Preparation of the Soviet Union for the Great Patriotic War and its beginning. Preparing the USSR for a big war

The USSR's preparations for World War II were comprehensive: they developed the national economy, increased the capabilities of the Armed Forces, created new models, and carried out mass educational patriotic work. The Soviet state rapidly increased its power. In the reasons for the Victory, one cannot underestimate the scale and enormous significance of the simply titanic work done by the peoples of the USSR in the pre-war years. The first (1929-1932) and second (1933-1937) five-year plans brought the country into the ranks of the most powerful industrial powers on the planet. Giant enterprises were built in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the chemical industry, mechanical engineering, and energy, and in fact new industries were created.

The rise was simply amazing; in the 20s the country was a backward state, which had even lost what it had in 1913, a predominantly agricultural character. What took other countries decades and even centuries, the Soviet Union did in years.

Assembly shop of KV-1 tanks at the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant. It is clearly visible that all the hulls are of a “simplified” type with a straight stern plate, and the turrets are both welded and cast. Spring 1942.

Thus, according to the People’s Commissar of Armaments Boris Vannikov, “the industry was given a deeply thought-out and clear mobilization task. It consisted of creating parent factories, design bureaus and research institutes designed to design and then master new advanced weapons in serial or mass production; produce weapons in the quantities necessary to supply the army in peacetime; to ensure reserves of weapons in quantities corresponding to mobilization needs in the event of war and to make up for losses in its initial stages, and thereby make it possible, within the time frame established by the mobilization plan, to ensure the deployment of military and civilian industry capacities until the war needs are fully met with weapons.”

In 1930, at the 16th Party Congress, it was decided to create a new metallurgical base in the east of the country, out of reach of enemy aircraft; this decision actually saved our state from disaster - at the beginning of the war, almost all of the metallurgy of the South and Center was either lost or taken away and I haven’t started working in new places yet. If power had not been created in the east of the country in the pre-war period, it would have taken several years to compensate for the lost capacity, and the war would have been even longer and bloodier.

The XVIII Party Congress, held in March 1939, decided that the main direction of economic development was still the growth of heavy industry, and great attention should be paid to the creation of a powerful industry in the east of the USSR. In 1939, a decision was made to build and reconstruct it in 1940-1941. aircraft factories. After it, the capacity of Soviet aircraft factories should have been approximately one and a half times greater than the capacity of German aircraft factories. In addition, they created new fighters, bombers, and attack aircraft that were not inferior to their world counterparts.

At the XVIII Party Conference held in February 1941, the Chairman of the State Planning Committee N.A. Voznesensky correctly noted that modern war “is a war of engines, ... is also, to a large extent, a war of reserves, ... requires huge raw materials, fuel, metal and productive reserves...”.

Production of T-34-76 tanks. In the foreground are 76.2 mm F-34 cannons of the 1940 model.
Workshop of the Chelyabinsk Kirov plant, 1943.

A lot of work was done in the tank industry; by the summer of 1941, its production capacity was also supposed to exceed Germany's by one and a half times. Serial production of new KV and T-34 tanks began; Germany did not yet have such vehicles. The artillery industry was developed; from May 1940 to the beginning of the war, the gun fleet was increased by one and a half times. Mobilization reserves of all types have been created. During the years of the Third Five-Year Plan, the annual growth of military production was 39%, while the growth of all industry was 13%. By the beginning of the war, a new tank industry had actually been created, and the aviation industry had been qualitatively rebuilt. The foundations have been created for a qualitative renewal and growth in the production of small arms and artillery. The Navy was regularly replenished with new warships and submarines.

Training of the Armed Forces: in 1939, the transition to a personnel system based on universal conscription was completed. From August 1939 to June 1941, the army grew more than two and a half times - to 5.4 million people. In 1940, 9 mechanized corps were created, the Air Force was reorganized - 75 divisions and 5 brigades were created for the war, of which 25 divisions were at the formation stage. The army was quickly rearmed.

In the pre-war period, the state actually destroyed or defeated “internal enemies”, a possible “fifth column” of the enemy. The society was united and united. Currently, you can find a lot of literature that says that Stalin did not invent “internal enemies”, they existed. From the very beginning, among the Bolsheviks there were “patriots” and “internationalists” (or “Trotskyists”), as a result, the “statists” led by Stalin prevailed, but the “Trotskyists” did not go away; they still occupied many important positions. Therefore, in order to save the state in the face of the threat of an imminent world war, to save the people and socialism, they had to be destroyed. It is clear that in the process of repression, innocent people also suffered - even now, according to various estimates, approximately every tenth person is in prison innocently. For this purpose, they also carried out a “cleansing” of command personnel in the army, drunkards and politically unreliable people were fired, someone was arrested and shot. As a result, the influence of the “Trotskyists” in the army was undermined, but the combat effectiveness of the army was not affected; those commanders who later showed their best side in the war “went to the top.”

Soviet military thought in the pre-war years generally correctly assessed the changes taking place in the armed forces and in the world. In April 1940, the General Staff developed an operational plan to repel a possible German attack. A.M. Vasilevsky, who was at that time the first deputy chief of the operational directorate of the General Staff, reported that Germany was considered the main enemy; Italy would also side with Berlin, but its role would be insignificant. Finland, Romania, and Hungary will also oppose the USSR. Chief of the General Staff B. M. Shaposhnikov believed that the war would be limited to the western borders of the USSR, so the main forces were concentrated here, but in order to fully guarantee security in the east of the state, forces were stationed there to guarantee a “stable position” there. It was correctly determined that the future war would be of a maneuverable nature, but would be protracted and would require the maximum effort of all the spiritual and material forces of the state and society. Soviet military thought developed a completely new theory of deep operations.

Society was prepared for war - year after year, work was carried out on the patriotic education of children, youth, and the entire population as a whole.

As a result, we can say that, despite a number of mistakes, the foundations of the economy, the development of the armed forces, and the education of the population were laid in a timely and correct manner. And this in the shortest possible time. This was confirmed by the Great Patriotic War; the USSR and its peoples withstood the most terrible war in all of mankind with honor, not only won, but became even stronger. And no one expected this; it was believed that if the USSR won, it would be so weakened that it would not be able to influence world processes for many decades. The USSR and its peoples accomplished three titanic feats in just two decades: they prepared for a world war, were able to win it, and restored the country, becoming even stronger. There is nothing like this in world history.

Workshop for the production of Il-2 attack aircraft at plant No. 18 in the city of Kuibyshev

Sources:
Voznesensky N.A. Selected works. M., 1979.
Zhukov Yu., Kozhinov V., Mukhin Yu. Riddle of '37. M., 2010.
Kozhinov V. The truth of Stalin’s repressions. M., 2009.
Smirnov G.V. Purification of the army. M., 2007.
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/vannikov/index.html
http://historic.ru/books/item/f00/s00/z0000125/index.shtml
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/vasilevsky/index.html
http://waralbum.ru/

Russia. WWII. Preparing the USSR for war

Preparing the Red Army for war:

Since 1931, on the initiative of Tukhachevsky, mechanized corps, massive airborne forces. The total strength of the USSR Armed Forces in 1938 reached 1.5 million people. But in 1937-1938. there were repressions against the country's military elite. In 1940, 70 commanders and chiefs of staff did not have basic military training and completed only short-term courses. They had no combat experience.

IN 1940 S.K. appointed People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko, Army General G.K. was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Zhukov, who proved himself at Khalkhin Gol.

Increasing the country's military-economic potential. In the 3rd Five-Year Plan (1938-1942) main funds were allocated for developmentheavy industry , especiallymilitary . They were built in the Urals and Siberia duplicate enterprises. Warehouses were created. State reserves of metal, oil, coal, and food were formed. The increase in defense production was in 1939-1840. 39%.

Was walking militarization of labor in 1940 g.: a 7-day working week was established, an 8-hour working day was introduced (previously it was 7 hours), a ban on voluntary dismissal and transfer from one enterprise to another without the permission of the administration under threat of criminal punishment. Workers and employees were officially assigned to their jobs. Being late for work was punishable under the criminal code. Delays over 20 minutes. equated to absenteeism. The release of low-quality products was considered an “anti-state crime.” Thus, the industry has established team leadership style .

IN 1939 introduced universal conscription. The strength of the Red Army was increased to 5.5 million people. The conscription age has been reduced from 21 to 18 years, the service life has been increased to 3-5 years, the period of reserve status has been increased from 40 to 50 years.

Shortage of command staff. In 1937-1938 was arrested, expelled from the party and dropped out of the army 35 thousand Human. Of the 733 people in senior command, 579 people died. Of the 16 army commanders, 15 died. Of the 169 division commanders, 136 died. Thousands of regiment, battalion, and squadron commanders were arrested and shot. Shortage command staff was partially reimbursed the return of some of the repressed officers (12 thousand) to the army. In 1938 – 1940 combat experience was acquired in Khalkhin Gol, Poland, Finland

The rearmament of the Red Army with new military equipment began(from 1939-1940). Serial production of aircraft began (Yak-1, Mig-3 fighters, Il-2 attack aircraft, Pe-20 bombers; tanks (T-34 and KV) that were not inferior to German ones. However, the equipment of the troops with them was unsatisfactory.

Developedstrategy upcoming war. Stalin insisted on an offensive strategy, but did not seriously consider defensive plans. Operational plans for a pre-emptive strike were being developed. But they were not approved. However, serious miscalculations were made. Management believed that A). the war will be fought on two fronts, against Germany and Japan. B) Strike back concept: it was assumed that The Red Army will repel an enemy attack near the western border of the USSR and will transfer hostilities to enemy territory. IN). Main battles will turn around at the border. The thought of the possibility of a retreat of the Red Army deep into the country was not allowed. It was believed that the war will be fought on enemy territory with “little bloodshed”" D), defensive structures on the old USSR border were dismantled. But they did not have time to build defensive structures on the new borders. E). It was assumed that Germany will try to seize the lands and resources of Ukraine and will deliver its main blow to the South. Therefore, the main forces of the Red Army were concentrated in the South-Western direction. According to Zhukov, by June 22, 1941, there were no government-approved operational and mobilization plans.

The troops did not study the experience of the Wehrmacht's battles in Europe in 1939-1940.

Ideological and moral preparation for war. A) 1934 Stalin’s work “A Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)” was published. It developed the idea of ​​continuity between the Russian Empire and the USSR in confronting external enemies. He was called upon to form a patriotic worldview. In the 1930s Stalin wrote the work “Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism”, creating his image as the main theoretician of Marxism in the USSR, a successor to the work of Marx and Lenin. B) The prestige of the Red Army was rising (the film “Tractor Drivers”; songs that stated that “the armor is strong and our tanks are fast”). People were sure that if a war started, it would be fought on foreign territory and with “little bloodshed.”

However, according to Zhukov, on the eve of the war the organization and armament of our troops were not at the proper level, air defense remained at an extremely low level, and mechanized formations were practically absent.

Before the war, Soviet aviation was inferior to German aviation, and the artillery was poorly equipped with tractors.

Miscalculations of Hitler and his circle(they had no doubt about a quick victory):

1. They underestimated the strength of the Red Army, believing that the repressions led to the loss of its combat effectiveness. The rearmament of the army has just begun.

2. They underestimated the economic potential of the USSR.

3. They underestimated the patriotism of the peoples who lived in the USSR. They hoped for an explosion of ethnic hatred in the USSR.

4. They hoped for the support of collective farmers who were forcibly driven into collective farms. They believed that collective farmers were opposed to Soviet power

Before the invasion of German troops

Stalin hoped for the opportunity to delay the war at least until 1942. He doubted the reliability of information about Germany’s preparations for the invasion of the USSR. He was confident that Germany would attack the USSR only after the defeat of England and the conquest of the Middle East, i.e. in 1942, Stalin considered information from intelligence officers (Richard Sorge) as disinformation.

Stalin and his entourage made serious political and military-strategic miscalculations when analyzing the pre-war situation. The country was preparing for war, but a quick and victorious war. These miscalculations resulted in huge losses. Preparations for war were not completed.

To avoid a war on two fronts, a neutrality pact was concluded between the USSR and Japan in 1941.

To strengthen the central leadership, Stalin was appointed in May 1941 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Balance of forces in June 1941 before the invasion

The Red Army was inferior to the enemy in numbers and motorization of troops.

In the early days of the war, the Soviet leadership did not understand the scale of the German invasion. This is evidenced by the directive sent at 7 o'clock. Morning of June 22, 1941: “...troops with all their might and means will attack enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border.”

So, what happened after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed? Despite the great friendship, the joint division of Poland, and the subsequent actions of the Soviet Union in relation to Finland and the Baltic states, it was quite obvious that each of the opposing sides was seeking to use the remaining time to build up the material and technical basis, military muscles.

It is worth noting that the Soviet Union used this time very, very effectively. That is, during the period from 1939 - the summer of 1941 to the beginning of the war, according to Soviet historiography, we produced about 18 thousand combat aircraft, not counting those that were produced before 1939. The figures regarding tank production are even more impressive. Their total number was close to 26 thousand, of which T-26 was 9998 units, BT - 7519, T-28 - 481, T-35 - 59, T-37 of various modifications - about 6 thousand, T-40 - 132, T -34 - 1225 units and "Klimenty Voroshilov" (KV) - 636 vehicles. This was the potential of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

To strike the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht managed to allocate 3,932 tanks and 266 assault guns. Moreover, we note that in 1941 the Germans managed to produce only 3094 tanks of all types, including 678 Czech light tanks.

What was it? The classic formulation that was used in Soviet times: all our tanks were hopelessly outdated, no good, except for the T-34 and KV. However, there is a certain figure of deceit here, because if we consider what the Wehrmacht tank units were armed with, the picture emerges very, very interesting.

At the beginning of the war, the Wehrmacht was armed with a significant number of not even tanks, but T-I tankettes, which weighed only 5.5 tons and were armed with machine guns; T-II tanks, which weighed 9 tons and had a 20-mm automatic cannon and, as our veterans recalled, could not withstand being hit by a heavy machine gun bullet. It was simply impossible for them to survive being hit by even a 37-mm shell. As a matter of fact, these tanks were originally created as training tanks. Later, during the war, they were used in counter-guerrilla and patrol operations. And such equipment made up a good half of what the Wehrmacht had at the start of the war.

Wehrmacht soldier near a burnt Soviet T-34 tank, 1941

In addition, the Wehrmacht had a certain number of Czech tanks, which German tankers loved very much because they were better than T-I and T-II. These are Skoda LT vz.35 tanks, which weighed 10 tons, had a crew of four people and more or less decent armor. This tank could withstand a hit from a 20mm shell, but anything larger was already deadly for it. The Germans had 218 such tanks. In addition, there were Czech tanks LT vz.38, which were of a later production, weighing about 10 tons; they had a little more armor, but by December 10, 1941, the last LT vz.38 was disabled, and subsequently all such tanks (those that survived) were used by the Germans, as already mentioned, for anti-partisan and patrol purposes.

As for decent equipment that could be called a tank, these were the T-III, which were in service with the Panzerwaffe. The weight of this tank was 19.5 tons; at first it was armed with a 37 mm cannon, then with a 50 mm short-barreled gun.

This tank became, so to speak, a draft horse, which during the first years of the war, on its backbone, carried out everything and anything that fell to the lot of the Panzerwaffe, although these vehicles could not be compared with our later tanks. The Wehrmacht had 1,440 such tanks at its disposal at the beginning of the war. And, in fact, they managed to allocate 965 vehicles to the Soviet front.

Not a single French captured tank was in service with the Panzerwaffe.

Well, the most formidable vehicle, which was lighter than the T-34 and which for some reason we call a “heavy tank,” was the T-IV. The T-IV appeared in 1938, it was armed with a short 75-mm cannon, and it really was a vehicle capable of providing some more or less serious resistance to our tanks, although its parameters were also inferior to what we had.

Of course, one can endlessly list which tanks the Germans got from the French as trophies, but these vehicles were simply not suitable for any purpose other than training tasks. There was a very interesting trend in the production of weapons in Germany after the end of the Strange War. As Halder noted in his memoirs, the word “impossible” ceased to exist for the Wehrmacht high command and, accordingly, for the political leadership of Germany in general. That is, a period of some euphoria and mischief began, which, in general, later acquired quite pronounced consequences.

As for the Soviet Union, the actions of Germany in Poland and the lightning defeat of the French army, which at the start of the war was not the weakest, having at its disposal more than 3 thousand tanks, showed that the enemy is very, very serious and must be treated with a certain, if not respect, then with an awareness of the degree of danger that he poses. Accordingly, in the Soviet Union in 1939-1941, active research and development work was carried out in almost all areas of the creation of equipment and weapons. You can repeat yourself endlessly and sing the praises of the T-34 and KV tanks, but, indeed, at the beginning of the war, these machines had no equal in any country in the world and until 1943 they were (undoubtedly) unrivaled. And it must be said that if in 1941 not so many of them were produced, somewhere a little more than 1.5 thousand, then already in 1942 the Soviet industry produced 24,718 tanks, of which T-34s accounted for 12.5 thousand.

Soviet I-16 fighters captured by the Germans at the airfield, 1941

The work really proceeded, as they say, at an accelerated pace, and the development of tanks capable of withstanding hits from anti-tank and tank guns was quite successful. One can cite a lot of reservations and a certain reluctance of the military to be overwhelmed by the adoption of new equipment (quite often this was met with a conservative approach), nevertheless, these tanks began to arrive in military units. The question is how were they used in 1941?..

As for aviation, there was also quite active work going on here. There were several aviation schools that created aircraft in the Soviet Union. This is the school of Nikolai Polikarpov, the “king of fighters” of the 30s, who built the I-15, I-16, I-153 (a rather curious car, a biplane with retractable landing gear, which outlived its usefulness even at the moment when it was first born ), I-180, I-185 (later developments). During the testing of these aircraft, Valery Chkalov died, which led Nikolai Polikarpov to a certain career decline. He was indirectly blamed for this, and work on these aircraft, unfortunately, was stopped, although the characteristics of such a machine as the I-185, it must be said, were outstanding.

By the summer of 1941, the forces of the Soviet Union were the largest army in the world

A group of young designers: Yakovlev, Lavochkin, Gorbunov, Gudkov and Mikoyan also created fighter aircraft. The undisputed leader was Yakovlev, Stalin's favorite, who built the Yak-1 aircraft. In his book “Time, People, Aircraft,” test pilot Rabkin provides documents on the condition in which the Yak-1, as well as the LAG-1 (later LAG-3), and the MiG-1 (MiG-3) were accepted for use. weapons. Perhaps the most terrifying picture was with the Yakovlev machine. The number of defects in the aircraft exceeded 120 items, including failures of carburetors, generator, engine overheating, defects in the cooling system, oil and water, and much, much more. As a matter of fact, the history of the birth of such aircraft as the Yak-1 and LAG-1 is quite interesting.

The fact is that both aircraft had the same propeller-engine group - a French-made Hispano-Suiza engine, purchased under license. It had been in production by the French since 1936, and by the time the license was purchased, the engine was named M-105 (later there was also a modification of the M-107, super-boosted and unviable). As a matter of fact, the French discontinued this engine, replacing it with a more efficient one. In a word, this is the “new” engine that was installed on Yakovlev’s planes and on Lavochkin’s first generation planes.

Yakovlev's plane was a structure made of metal tubes, covered with fabric, in places with plywood, and in its characteristics was in many ways close to a sports plane. Its survivability factor was relatively low, but due to the fact that fabric was used, it was quite light.

As for Lavochkin’s plane, it was made of delta wood, plywood, and had greater survivability, but also greater weight, for which pilots during the war nicknamed the LAG-1 “flying guaranteed coffin,” because the machine did not have sufficient maneuverability . And if we add to this the problems with carburetors and many others that were encountered on these planes, then, in general, you can imagine how difficult it was for our pilots to fight on them.

A Wehrmacht unit at a Catholic service before the invasion of the USSR, 1941. Photo by: Alois Beck

A very interesting machine was Mikoyan’s MiG-1, later MiG-3, which was discontinued in 1941. Also a vague and incomprehensible story. German test pilot Hans-Werner Lerche, who was responsible for testing captured Soviet aircraft in Germany, noted the very high performance of the MiG-3 in 1941 and even 1942. The fact is that this machine developed about 640 km/h, while later modifications of the Messerschmitt Bf.109 developed only 600. Nevertheless, the MiG was discontinued. It was believed that this machine was quite strict for piloting, that it did not have powerful enough weapons, and the main thesis, which is given in Yakovlev’s memoirs, is that the plane had an engine for flying at high altitudes. The same test pilot Rabkin refutes Yakovlev, saying that the altitude of an aircraft is determined by how its fuel system and carburetors are configured and how the mixture is enriched or lean. That is, the MiG-3 could also be made into an aircraft for combat at medium and low altitudes. And, by the way, Alexander Pokryshkin, who started the war precisely on the MiG-3, despite its declared high-altitude characteristics, coped well with this aircraft and used it very effectively at low altitudes in battles with the Messerschmitt Bf.109.

Thus, the total strength of our aviation at the start of the war was very, very impressive. The total number of aircraft in the Red Army Air Force fleet was approaching the number of tanks in tank fleets. At the same time, the Il-2 aircraft was developed and brought into production - a very controversial machine, the most popular in our aviation. Almost 40% of the pilots who died during the war were Il-2 pilots, who had the bitterest bread: they plowed the front line and, accordingly, died more often than all other aces. According to statistics, IL-2 gunners were killed seven times more often than pilots. That is, before one IL-2 pilot died, he changed seven gunners.

At the beginning of the war, our aviation numbered somewhere around 30 thousand aircraft. It would seem like a huge mass of equipment and weapons... Torpedo boats were built in large quantities as a cheap, economical and, if used wisely, effective means of combating naval targets. 85-mm cannons (essentially an analogue of the famous 88-mm cannon) and guns of other calibers were produced under a German license. That is, the military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union was working at full speed, and by the time Germany attacked our country, we had a huge numerical superiority in technology. We were many times superior to the Wehrmacht, Panzerwaffe and Luftwaffe.

Germany had quality on its side, the USSR had quantity on its side.

As for the use of this technique, this is the other, opposite side of the issue. The fact is that it is not enough to produce a lot of weapons, you also need to be able to use them. As many of our pilots and tank crews wrote in their memoirs, in the units there was a struggle to save fuel and lubricants, firing was carried out extremely rarely, but the matter of economic work was very well organized, with the holding of all kinds of political classes, lectures, seminars, marching and other absolutely “ necessary” in the preparation of the armed forces. A quote comes to mind from Eike Mitteldorff, an officer of the Wehrmacht General Staff, who wrote an army instruction manual, which, among other things, states that soldiers should do minimal drill training in order to be able to walk decently in the ranks. Of the 16 hours of daily training in the Wehrmacht, most of the time was devoted to practicing tactics, shooting and other activities necessary for survival on the battlefield.

This picture was taking shape by June 1941. At the same time, what’s interesting is that each of the opposing sides had its own euphoria: ours, because we had a huge technical park, the Germans, because with small forces they managed to cover half of Europe and it seemed that this would go on forever. However, the events that began to occur in the summer of 1941 and in subsequent years showed that quantitative superiority is not always a guarantee of success, while qualitative superiority is not always the key to victory.

The Soviet government tried to prepare for a future war. The improvement of the Soviet military industry continued. The growth rate of military production exceeded the growth rate of industry as a whole. In June 1940, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, an eight-hour working day was introduced instead of a seven-hour one and a seven-day working week. The unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises and institutions was prohibited. The strength of the USSR Armed Forces increased, reaching 5.3 million people by June 1941. New types of weapons were successfully produced by the Soviet military industry. In the late 30s - early 40s, the USSR created new, more advanced models of automatic small arms (PPSh and PPS assault rifles), artillery, tanks (KV and T-34), aircraft (Il-2 attack aircraft, Yak fighters -1 and Mig-3, Pe-2 dive bombers).

But there were also serious problems: new types of planes and tanks had just begun to arrive in military units, and the soldiers had not yet had time to learn how to operate them. Defensive construction on the new borders of the USSR proceeded slowly, and old barriers were dismantled.

In Soviet military science and army training, the main emphasis was placed exclusively on offensive operations. Issues of defense and retreat were almost not analyzed. The Field Manual of the Red Army stated that the war would be fought on enemy territory and with “little bloodshed.” These misconceptions were the reason why military depots were located too close to the border. In addition, the Soviet leadership was convinced that in the event of an attack the enemy would strike in a southern direction, across Ukraine. This is where the main forces of the Red Army were concentrated.

The country's defense capability was undermined by the socio-economic policies pursued by the totalitarian regime, mass repressions that also affected military personnel, as well as major miscalculations in military development, in determining the likely timing of the start of the war, the main blame for which falls on I.V. Stalin and his inner circle . By June 1941 the Red Army had 187 divisions; it consisted of about 3 million people, more than 38 thousand guns and mortars, 13.1 thousand tanks, 8.7 thousand combat aircraft; in the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets there were 182 ships and 1.4 thousand combat aircraft. The Soviet troops were not fully equipped with personnel, tanks, aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons, cars, and engineering equipment; The troops and command staff had a low level of training.

The Stalinist leadership hoped that Hitler would comply with the non-aggression pact signed on August 23, 1939, and in addition, they thought that, taking into account historical experience, Germany would not dare to simultaneously wage a war on two fronts. However, such calculations turned out to be untenable.

USSR readiness for war:

"Pros":

Ural-Siberian and Far Eastern industrial bases

Military budget growth

Increasing the size of the army to 5 million people

The latest types of technology have been developed

Activation of defense mass work

"Minuses":

80% of industry is located in the European part

The army is not equipped with new equipment

Disbandment of old fortified areas

Destruction of senior command personnel during repressions

Error in the development of military doctrine: “defeating the enemy on his territory”

Tightening labor discipline, 7-day work week.

On Sunday, June 22, 1941, violating the non-aggression pact, German troops invaded the territory of the USSR along the entire western border: 190 divisions, 3.5 thousand tanks, 4 thousand Wehrmacht aircraft were opposed by 170 Soviet divisions.

In accordance with the plan for waging war against the USSR (“Barbarossa plan”), approved by Hitler back in 1940, it was planned to simultaneously launch massive attacks by three army groups, encircle and destroy the main forces of the Red Army, capture Moscow and rapidly advance inland to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line.

Army Group North, under the command of Field Marshal Leeb, was to capture the Baltic territories and ports on the Baltic Sea, including Leningrad and Kronstadt. Finnish troops were also called in to capture Leningrad. The German Army “Norway” was supposed to capture Murmansk and Polyarny.

Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Bok, concentrated on the main Smolensk-Moscow direction, began military operations on the territory of Belarus.

The task of destroying units of the Red Army in Right Bank Ukraine with access to the Dnieper and further development of the offensive to the east was assigned to the South group (commanded by Field Marshal Rundstedt), which began advancing in the Kiev direction.

Germany's goal in the outbreak of the war was not only to seize our territory and liquidate the USSR, but also to mercilessly exterminate the military and civilian population.

The Great Patriotic War is divided into three periods.

First period - from June 22, 1941 to November 18, 1942 - includes the strategic defense of the Red Army, the defeat of Nazi troops near Moscow, the failure of the blitzkrieg.

Second period- from November 19, 1942 to December 31, 1943 - characterized by a radical change during the Second World War.

Third period- from January 1, 1944 to May 9, 1945 - this is the defeat of the fascist bloc and the unconditional surrender of Germany.

There is no consensus regarding the war with Japan. Some historians consider it the fourth period - from August 9 to September 2, 1945, others consider this event as an independent Far Eastern campaign.

From the first minutes of the war, an extremely difficult situation developed at the front. The troops of the border districts offered courageous resistance to the enemy, but with huge losses, they had to retreat to the east with battles. The war, having caused a surge of patriotism, became a national and personal matter for everyone. Already on June 23, 1941, queues of volunteers lined up near the military registration and enlistment offices, who went to fight the enemy and believed in an early victory. They did not yet know what they were about to experience. On June 23, the highest body of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces was formed - the Headquarters of the High Command (from August 8 - the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command). On June 30, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created under the chairmanship of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Stalin. All power in the state was concentrated in the hands of the State Defense Committee.

In the first period of the war, the main event in the northwestern direction was the Leningrad defensive operation (July 10 - September 30, 1941), which was carried out by troops of the Northern (from August 23 - Leningrad) and Northwestern fronts with the assistance of the forces of the Baltic Fleet. The Nazis failed to capture Leningrad straight away. From the end of September, a stubborn struggle for the city began, which lasted more than three years.

In the central direction, the German offensive was suspended only in the Smolensk region, where, during the defensive and offensive operations carried out by troops of the Western and Central Fronts, Army Group Center was forced to go on the defensive. The Battle of Smolensk (from July 10 to September 10), carried out in order to prevent a German breakthrough in the Moscow direction, forced the enemy to postpone the planned attack on Moscow for almost two months. It was during the Battle of Smolensk that Soviet BM-13 (Katyusha) rocket launchers were used for the first time.

From July 7 to September 26, 1941, troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts carried out the Kyiv defensive operation. By order of Stalin, they held Kyiv “at any cost,” but were surrounded and destroyed by the enemy.

The situation on the Soviet-German front in the summer and autumn of 1941 can be described as catastrophic. Despite courageous resistance, the Red Army retreated with heavy fighting, losing 850 thousand people in the first three weeks of the war alone. German troops occupied Lithuania, Latvia, part of Belarus, Right Bank Ukraine, and reached the distant approaches to Leningrad.

The main battle of the first period of the war was the battle for Moscow, which lasted almost eight months.

September 30, 1941 - the beginning of the German offensive (Operation Typhoon). An attempt to take the capital with a frontal attack on the central part of the front. Encirclement of Soviet troops in the Vyazma region.

October 19 - introduction of a state of siege in Moscow. Pulling up reserves to Moscow from the depths of the country.

November 15 - new German offensive. An attempt to take the capital with the help of flank attacks from the north (from Klin) and from the south (from Tula).

November 24, enemy capture of Solnechnogorsk. The defeat of the Germans in the Tula region and the weakening of their offensive.

January 1942 - general offensive of the Red Army.

April 1642 - completion of the battle of Moscow, liberation of the Moscow and Tula regions.

Victory value:

Blitzkrieg breakdown

Germany's first major defeat in World War II

A colossal moral and psychological factor for the USSR.

Despite the failure of the Nazi offensive near Moscow and their significant losses, the Red Army was unable to fully solve its tasks of defeating the enemy. The establishment of the Supreme High Command Headquarters to carry out a number of offensive operations in some directions and the transition in general to strategic defense became the reason for the failure of the offensive of Soviet troops in May 1942 in the Crimea and the Kharkov region. On July 4, after an eight-month defense that delayed the German offensive in the Caucasus, Sevastopol fell.

Having again seized the strategic initiative in the summer of 1942, the German army received orders to seize the Donbass, Kuban, Volga region and the Caucasus to provide itself with economic resources, and then, having defeated the forces of the Red Army, to resume the offensive on Moscow.

By mid-July, the Wehrmacht strike forces broke through into the large bend of the Don. The Battle of Stalingrad began, which lasted 200 days and nights. Its defensive period began on July 17, 1942 and lasted until November 18, 1942. At this time, the enemy made numerous attempts to capture the city, but encountered stubborn resistance from our troops. In the battles on the outskirts of Stalingrad and in the city itself, the enemy was dealt a blow from which he could not recover.

On July 28, 1942, Stalin signed order No. 227, known as “Not a Step Back,” in which alarmism, cowardice, and lack of discipline were declared the main reasons for the failures and retreats of our troops.

The reasons for the failures of the Red Army in the initial period of the war:

Repressions in the army on the eve of the war among command personnel

Errors and miscalculations regarding the timing of the start of the war

Military doctrine that provided for military operations only on foreign territory

Late in bringing troops to combat readiness

Dismantling of old and absence of new fortifications on the border.

Let us consider the preparations for war on the part of the USSR. We cannot say that the Red Army was not preparing for war, since the approach of war was felt in the political situation that had developed by the end of the 30s and its inevitability was determined by the actions of Germany and its allies. Therefore, the USSR was preparing for war, preparing very intensely: a second industrial and economic base was being created at an accelerated pace in the regions of the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia, with special attention being paid to the development of the defense industry: defense spending in the USSR state budget for 1941 increased to 43.4 % versus 32.6% in 1940. Particular attention was paid to tank building, the aviation industry and the production of ammunition. At the beginning of 1941, Soviet factories produced about two thousand new model fighters (Yak-1, LaGG-3, MiG-3), 458 Pe-2 dive bombers, 249 Il-2 attack aircraft. In 1941, it was possible to increase ammunition production by more than 3 times compared to 1940. From January to June 1941, the production of ammunition for the most important types increased by 66%. The production of new types of KV and T-34 tanks proceeded at a rapid pace, so that by June 22, 1941, their number on the western borders reached 1,475 units (2).

The increase in mobilization readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces was facilitated by the holding of a training camp in early June 1941, during which 755,000 reservists were called up to military units. The deployment of all types and branches of troops continued, their structure was improved, and new units and formations were created. Thus, in February - March 1941, the formation of 20 mechanized corps began, and in April - 10 anti-tank artillery brigades of the reserve of the High Command. In addition, it was planned to create 106 air regiments armed with new equipment. In the middle, the number of air regiments increased by more than 80% compared to the beginning of 1939. By mid-1941, the total number of the Red Army reached more than 5 million people and was 2.8 times greater than in 1939 (2). From these facts it is clear that the upcoming war and preparations for it occupied an increasingly significant place in the socio-economic sphere of the country. This means the USSR was preparing for war. The question arises, what kind of war? In 1941, there were 5 military districts on the territory of the USSR, which bordered on foreign states on the European territory of the USSR: the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO), later transformed into the Northwestern Front; Western Special Military District (ZOVO), hereinafter referred to as the Western Front; Kiev Special Military District (KOVO), hereinafter referred to as the Southwestern Front; Odessa Military District (ODVO), later the 9th Army; Leningrad Military District (LMD), later referred to as the Northern Front (3).

By June 1941, the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces was over 5 million people: Ground Forces and Air Defense Forces - over 4.5 million; Air Force - 476 thousand; Navy - 344 thousand. The army was armed with over 67 thousand guns and mortars, 1860 tanks of new types (1475 on the Western border), the total number of tanks, taking into account high-speed, multi-turreted, amphibious, etc., was more than 10 thousand units ( of which 8 thousand are on the Western border). Long-range aviation was armed with Il-4 (DB-3F) and Pe-8 aircraft (about 800 aircraft in total). The rest of the aviation fleet consisted of about 10 thousand aircraft (of which 2,739 were new types of aircraft). The Navy was armed with 276 warships of the main types, including 212 submarines (4).

Let's consider the dispersion of these forces among the armies. By the beginning of the war, the Red Army had 28 combined arms armies. Of these, the 1st and 2nd Red Banner armies, as well as the 15th and 16th armies, guarded the Far Eastern borders of the USSR throughout the war, and we will not consider them.

Two strategic echelons were formed in the Red Army. Let's consider the first strategic echelon. The 8th, 11th and 27th armies were formed on the territory of PribOVO. The 8th Army was created in October 1939 on the basis of the Novgorod Army Task Force; in August 1940 it was included in PribOVO. By the beginning of the war, the 8th Army included: the 10th and 11th Rifle Corps (sk), the 12th Mechanized Corps (mk), the 9th Anti-Tank Brigade; Commander - Major General P. P. Sobennikov. The 11th Army was formed in 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District (later ZOVO), and took part in the campaign of Soviet troops in the West. Belarus. in 1940 it was included in the PribOVO; it included: 16th and 29th sk, 3rd mk, 23rd, 126th, 128th rifle divisions (SD), 42nd and 46th fortified areas (UR); commander - Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov. The 27th Army was formed in May 1941 in PribOVO; it included: 22nd and 24th sk, 16th and 29th rifle divisions, 3rd rifle brigade (rf); Commander - Major General N. E. Berzarin. The 3rd, 4th, 10th, and 13th armies were formed on the territory of the ZOVO. The 3rd Army was created in 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District on the basis of the Vitebsk Army Group of Forces, and in September 1939 it participated in the Red Army’s campaign in the West. Belarus. It consisted of 4 sk, 11 mk, 58 ur; commander - Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov. The 4th Army was formed in August 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District on the basis of the Bobruisk Army Group, and in September 1939 it took part in the campaign to the West. Belarus; it included: 28 sk, 14 mk, 62 ur; Commander - Major General A. A. Korobkov. The 10th Army was formed in 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District; in September 1939 it took part in the Red Army's campaign in the West. Belarus. It consisted of: 1st and 5th sk, 6th and 13th mk, 6th cavalry corps (kk), 155th infantry regiment, 66th UR; commander - Major General K. D. Golubev. The 13th Army was formed in May-June 1941 in the ZOVO; it united formations and units located in the Minsk region. It consisted of: 21st infantry regiment, 50th infantry division, 8th artillery brigade of anti-tank defense; commander - Lieutenant General P. M. Filatov. The 5th, 6th, 12th and 26th armies were formed on the territory of the Kyiv OVO. The 5th Army was created in 1939 in KOVO; it included the 15th and 27th sk, 9th and 22nd mk, 2nd and 9th UR; Commander - Major General M.I. Potapov. 6th Army - formed in August 1939 in KOVO, in September 1939 participated in the Red Army's campaign in the West. Ukraine; composition: 6th and 37th sk, 4th and 15th microscope, 5th and 6th ur; commander - Lieutenant General N. N. Muzychenko. 12th Army - formed in 1939 in KOVO, in September 1939 participated in the Red Army's campaign in the West. Ukraine; composition: 13th and 17th sk, 16th microscope, 10th, 11th and 12th ur; commander - Major General P. G. Monday. 26th Army - formed in July 1940 in KOVO; composition: 8th sk, 8th mk, 8th ur; commander - Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko.

The 9th Army was formed on the territory of the Odessa Military District in June 1941. Its composition: 14th, 35th and 48th sk, 2nd kk, 2nd and 8th mk, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 84th and 86th UR ; Commander - Colonel General Ya. T. Cherevichenko. On the territory of the Leningrad Military District, 7, 14 and 23 armies were formed. 7th Army - formed in the 2nd half of 1940 in the Leningrad Military District. Its composition: 54th, 71st, 168th and 237th SD and 26th SD; Commander: Lieutenant General F.D. Gorelenko. 14th Army - formed in October 1939 in the Leningrad Military District; composition: 42nd sk, 14th and 52nd infantry divisions, 1st tank division, 23rd UR, 1st mixed air division; commander - Lieutenant General F. A. Frolov. 23rd Army - formed in May 1941 in the Leningrad Military District; composition: 19th and 50th sk, 10th mk, 27th and 28th ur; commander - Lieutenant General P. S. Pshennikov (4, 7).

From the above data it is clear that at the beginning of the war enormous forces were concentrated at the westernmost border of the Soviet Union. At first glance, all Soviet armies look the same, but, considering their qualitative composition, we see serious differences between different armies. For further analysis we need to go back in time to the Finnish Winter War. In the months before the war, several Soviet armies were deployed: the 14th Army (two rifle divisions), the 9th Army (three rifle divisions), the 8th Army (four rifle divisions), and the 7th Army (10th Mechanized corps, three tank brigades, 10th, 19th, 34th and 50th rifle corps, eleven separate artillery regiments, army aviation). Among the armies that participated in the Finnish War, the 7th Army clearly stood out. Knowing that the Soviet Union was preparing an aggressive war against Finland, we can rightfully call the 7th Army a shock army and say that it will have the honor of delivering the main blow. This can be confirmed if you look at the command structure of this army: the commander is K. A. Meretskov, who commands the LVO, then will become the chief of the General Staff, and even later will receive the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union; The artillery headquarters of the 7th Army is commanded by L.A. Govorov, his name speaks for itself: hardly anyone now does not know the war hero, Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov.

In this way we can define a shock army. To do this, let's look at the German Wehrmacht. It has clearly defined mechanisms of aggression - tank groups; What distinguishes them from ordinary armies is the presence of a large number of tanks. Thus, we see that the main feature by which we can call any Soviet army a shock army is the presence of a mechanized corps in it (in 1941 this was about 1000 tanks).