German leaflets in the Second World War. Military history, weapons, old and military maps

We bring to your attention the article “Propaganda of corruption is a dirty business” by Doctor of Political Sciences Sergei Moshkin, originally published in No. 5 of the Ural magazine for 2005.
The article is devoted to German propaganda in the occupied Soviet territories. Illustrative material for this article was selected by LiveJournal user kazagrandy.
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Almost all large-scale wars of the 20th century were accompanied by propaganda efforts of the warring parties with the goal of demoralizing and disintegrating the enemy army from within, inducing enemy soldiers to give up their weapons and surrender.

During the Second World War in Nazi Germany, a special apparatus was created for this purpose, “for propaganda,” A. Hitler believed, “is the same weapon of struggle, and in the hands of an expert in this matter, the most terrible of weapons.” The general management of propaganda work in the Reich was carried out by the Ministry of Propaganda of J. Goebbels. At the same time, a propaganda system operated in the department of A. Rosenberg, the Imperial Minister for the Eastern Territories. At the General Staff of the German Army there was a special department for conducting propaganda among enemy troops and the population of the occupied territories.

By the time of the invasion of Soviet territory, the German troops destined for the war on the Eastern Front had formed 19 propaganda companies and 6 platoons of SS war correspondents. They included military journalists, translators, maintenance personnel for propaganda radio vehicles, employees of field printing houses, specialists in the publication and distribution of anti-Soviet literature, posters, and leaflets.

The “art” of Nazi propaganda was based on the principles set forth by Hitler:

- “propaganda should appeal only to the masses”;

- “propaganda should influence more the feeling and only to a very small extent the so-called reason”;

- “present ideas briefly, clearly, understandably, in the form of easy-to-remember slogans”;

- “In order for a lie to be believed, it must be propagated in the most one-sided, rude, persistent way.”

A distinctive feature of Nazi propaganda was its special desire for primitivization aimed at the poorly educated and politically inexperienced masses. “All propaganda,” Hitler wrote, “must be accessible to the masses; its level should proceed from the level of understanding characteristic of the most backward individuals among those whom it wants to influence... And since we are talking about propaganda during the war... then it is clear that propaganda should be as simple as possible.”

The simplest and most effective means of moral and psychological decay of Soviet troops during the war were German propaganda leaflets.

In “Proposals for the Preparation of Leaflets for Enemy Troops,” Goebbels reminded his subordinates that for a propagandist in his work, all means are good if they contribute to achieving the goal: “Propaganda of corruption is a dirty business that has nothing to do with faith or worldview. In this matter, only the result itself is decisive. If we manage to win the enemy’s trust... and if we manage to penetrate the souls of the enemy soldiers, plant in them slogans that corrupt them, it makes absolutely no difference whether these are Marxist, Jewish or intellectual slogans, as long as they are effective!”

Leaflets were produced in huge quantities and assortments. All of them, as a rule, were printed on plain newsprint, in black and white, with text on one side and a drawing (or photograph) on the other. Occasionally, leaflets were found with an additional red print, emphasizing the importance of one or another element of the leaflet, be it a drawing or a political slogan. The scale of the circulation can be judged from Goebbels’s entry alone, which he made in his diary in June 1941: “About 50 million leaflets for the Red Army have already been printed, sent out and will be scattered by our aviation...”

Initially, leaflets were produced centrally in Germany, but as German troops advanced deeper into Soviet territory, their production was established directly in the troops, as well as in captured Soviet printing houses. Judging by the vocabulary, the construction of phrases, and the artistic techniques used, the texts of the leaflets were written by people for whom Russian was their native language.

Unlike propaganda posters addressed to the population of the occupied territories, “trench” leaflets intended for distribution in the combat zone of Soviet troops were distinguished by a small format - the size of a postcard. It was more convenient to scatter such leaflets from airplanes over enemy positions, and for saboteurs to carry them behind the front line for distribution in the rear of the Red Army. Finally, it was easier for any Red Army soldier to pick up such a leaflet from the ground and put it in his pocket, unnoticed by the political commissars.

A characteristic feature of the “trench” leaflets: almost all of them simultaneously served as a pass for the voluntary transfer of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army to the side of the German troops. The text of the pass in Russian and German was especially outlined in the leaflet. In the initial period of the war, it usually looked like this: “PASS. The bearer of this, not wanting senseless bloodshed for the interests of the Jews and commissars, leaves the defeated Red Army and goes over to the side of the German Armed Forces. German officers and soldiers will give the convert a good welcome, feed him and give him a job. The pass is valid for an unlimited number of commanders and soldiers of the Red Army who defect to the side of the German troops.”

A similar text in German was printed nearby, probably so that the Red Army soldier who surrendered was confident that his intentions would be correctly understood by the German soldiers.

In the spring of 1943, when collaborationist military formations from among the citizens of the USSR appeared in the German army, the propaganda organs of the Third Reich began to address leaflets and passes to fighters of the multinational Red Army with the following content: “The pass is valid for an unlimited number of commanders, soldiers and political workers of the Red Army who are switching to side of the German Armed Forces, their allies, the Russian Liberation Army and the Ukrainian, Caucasian, Cossack, Turkestan and Tatar liberation detachments.”

The main theses of the “leaflet” propaganda were developed by Goebbels even before the start of hostilities against the Soviet Union: “... no anti-socialism, no return of tsarism; do not talk about the dismemberment of the Russian state (otherwise we will embitter the Great Russian-minded army); against Stalin and his Jewish henchmen; land to the peasants... Sharply accuse Bolshevism, expose its failures in all areas. For the rest, follow the course of events...”

Following these guidelines, the Soviet government, the Bolshevik Party and its leadership were subjected to derogatory criticism from German propagandists. They presented the outbreak of war as a liberation mission of the German people's army fighting against the barbarity of the Bolsheviks. The successes of the Wehrmacht are inevitable not only because the Bolshevik leadership has shown its complete incompetence, but also because the Red Army does not want and cannot fight for the interests of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): “Commanders and soldiers of the Red Army! Your situation is hopeless. The ring of German troops around you is shrinking ever closer. You lack ammunition, supplies and food, your rulers and leaders are incapable of anything, they flee and leave you to your fate. The communist authorities have still oppressed many of you and deprived them of all rights, but now they are using you to protect their regime. Your struggle is useless! Is it acceptable for your superiors, out of stubbornness, to still mercilessly drive you to your inevitable death? No - your life is dear to you! Save it for a better future and for your families. Go to the Germans - there you will find good treatment and food, as well as a speedy return to your homeland.”

“Stalin’s enemies are our friends!”

Special efforts of German propaganda were focused on the figure of I. Stalin. In one of the leaflets, the familiar abbreviation USSR stood for “The Death of Stalin Will Save Russia.” There is also a caricature: a proletarian hammer hits Stalin on the head, and a peasant sickle is pressed to his neck.

In another leaflet, a caricature of Stalin with a predatory grin is whittling coffins; on the coffins are the numbers of fallen divisions and armies. Caption under the picture: “Father Stalin takes care of his divisions...”

In July 1941, near Vitebsk, the commander of the battery of the 14th howitzer artillery regiment of the 14th armored division, Yakov Dzhugashvili, was captured. For German propagandists this was a real success. Still would! The son of Stalin himself, alive and unharmed, ended up in German captivity. An entire propaganda campaign was launched around this. They urgently produced a leaflet “Do you know who this is?”, which included photographs of Yakov surrounded by German officers. On the reverse side was the text: “This is Yakov Dzhugashvili, Stalin’s eldest son... He surrendered, because any resistance to the German Army is now useless! Follow the example of Stalin's son - he is alive, healthy and feeling great. Why should you make useless sacrifices, go to certain death, when even the son of your supreme boss has already surrendered. Move over too!”

Thousands of such leaflets were scattered from German aircraft. One of them, in a special envelope sealed with wax, was delivered from the front on behalf of Zhdanov personally to Stalin. A few days later a new leaflet appeared. It included the text of a letter written as if by Jacob’s hand: “Dear father, I am quite healthy, I will be sent to one of the officer camps in Germany. The treatment is good. I wish you good health, hello everyone. Yasha.”

Stalin, it seems, then believed in his son’s treason, and one can only guess what effect this leaflet had on the retreating Soviet troops.

However, that was not all. The Germans, using the fact of Yakov’s captivity, embarked on outright falsification. A leaflet was produced: “Following Stalin’s son, Voroshilov’s son also surrendered.” There was also a cartoon showing I. Stalin and K. Voroshilov cowardly peeking out from behind the Kremlin wall. Near the wall is a German soldier with a sign in his hands: “They surrender here.” The captive Yakov Dzhugashvili welcomes Sergei Voroshilov with open arms. Behind Sergei is a whole column of children of Kremlin dignitaries going to the Germans. Below the cartoon was printed a small propaganda “poem”:

Stalin the son:

Here you are in captivity, Seryozha.

Hello, friend of my soul.

Voroshilov-son:

And he’s following me into captivity too

Tail of red sons.

Here, look, disarmed,

Budyonny’s son also goes into captivity.

And after him, having served his time,

Timoshenkov's son,

And behind them others

To save Russia,

They cheerfully go to the Germans as prisoners,

They spit on their dads...

While humiliating Stalin, the Germans resorted to more sophisticated methods of propaganda. They produced, for example, provocative leaflets, allegedly written by the commanders and commissars of the Red Army for those of their soldiers who, sincerely fighting for socialism, could not help but see the vicious features of the Stalinist regime. They said:

“Lenin himself did not want Stalin to become his successor. Lenin did not trust Stalin and felt that under him the Soviet Union would perish... We have weapons in our hands, and we will throw off the damned Stalinist yoke!”

For greater authenticity, some of these leaflets were based on genuine quotes from Lenin from the famous “Letter to the Congress” and were equipped with the slogans “For the cause of Lenin! Down with Stalin! For Leninist socialism!” There one could also find altered words of the famous song by A. Alexandrov:

Get up, huge country,

Stand up for mortal combat

With the cowardly clique of Stalin,

With the despised horde.

May the rage be noble

It boils like a wave.

Open your eyes, free

Soviet country.

Even the allied relations of the USSR with Great Britain and the USA were blamed by Nazi propaganda on Stalin, trying to prove that for Soviet soldiers this war was a war for other people’s interests. The working people of Russia, the Germans convinced, are not the enemies of Germany. The enemies of Germany are Stalin and his henchmen, who entered into a conspiracy with the Anglo-American capitalists. Therefore, defending the Stalinist regime in fact means supporting the world bourgeoisie.

The Red Army soldiers were deliberately led to the idea that friendship with the Anglo-American capitalists finally revealed the anti-people essence of Stalin’s policies, for whom his personal interests and the interests of his capitalist allies were immeasurably more important than the interests and needs of the peoples of Russia. And because:

“The war will end only after the destruction of Bolshevism. No compromises are possible. Don’t die in vain, don’t support Stalin’s doomed regime in vain! Help him overthrow! Refuse to defend him. Stalin's death will save Russia! Stalin’s enemies are our friends!”

Reich propagandists inspired the defending Red Army that only the victory of Germany, which was a foregone conclusion, was only a matter of time, and, accordingly, the death of Stalin would make Russia a free and prosperous country.

“The Jews are the eternal enemies of your people!”

The conclusion from all this was the following: Bolshevism and Jewry are one whole. Both are enemies of the peoples of Russia and must be destroyed.

Here are some quotes from Nazi leaflets that littered the trenches of Soviet soldiers: “The Jews are the most vile, the most dangerous rodents, undermining the foundations of our world. You fight for them, sacrifice countless amounts of goods, health, life, so that they can continue to gorge themselves in the rear and line their pockets.”

“Only when the last Jew is expelled from your fatherland will peace come. Beat the Jewish spawn! Destroy this scourge of humanity and you will end the war!”

The assortment of anti-Semitic leaflets was perhaps the most abundant in the arsenal of Reich propagandists. Various methods and means of ideological corruption of Soviet soldiers were used here - from primitive slogans like “Beat the Jew-political instructor, your face is asking for a brick!” to fiery appeals to start a new, this time anti-Bolshevik-anti-Jewish revolution: “Fighters, commanders and political workers! It is your sacred duty to start a second revolution for the happiness of the Motherland and your families. Know that victory is yours, since the weapon is in your hands. Save the Fatherland from the Jewish boor! Down with the traitors of Russia - the Jewish accomplices! Death to Jewish Bolshevism! Forward, for freedom, for happiness and life!”

German propagandists did not disdain the so-called “light” genres: caricatures, simple humorous poems. They were easily remembered and, on occasion, retold to others. It must be assumed that satirical genres, due to their deliberate primitiveness and imagery, coped with their propaganda tasks no worse than rationally verified propaganda materials. Their strength lay in their special emotional impact on the reader.

For example, one of the leaflets contained a cartoon drawing of a Jewish blacksmith. There’s a signature right there: “Does this happen? No! A Jew never works himself!”

German military propagandists even invented a certain poetic hero - the Russian experienced soldier Foma Smyslov, who gives everyday advice and instructions to young Red Army soldiers. In his cherished words, Grandfather Thomas - a kind of folk storyteller - recalls how powerful and rich Rus' was until “a Jew appeared in the Kremlin.” He, the Jew, started this war, having quarreled the Russians with the Germans, hid himself in the rear and drove the guys from there to the slaughter. Thomas’s “Testament” ends with the words:

The German and I have nothing to argue about, we have many glorious years
We lived as neighbors with him and saw troubles together.
Together with the Germans we beat our enemies more than once,
But there were no Jews in our government then!
Listen, guys, to what my grandfather bequeathed to me:
“Our land is rich, but there is no place for Jews in it!”
“New life without convict collective farms!”

The activities of the Stalinist leadership in the 1920-1930s provided the Nazis with rich food for criticism of the Soviet order. Dispossession, mass repression and famine, forced collectivization, persecution of the church, Stakhanovism and socialist competition - all these themes were played up in one way or another by German propaganda addressed to the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army.

“Remember! - it was written in one of the propaganda leaflets. “Germany is fighting not against the Russian people, but against your Jewish-communist government, which has brought you a lot of grief and misfortune.”

There is a drawing on the leaflet: a proletarian and a peasant, shackled, hunched over under the weight of a yoke, walking under the escort of a Jewish security officer. Caption: “This was Soviet freedom.”

Knowing that the bulk of the Red Army soldiers came from peasants - the most disadvantaged class and offended by the Soviet regime, German propagandists made one of the main points of their program the promise to liquidate collective farms and return individual farms to the peasants. Propagandists of the Third Reich insisted that the German soldier was bringing land and freedom to Russia.

It must be admitted that the propaganda onslaught brought its results: often in Soviet villages the Germans were greeted with bread and salt, as liberators from collective farms, taxes and repressions.

However, the peasants of the occupied territories understood the essence of the “new agrarian order” quite quickly: the collective farms were never liquidated, the German authorities simply renamed them communal farms. Peasants did not receive individual land plots and were obliged to cultivate communal lands under the strict supervision of a manager appointed by the occupation authorities. Severe punishment from a military court awaited general work evaders. The entire harvest was placed at the disposal of the German authorities, and the peasants received payment for their work. The amounts and forms of payment were established at the discretion of local bosses.

In general, the German “new order” did not give anything new to the peasants in comparison with the Bolshevik government: the same forced public works, confiscation of surpluses, repression, hunger and poverty. The age-old dream of the farmer to own a personal piece of land has never come true.

Meanwhile, German front-line leaflets openly lied, urging the Red Army soldiers to surrender: “Hurry up! The Germans in the areas they occupied are already beginning to resolve the land issue. Red Army soldiers, don’t be late, otherwise you will be left without land!”

There is also a drawing in the style of “propaganda of decomposition”. On one half of the picture there is an idyllic picture of a well-fed peasant life, full of prosperity and family happiness: a smiling peasant in an embrace with his beautiful wife is sitting in the front garden of his own house, next to him in the grass a small child is playing with a kid. On the other half - a wounded fighter, bleeding, writhing in death throes. Signature: “Red Army soldier, choose! Death or life."

“You will be greeted with us as comrades”

In the third year of the war, the tone of Nazi propaganda leaflets changed significantly. In them, especially after the Battle of Stalingrad, theses gradually disappeared, about the invincibility of the German army, about the futility and pointlessness of resisting its combat power. Now, more and more often, when agitating the Red Army soldiers to lay down their arms, the Reich’s military propagandists played on the most vulnerable human feelings, appealing to the soldiers’ instinct of self-preservation. The hardships of army life, cold, malnutrition, cruelty of commanders, fear of being killed, fatigue and lack of sleep - these became the themes of propaganda events to disintegrate the Soviet troops.

Why suffer? All the horrors of the front can be stopped in one moment: “It’s enough to raise both hands and shout: “Stalin is kaput!” or “Bayonets in the ground!” And you are guaranteed “good treatment, food and the opportunity to get a job in your specialty.”

Exploiting the feeling of homesickness, propagandists of the German army turned to the Red Army soldiers: “Why are you, soldiers and commanders who have been at the front for three years, not given a short leave to go home to your family? Yes, only because you don’t know and don’t see what’s going on in the rear and in your home. For three years, your wives and children have not known a good day, and the cities and villages are overcrowded with Jewish profiteers who live off the labor of your families.”

Experts in “propaganda of decomposition” did not forget erotic themes in order to evoke in the Red Army soldiers a feeling of jealousy and pain for the wives and daughters who remained behind the lines. In the same leaflet we read: “These Jewish profiteers are forcing Russian and Ukrainian women and girls, wives of commanders and Red Army soldiers to sell them their bodies for a piece of bread.”

To demoralize the Red Army soldiers, Goebbels's employees published information in leaflets about Red Army commanders who were involved in drunkenness and debauchery in the rear with impunity, while on the front line any soldier could be sentenced to death for the slightest offense. For greater persuasiveness, the leaflets indicated the names of executed military personnel, the names and numbers of military units. Soviet soldiers were portrayed here as innocent and silent victims of the inhumane acts of their officers.

Thus, one of the leaflets with the characteristic name “True” told how a young Red Army soldier accidentally injured two fingers while jumping into a trench. His comrades saw that it was an accident. However, the poor fellow was sentenced to death as a crossbow. They immediately dug a hole, and in front of the entire regiment, a machine gunner fired a bullet into the back of his head. The text of the leaflet ended with the words: “Fighters! Your innocent comrade was shot like a dog. This is the gratitude shown to a soldier at the forefront. But here’s our advice: save your life, come to us.”

Calling on the Red Army soldiers to surrender, German propagandists promised the soldiers what they needed most: warmth, hot food and, most importantly, to save their lives. However, the Germans were not Germans if they had not even published instructions for “future Soviet prisoners” on behavior in German captivity in propaganda leaflets. Here are just a few points of such instructions: “...You must maintain ideal cleanliness in relation to your things and those entrusted to you by the Germans. Your body should always be clean.

...Your behavior must be disciplined and military-like.

... Maintain cleanliness and diligence in your work. We demand precision.

…You will receive a special reward for good behavior and work.”

“Decomposing” leaflets were abundantly supplied with photographs with scenes of the supposedly carefree life of former Red Army soldiers among the Germans. For example, in a leaflet entitled “This is how your comrades live in German captivity,” the photograph showed a man in a military uniform without shoulder straps, peacefully reading a book while lying on a bed. The relaxed posture of a person, the interior of the room, the bed made up with linen - everything speaks of an atmosphere of peace, warmth and comfort. Under the photo there is a signature, for which, in fact, the leaflet was made: “After the end of work, you are the master of your time. If you want, read a book, if you want, sleep, if you want, take a walk! They won’t drag you to a meeting or to a subbotnik.”

Goebbels’ assistants did not hesitate to publish even such staged photographs: former Red Army soldiers, dressed in new cloth pea coats, play musical instruments and sing. One has a guitar in his hands, another has a mandolin, and the third has a button accordion. The rest, hugging each other, cheerfully sing along with the musicians.

With such leaflets, Reich propagandists tried their best to convince the Red Army soldiers that being in German captivity was not associated with any risks. On the contrary, those who voluntarily surrender will enjoy a satisfying life, peaceful work and rest, and those who especially distinguished themselves in their work will receive a reward from the German command.

What about Soviet counter-propaganda? It must be admitted that in the first months of the war, the command of the Red Army was not ready to actively work against Nazi propaganda. Moreover, some Soviet political workers did not consider it necessary to do this at all, believing that “the provocative and adventuristic nature, the falsity of enemy propaganda is its main weakness... Therefore, in our propaganda there is no need to even refute the content of enemy leaflets, because they themselves refute them fascists with their deeds: murders, robberies, violence.”

A clear underestimation of the danger of the German “propaganda of decomposition” allowed Goebbels’s employees to seize the initiative at the initial stage of the war. The first stunning successes of the Wehrmacht undermined the faith of many soldiers and commanders of the Red Army in the possibility of victory over Germany.

However, already from the winter of 1942, after the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow, Soviet counter-propaganda took on an active offensive character.

The command of the Red Army issued a number of directives instructing commanders and political workers at all levels to expose German propaganda by all means. As information about the true situation of Soviet prisoners of war in German captivity began to spread among the Red Army soldiers, the effectiveness of the Nazi “propaganda of decomposition” decreased significantly, and after 1943, with the completion of a radical turning point in the war and the massive retreat of parts of the German army along the entire front, and became completely insignificant.

The most common type of leaflet leaflet during the war is a prisoner pass for enemy soldiers. Special artillery shells, aerial bombs, and rifle grenades were used to deliver leaflets to enemy soldiers.

German leaflets with a capture pass for Soviet soldiers are widely known. But our propagandists did not remain in debt. At the beginning of the war, Russian passes did not work - the Germans were successfully advancing, and appeals to class consciousness, the call to turn arms against the exploiters were not perceived by the Germans, who considered themselves representatives of a nation, and not a certain social class. But Soviet propagandists knew how to learn from their mistakes. After the first defeats on the Eastern Front, passes were finally earned. We present to your attention a small selection of little-known Soviet leaflets for Wehrmacht soldiers.

German soldiers are informed about the winter defeat of the Wehrmacht near Moscow. On the reverse side there is a standard captivity pass. A curious password is in Russian, which the Germans who decide to surrender must shout: Farewell Moscow! Down with Hitler!

On the leaflet in the background are Tyrolean partisans from the Napoleonic Wars. In the foreground is a Soviet partisan. The text reads: What do you say when you look at their faces? Soviet peasants are doing the same, fighting for the honor and freedom of their homeland.

And this Soviet leaflet tells German soldiers on the Eastern Front that their comrades suffered a crushing defeat in Libya. Map of the theater of military operations, a detailed account of what happened in this theater. On the reverse side of the leaflet is a statement of the fact that a war on two fronts will not lead Germany to anything good and a call to surrender.

And this leaflet informs German soldiers about the imminent opening of a second front.

A series of leaflets about how well captured Germans were in the Soviet rear:

Generals don't die, they surrender. Do the same. Comments are unnecessary; it sounds convincing.

The wife of a wounded soldier is being groped by an SS man in the rear. An attempt to quarrel between the Wehrmacht and the SS troops.

This leaflet tells the Germans that total mobilization is happening in their rear, the Italian allies have gone home, and the Germans are plugging all the holes at the front.

“This is what total mobilization is.? Goebbels has fun with girls, and elderly women are sent as slaves to factories” (although instead of elderly German women, slaves stolen from occupied countries worked in German factories; the use of slave labor allowed the Germans to carry out total mobilization).

The dead speak to the living. “Comrades, no matter where you are in the trench, in the dugout, at the post, we will relentlessly follow you, the shadows of Stalingrad.”

With Hitler the war will never end

One of the features of the Second World War was the active information war of the Soviet and Nazi regimes. Moscow and Berlin actively used technical innovations of the 20th century: radio, cinema, mass printing. The great powers actively studied and used methods to influence the psyche of people, their consciousness and subconscious.

The methods were the same for both the “democratic” United States and totalitarian Germany and the Soviet Union. Constant influence on people from a very early age, their inclusion in various mass children's, youth, women's, trade union and other organizations. Constantly hammering into consciousness slogans and theses. Strict media control. Creating an image of an enemy – internal and external. In the West, these were communists, Jewish Bolsheviks and Jews (in the Third Reich), “commissars”; in the USSR, they were bourgeois plutocrats.

The regimes of Mussolini and Hitler were distinguished by great belligerence and the militarization of their propaganda. The cult of strength became the basis of their ideology - constant military parades, warlike speeches, and paramilitary mass movements were held. European citizens were intimidated and tried to break their will to resist even before the start of the big war. For example, the German film “Baptism of Fire” of 1939, about the actions of the Luftwaffe in the Polish campaign, was designed for exactly this effect.

A peculiarity of the propaganda of the United States was its appropriation of the position of “fighter for peace”, “democracy”; they have retained this distinction to this day. This is confirmed by the names of several American organizations of that time: the American Committee Against War, the World Congress against War, the American League against War and Fascism, etc. The Soviet Union also sinned with this, although Soviet foreign policy was really aimed at preserving peace in the USSR, in in contrast to Italy, Germany, and the USA, which deliberately fueled the global conflagration of war.

They helped in the most powerful information impact on people, the widespread elimination of illiteracy, the growing role of radio and cinema. Already at that time, psychologists knew that people were divided into two categories - the easily suggestible majority (90-95%) and a small category of difficult-to-suggest people. Work is carried out with both groups of the population: for the first, quite ordinary simple propaganda, the idea is persistently hammered into the heads day after day until it takes possession of the masses. The second group is captivated by more sophisticated teachings and ideas.

For the illiterate and semi-literate, there were posters that were supposed to explain in the simplest way the essence of a phenomenon or event.

Cinema began to play and still plays a huge role. Movies carry a great message of persuasion. They can be used both for the benefit of the people and for their corruption and deception. For example, in the USSR, socialist realism played the most important role when people’s lives were idealized. He set a high social and cultural bar to which Soviet people should strive. Films were made about workers, historical and patriotic films, for example: “The Steel Road (Turksib)” in 1929, “Alexander Nevsky” in 1938.

In the 30s, the USSR began to correct the mistakes and abuses that were made after the October Revolution of 1917. Thus, they reduced the pressure on Christianity and began to restore the images of heroes from the period of “damned tsarism.” Although back in the 20s it was believed that the “royal legacy” should be completely done away with, including Kutuzov, Suvorov, Ushakov, Nakhimov, Rumyantsev, etc. Gradually, the understanding came that the Soviet patriot should be educated by examples pre-revolutionary times. Great figures of Russian culture - Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Pushkin, Lermontov - were also rehabilitated. Chekhov, etc.

Posters continued to be of great importance; the most famous artists who created them were wartime artists Sokolov-Skalya, Denisovsky, Lebedev, and the Kukryniksy collective - this is the pseudonym of three famous Soviet artists, which was obtained from the initial letters of their surnames. They worked together for 20 years - Mikhail Kupriyanov, Porfiry Krylov and Nikolai Sokolov. Many of these works were reminiscent of the exploits of long-standing Russian national heroes, so one of the posters depicted Alexander Nevsky, the heroic prince, the winner of the Swedes and German knights, the invincible commander Alexander Suvorov, who beat the Turks and the French, Vasily Chapaev, the Soviet hero of the Civil War. In parallel with the great counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow in 1941–1942, a poster with Mikhail Kutuzov, who 130 years earlier had defeated Napoleon’s “Great Army”, was massively released.

Some of the works of Soviet artists were satirical in nature; they drew caricatures of Hitler's leaders, in particular Goebbels. Others described Nazi atrocities - robbery, murder, violence. They were quickly distributed throughout the Union, at every factory, collective farm, in universities and schools, hospitals, units of the Red Army, on naval ships, so that they affected almost every Soviet citizen. It happened that such propaganda materials were accompanied by caustic poems, the authors of which were poets such as Samuel Marshak. The popularity of military posters and cartoons was achieved thanks to the talent of Soviet artists, who painted them in the simplest and most accessible form for people.

To maintain morale and at the same time for a certain relaxation of the people’s psyche, propaganda trains and propaganda brigades were created. Mobile teams of lecturers, artists, poets, singers, and actors were staffed. They traveled throughout the Union, including to the front, held talks, lectures, showed films, organized concerts, and provided people with information about the progress of the war.

Cinema also played a huge role; it was during the war that famous films were made, such as “Kutuzov” (1943), “Zoya” (1944), about the short life of the Moscow schoolgirl Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, who at the beginning of the war became a partisan saboteur and was executed by the Germans.

During the Great Patriotic War, a series of excellent documentaries were shot: “The Defeat of the German Army near Moscow” (1942), “Siege of Leningrad” (1942), “Battle for Ukraine” (1943), “Battle for the Eagle” (1943) year), "Berlin" (1945), "Vienna" (1945).

USSR propaganda during World War II, both within the country and abroad, was surprisingly successful. Abroad, Moscow was able to play on the sympathy of the peoples of the world for the Soviet system and the people who suffered so much from the atrocities of the Nazis. For most people, the Soviet people were the liberators of Europe, the victors of the “brown plague.” And the USSR was a model of the state of the future.

Within the country, strict discipline and appeal to people’s deeply rooted feelings of love for their homeland and fatherland allowed Stalin to conduct such a successful military campaign that Berlin, London and Washington were greatly surprised. They believed that the USSR was a colossus with feet of clay that could not withstand the blow of the armed forces of the Third Reich.

Foundations of Soviet ideology

Soviet propaganda of the war and post-war periods was based on the government’s guidelines enshrined in the 1936 Constitution of the USSR, as well as the decisions of the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In March 1939 At the congress, the reports of I.V. Stalin and other party leaders noted that in the country of the Soviets de facto equality of citizens and democratic freedoms were ensured, that the USSR had surpassed capitalist countries in the field of production technology and industrial growth rates. Particular emphasis was placed on the absence of antagonistic classes and “the picture of friendly cooperation of workers, peasants, and intelligentsia.” “On the basis of this community, such driving forces as the moral and political unity of Soviet society, the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, and Soviet patriotism developed,” stated J.V. Stalin. The only thing that could shake the Soviet system, the leaders of the USSR believed, were murderers, spies and saboteurs. Their destruction ensured “homogeneity and internal unity of the rear and front in case of war.” J.V. Stalin called foreign criticism of Soviet domestic policy “vulgar chatter,” which is only worth “making fun of.” The report set goals for strengthening the Soviet state and its punitive bodies in the conditions of capitalist encirclement. It was decided to create a Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation within the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (UPA) 1.

War and propaganda

WITH In the first days of the war, the Politburo (PB) of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made decisions on organizing propaganda and counter-propaganda. On June 24, the Sovinformburo (SIB) was entrusted with managing the coverage of international events, internal life and military operations on the fronts in the press and on the radio, “organizing counter-propaganda against German and other enemy counter-propaganda.” Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.S. Shcherbakov was appointed head, and S.A. Lozovsky was appointed deputy. On June 25, the Soviet bureau of military-political propaganda was created, headed by L.Z. Mekhlis and deputy D.Z. Manuilsky. The functions of the bureau included conducting propaganda and counter-propaganda among the enemy troops and population 2 . A literary group was created at the NIB, which included writers and publicists N.N. Virta, B.N. Polevoy, KM. Simonov, N.A. Tikhonov, A.N. Tolstoy, A.A. Fadeev, K.A. Fedin, M.A. Sholokhov, I.G. Erenburg and others. German anti-fascists V. Bredel and F. Wolf collaborated with them.

Articles by Ehrenburg, Simonov, Petrov, Leonov, Fedin had a significant audience abroad. The American agency United Press transmitted Ehrenburg's articles to 1,600 newspapers, and at least 10 million US radio listeners read Leonov's letter to “An Unknown American Friend.” “All literature is becoming defensive,” stated V. Vishnevsky 3 .

The leadership of the NIB, represented by S. Lozovsky, in March 1942, drew attention to the responsibility of writers for every word in connection with the release of their work on the world stage. “Individual facts and generalizations should show the fighting qualities of our army, the unity of the front and rear... The strength of our country does not lie in the fact that we do everything easily, but in the fact that, despite enormous difficulties, enormous sacrifices, we move forward with unshakable moral unity. This means truly portraying what the Soviet Union is and what the strength of the Soviet Union is." 4 Entering the international arena required propagandists to be more flexible when influencing different categories of listeners and readers: I. Ehrenburg noted that “different arguments were required for the Red Army soldiers and neutral Swedes” 5 . The senior instructor of the VII department of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army (GLAVPURKKA), battalion commissar S.I. Kirsanov, wrote about this in more detail in the spring of 1942 to the secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.S. Shcherbakov and G.M. Malenkov. He proposed using Soviet propaganda to expose the “ideological” arguments of fascist propaganda, its contradictions, the facts of the deterioration of Germany’s internal situation, the growth of hatred towards it in Europe and the world, and the predatory nature of the war on its part. Propaganda among the Red Army soldiers suggested paying attention to the frank statements of the fascists about the “new order” 6 .

German counterintelligence recognized that the Soviet side possessed the entire arsenal of methods of ideological struggle. Thus, in November 1942, the headquarters of the 2nd German Army noted the systematic, thoughtful and purposeful work of Soviet propaganda on German soldiers and the population. The propagandists did not speculate on communist rhetoric, spared the church, and did not affect the peasantry and middle class of Germany. The main blow was directed against the Fuhrer and the NSDAP in order to tear them away from the people, for which claims of privileges for members of the Nazi Party were used. Soviet propagandists took into account the needs and level of culture of the target: “She speaks to them in folk, soldier and specific local expressions, gives the opportunity to individuals, passing them off as Germans, to address the Germans and abuses the signatures of the killed. At the same time, she appeals to the original human feelings, such as fear of death, fear of battle and danger, longing for his wife and child, jealousy, longing for his homeland. All this is opposed to the transition to the side of the Red Army...” The content of the propaganda included depictions of the superiority of the Allied forces, the vastness of Russian territory, and the unjust nature of the war on Germany's part. Rumors were spread in the front line and at the front; short messages without argumentation and drawings conveyed, from the point of view of the German staff officers, “cruelty and inhuman rudeness” 7 . Counter-propaganda materials on Estonia in September 1942 were designed for certain categories of the population - the peasantry, workers, women, youth, partisans, intelligentsia - and carried general and specific calls to fight the fascists. Their content was promptly updated in accordance with the plans of the leadership and the situation at the fronts 8 .

The Central Committee apparatus prepared letters of appeal from Soviet partisans to members of the Resistance in Romania, Finland, and Slovakia. It was proposed to use British aviation to implement the appeal using leaflets 9 .

The image of the fascist enemy and patriotism

A universal technique of propagandists in all countries was a sharp demarcation between the world of good, which meant the world of the subject, and the world of evil of the object. The latter was humiliated through comparisons with animals, “forces of hell,” and “subhumans” - depending on one’s worldview 10 . I. Ehrenburg precisely formulated the task of the propagandists: “We must constantly see before us the image of a Hitlerite: this is the target at which we must shoot without missing, this is the personification of what we hate. Our duty is to incite hatred of evil and strengthen the thirst for the beautiful, the good, the just” 11.

The term “fascist” became synonymous with “inhuman”, a werewolf generated by the dark forces of capitalism, the inhuman economic political system and the ideology of Nazi Germany. Wittingly or unwittingly, propagandists tapped into archaic, pagan layers of consciousness of Soviet people. The fascists were portrayed as soulless automatons, methodical killers, exploiters, rapists, and barbarians. The leaders of the Reich were presented as professional losers in peaceful life, sexual perverts, murderers and exploiters, modern slave owners 12 .

The propagandists also harshly exposed Germany’s allies: “In the Donbass, the Italians are surrendering - they don’t need leaflets, they are driven crazy by the smell of our camp kitchens. Hungry Finns are beginning to realize that they have been duped. The Hungarians are grumbling. The lousy Romanians scratch themselves angrily. The Slovaks grumble. There is a smell of scandal in the servant's room" 13. In contrast to the aggressive plans of the fascists, Soviet propagandists emphasized the popular, fair nature of the war on the part of the USSR, the strength and courage of the Soviet people. The initial period of the war is characterized by the essays by P. Pavlenko and P. Krylov “Captain Gastello”, I. Ehrenburg “The Test”; L. Leonov “Your brother Volodya Kurylenko”; M. Sholokhov “The Science of Hate”; A. Dovzhenko “One hundred hurricanes in the chest” and others 14.

The essays emphasized the enormous possibilities of the Soviet social system, the strength and technical equipment of the Red Army, the successes of Soviet soldiers, their ability to bring “savvy, even thriftiness” to revenge (I. Ehrenburg). Pilot Pokryshkin, who destroyed fascist aces, tanker Chesnokov, who carried out a three-day raid behind enemy lines, Komsomol partisan Kurylenko, who died in an unequal battle - all of them were supposed to become models for Soviet people, especially young people. The emphasis was on the all-crushing willpower and hatred of Soviet heroes: they could postpone death to fulfill their duty, kill enemies with their fists after a rifle was broken on them, stand at the machine for two shifts as a puny boy. Soviet propaganda painted the image of Soviet soldiers: simple and modest people, very kind in peacetime, true friends. It was about “the exceptional art of a new man, our warrior-knight with new psychotechnical qualities.” He was an epic hero who liberated Humanity from Universal Evil. Fascist propagandists did not ignore the cardinal turn in Soviet propaganda during the war. In “Secret information for local party leaders for 1942-1944.” noted: “Stalin mobilized at the moment of greatest danger for himself (Moscow, Stalingrad) those spiritual reserves that he had previously condemned as reactionary and directed against the Bolshevik revolution: love for the motherland, tradition (uniform, orders, titles, “Mother Russia” , national spirit, church), thereby encouraging naivety, vanity, pride and the spirit of resistance. With this change in the political and ideological line and the slogan “Expel the German occupiers from your native land and save the Fatherland!” Stalin achieved success" 15.

Patriotism was combined with pan-Slavism. At the beginning of the war, A.A. Fadeev addressed the “brothers of the oppressed Slavs” with a call to unite to defeat the enemy. One of the arguments was: “all democratic countries are with us” 16.

Relations with allies

The relations between the allies in the works of publicists were not idyllic, but friendly. In K. Simonov’s essay “The Americans,” the Yankees were portrayed as cheerful guys, lovers of souvenirs and real warriors, very similar to the Russians. The invincibility of the Allies was emphasized in every possible way. B. Polevoy expressed this idea through the mouth of a German defector in July 1942: “Russians, British, Americans, this is a mountain. He who tries to break a mountain with his head breaks his head...” 17. In general, Soviet propaganda formed a positive image of the USA, Great Britain, and the Resistance forces in France led by de Gaulle 18 . Not only spiritual food, but also material benefits served to strengthen the friendly feelings of the Soviet people towards the allies: American stew, humorously nicknamed by the soldiers “the second front”; 400 thousand Studebakers; famous convoys; egg powder; English pilots in Murmansk.

Propaganda against the Allies was carried out using various means. Thus, in August 1942, the UPA gave instructions to the delegation that traveled to the United States. When meeting with Americans, the delegates were supposed to emphasize the importance of arms supplies, “especially tanks and aircraft,” to express the strong confidence of the peoples of the USSR in the strength of the alliance with Great Britain and the USA, and the desire of the youth of the USSR to establish close contact with American youth; convince interlocutors of the need to deploy a Second Front; promote Soviet values: the moral and political unity of the peoples of the USSR, united around their government to defend the Fatherland, the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, the heroism of the Soviet people, the strength of the connection between city and countryside; expose the barbarity of the German occupiers 19. Officially, the delegation was called the student delegation. However, there was only one former member of it - due to conscription into the army, a student, Hero of the Soviet Union, Senior Lieutenant V. Pchelintsev. The other two - Secretary of the Komsomol Moscow City Committee, Candidate of Historical Sciences N. Krasavchenko and the famous sniper, Hero of the Soviet Union, Senior Lieutenant LLavlichenko, have already graduated from higher educational institutions. But for the receiving party this did not matter. Over the course of 130 days, the delegation visited 43 cities in the USA, Canada, and Great Britain and received the warmest welcome everywhere. Young Soviet people - order bearers, representatives of the power that bore the brunt of the war against fascism, were authoritative for the Western public 20. Their authority worked for Soviet propaganda. Publicists very often used a technique with which they tried to force foreign listeners and readers to identify themselves with Soviet people. “The battle for the Volga is the battle for the Mississippi. Have you done everything to protect your native, your wonderful river, American,” K. Fedin cried out in August 1942. In January 1944, I. Ehrenburg turned this into an apologetics for universal human values: “Let’s forget about borders for an hour, take human values in their naked form and, looking at our wonderful victories, we will rightfully say: “This is, first of all, the victory of man.” 21.

The appearance of the term “cosmopolitan” in propaganda

However, the governments of the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition were not inclined to forget “about borders.” This is evidenced by the reaction of the Soviet and American governments to the Zionist conference, which took place in two stages - May 10, 1942 and August 29, 1943 in New York at the Biltmore Hotel. The adopted program provided for the formation of a Jewish state on the territory of Palestine and unlimited immigration to the “Promised Land” 22 . Such actions seemed untimely to the American government, with unpredictable consequences. In the USSR, apparently, to intimidate Jews and prevent alien elements from entering the government apparatus, a number of high-ranking workers of Jewish nationality were removed, and Jews who worked in the field of art were persecuted. Such a nervous reaction of the Soviet leaders cannot be explained only by the influence of fascist propaganda and the presence of anti-Semites in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks 23 .

During the break between the stages of the Biltmore Conference, a dispute spontaneously arose about the content of Soviet patriotism. In July 1942, I. Ehrenburg wrote that “a true patriot loves the whole world.” In the spring of 1943, A.A. Fadeev, in a letter to V.V. Vishnevsky, accused I. Ehrenburg of not understanding Soviet patriotism and attributed his opponent to the “well-known” circles of the intelligentsia, “who understand internationalism in a vulgar cosmopolitan spirit and have not outlived slavish admiration for everything abroad" 24. Historically, Russians traditionally associated the term “cosmopolitan” with Jews 25 .

The term “cosmopolitan”, previously used in private conversations and correspondence, has been appearing in print since 1943. Ehrenburg, who was aware of the accusations against him from Fadeev, continued to defend his position and brought forward new arguments. On July 3, 1943, in the article “The Debt of Art,” he wrote: “We know... that outside of national culture there is no art. Cosmopolitanism is a world in which things lose color and shape, and words are deprived of their meaning. ... In the days of deep spiritual darkness that fascism brought to the world, it is necessary to speak with particular passion about the universal significance of art” 26. In November 1943, after the end of the Zionist conference and in connection with a radical change in the course of the war, an article by A.A. Fadeev appeared with the characteristic title “On national patriotism and national pride of the peoples of the USSR,” which contained indirect criticism of Zionist decisions. The author used the term “cosmopolitan” in a different context and with a different meaning. It was no longer about anyone’s cosmopolitan understanding of patriotism, but about the image of the enemy. “Of course,” Fadeev wrote, “in our country there is still a small minority of people hostile to our system. In addition, the enemy sends his agents to us who may try, by inciting nationalist prejudices and remnants among backward people, to introduce national discord into the fraternal community of peoples of the USSR or to undermine the sense of national honor and pride in our people by servile admiration of everything that bears a foreign brand, or sanctimonious sermons of BASELESS "COSMOPOLITISM", based on the fact that everything, they say, is "people in the world", and the nation, the homeland is, they say, an "obsolete concept"" 27 (emphasis added - A. F.). In the spirit of the times, the author focused on the fact that it was from this environment that at the beginning of the war voices were heard about the advantages of German technology and organization. At the same time, Fadeev attacked foreign art and its uncritical perception by some Soviet intellectuals: “art for art’s sake,” the author wrote, gives nothing to true art, i.e. Soviet. In the statements of Stalin's close associate one can sense not only natural Germanophobia, but also a harsh attitude towards any Western - liberal - influence in general. To neutralize this influence, Fadeev immediately resorts to using the image of an external and internal enemy in the form of a “cosmopolitan”.

A radical turning point in the war and propaganda

The close attention of Soviet leaders to the problem of Western influence was associated with the beginning of a radical change in the course of the war. Its result was predetermined; the opportunity arose to deal with domestic political problems in the context of the planned post-war cooperation with Western democracies.

Outwardly, relations between the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition looked good. During the Tehran (November-December 1943), Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July-August 1945) conferences, I.V. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill resolved issues with the post-war border structure, principles of governing Germany, shares of reparations. The Soviet Union received the Kuril Islands, South Sakhalin, and Koenigsberg in exchange for a promise to start a war against Japan. In October 1944, Stalin and Churchill distributed spheres of influence in Eastern, Central and Southwestern Europe: Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary were predominantly under Soviet control, Yugoslavia was under joint control, and Greece was under British control. During the Tehran Conference, Stalin and Roosevelt decided on the principles for resolving the colonial issue: preparing peoples for self-government through 30-40 years of tutelage of an international allied commission. In general, the governance of the world, as W. Churchill noted, “had to be carried out by the “four policemen,” namely the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and China” 28 . At the same time, as victory approached, the contradictions between the allies became more acute, which gave rise to a certain mistrust and misunderstanding of the other side. Thus, in July 1943, Soviet representatives were not admitted to the Control Commission for Italy and were content with their presence in the inter-allied advisory Council. A.M. Shlesinger in his work “The Origins of the Cold War” rightly notes that I.V. Stalin used this precedent in relation to the countries of Eastern Europe.

The anti-Western attitudes of the Soviet leadership were also fueled by the anti-Sovietism of right-wing circles in the West. At the final stage of the war, propagandists engaged in polemics with American “observers.” Thus, in January 1945, I. Ehrenburg wrote: “Why did observers, who assured in 1939 that we supposedly want to conquer the world, in 1944 began to assert that we would not cross our state border due to malicious motives? Why are they offended when we walk, offended when we stop, and offended when we walk again? One might think that the Red Army is not busy defeating Germany, but insulting some American observers." 29

Surveys of representatives of foreign companies by Soviet leaders in April 1944 showed that there were many fascist and pro-fascist organizations and individuals in the United States. There was no feeling in the country, according to one of them, that there was a war going on. State Department officials are anti-Soviet. The most determined of them were ready to fight with the USSR 30 . In February 1944, the displeasure of officials from the Society for the Development of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was caused by the actions of the American Committee for Assistance to Russia in the War, which, in their opinion, was engaged in “self-promotion and inflating the assistance provided by America to the USSR ", "unceremonious depiction of major Soviet figures" by the Western press. The obstacles placed by American officials in the path of Soviet propaganda were perceived with indignation: from the point of view of the chairman of the board of VOKS V.S. Kemenov, the exclusion of photographs of children's corpses from the exhibition prevented Americans from “learning the truth about the struggle and suffering of the Soviet people” 31 . In mid-May 1944, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks meticulously analyzed the methods of work of the British Ally, the weekly magazine of the British Embassy in the USSR. They were considered provocative and lulled the vigilance of the Soviet people 32 .

From the point of view of the Kremlin leadership, things were also unfavorable inside the country. The Soviet government and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were concerned about “mistakes of a nationalistic nature” in a number of regions, for example, the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; the allegedly disrespectful attitude of some of the intelligentsia towards Soviet achievements and the growing influence of the West among them. Meanwhile, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.I. Kalinin and the party leadership unequivocally looked at the Soviet intelligentsia of all nationalities: “she is the conductor of our ideology among the masses” 33 .

While developing the national self-awareness of the peoples of the USSR during the war years, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks simultaneously sought to prevent nationalism, which was considered a product of bourgeois ideology. Nationalism took extreme forms in the newly liberated regions - the Baltic states and Western Ukraine. In its wake, an insurgency grew. On March 1, 1944, the urgency of the issue was recognized by N.S. Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U. Quite in the spirit of A.A. Fadeev, he stated at a session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine: “We call Ukrainian nationalists Ukrainian-German because they are faithful dogs and assistants of the Germans in the enslavement of the Ukrainian people. They have nothing in common with the Ukrainian people. They are agents of the Germans in the Ukrainian environment...” 34. Khrushchev demanded severe punishment for “the enemies of our Motherland.” Meanwhile, the scale of resistance did not tend to decrease 35.

Hidden blow to liberalism

On the eve of the Red Army's liberation campaign in Europe, the prerequisites were ripe for making decisions on ideological issues. The resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) “On shortcomings in scientific work in the field of philosophy” was carried out by protocol dated May 1, 1944. 36 In April 1944, the magazine “Bolshevik” published its summary and commentary under the title “On shortcomings and errors in coverage history of German philosophy of the late 18th and early 19th centuries.” 37. The occasion was the publication in 1943 of Volume III of the “History of Philosophy” under the leadership of the head of the UPA G.F. Aleksandrov.

Analysis of the document allows us to take another look at the universal techniques and methods of propagandists in all countries, their ability to “pull” the right ideas through the verbal tinsel. “The authors of Volume III did not take into account,” the resolution stated, “that the opposition between Hegel’s idealistic dialectic and the Marxist dialectical method reflects the opposition between the bourgeois and proletarian worldviews. Hegel’s dialectic was addressed exclusively to the past”; “... such reactionary socio-political ideas of German philosophy as the praise of the Prussian monarchical state, the exaltation of the Germans as the “chosen” people, the disdainful attitude towards the Slavic peoples, the apologetics of war, the justification of colonial aggressive policies, etc. are not criticized. Thus, the volume glosses over the fact that the ideologists of the German imperialist bourgeoisie use the reactionary aspects of the philosophy of Kant, Fichte and Hegel.”

For the sake of political expediency, the authors of the resolution ignored the historical features of the creation of works, for example, by Hegel, the context of his statements, and did not explain the reasons for his illusions. The classic's historical merits were measured not by what he did in relation to his predecessors, but by the scale of the claims brought against him by the drafters of the resolution. Thus, Hegel states the objectivity of wars and colonial conquests in his era: they are “in the nature of things”; he is declared an apologist for wars. At the same time, it was silent that the classic of philosophy considered the liberation of the colonies “the greatest good.” The philosopher really welcomed wars that “prevent nations from rotting.” Such ideas were inspired by the influence of the Napoleonic wars on the development of feudal Germany and were in line with his concept of the source of movement. Soviet propagandists did not want to delve into such “trifles,” thereby becoming like the “ideologists of the German imperialist bourgeoisie” whom they criticized. Having proclaimed the Soviet political system as the highest type of democracy, and themselves as the only true representatives of the interests of the people, Soviet leaders and ideologists repeated the reactionary features of the system of Hegelian philosophy.

Hegel did not accept the social structure of his contemporary Russia, in which there were “the serf masses and those who rule.” His ideal was the prosperity of the middle class, formed in a civil society, “where rights exist for relatively independent special circles and where the arbitrariness of the bureaucratic world is prevented by the resistance of such entitled circles” 38 . This liberal attitude completely contradicted the principles of the organization of power in the USSR and was the most important in the choice of the object of criticism in the person of Hegel’s philosophy.

The drafters of the resolution needed to discredit German classical philosophy by substituting concepts, ignoring the context of the works of the criticized author, the historical conditions of their creation, abstractness, pseudo-science and anti-fascist form to push through anti-liberal ideas, strengthening the ideological power of the Soviet government in conditions of cooperation with liberal powers - the USA and Great Britain. In addition, the resolution aimed the party’s activists at strengthening ideological work with “political undergrowth”, of whom, as inspections of the commissions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks showed, there were many among senior officials in various regions of the USSR39.

The Politburo resolution “On shortcomings in scientific work in the field of philosophy” showed the fundamental opposition between the ideological and other interests of the USSR and the liberal powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, and became an important ideological prerequisite for the emergence of the post-war image of an external enemy. However, as long as the common enemy, fascism, was not defeated, as long as the leaders of the powers had illusions about post-war cooperation, the emerging contradictions in the coalition were overcome.

The image of the Allies at the final stage of the war did not undergo any changes in the Soviet press or journalism. The power of the Red Army, its loyalty to the traditions of Suvorov, Rumyantsev, Kutuzov, were still glorified; spiritual, military, economic superiority was associated with the Soviet social system, born of October 40. Soviet authors called the Nazis nothing more than “mechanical men ironed with a German pattern”; I. Ehrenburg used the Americanism to designate the enemy: “gangsters” 41. In Leonid Leonov’s essay “The Morning of Victory,” which is dated April 30, 1945, the image of the fascist enemy sounds in the context of the restrained triumph of the victors: “We won because we wanted good even more than our enemies wanted evil. Germany is paying for the black sin of greed, into which the Fuhrer and his crowd involved her. They made it their stall, a tavern for grub, a den for demagogic fornication, a machine for executions, a parade ground for manic processions... Then we poured into this country like the sea - and here it lies on its side, beaten, ripped apart, distraught" 42.

Soviet journalists and writers spoke with hatred about everyone who dared to put in a word for the Nazis or simply did not condemn them: about the Turkish journalist Yalcin, Lord Brailsford, the Pope 43. The fascist enemy was crushed, but elements were already emerging that would in the near future form a new stereotype of the “image of the enemy.”

Some conclusions

Thus, in the fight against the Nazi invaders, Soviet propagandists acquired unique experience in conducting modern psychological warfare. They successfully solved all the tasks assigned to them by the government. Even the Nazis recognized the power of Soviet propaganda.

With the outbreak of the war, it became clear that socialist values alone would not be enough in the fight against the enemy. One of the most important means of propaganda was Soviet patriotism, in fact, great power, which played a huge role during the war: with its help, the peoples of the USSR were mobilized to repel the real terrible enemy.

During the war, newspaper and journalistic cliches, techniques, moves were developed with the help of which the image of a fascist aggressor was created - a “non-human”, a barbarian, a sadist, an “automatic machine”, a sexual pervert, an exploiter, a slave owner, a hypocrite. The effectiveness of such propaganda was enhanced by the experience of tens of millions of people - soldiers, residents of the occupied territories. The result was the trust of the Soviet people in what the newspapers wrote.

The Great Victory became a symbol of the power and success of the USSR, and made it possible to consolidate all the stereotypes that were propagated by Soviet propaganda and Soviet values. The war contributed to the release of the creativity of many writers and journalists into the international arena and the acquisition of experience in influencing people with a different worldview. At the same time, counter-propaganda work did not stop, with the help of which Soviet leaders sought to prevent Western influence on the peoples of the USSR. During the Second World War, elements of the post-war image of the enemy arose: propagandists criticized and discredited foreign journalists who expressed the interests of the right-wing circles of the West, and the Pope.

Since 1943, Soviet propagandists - primarily A.A. Fadeev, began to use the term "cosmopolitan" to designate Soviet people who came under the ideological influence of the West. However, in general, the Soviet propaganda apparatus and the press did a lot to create a positive image of allies in arms - the USA and Great Britain. As a result, illusions arose among a significant part of the people and the intelligentsia regarding the possibilities of long-term post-war cooperation with the liberal powers of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The top leadership of the USSR was not free from these illusions. At the end of the war, the Soviet government took concrete steps to obtain a loan of $6 billion from the US government to restore the destroyed economy. A large role was played by the subjective factor - personal cooperation and even friendship between I.V. Stalin and F. Roosevelt. The change in American leadership in April 1945 changed the situation. It soon became clear that, in the words of W. Churchill, the fight against a common enemy was the “only link” that connected the coalition powers. Already in May 1945, looking at the jubilant crowds of people, the British Prime Minister was thinking about creating an anti-Soviet bloc 44.

1 XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b). March 10-21, 1939. P. 26.
2 RCKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1041.L. 26.29.
3 From the Soviet information bureau... 1941-1945. Journalism and essays of the war years. In 2 volumes. Ed. second. M., 1984. T. 2. P. 460.
4 From the Soviet Information Bureau... T. 2. P. 470.
5 Ibid. T. 1. P. 14; T. 2. P. 458, 459.
6 RCKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 95. L. 123.
7 Ibid. L. 207,210,211.
8 Ibid. D. 89. L. 35-37, 39-48, 57 vol.
9 Ibid. L. 8, 9.
10 Ibid. D. 322. L. 118, 119; From the Soviet Information Bureau... T. 2. P. 424; Roosevelt F.D. Fireside chats. M., 1995. P. 186.
11 Ehrenburg I. The debt of art // Literature and art. 1943. July 3.
12 Ehrenburg I. The hour is approaching! M., 1942. S. 28, 36, 44; From the Soviet Information Bureau... T. 1. P. 187; T. 2. P. 410.
13 Ehrenburg I. The hour is approaching! P. 50.
14 See: From the Soviet Information Bureau... Vol. 1, 2.
15 RCKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 322. L. 119.
16 Fadeev A. Decree. op. T. 5. P. 362.
17 From the Soviet Information Bureau... T. 1. P. 191.
18 Ehrenburg I. War. June 1941 - April 1942. M., 1942. P. 249, 250, 251, 253.
19 RCKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 89. L. 24, 25.
20 The author expresses gratitude for advice on this issue to Dr. leading researcher at the IRI RAS N.K. Petrova.
21 From the Soviet Information Bureau... T. 1. P. 246, 251, 252, 258; T. 2. P. 178.
22 Dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Materials of the scientific conference. Nizhny Novgorod, 1991. S. I, 12.
23 See about this: Kostyrchenko G. Decree. op. pp. 8-22.
24 Simonov K, Ehrenburg I. In one newspaper. M., 1984. P. 103; Fadeev A. Decree. op. T. 7. pp. 140-141.
25 Goncharov I.A. Collection op. In 8 volumes. Library "Ogonyok". T. 5. Frigate “Pallada”. M., 1952. P. 130.
26 Ehrenburg I. The debt of art // Literature and art. 1943. July 3.
27 Under the banner of Marxism. 1943. No. 11. P. 34-35.
28 Churchill W. Decree. op. Book 3. pp. 205, 448, 449.
29 From the Soviet Information Bureau... T. 2. P. 352.
30 RCKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 248. L. 26, 29.
31 Ibid. L. 1-6.
32 Ibid. L. 44, 45.
33 Ibid. D. 212. L. 173-182; Issues of party building. pp. 219-221.
34 True. 1944. March 16.
35 See: RTSKHIDNI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1050. L. 145-152.
36 Ibid.
37 Bolshevik. 1944. No. 7-8.
38 See: Hegel G.V.F. Philosophy of law. § 248, 297, 324, 338, etc.
39 Issues of party building... P. 225. V.A. Nevezhin also writes about the transition of Soviet propaganda to offensive tactics against the allies at the end of the war. See: Nevezhin V.A. Cultural ties of the USSR with Great Britain and the USA within the framework of the anti-Hitler coalition. Diss. for the job application uch. step, Ph.D. ist. Sci. M., 1990. P. 186.
40 From the Soviet Information Bureau... T. 2. P. 345, 347, 362, 417.
41 Ibid. pp. 358,404.
42 Ibid. P. 429.
43 Ibid. pp. 339,426,428.
44 Churchill W. Decree. op. pp. 574,575, 631.

Propaganda posters from World War II

Well, let's return to the topic of the article. Posters became a special form of art during the Second World War. With their help, states supported their armies, the inhabitants of the country and raised patriotism. Let's look at the posters of that time from all sides of the conflict.

Posters from England, USSR and USA

These posters were dedicated to the fact that you need to be careful with your words, there are enemies all around and it is not a fact that the one you tell will turn out to be your friend.

British poster - “This is what free conversation can lead to.”

“Enemy ears are listening.”

“You never know who is on the wires! Be careful what you say.”

British posters promoting economy: “When you travel alone, you are taking Hitler with you. Join the car sharing club today.”

I would like to add to this poster that our country would have had such problems during the Second World War. For example, how would the residents of besieged Leningrad react to such statements? You can read an interesting topic about the blockade.

But our Soviet artists worked hard on the images of Hitler.

The face of Hitlerism.

The British were also not far behind us; they portrayed Hitler as a cannibal gnawing the bones of conquered countries.

Here is also a British poster depicting Hitler and his henchmen as horsemen of the apocalypse who destroy everything in their path.

Horsemen of the Apocalypse

Soviet poster showing the treacherous surrender of Czechoslovakia to Hitler in 1938.

Czechoslovakia was treacherously given away

Soviet posters with Laval. In 1942, Berlin appointed citizen Laval as prime minister of the collaborationist government in France, who wanted cooperation with Nazi Germany. According to his orders, French patriots were destroyed.