The Barbarossa plan called for a lightning war. Barbarossa

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Basis of the plan.

Plan Barbarossa(Directive No. 21. Plan "Barbarossa"; German. Weisung Nr. 21. Fall Barbarossa, presumably after the name of the King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa) - the code name of the plan for the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR developed in 1940-1941, the implementation of which was subsequently undertaken in the form of the eponymous Operation Barbarossa. The main task - “to defeat Soviet Russia in one short-term campaign”, using the experience of applying the “blitzkrieg” strategy in Europe. The economic subsection of the plan related to the exploitation of the territory of the USSR was called the Oldenburg Plan (Goering's Green Folder).

Military-political situation

In 1940, Germany captured Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and defeated France. Thus, by June 1940, Germany managed to radically change the strategic situation in Europe, remove France from the war and expel the British army from the continent. The victories of the Wehrmacht gave rise to hopes in Berlin for a quick end to the war with England, which would allow Germany to devote all its strength to the defeat of the USSR, and this, in turn, would free its hands to fight the United States. However, Germany failed to force Britain to make peace. The war continued, with fighting taking place at sea, in North Africa and in the Balkans. In June 1940, preparations began for the implementation of a plan for an amphibious operation to land a combined assault force on the English coast called Sea Lion. During the planning, however, it gradually became clear to the Wehrmacht command that a throw across the English Channel could turn into an operation with an uncertain result, associated with heavy losses.

In October 1940, preparations for the Sea Lion were curtailed until the spring of 1941. Germany made attempts to attract Spain and France to an alliance against England, and also initiated negotiations with the USSR. At the Soviet-German negotiations in November 1940, Germany invited the USSR to join the Tripartite Pact and “divide the inheritance of England,” but the USSR, formally recognizing the possibility of such a step, set conditions that were clearly unacceptable to Germany.

Start of development

First data

The work of Karl Klee mentions that “On June 2, 1940, after the end of the first phase of the French campaign, Hitler visited the headquarters of Army Group A at Charleville.”. A. N. Yakovlev further quotes K. Klee:

Before the meeting began, he walked... with the commander of Army Group A (von Rundstedt) and the group's chief of staff (von Sodenstern). As if conducting a personal conversation, Hitler said that if, as he expected, France “falls away” and is ready to conclude a reasonable peace, then he will finally have a free hand to carry out his real task - to get rid of Bolshevism. The question is - as Hitler said verbatim - how “I will tell my child about this.”

Collection 1941. Book. 1, doc. No. 3, M.: MF "Democracy", 1998

In the future, G. von Rundstedt and G. von Sodenstern will take part both in the development of the plan for the “Eastern Expedition” and its implementation in 1941.

On June 22, 1940, on the day the Compiegne Armistice was signed and exactly a year before the start of the “Eastern Campaign,” F. Halder suggested in his military diary: “The near future will show whether our successes will force England to take the path of prudence or whether she will try to continue the war alone.”. And already on June 25, the Chief of the OKH General Staff mentioned the discussion of the creation of strike groups (in Poland, a kind of "Springboard in the East"): “new emphasis: striking force in the East (15 infantry, 6 tanks, 3 motorized vehicles)”.

"English" and "Eastern Problems"

On June 30, 1940, F. Halder writes about “a conversation with Weizsäcker, who reported Hitler’s opinion”: “The main focus is on the East”. Ernst von Weizsäcker quoted the Fuhrer:

We will probably have to demonstrate our strength once more to England before she stops fighting and will untie our hands in the East.

F. Halder War diary. Section June 1940

Based on the results of these negotiations with State Secretary von Weizsäcker, the Chief of the General Staff “I considered it necessary to make a note for myself - to analyze the possibilities and prospects of a military campaign against the Soviet Union”. On July 3, after a discussion with the chief of the operational department of the OKH General Staff, G. von Greifenberg, he already appears "the first specific entry in Halder's diary relating to the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union" :

At present, the English problem, which should be developed separately, and the Eastern problem are in the foreground. The main content of the latter: a method of delivering a decisive blow to Russia in order to force it to recognize the dominant role of Germany in Europe

F. Halder War diary. Section July 1940

Thus, at the beginning of July, “Hitler’s main military-political decision” in the diary of the Chief of the General Staff “was written down in such a categorical form.” The military leadership then set itself two strategic goals simultaneously: “English problem” and “Eastern problem”. According to the decision of the first - “related to the operation against England”; on the same day, they discussed “the creation of a working group at the General Staff headed by Greifenberg” and the drawing up in the near future of a draft operational plan for a landing on the British Isles.

On the “Eastern problem” on July 4, Halder talked with the commander of the 18th Army, the “conqueror of Paris,” General G. von Küchler and Chief of Staff E. Marx: "I briefed them on the 18th Army's missions relating to operational problems in the East." Also noted was the report of the head of the “Foreign Armies - East” department, Colonel Eberhard Kinzel, “on the grouping of Russian troops,” which served as the basis for all subsequent calculations in the development of the Barbarossa plan. A characteristic feature of the materials presented by Kinzel was an underestimation of the forces located near the border of the 1st strategic echelon, and especially the reserves of the Red Army.

The USSR as the last barrier to German domination in Europe

Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1971-070-61, Hitler mit Generalälen bei Lagebesprechung

The decision to war with the USSR and the general plan for the future campaign were announced by Hitler at a meeting with the high military command on July 31, 1940, shortly after the victory over France. In his diary of the Chief of the General Staff, Franz Halder quotes Hitler's statement:

England's Hope - Russia and America. If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in the incredible strengthening of Japan in East Asia. […]

If Russia is defeated, England will lose its last hope. Then Germany will dominate Europe and the Balkans. Conclusion: According to this reasoning, Russia must be liquidated. Deadline: spring 1941.

The sooner we defeat Russia, the better. The operation will only make sense if we defeat the entire state with one swift blow. Just capturing some part of the territory is not enough. Stopping action in winter is dangerous. Therefore, it is better to wait, but make a firm decision to destroy Russia.

F. Halder also notes that Hitler initially determined “the beginning [of the military campaign] is May 1941, the duration of the operation is five months”. The operation itself breaks down into:

War planning by OKH and OKW headquarters

The leading place in planning Germany's war against the USSR was taken by the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces (OKH), led by its chief, Colonel General F. Halder. Along with the General Staff of the Ground Forces, an active role in planning the “eastern campaign” was played by the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW), led by General A. Jodl, who received instructions directly from Hitler

OKH plan

On July 22, 1940, Halder set the first specific tasks for developing plans for a war against the USSR to the head of the operational department of the OKH General Staff, Colonel H. Greifenberg. The head of the department of foreign armies of the East, Lieutenant Colonel E. Kinzel, and, from July 24, the military-geographical department of the General Staff were also involved in this work. To speed up the development of the plan for the “eastern campaign,” Halder ordered the involvement of General E. Marx, who had been considered the best specialist on Russia since the First World War.

At the beginning of August, Marx presented his project for Operation Ost, which took into account all the data available at the General Staff on the armed forces and economy of the USSR, on the characteristics of the terrain, climate and the condition of the roads of the future theater of military operations. In accordance with Marx’s development, for the war against the USSR it was planned to deploy 147 divisions. To deliver the main blow, it was planned to create a strike group north of the Pripyat marshes. The second strike was planned to be delivered south of Pripyat. The outcome of the entire campaign against the USSR, it was emphasized in the development, would largely depend on the effectiveness of attacks by tank and motorized formations. The total duration of the “eastern campaign” was determined by Marx in 9-17 weeks. During this time, German troops were supposed to reach the Rostov-Gorky-Arkhangelsk line.

At the beginning of September, General Marx, on the instructions of Halder, handed over all the prepared materials on planning the “eastern campaign” to General F. Paulus, who had just been appointed to the post of first chief quartermaster and permanent deputy chief of the general staff. Under his leadership, members of the General Staff continued to develop proposals for the creation of a group of troops for the war against the USSR, their strategic concentration and deployment. On October 29, a memorandum was presented to Halder "Original sketch of the OKH General Staff regarding the operational principles for waging war against the Soviet Union". It noted the advantage of German troops over Soviet troops in combat experience and, as a consequence, the possibility of their successful actions in conditions of a maneuverable, fleeting war.

Paulus proceeded from the assumption that the Soviet forces deployed against Germany would amount to approximately 125 rifle divisions, 50 tank and mechanized brigades. The arrival of reserves was determined by the following schedule: 3 were expected before the third month of the war 0-40 Russian divisions, until the sixth month - still 100 divisions. However, German intelligence was unable to discover the creation of a second strategic echelon, the appearance of which in July 1941 would be an unpleasant surprise for the command of the ground forces.

Paulus believed that decisive superiority in forces and means could be achieved through a surprise attack. To achieve this, it was proposed to develop a set of measures to disinformation the Soviet leadership. Like Marx, Paulus considered it necessary to deprive the Red Army troops of the opportunity to retreat into the interior of the country and conduct a mobile defense. The German groups were given the task envelop, encircle and destroy enemy troops, preventing them from retreating .

OKW plan

At the same time, at the headquarters of the OKW operational leadership, at the direction of General Jodl, the development of its own version of the “eastern campaign” was underway. Based on the Fuhrer’s instructions, Jodl ordered Lieutenant Colonel B. Lossberg from the national defense department (operational) to prepare a draft directive for the “eastern campaign” and conduct research related to the involvement of Finland, Turkey and Romania in the war against the USSR. Lossberg completed his development on September 15, 1940. In contrast to the version of the OKH General Staff, they envisaged the creation of three strategic groupings: two north of the Pripyat swamps and one south of them. The main blow was supposed to be delivered by the central group in the area between the Dnieper and the Western Dvina in order to cut through the Soviet forces in the Minsk region, and then advance in the general direction of Moscow. According to this project, the northern group was supposed to advance from East Prussia to the line of the Western Dvina with the goal of capturing the Baltic states, and then Leningrad. The southern group would strike on both flanks with the task of encircling and destroying Soviet troops on the territory of Western Ukraine, and during the subsequent offensive, crossing the Dnieper, capturing the rest of Ukraine, while establishing direct contact with the central group. In the future, it was planned to combine the actions of three strategic groupings to reach the line Arkhangelsk - Gorky - Volga (to Stalingrad) - Don before it flows into the Sea of ​​Azov.

Final revision and approval

In November-December 1940, the OKH General Staff continued to clarify and map out developments on actions in the main strategic directions, on the distribution of forces and means for the offensive, and also coordinated the results of this work with the OKW operational leadership headquarters. In the course of clarifying the plan of the campaign, they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to divide the Soviet defense front into separate sections, where they would try to blockade the Soviet troops, depriving them of the opportunity to retreat. It was considered most expedient to create three strike groups, of which the northern one would advance on Leningrad, the central one - through Minsk to Smolensk, the southern one - on Kiev, and the strongest was to be the central one. In total, it was planned to use 105 infantry, 32 tank and motorized divisions in the “eastern campaign”.

In the first half of December, the OKW operational headquarters began putting together options for the “eastern campaign” plan and preparing a draft directive from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. On December 17, Jodl reported the prepared draft directive to Hitler. Hitler made a number of comments. In his opinion, it was very important to ensure a breakthrough of the Soviet defense and the rapid advance of motorized forces both north and south of the Pripyat marshes, after which they should turn to the north and south in order to encircle and destroy the Red Army troops in the Baltic states and the Ukraine. Hitler believed that an attack on Moscow would be possible only after the capture of the Baltic states and Ukraine, which would isolate the Soviet Union from the Baltic and Black Seas. He also stressed that all problems associated with the war in Europe must be resolved in 1941, since in 1942 the United States would be in a position to enter the war.

Directive No. 21 "Plan Barbarossa"

Variant "Barbarossa"

On December 18, 1940, after making some clarifications to the project, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, which received the code name “Barbarossa Option” and became the main guiding document in the war against the USSR. The German armed forces were given the task of “defeating Soviet Russia in one short-term campaign,” for which it was supposed to use all ground forces with the exception of those that performed occupation functions in Europe, as well as approximately two-thirds of the air force and a small part of the navy. With rapid operations with deep and rapid advance of tank wedges, the German army was supposed to destroy the Soviet troops located in the western part of the USSR and prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready units into the interior of the country. Subsequently, quickly pursuing the enemy, German troops had to reach a line from where Soviet aviation would not be able to carry out raids on the Third Reich. The ultimate goal of the campaign is to reach the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line, creating there, if necessary, conditions for the German Air Force to “influence Soviet industrial centers in the Urals.”

The immediate strategic goal of the war against the USSR was the defeat and destruction of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, Belarus and Right-Bank Ukraine. It was assumed that during these operations the Wehrmacht would reach Kyiv with fortifications east of the Dnieper, Smolensk and the area south and west of Lake Ilmen. The further goal was to timely occupy the militarily and economically important Donetsk coal basin, and in the north to quickly reach Moscow. The directive required operations to capture Moscow to begin only after the destruction of Soviet troops in the Baltic states and the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt.

The task of the German Air Force was to disrupt the opposition of Soviet aviation and support its own ground forces in decisive directions. The naval forces were required to ensure the defense of their coast, preventing the Soviet fleet from breaking through from the Baltic Sea. After the neutralization of the Soviet fleet, they had to provide German maritime transport in the Baltic and supply the northern flank of the ground forces by sea.

The invasion was scheduled to begin at May 15, 1941. The estimated duration of the main hostilities was 4-5 months according to plan.

Operational and strategic planning

With the completion of the development of the general plan for Germany's war against the USSR, operational-strategic planning was transferred to the headquarters of the branches of the armed forces and formations of troops, where more specific plans were developed, tasks for the troops were clarified and detailed, and measures were determined to prepare the armed forces, the economy, and the future theater of military operations for war. actions.

Under the leadership of Paulus, the OKH General Staff spent more than a month preparing a directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops, taking into account Hitler's instructions made at a meeting of the Wehrmacht leadership at Berghof on January 9, 1941. Speaking at the meeting, the Fuhrer emphasized that the armed forces of the USSR should not be underestimated, although they represent a “clay colossus without a head.” He demanded that the best forces be allocated and operations carried out in such a way as to cut off Soviet troops in the Baltic states as quickly as possible and not to gradually oust them along the entire front.

OKH Directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of the Wehrmacht

In January 1941, a number of games were held on maps, and the basics of the actions of German troops in each of the operational directions were formulated. As a result, a meeting was held in Berlin on January 31, 1941, at which Field Marshal von Brauchitsch informed that the German plan was based on the assumption of a Red Army battle west of the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper. A.V. Isaev notes that “regarding the last remark, von Bock noted skeptically in his diary”:

When I asked Halder if he had any definite information that the Russians would hold the territory in front of the mentioned rivers, he thought for a moment and said: “This may well be the case.”

Isaev A.V. Unknown 1941. The stopped blitzkrieg.

According to Isaev, “German planning from the very beginning proceeded from a certain assumption based on general reasoning”, because “the actions of the enemy, that is, the Red Army, could differ from those assumed by the German high command”.

However, on January 31, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal W. von Brauchitsch, signed OKH Directive No. 050/41 on the strategic concentration and deployment of the Wehrmacht, and on February 3, together with Halder, reported it to Hitler. The directive, which developed and concretized the principles of the war against the USSR, set out in Directive No. 21, defined specific tasks for all army groups, armies and tank groups to a depth that ensured the achievement of the immediate strategic goal: the destruction of the Red Army troops west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina. Measures were envisaged for the interaction of ground forces with the Air Force and Navy, cooperation with allied states, transfer of troops, etc.

The main task, according to the directive, was to “ carry out extensive preparatory measures that would make it possible to defeat Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign even before the war against England was over" It was planned to achieve this by delivering quick and deep strikes by powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps with the goal of disuniting and destroying the main forces of the Soviet troops in the western part of the USSR, preventing the retreat of their combat-ready units into the vast interior regions of the country. The fulfillment of this plan, the directive said, would be facilitated by attempts by large formations of Soviet troops to “stop the German offensive on the line of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers.”

The German leadership proceeded from the need to ensure the defeat of Soviet troops along the entire front line. As a result of the planned grandiose “border battle,” the USSR should have had nothing left except 30-40 reserve divisions. This goal was supposed to be achieved by an offensive along the entire front. The Moscow and Kiev directions were recognized as the main operational lines. They were provided by army groups “Center” (48 divisions were concentrated on a 500 km front) and “South” (40 German divisions and significant Allied forces were concentrated on a 1250 km front). Army Group North (29 divisions on a 290 km front) had the task of securing the northern flank of Group Center, capturing the Baltic states and establishing contact with Finnish troops. The total number of divisions of the first strategic echelon, taking into account the Finnish, Hungarian and Romanian troops, was 157 divisions, of which 17 tank and 13 motorized, and 18 brigades.

On the eighth day, German troops were supposed to reach the line Kaunas - Baranovichi - Lvov - Mogilev-Podolsky. On the twentieth day of the war, they were supposed to capture territory and reach the line: Dnieper (to the area south of Kiev) - Mozyr - Rogachev - Orsha - Vitebsk - Velikiye Luki - south of Pskov - south of Pärnu. This was followed by a pause of twenty days, during which it was planned to concentrate and regroup formations, give rest to the troops and prepare a new supply base. On the fortieth day of the war, the second phase of the offensive was to begin. During it, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass.

Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow: “ The capture of this city means a decisive success both politically and economically, not to mention the fact that the Russians will lose their most important railway junction" The Wehrmacht command believed that the Red Army would throw its last remaining forces to defend the capital, which would make it possible to defeat them in one operation.

The Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line was indicated as the final line, but the German General Staff did not plan the operation that far.

After the report to Hitler, OKH Directive No. 050/41 was sent to the headquarters of the army groups, air force and naval forces. On the recommendation of the General Staff, bilateral command and staff games were held in army groups. After discussing their results at meetings of the main command of the ground forces with representatives of the army groups, the headquarters of the army groups developed operational plans for their formations, which were reviewed on February 20 at the OKH General Staff.

Adjusting attack plans

In connection with Hitler's decision to expand the scale of Operation Marita (attack on Greece), which required the involvement of additional forces, in mid-March 1941, changes were made to the war plan against the USSR, mainly concerning actions on the southern flank of the German group. The 12th Army, which was supposed to operate here, was, by order of Hitler, fully committed to Greece and was left there after the end of the Balkan campaign. In this regard, it was considered possible, at the first stage of the war against the USSR, to limit the actions of the German-Romanian troops on the eastern border of Romania, for the leadership of which a new army command was formed on the territory of Romania - the 11th, which was to be completely redeployed there by mid-May .

Hitler's instructions to change the plan for Operation Barbarossa were reflected in Brauchitsch's Directive No. 644/41 of April 7, 1941. It indicated that the allocation of additional forces for the Balkan campaign required postponing the start of the operation to a later date - four to six weeks. All preparatory measures, including the transfer of mobile formations necessary for the offensive in the first operational echelon, were required by the directive to be completed approximately by 22nd of June .

V.I. Dashichev noted that at a meeting on April 30, 1941, where Hitler announced the start date of the war against the USSR - June 22 - OKH Commander-in-Chief von Brauchitsch gave the following forecast of military operations on the Eastern Front: “ Supposedly major border battles lasting up to 4 weeks. Only minor resistance should be expected in the future».

In order to maintain secrecy, the armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland received specific tasks just before the start of the war.

Military-political, economic and ideological goals of Operation Barbarossa

The plan for the attack on the USSR also included the use of resources from the occupied territories, determined by the Oldenburg plan, developed under the leadership of Reichsmarschall Goering and approved by Hitler on April 29, 1941. This document provided for the seizure and placement at the service of the Reich of all reserves of raw materials and large industrial enterprises in the territory between the Vistula and the Urals. The most valuable industrial equipment was supposed to be sent to the Reich, and that which could not be useful to Germany was to be destroyed. It was planned to decentralize the territory of the European part of the USSR economically and make it an agricultural and raw materials appendage of Germany. It was proposed to divide the territory of the European part of the USSR into four economic inspectorates (Leningrad, Moscow, Kyiv, Baku) and 23 economic commandant’s offices, as well as 12 bureaus. Later it was planned to divide this territory into seven states economically dependent on Germany.

On May 9, 1941, Alfred Rosenberg made a report to the Fuhrer on the plan to dismember the USSR and create local government bodies. On the territory of the USSR it was planned to create five Reichskommissariats, divided into general commissariats and, further, into districts. The plan was adopted with a number of amendments.

The military-political and ideological goals of Operation Barbarossa are evidenced by a number of statements by Hitler.

As follows from the words of the chief of staff of the operational leadership of the OKW, General A. Jodl (entry dated March 3, 1941), Hitler stated the following:

The upcoming war will be not only an armed struggle, but also at the same time a struggle between two worldviews. To win this war in conditions where the enemy has a huge territory, it is not enough to defeat his armed forces, this territory should be divided into several states, headed by their own governments, with which we could conclude peace treaties ...

Every large-scale revolution brings to life phenomena that cannot simply be cast aside. It is no longer possible to eradicate socialist ideas in today's Russia. These ideas can serve as an internal political basis for the creation of new states and governments. The Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia, which represents the oppressor of the people, must be removed from the scene. The former bourgeois-aristocratic intelligentsia, if it still exists, primarily among emigrants, should also not be allowed to come to power. It will not be accepted by the Russian people and, moreover, it is hostile towards the German nation. This is especially noticeable in the former Baltic states. Moreover, we must under no circumstances allow the Bolshevik state to be replaced by a nationalist Russia, which will ultimately (as history shows) once again confront Germany.

(Directive No. 21. Plan "Barbarossa"; German. Weisung Nr. 21. Fall Barbarossa, in honor of Frederick I) - a plan for Germany's invasion of the USSR in the Eastern European theater of World War II and the military operation carried out in accordance with this plan at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.

Development of the Barbarossa plan began on July 21, 1940. The plan, finally developed under the leadership of General F. Paulus, was approved on December 18, 1940 by the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht No. 21. It provided for the lightning defeat of the main forces of the Red Army west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers, in the future it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass with a subsequent exit on the line Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan.

The expected duration of the main hostilities, designed for 2-3 months, is the so-called “Blitzkrieg” strategy (German. Blitzkrieg).

Prerequisites

After Hitler came to power in Germany, revanchist sentiments sharply increased in the country. Nazi propaganda convinced the Germans of the need for conquest in the East. Back in the mid-1930s, the German government announced the inevitability of war with the USSR in the near future. Planning an attack on Poland with the possible entry of Great Britain and France into the war, the German government decided to protect itself from the east - in August 1939, a Non-Aggression Treaty was concluded between Germany and the USSR, dividing the spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland, as a result of which Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3. During the Polish campaign of the Red Army, the Soviet Union sent troops and annexed the former possessions of the Russian Empire from Poland: Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. A common border appeared between Germany and the USSR.

In 1940, Germany captured Denmark and Norway (Danish-Norwegian operation); Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France during the French Campaign. Thus, by June 1940, Germany managed to radically change the strategic situation in Europe, remove France from the war and expel the British army from the continent. The victories of the Wehrmacht gave rise to hopes in Berlin for a quick end to the war with England, which would allow Germany to devote all its strength to the defeat of the USSR, and this, in turn, would free its hands to fight the United States.

However, Germany failed to either force Great Britain to make peace or defeat it. The war continued, with fighting taking place at sea, in North Africa and the Balkans. In October 1940, Germany made attempts to attract Spain and Vichy France to an alliance against England, and also initiated negotiations with the USSR.

Soviet-German negotiations in November 1940 showed that the USSR was considering the possibility of joining the Tripartite Pact, but the conditions it set out were unacceptable to Germany, since they required it to renounce intervention in Finland and closed its possibility of advancing to the Middle East through the Balkans.

However, despite these events of the autumn, based on Hitler’s demands put forward by him in early June 1940, the OKH drew up rough outlines of a campaign plan against the USSR, and on July 22, the development of an attack plan began, codenamed “Plan Barbarossa.” The decision to war with the USSR and the general plan for the future campaign were announced by Hitler soon after the victory over France - on July 31, 1940.

The Axis powers are informed of Barbarossa's plan.

Plans of the parties

Germany

The overall strategic objective of the Barbarossa plan is “ defeat Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the war against England was over" The concept was based on the idea “ split the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of the country, with quick and deep strikes from powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, destroy disunited groups of enemy troops" The plan provided for the destruction of the bulk of Soviet troops west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers, preventing them from withdrawing inland.

In development of the Barbarossa plan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces signed a directive on the concentration of troops on January 31, 1941.

On the eighth day, German troops were supposed to reach the line Kaunas, Baranovichi, Lvov, Mogilev-Podolsky. On the twentieth day of the war, they were supposed to capture territory and reach the line: Dnieper (to the area south of Kyiv), Mozyr, Rogachev, Orsha, Vitebsk, Velikie Luki, south of Pskov, south of Pärnu. This was followed by a pause of twenty days, during which it was planned to concentrate and regroup formations, give rest to the troops and prepare a new supply base. On the fortieth day of the war, the second phase of the offensive was to begin. During it, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass.

Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow: “ The capture of this city means a decisive success both politically and economically, not to mention the fact that the Russians will lose their most important railway junction" The Wehrmacht command believed that the Red Army would throw its last remaining forces into defense of the capital, which would make it possible to defeat them in one operation.

The line Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan was indicated as the final line, but the German General Staff did not plan the operation that far.

The Barbarossa plan set out in detail the tasks of army groups and armies, the order of interaction between them and with the Allied forces, as well as with the Air Force and Navy, and the tasks of the latter. In addition to the OKH directive, a number of documents were developed, including an assessment of the Soviet Armed Forces, a disinformation directive, calculation of time for preparing an operation, special instructions, etc.

Directive No. 21, signed by Hitler, named May 15, 1941 as the earliest date for an attack on the USSR. Later, due to the diversion of part of the Wehrmacht forces to the Balkan campaign, June 22, 1941 was named as the next date for the attack on the USSR. The final order was given on June 17.

USSR

Soviet intelligence managed to obtain information that Hitler had made some kind of decision related to Soviet-German relations, but its exact content remained unknown, like the code word “Barbarossa”. And the information received about the possible outbreak of war in March 1941 after withdrawal from the war in England were absolutely disinformation, since Directive No. 21 indicated the approximate date for the completion of military preparations - May 15, 1941 and emphasized that the USSR must be defeated " more before that how the war against England will end».

Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership did not take any action to prepare defense in the event of a German attack. In the operational-strategic headquarters game that took place in January 1941, the issue of repelling aggression from Germany was not even considered.

The configuration of the Red Army troops on the Soviet-German border was very vulnerable. In particular, the former Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov recalled: “ On the eve of the war, the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies of the Western District were located in the Bialystok ledge, concave towards the enemy, the 10th Army occupied the most unfavorable location. This operational configuration of troops created the threat of deep envelopment and encirclement from Grodno and Brest by attacking the flanks. Meanwhile, the deployment of front troops in the Grodno-Suwalki and Brest directions was not deep and powerful enough to prevent a breakthrough and envelopment of the Bialystok group. This erroneous deployment of troops, committed in 1940, was not corrected until the war itself...»

Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership took certain actions, the meaning and purpose of which continue to be discussed. At the end of May and beginning of June 1941, a partial mobilization of troops was carried out under the guise of reserve training, which made it possible to call up over 800 thousand people who were used to replenish divisions located mainly in the West; from mid-May, four armies (16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd) and one rifle corps began moving from the internal military districts to the border of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers. From mid-June, a hidden regrouping of the formations of the western border districts themselves began: under the guise of going to the camps, more than half of the divisions constituting the reserve of these districts were set in motion. From June 14 to 19, the commands of the western border districts received instructions to withdraw front-line commands to field command posts. From mid-June, vacations for personnel were cancelled.

At the same time, the General Staff of the Red Army Army categorically suppressed any attempts by the commanders of the western border districts to strengthen the defense by occupying the forefield. Only on the night of June 22 did the Soviet military districts receive a directive to switch to combat readiness, but it reached many headquarters only after the attack. Although, according to other sources, orders to withdraw troops from the border were given to the commanders of the western districts from June 14 to 18.

In addition, most of the territories located on the western border were incorporated into the USSR relatively recently. The Soviet army did not have powerful defensive lines on the border. The local population was quite hostile to Soviet power, and after the German invasion, many Baltic, Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalists actively helped the Germans.

Balance of power

Germany and allies

Three army groups were created to attack the USSR.

• Army Group North (Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb) was deployed in East Prussia, on the front from Klaipeda to Gołdap. It included the 16th Army, the 18th Army and the 4th Tank Group - a total of 29 divisions (including 6 tank and motorized). The offensive was supported by the 1st Air Fleet, which had 1,070 combat aircraft. The task of Army Group North was to defeat Soviet troops in the Baltic states, capture Leningrad and ports on the Baltic Sea, including Tallinn and Kronstadt.

• Army Group Center (Field Marshal Feodor von Bock) occupied the front from Gołdap to Wlodawa. It included the 4th Army, 9th Army, 2nd Tank Group and 3rd Tank Group - a total of 50 divisions (including 15 tank and motorized) and 2 brigades. The offensive was supported by the 2nd Air Fleet, which had 1,680 combat aircraft. Army Group Center was tasked with dissecting the strategic front of the Soviet defense, encircling and destroying the Red Army troops in Belarus and developing an offensive in the Moscow direction.

• Army Group South (Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt) occupied the front from Lublin to the mouth of the Danube. It included the 6th Army, 11th Army, 17th Army, 3rd Romanian Army, 4th Romanian Army, 1st Tank Group and the Hungarian Mobile Corps - a total of 57 divisions (including 9 tank and motorized) and 13 brigades (including 2 tank and motorized). The offensive was supported by the 4th Air Fleet, which had 800 combat aircraft, and the Romanian Air Force, which had 500 aircraft. Army Group South had the task of destroying Soviet troops in Right Bank Ukraine, reaching the Dnieper and subsequently developing an offensive east of the Dnieper.

USSR

In the USSR, on the basis of the military districts located on the western border, according to the decision of the Politburo of June 21, 1941, 4 fronts were created.

• The North-Western Front (commander F.I. Kuznetsov) was created in the Baltic states. It included the 8th Army, the 11th Army and the 27th Army - a total of 34 divisions (of which 6 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Northwestern Front.
• The Western Front (commander D. G. Pavlov) was created in Belarus. It included the 3rd Army, 4th Army, 10th Army and 13th Army - a total of 45 divisions (of which 20 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Western Front Air Force.
• The Southwestern Front (commander M.P. Kirponos) was created in Western Ukraine. It included the 5th Army, 6th Army, 12th Army and 26th Army - a total of 45 divisions (of which 18 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Southwestern Front.
• The Southern Front (commander I.V. Tyulenev) was created in Moldova and Southern Ukraine. It included the 9th Army and the 18th Army - a total of 26 divisions (of which 9 were tank and motorized). The front was supported by the Air Force of the Southern Front.
• The Baltic Fleet (commander V.F. Tributs) was located in the Baltic Sea. It consisted of 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyer leaders, 19 destroyers, 65 submarines, 48 ​​torpedo boats and other ships, 656 aircraft.
• The Black Sea Fleet (commander F.S. Oktyabrsky) was located in the Black Sea. It consisted of 1 battleship, 5 light cruisers, 16 leaders and destroyers, 47 submarines, 2 brigades of torpedo boats, several divisions of minesweepers, patrol and anti-submarine boats, and over 600 aircraft.

Development of the USSR Armed Forces since the signing of the non-aggression pact

By the beginning of the forties, the Soviet Union, as a result of the industrialization program, came to third place after the United States and Germany in terms of the level of development of heavy industry. Also, by the beginning of the Second World War, the Soviet economy was largely focused on the production of military equipment.

First phase. Invasion. Border battles (22 June - 10 July 1941)

Beginning of the invasion

In the early morning at 4 o'clock on June 22, 1941, the German invasion of the USSR began. On the same day, Italy (Italian troops began fighting on July 20, 1941) and Romania declared war on the USSR, Slovakia declared war on June 23, and Hungary declared war on June 27. The German invasion took the Soviet troops by surprise; on the very first day, a significant part of the ammunition, fuel and military equipment was destroyed; The Germans managed to ensure complete air supremacy (about 1,200 aircraft were disabled). German aircraft attacked naval bases: Kronstadt, Libau, Vindava, Sevastopol. Submarines were deployed on the sea lanes of the Baltic and Black Seas and minefields were laid. On land, after strong artillery preparation, the advanced units, and then the main forces of the Wehrmacht, went on the offensive. However, the Soviet command was unable to soberly assess the position of its troops. On the evening of June 22, the Main Military Council sent directives to the Military Councils of the fronts, demanding that decisive counterattacks be launched against the enemy groups that had broken through in the morning of June 23. As a result of failed counterattacks, the already difficult situation of the Soviet troops worsened even further. Finnish troops did not cross the front line, waiting for events to develop, but giving German aviation the opportunity to refuel.

The Soviet command launched bombing attacks on Finnish territory on June 25. Finland declared war on the USSR and German and Finnish troops invaded Karelia and the Arctic, increasing the front line and threatening Leningrad and the Murmansk railway. The fighting soon turned into positional warfare and had no impact on the general state of affairs on the Soviet-German front. In historiography they are usually separated into separate campaigns: the Soviet-Finnish War (1941-1944) and the Defense of the Arctic.

Northern direction

At first, not one, but two tank groups operated against the Soviet North-Western Front:

• Army Group North operated in the Leningrad direction, and its main striking force, the 4th Tank Group, was advancing on Daugavpils.
• The 3rd Tank Group of Army Group Center was advancing in the Vilnius direction.

An attempt by the command of the North-Western Front to launch a counterattack with the forces of two mechanized corps (almost 1000 tanks) near the city of Raseiniai ended in complete failure, and on June 25 a decision was made to withdraw troops to the Western Dvina line.

But already on June 26, the German 4th Tank Group crossed the Western Dvina near Daugavpils (56th motorized corps of E. von Manstein), on July 2 - at Jekabpils (41st motorized corps of G. Reinhard). Following the motorized corps, infantry divisions advanced. On June 27, Red Army units left Liepaja. On July 1, the German 18th Army occupied Riga and entered southern Estonia.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Tank Group of Army Group Center, having overcome the resistance of Soviet troops near Alytus, took Vilnius on June 24, turned to the southeast and went behind the rear of the Soviet Western Front.

Central direction

A difficult situation developed on the Western Front. On the very first day, the flank armies of the Western Front (3rd Army in the Grodno area and 4th Army in the Brest area) suffered heavy losses. The counterattacks of the mechanized corps of the Western Front on June 23–25 ended in failure. The German 3rd Panzer Group, having overcome the resistance of Soviet troops in Lithuania and developing an offensive in the Vilnius direction, bypassed the 3rd and 10th Armies from the north, and the 2nd Panzer Group, leaving the Brest Fortress in the rear, broke through to Baranovichi and bypassed them from the south. On June 28, the Germans took the capital of Belarus and closed the encirclement ring, which contained the main forces of the Western Front.

On June 30, 1941, the commander of the Soviet Western Front, Army General D. G. Pavlov, was removed from command; Later, by decision of the military tribunal, he, along with other generals and officers of the Western Front headquarters, was shot. The troops of the Western Front were led first by Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko (June 30), then People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S. K. Timoshenko (appointed on July 2, took office on July 4). Due to the fact that the main forces of the Western Front were defeated in the Battle of Bialystok-Minsk, on July 2, the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon were transferred to the Western Front.

At the beginning of July, the Wehrmacht motorized corps overcame the Soviet defense line on the Berezina River and rushed to the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, but unexpectedly encountered troops of the restored Western Front (in the first echelon of the 22nd, 20th and 21st Armies). On July 6, 1941, the Soviet command launched an offensive in the Lepel direction (see Lepel counterattack). During the heated tank battle on July 6-9 between Orsha and Vitebsk, in which more than 1,600 tanks took part on the Soviet side, and up to 700 units on the German side, German troops defeated the Soviet troops and took Vitebsk on July 9. The surviving Soviet units retreated to the area between Vitebsk and Orsha. German troops took up their starting positions for the subsequent offensive in the area of ​​Polotsk, Vitebsk, south of Orsha, as well as north and south of Mogilev.

South direction

The military operations of the Wehrmacht in the south, where the most powerful group of the Red Army was located, were not so successful. On June 23-25, Black Sea Fleet aircraft bombed the Romanian cities of Sulina and Constanta; On June 26, Constanta was attacked by ships of the Black Sea Fleet together with aviation. In an effort to stop the advance of the 1st Panzer Group, the command of the Southwestern Front launched a counterattack with six mechanized corps (about 2,500 tanks). During a major tank battle in the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody area, Soviet troops were unable to defeat the enemy and suffered heavy losses, but they prevented the Germans from making a strategic breakthrough and cutting off the Lviv group (6th and 26th Armies) from the rest of the forces. By July 1, the troops of the Southwestern Front retreated to the fortified line Korosten-Novograd-Volynsky-Proskurov. At the beginning of July, the Germans broke through the right wing of the front near Novograd-Volynsky and captured Berdichev and Zhitomir, but thanks to counterattacks by Soviet troops, their further advance was stopped.

At the junction of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, on July 2, German-Romanian troops crossed the Prut and rushed to Mogilev-Podolsky. By July 10 they reached the Dniester.

Results of border battles

As a result of border battles, the Wehrmacht inflicted a heavy defeat on the Red Army.

Summing up the results of the first phase of Operation Barbarossa, on July 3, 1941, the Chief of the German General Staff F. Halder wrote in his diary:

Second phase. The offensive of German troops along the entire front (July 10 - August 1941)

Northern direction

On July 2, Army Group North continued its offensive, its German 4th Panzer Group advancing in the direction of Rezekne, Ostrov, Pskov. On July 4, the 41st Motorized Corps occupied Ostrov, and on July 9, Pskov.

On July 10, Army Group North continued its offensive in the Leningrad (4th Tank Group) and Tallinn (18th Army) directions. However, the German 56th Motorized Corps was stopped by a counterattack by the Soviet 11th Army near Soltsy. Under these conditions, the German command on July 19 suspended the offensive of the 4th Panzer Group for almost three weeks until the formations of the 18th and 16th armies arrived. Only at the end of July did the Germans reach the border of the Narva, Luga and Mshaga rivers.

On August 7, German troops broke through the defenses of the 8th Army and reached the coast of the Gulf of Finland in the Kunda area. The 8th Army was split into two parts: the 11th Rifle Corps went to Narva, and the 10th Rifle Corps to Tallinn, where, together with the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, they defended the city until August 28.

On August 8, Army Group North resumed its offensive against Leningrad in the direction of Krasnogvardeisk, and on August 10 - in the Luga area and in the Novgorod-Chudov direction. On August 12, the Soviet command launched a counterattack near Staraya Russa, but on August 19 the enemy struck back and defeated the Soviet troops.

On August 19, German troops occupied Novgorod, and on August 20, Chudovo. On August 23, fighting began for Oranienbaum; The Germans were stopped southeast of Koporye (Voronka River).

Offensive on Leningrad

To strengthen Army Group North, the 3rd Panzer Group of G. Hoth (39th and 57th Motorized Corps) and the 8th Air Corps of V. von Richthofen were transferred to it.

At the end of August, German troops launched a new offensive against Leningrad. On August 25, the 39th motorized corps took Lyuban, on August 30 it reached the Neva and cut off the railway connection with the city, on September 8 it took Shlisselburg and closed the blockade ring around Leningrad.

However, having decided to carry out Operation Typhoon, A. Hitler ordered the release no later than September 15, 1941 of most of the mobile formations and the 8th Air Corps, which were called upon to participate in the final offensive on Moscow.

On September 9, the decisive assault on Leningrad began. However, the Germans failed to break the resistance of the Soviet troops within the specified time frame. On September 12, 1941, Hitler gave the order to stop the assault on the city. (For further military operations in the Leningrad direction, see Siege of Leningrad.)

On November 7, the Germans continue their offensive in a northern direction. The railways carrying food through Lake Ladoga to Leningrad were cut. German troops occupied Tikhvin. There was a threat of German troops breaking through to the rear and encircling the 7th Separate Army, which was defending the lines on the Svir River. However, already on November 11, the 52nd Army launched a counterattack on the fascist troops who occupied Malaya Vishera. During the ensuing battles, the Malovishera group of German troops suffered a serious defeat. Her troops were thrown back from the city across the Bolshaya Vishera River.

Central direction

On July 10-12, 1941, Army Group Center launched a new offensive in the Moscow direction. The 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper south of Orsha, and the 3rd Panzer Group attacked from Vitebsk. On July 16, German troops entered Smolensk, and three Soviet armies (19th, 20th and 16th) were surrounded. By August 5, the fighting in the Smolensk “cauldron” ended, the remnants of the troops of the 16th and 20th armies crossed the Dnieper; 310 thousand people were captured.

On the northern flank of the Soviet Western Front, German troops captured Nevel (July 16), but then fought for a whole month for Velikiye Luki. Big problems for the enemy also arose on the southern flank of the central section of the Soviet-German front: here the Soviet troops of the 21st Army launched an offensive in the Bobruisk direction. Despite the fact that Soviet troops failed to capture Bobruisk, they pinned down a significant number of divisions of the German 2nd Field Army and a third of the 2nd Panzer Group.

Thus, taking into account two large groupings of Soviet troops on the flanks and incessant attacks along the front, the German Army Group Center could not resume the attack on Moscow. On July 30, the main forces went over to the defensive and focused on solving problems on the flanks. At the end of August 1941, German troops managed to defeat Soviet troops in the Velikie Luki area and capture Toropets on August 29.

On August 8-12, the 2nd Tank Group and the 2nd Field Army began advancing southward. As a result of the operations, the Soviet Central Front was defeated, and Gomel fell on August 19. The large-scale offensive of the Soviet fronts of the Western direction (Western, Reserve and Bryansk), launched on August 30 - September 1, was unsuccessful, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses and went on the defensive on September 10. The only success was the liberation of Yelnya on September 6.

South direction

In Moldova, an attempt by the command of the Southern Front to stop the Romanian offensive with a counterattack of two mechanized corps (770 tanks) was unsuccessful. On July 16, the 4th Romanian Army took Chisinau, and in early August pushed the Separate Coastal Army to Odessa. The defense of Odessa pinned down the forces of the Romanian troops for almost two and a half months. Soviet troops left the city only in the first half of October.

Meanwhile, at the end of July, German troops launched an offensive in the Belaya Tserkov direction. On August 2, they cut off the 6th and 12th Soviet armies from the Dnieper and surrounded them near Uman; 103 thousand people were captured, including both army commanders. But although German troops, as a result of a new offensive, broke through to the Dnieper and created several bridgeheads on the eastern bank, they failed to take Kyiv on the move.

Thus, Army Group South was unable to independently solve the tasks set for it by the Barbarossa plan. From early August to early October, the Red Army carried out a series of attacks near Voronezh.

Battle of Kyiv

In pursuance of Hitler's orders, the southern flank of Army Group Center launched an offensive in support of Army Group South.

After the occupation of Gomel, the German 2nd Army of Army Group Center advanced to join the 6th Army of Army Group South; On September 9, both German armies united in eastern Polesie. By September 13, the front of the Soviet 5th Army of the Southwestern Front and the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front was completely broken, both armies switched to mobile defense.

At the same time, the German 2nd Tank Group, repelling the attack of the Soviet Bryansk Front near Trubchevsk, entered operational space. On September 9, the 3rd Panzer Division of V. Model broke through to the south and captured Romny on September 10.

Meanwhile, the 1st Tank Group launched an offensive on September 12 from the Kremenchug bridgehead in a northern direction. On September 15, the 1st and 2nd tank groups linked up at Lokhvitsa. The main forces of the Soviet Southwestern Front found themselves in the gigantic Kiev “cauldron”; the number of prisoners was 665 thousand people. The administration of the Southwestern Front turned out to be destroyed; Front commander Colonel General M.P. Kirponos died.

As a result, Left Bank Ukraine was in the hands of the enemy, the path to Donbass was open, and Soviet troops in Crimea were cut off from the main forces. (For further military operations in the Donbass direction, see Donbass operation). In mid-September, the Germans reached the approaches to Crimea.

Crimea was of strategic importance as one of the routes to the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus (through the Kerch Strait and Taman). In addition, Crimea was important as an aviation base. With the loss of Crimea, Soviet aviation would have lost the ability to raid Romanian oil fields, and the Germans would have been able to strike targets in the Caucasus. The Soviet command understood the importance of holding the peninsula and focused its efforts on this, abandoning the defense of Odessa. On October 16, Odessa fell.

On October 17, Donbass was occupied (Taganrog fell). On October 25, Kharkov was captured. November 2 - Crimea is occupied and Sevastopol is blocked. November 30 - the forces of Army Group South gained a foothold on the Mius Front line.

Turn from Moscow

At the end of July 1941, the German command was still full of optimism and believed that the goals set by the Barbarossa plan would be achieved in the near future. The following dates were indicated for achieving these goals: Moscow and Leningrad - August 25; Volga line - early October; Baku and Batumi - early November.

On July 25, at a meeting of the chiefs of staff of the Wehrmacht's Eastern Front, the implementation of Operation Barbarossa was discussed in time:

• Army Group North: Operations developed almost entirely according to plans.
• Army Group Center: Until the start of the Battle of Smolensk, operations developed in accordance with plans, then development slowed down.
• Army Group South: Operations progressed more slowly than expected.

However, Hitler became increasingly inclined to postpone the attack on Moscow. At a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group South on August 4, he stated: “ First, Leningrad must be captured, for this purpose the troops of the Gotha group are used. Secondly, the eastern part of Ukraine will be captured... And only as a last resort will an offensive be launched to capture Moscow».

The next day, F. Halder clarified the Fuhrer’s opinion with A. Jodl: What are our main goals: do we want to defeat the enemy or are we pursuing economic goals (the seizure of Ukraine and the Caucasus)? Jodl replied that the Fuehrer believed that both goals could be achieved simultaneously. To the question: Moscow or Ukraine or Moscow and Ukraine, you should answer - both Moscow and Ukraine. We must do this, because otherwise we will not be able to defeat the enemy before the onset of autumn.

On August 21, 1941, Hitler issued a new directive which stated: " The most important task before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of Crimea, industrial and coal areas on the Donets River and blocking the Russian oil supply routes from the Caucasus. In the north, such a task is to encircle Leningrad and connect with Finnish troops».

Evaluation of Hitler's decision

Hitler's decision to abandon an immediate attack on Moscow and to turn the 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Group to help Army Group South caused mixed opinions among the German command.

The commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, G. Goth, wrote in his memoirs: “ There was one compelling argument of operational significance against continuing the offensive on Moscow at that time. If in the center the defeat of the enemy troops located in Belarus was unexpectedly quick and complete, then in other directions the successes were not so great. For example, it was not possible to push back the enemy operating south of Pripyat and west of the Dnieper to the south. An attempt to throw the Baltic group into the sea was also unsuccessful. Thus, both flanks of Army Group Center, when advancing to Moscow, were in danger of being attacked; in the south, this danger was already making itself felt...»

The commander of the German 2nd Panzer Group, G. Guderian, wrote: “ The battle for Kyiv undoubtedly meant a major tactical success. However, whether this tactical success also had major strategic significance remains in doubt. Now everything depended on whether the Germans would be able to achieve decisive results before the onset of winter, perhaps even before the onset of the autumn thaw.».

Only on September 30, German troops, having brought up reserves, went on the offensive against Moscow. However, after the start of the offensive, stubborn resistance from Soviet troops and difficult weather conditions in late autumn led to a halt in the offensive against Moscow and the failure of Operation Barbarossa as a whole. (For further military operations in the Moscow direction, see Battle of Moscow)

Results of Operation Barbarossa

The ultimate goal of Operation Barbarossa remained unachieved. Despite the impressive successes of the Wehrmacht, the attempt to defeat the USSR in one campaign failed.

The main reasons can be associated with a general underestimation of the Red Army. Despite the fact that before the war the total number and composition of Soviet troops was determined quite correctly by the German command, the major miscalculations of the Abwehr included an incorrect assessment of the Soviet armored forces.

Another serious miscalculation was the underestimation of the mobilization capabilities of the USSR. By the third month of the war, it was expected to meet no more than 40 new divisions of the Red Army. In fact, the Soviet leadership sent 324 divisions to the front in the summer alone (taking into account the previously deployed 222 divisions), that is, German intelligence made a very significant mistake in this matter. Already during the staff games conducted by the German General Staff, it became clear that the available forces were not enough. The situation was especially difficult with reserves. In fact, the “Eastern Campaign” had to be won with one echelon of troops. Thus, it was established that with the successful development of operations in the theater of operations, “which is expanding to the east like a funnel,” German forces “will prove insufficient unless it is possible to inflict a decisive defeat on the Russians up to the Kiev-Minsk-Lake Peipsi line.”

Meanwhile, on the line of the Dnieper-Western Dvina rivers, the Wehrmacht was waiting for the Second Strategic Echelon of Soviet troops. The Third Strategic Echelon was concentrating behind him. An important stage in the disruption of the Barbarossa plan was the Battle of Smolensk, in which Soviet troops, despite heavy losses, stopped the enemy’s advance to the east.

In addition, due to the fact that the army groups launched attacks on divergent directions towards Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv, it was difficult to maintain cooperation between them. The German command had to carry out private operations to protect the flanks of the central attacking group. These operations, although successful, resulted in wasted time and resources for the motorized troops.

In addition, already in August the question of the priority of targets arose: Leningrad, Moscow or Rostov-on-Don. When these goals came into conflict, a crisis of command arose.

Army Group North failed to capture Leningrad.

Army Group "South" was unable to carry out deep envelopment with its left flank (6.17 A and 1 Tgr.) and destroy the main enemy troops in right-bank Ukraine on time and, as a result, the troops of the South-Western and Southern Fronts were able to retreat to the Dnieper and gain a foothold .

Subsequently, the turn of the main forces of Army Group Center away from Moscow led to a loss of time and strategic initiative.

In the fall of 1941, the German command tried to find a way out of the crisis in Operation Typhoon (Battle of Moscow).

The 1941 campaign ended with the defeat of German troops in the central sector of the Soviet-German front near Moscow, near Tikhvin on the northern flank and under

("Barbarossa Plan")

the code name for the plan of aggressive war of Nazi Germany against the USSR. The idea of ​​liquidating the Soviet Union by military means was the most important programmatic task of German imperialism and fascism on the path to achieving world domination.

After the victorious completion of the French campaign of 1940 (See French campaign of 1940), the fascist German political leadership decided to prepare a plan for war against the USSR. By order of Hitler of July 21, 1940, this task was assigned to the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH). In July - December 1940, several versions of the plan were developed simultaneously, including the OKH plan, the plans of General E. Marx, Sodenstern, and others. As a result of repeated discussions, military staff games and special meetings at Hitler's headquarters, the General Staff of the Ground Forces and other higher headquarters on December 5, 1940, the final version of the plan (“Otto’s plan”) was approved, presented by the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General F. Halder. On December 18, 1940, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) issued Directive No. 21 (“B. p.”), signed by Hitler, which outlined the main idea and strategic plan of the upcoming war against the USSR. “B. p.” received detailed formalization in the “Directive on the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of Troops”, issued on January 31, 1941 by the OKH and signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal W. Brauchitsch. The general strategic task of the “B.P.” - “to defeat Soviet Russia in a short-lived campaign even before the war against England is over.” The plan was based on the idea of ​​“splitting the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep strikes by powerful mobile groups to the north and south of the Pripyat marshes and, using this breakthrough, to destroy disparate groups of enemy troops." The plan provided for the destruction of the bulk of the Soviet troops west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers, preventing their withdrawal into the interior of Russia. In the future, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass and reach the line Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan. Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow. In "B. p." the tasks of army groups and armies, the procedure for interaction between them and with the Allied forces, as well as with the Air Force and Navy and the tasks of the latter were outlined in detail. The originally scheduled date for the attack - May 1941 - in connection with the operations against Yugoslavia and Greece was postponed to June 22 ( The final order was given on June 17. A number of additional documents were developed for the OKH directive, including an assessment of the Soviet Armed Forces, a disinformation directive, calculation of the time to prepare an operation, special instructions, etc.

By June 22, 1941, three army groups (a total of 181 divisions, including 19 tank and 14 motorized, and 18 brigades), supported by three air fleets, were concentrated and deployed near the borders of the USSR. In the zone from the Black Sea to the Pripyat marshes - Army Group South (44 German, 13 Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian and 4 Hungarian brigades); in the zone from the Pripyat marshes to Goldap - Army Group Center (50 German divisions and 2 German brigades); in the zone from Goldap to Memel - Army Group North (29 German divisions). They were given the task of attacking in the general direction of Kyiv, Moscow and Leningrad, respectively. 2 Finnish armies were concentrated on the territory of Finland, and a separate German army “Norway” was concentrated on the territory of Northern Norway (a total of 5 German and 16 Finnish divisions, 3 Finnish brigades) with the task of reaching Leningrad and Murmansk. There were 24 divisions in the OKH reserve. In total, St. was concentrated to attack the USSR. 5.5 million people, 3,712 tanks, 47,260 field guns and mortars, 4,950 combat aircraft. Despite the initial significant successes of the Nazi troops, “B. P." turned out to be untenable due to the adventuristic calculations underlying it and based on the false premise of the weakness of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces. Failure "B" P." explained by an underestimation of the political, economic and military power of the USSR and the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, along with an overestimation of the capabilities of Nazi Germany (see Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-45).

Lit.: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 2nd ed., vol. 1, M., 1963; Top secret! For command only, trans. from German, M., 1967; Hubatsch W., Hitlers Weisungen fur die Kriegfuhrung 1939-1945, Münch., 1965.

I. M. Glagolev.

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• - one of the most prominent representatives of the Hohenstaufen dynasty...

  Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Euphron

• -, ruler of Algeria from 1519. Sea pirate and naval commander. Son of a potter. Using the struggle of the Algerian population against the Spanish invaders, H.B., together with his brother Arouj, seized power in Algeria...

  Great Soviet Encyclopedia

• - "BARBAROSSA" is the code name for the plan of aggressive war of Nazi Germany against the USSR. Developed in 1940...
• - FREDERICK I Barbarossa, German king from 1152, Emperor of the “Holy Roman Empire” from 1155, from the Staufen dynasty...

  Large encyclopedic dictionary

• - ruler of Algeria from 1518. From 1533 commander of the fleet of the Ottoman Empire...

  Large encyclopedic dictionary

• - ...

  Dictionary of foreign words of the Russian language

• - Barbar"ossa, -y, m.: Fr"idrich Barbar"ossa, pl"an "Barbar"...
• - Fr "Jedrich Barbar"...

  Russian spelling dictionary

"Barbarossa Plan" in the books

Plan Barbarossa

Plan Barbarossa When Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, the Führer (“leader”) of the German people, ordered planning for Operation Barbarossa to begin in the summer of 1940, Germany had been at war for almost a year. Even before the Second War actually began on September 1, 1939

Plan Barbarossa