counterparts. Doctor of Military Sciences, captain of the first rank Konstantin Sivkov compared the Admiral Kuznetsov and American Nimitz-class aircraft carriers and found that, in relation to local wars, the efficiency coefficient for US ships is 0.35, for Russia - 0.3. At the same time, the lag of the Soviet ship in terms of local conflicts reaches 14%, global - 10%.
“Nimitz is a more versatile aircraft carrier,” notes Sivkov. A powerful catapult allows heavier aircraft to take off, which will expand the capabilities of both the strike and support fleets. Such aircraft can carry a larger bomb load.
The presence of a springboard in the design of the Soviet ship does not allow large aircraft to be placed on board. This forces the duties of long-range radar detection to be entrusted to Ka-31 helicopters, which, for all their advantages, are limited in their movement radius. On the other hand, the absence of a catapult led to a decrease in the mass of the ship, an increase in internal volume and, ultimately, a decrease in energy costs.
Russian experts are calm about the fact that the comparison of aircraft carriers is far from being in our favor. The aircraft carrier is a favorite toy of American admirals, designed to solve strategic and combat tasks inherent in US military doctrine. However, the Russian, as well as the Chinese military, are gradually acquiring weapons systems that can effectively withstand the American miracle ships.