Reforms of the political system in the USSR. Beginning of reform of the political system

The reform began with various kinds of political and organizational measures adopted at the plenum of the Party Central Committee in January 1987: alternative elections; secret voting when electing responsible party officials; election of candidates within the enterprise itself; introduction of new forms and mechanisms for workers' participation in enterprise management 6.

On June 28 - July 1, 1988, the All-Union Conference of the CPSU was held, which marked the beginning of constitutional reforms in the country. Here a struggle of opinions between supporters and opponents of “perestroika” unfolded on the issue of the country’s development tasks.

A new government body was established - the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, from among its participants the Supreme Council was elected, which turned into a permanent parliament. At the end of 1988, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a law changing the system of elections to the Soviets. Elections to the highest body of power on new electoral principles took place in the spring of 1989. The First Congress of People's Deputies (1998) formed the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and M.S. was elected its chairman. Gorbachev.

The First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR ended with the division of supporters of perestroika into moderates led by Gorbachev and radicals who united in the Interregional Group of People's Deputies, i.e. opposition appeared. A coordinating committee of the group and five co-chairs were elected, the leading role being played by A.D. Sakharov and B.N. Yeltsin. Gorbachev ceased to be the sole leader of the reform process; he had competitors. A struggle for power began.

Glasnost and multi-party system

All these changes took place in an atmosphere of democratization of public life, which was facilitated by the development and adoption of a number of laws with the aim of establishing a “rule of law state” and the flourishing of numerous “informal associations”.

As a result of the rise in the political activity of the people, there is a growth in non-traditional, informal groups, organizations and movements. In 1989, there were already up to 30 thousand amateur public associations of various types in the country.

Reforms in foreign policy

The years of "perestroika" became a time of positive changes in the foreign policy of the USSR. Over the course of several years, M.S. Gorbachev gained enormous personal authority in the international arena, both at high-level meetings with leaders of foreign states and during press conferences, which allowed him to demonstrate his undoubted talent for communication and ability to present the new image of the Soviet Union. Union. 8

The main ideas of the new foreign policy were formulated by M.S. in his book “Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the Whole World,” published in 1987 9. The priority of universal human values, their protection and the defense of peace over the differences between the world systems of socialism and capitalism was affirmed.

In 1987, M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan reached an agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and on the cessation of American assistance to the Mujahideen, which took place on February 15, 1989.

In December 1989, M. S. Gorbachev met with the new US President George W. Bush in Malta.

In July 1990, at a meeting with German Chancellor G. Kohl, M. S. Gorbachev agreed to the entry of a united Germany into NATO, in return the USSR received a promise that NATO troops would not be stationed on the territory of the GDR. In August of the same year, the Berlin Wall was destroyed, the GDR became part of the Federal Republic of Germany and ceased to exist as a sovereign state.

The overall result of M. S. Gorbachev's foreign policy line was the end of the Cold War.

Economic reform

Glasnost raised dissatisfaction with the existing order to a new level and encouraged a variety of forms of protest against it, which occurred against the backdrop of a sharp deterioration in living conditions and an economic crisis. It was this process that determined the socio-political dynamics of the last five years.

Attempts at political reforms did not lead to an improvement in the socio-economic situation in the country. On the contrary, as “perestroika” deepened, chaos grew in the country, and the shortage of the most necessary goods and services grew. To overcome these negative trends, an economic reform was proposed, the essence of which was the introduction of free contract prices. The high contract prices of monopolistic enterprises, through which large profits were made, were used mainly to increase wages; almost nothing was left for the development and development of scientific and technological achievements. This, in turn, led to a violation of the proportions of growth in the money and commodity supply, to an increasing shortage of goods, and disorganization of the consumer market. The situation in the national economy continued to deteriorate.

Daily life during the period of "perestroika"

The economic reform policy has led to significant socio-economic problems. Increasing economic difficulties inevitably affected the sphere of consumption; basic goods began to disappear from stores 11 . The production of both industrial and agricultural products fell sharply. Social problems remained unresolved. The variety of forms of ownership led to the emergence of new social categories of the population. Social groups emerged that owned the means of production: members of cooperatives and individuals engaged in self-employment.

And it kept growing.

There was also a purely pragmatic point in this position. Following Lenin, Kamenev, Trotsky and Stalin, Gorbachev perfectly

He understood that the real equality of Russia in the rank of a union republic would mean the end of the power of central government structures and him personally. Thanks to the gigantic weight of the RSFSR, its potential leader turned into the main political figure in the USSR, which, of course, would have deprived any General Secretary of the opportunity to uncontrollably manipulate Russian resources. Therefore, in 1989, Gorbachev more than once condemned the “blue dream of the Baltic states” - to make Russia sovereign: “To restore authority - yes. But not on the path of sovereignty”62. Encouraging all kinds of sovereignty “delights” in other republics, Gorbachev insisted on the “integration feature” of the Russians, “formed historically.” The “specificity” of Russia is to be “the core of the entire federation,” its axis around which “everything in the Union will revolve.” Therefore, “ideologically we must substantiate the Russian phenomenon. For now, the problem of regional (!) governance in Russia needs to be discussed only stage-wise,” he said when discussing the platform of the Central Committee on the national issue63. When communicating with his assistant, Gorbachev was more direct: “If Russia becomes one, then it will begin!” A. S. Chernyaev recalled his “patron”: “Zhelezno” stood against the creation of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, against the full status of Russia as a union republic. At the Politburo after his vacation (September 1989) he said so poignantly: “Then the end of the empire”64. In this regard, Gorbachev’s 1995 recognition that it was Russia that opened the parade of sovereignties65 seems strange.

The Russian factor appeared in politics in 1989. At the turn of 988-1989. As a reaction to the “Baltic challenge,” the question of Russian sovereignty is being raised in the regional press. Around this time, among the Moscow intelligentsia, a note by the doctor of legal sciences G.I. Litvinova, where she pointed out the disastrous consequences of the national policy of Russia and the Russians previously pursued, became quite widespread, as a result of which the republic, being an all-Union donor, found itself on one of the last places in the most important Parameters of social development66. Official publications were in no hurry to discuss the problem. The catalyst was the work of the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and, in particular, the emotional speech at it by the writer V. G. Rasputin - the only one of the delegates who openly decided to rebuke the numerous Russophobic attacks in the republics of the USSR. He can hardly be credited with the authorship of the concept of “separation of Russia from

Union"67 - the logic of political confrontation and, most importantly, the reluctance of the ruling team to notice the Russian issue pushed in this direction. The Russian leaders of that time - V.I. Vorotnikov and A.I. Vlasov - were unable to act as consolidating figures on a nationwide scale. Their proposals, regularly set out, in particular, in notes68, were of a palliative nature and were kept in the spirit of utmost loyalty to the Secretary General. That is why the “struggle for Russia” was waged “from below” by provincial delegates and deputies. “The dam broke” at the September (1989) plenum of the Central Committee, dedicated to the national question: for the first time, Russian communists “presented an account” to the union party leadership for the plight of the republic. The position of many was expressed by the secretary of the Smolensk Regional Committee of the CPSU A. A. Vlasenko: “The largest republic in the country - Russia - is in conditions of financial, price, and economic discrimination. Its population, especially in the Non-Black Earth Region, and in other regions, lives much poorer, suffers due to the lack of roads and the backwardness of the social sphere”*9. At this plenum and, later, at the Second Congress of People's Deputies, as well as in the press in the mid-second half of 1989, a long-term mechanism of price imbalances was revealed, which predetermined the “legal*” underfinancing of Russia70.

However, the official authorities still did not show due attention to Russia's Russian problems. Therefore, some Russian deputies took the initiative to convene a meeting in which all people's deputies of the USSR from the Russian Federation would take part. At the meeting it was supposed to develop a consolidated position on the relations of the republic with the Union Center. The idea did not receive support in Moscow, and an attempt was made to disrupt the forum. As a result, only 51 deputies came to the meeting in Tyumen (October 20-21, 1989). Here the political situation in the USSR, the situation in Russia was considered, and the Russian Deputy Club was created71.

An analysis of these and other events allows us to conclude that Gorbachev and his entourage were not ready to offer any reasonable option for resolving the long-standing historical contradiction between the Union and Russian power structures. The apogee of their “creativity*” was the creation of the Bureau of the Central Committee for Russia. This idea could not initially be productive. Firstly, the existence of such a body back in Khrushchev times showed its artificiality, as a result of which it was

successfully liquidated. Secondly, in 1989, in all the republics, the process of “nationalization” and gaining greater independence of the already existing communist parties was in full swing, and Russia was again “allowed” only by the Bureau. The confusion of the union leaders was manifested in their avoidance of creating new Russian political structures, be it the Congress of People's Deputies or the Russian Communist Party. Paradoxically, neither the party nor the Soviet authorities of the union level were engaged in either serious preparation for the elections of people's deputies of Russia, or work with regional party organizations during the growing movement for the creation of a republican communist party72. The fallacy of such a course was retrospectively noted not only by opponents of the former Secretary General, but also by his most devoted supporters.

A possible reasonable explanation for this line can only be that during the formation of Russian power structures (spring - summer 1990), Gorbachev’s authority and popularity rapidly fell as social and other difficulties grew. The initiator of perestroika was no longer a generally recognized national leader, as this was in 1985-1986. He had every reason to fear that the open expression of the will of Russians either during the party or during the Soviet election campaigns would not bring him any political dividends. Populism, widely used by radicals, made the chances of Gorbachev and his supporters even more illusory : condemnation of Party privileges, savoring economic failures and the promise to quickly solve all the problems facing the country The official authorities could not oppose anything. In fact, during this period, the USSR was on the way to the emergence of 1 dual center (Union-Russia) in making the most important decisions for the country, which during Gorbachev's style of further behavior also predetermined a lot - political maneuvering, in which personal motives (preserving one's own power and democratic image) sometimes became dominant.

In 1989, rapid changes took place in the ideological life of society. Of these, it is logical to highlight three among the most important changes. First: criticism of the history of Soviet society in the media has taken on an openly destructive character. Second: the “landslide” nature of the criticism led to doubt about the “socialism” of the society built in the USSR and completely deprived the entire post-October development of the country of positive meaning. Third: against this background the program was formulated

the goal of renouncing the past and returning the country to the “bosom of civilization” through the rooting of “democratic” economic, political and value institutions on Soviet soil.

The situation in the sphere of historical consciousness was quite accurately defined by some of the participants in the meeting of historians held at the CPSU Central Committee on October 3, 1989. Opening it, the Central Committee Secretary for Ideology V. A. Medvedev expressed the official position. He noted that the socio-political background in the country depends on ideas about the past. “And of course, historical issues and their research play a huge instrumental role, being a necessary component in justifying how today’s problems should be solved.” “You cannot defend something that requires exposure,” said the main party ideologist. - There can be no deals with conscience. The reckoning with the mistakes of the past must necessarily be completed, and there can be no restrictions here.”73 At a time when professional historical science was going through a difficult period of adaptation to changing conditions before our eyes, such calls objectively complicated its development. But in fact, they encouraged “historical research” - non-professionals who were ready for a merciless “reckoning with the mistakes of the past.”

Academician G.L. Smirnov spoke with concern about the emerging situation. He noted that publications increasingly appear in the country presenting the entire history of socialist construction in the USSR as an inhumane, destructive process for humans. “In this kind of publications, the stages of our history - the 20-30s, the Great Patriotic War, the post-war period and perestroika - are presented in such a way as not to leave the reader with any positive ideas about the transformations carried out, the constructive and creative activity of the people, economic growth, countries and people's cultures. Repressions, crimes, mistakes, miscalculations constitute not only the dramatic, tragic aspects of the historical process, but the exclusive and exhaustive content of our development and the activities of the Party. Obviously, the goal has been set as follows: not to leave any trace in the minds of people, in the memory of descendants, to prove the collapse of the party, its ideology and policies, to justify the need to remove the party from the leadership of society."7" At the meeting it was stated that now historical consciousness is formed mainly by publicists who dominate large-circulation publications. As a result, in

The beginning of the reform of the political system of the USSR..

In the mass consciousness - especially among young people - the more than 70-year period of the country’s history is perceived only as a continuous chain of crimes, as a kind of “criminal chronicle”75. Academician Yu. S. Kukushkin noted that without a careful attitude to Marxist ideology, without a thorough justification of the theory of perestroika, one cannot count on its success. He drew attention to the fact that it is impossible to carry out genuine perestroika under the banner of nihilism and de-ideologization, and yet the demand for de-ideologization of historical science was vigorously imposed with the help of many media. The speaker expressed surprise at the passivity of official structures in restructuring the teaching of social sciences, which complicates the social orientation of young people when faced with the undisguised ideological aggressiveness of extremist forces76. Academician-Secretary of the Department of Horology of the USSR Academy of Sciences I. D. Kovalchenko also expressed his conviction that on the most important methodological issues the position of the CPSU Central Committee should be more detailed and definite. “Scientists may agree or disagree with it, but it must exist, and it must be known”77. As if responding to the considerations voiced, V. A. Medvedev very lapidally formulated the “principled positions” of the Central Committee: Lenin, October, socialist choice. At the same time, in his 1998 memoirs, Medvedev actually acknowledged the collapse of his own attempts to influence the situation: in 1989, in the pre-logical department of the Central Committee, an attempt was made to create a “quick response” group to biased ahistorical publications in the press. The idea did not bring positive results, since it did not find interested support among society. A situation has already developed where a scientifically correct, restrained position could be defamed for “conservatism” or even dogmatism.” An interesting example is given by Medvede->1M himself. In 1989, as Secretary of the Central Committee, he appealed to the leadership of the IML to carry out an analysis of the upcoming publication of Solzhenitsyn’s “Gulag Archipelago” so that the reader would receive a qualified scientific analysis of the writer’s far from indisputable historical constructions. However, according to Medvedev, “this request did not arouse enthusiasm among scientists” and, despite repeated reminders, the work was never carried out78. There were no people willing to contribute.” And although professional historians Nemano contributed to a truly scientific rethinking and resolution of many important pages of Soviet history,79 their influence on historical consciousness did not become decisive.

The noted approach to covering the Soviet past entailed attempts to give a holistic description of the system built in the country. By the beginning of 1990, in the publications of scientists, primarily philosophers, one could read that the USSR built “not socialism and not early socialism,” but “barracks pseudo-socialism, totalitarianism” (B.V. Rakitsky)80. It was proposed to “completely and completely” get rid of the “authoritarian-bureaucratic social and political system” (G. G. Vodolazov)81. It was noted that in the USSR a “dead-end line of evolution” had been realized, a totalitarian system had developed (A. P. Butenko) 82. It was written about “the organic defects of the system of socialism - (L. S. Vasiliev)83, that now “the communist version of socialism is collapsing,” that October was defeated, “leaving only the illusion of the socialist appearance of our society,” that the Bolsheviks imposed a “marginal path” on Russia (V.P. Kiselev).84 Pointed to the tragedy of Russia, “where as a result of the revolution the weak shoots of the already ugly Russian capitalism were torn out by the roots, cultural traditions were destroyed... and in return it was proposed restoration to unprecedented proportions of the “Asian* imperial-despotic past, however, somewhat embellished (strengthened!) by elements of the twentieth century.” At the same time, “Marxism and Leninism put at Stalin’s disposal everything that he used” (L. S. Vasiliev)85.

Getting rid of the past was seen as returning to the path to a democratic, humane society, the movement towards a “global SHSHIZAZIM”*. It was supposed to bring these intentions to life through the implementation of an “anti-totalitarian”, “anti-barracks* revolution, which would solve its problems during a certain “transition” (or “transfer”) period87.

Researchers call the main political event of 1989 the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the work of which meant the entry of the reform of the political system into the practical phase. However, the beginning of the reform coincided with the emergence of an organized political opposition, which was quite determined from the moment it emerged. And these two processes - the reform of the state structure and the expansion of opposition activity in the struggle for power - unfolded in parallel, while the latter had an increasingly greater, but not always positive, influence on the development of events throughout the country.

Analysis of documentary publications gives grounds for the conclusion that the emergence of the opposition at the First Congress of People's

The beginning of the reform of the political system of the USSR.

The confusion was not a spontaneous act, but was the result of already emerging polarization and preliminary organizational work. A definite catalyst for the intensification of the positive movement in society was the campaign for the election of local deputies in the winter and spring of 1989. In an atmosphere of increasing economic difficulties, anti-bureaucratic sentiments and the desire to nominate deputies from the non-apparatus environment intensified. Since January 22, unauthorized election rallies organized by candidate support groups (A.D. Sakharov, N. Yeltsin, etc.) have been taking place in Ryazan, Moscow, Kuibyshev and other cities. On this wave, on February 4, 1989, a new political organization was established - the “Moscow Tribune”. This center of the Moscow intelligentsia was created to organize and support actions related to the elections to the first congress. It was already stated that the “Moscow Tribune” intends to play a constructive opposition, focusing mainly on organizing public discussions88. Support groups for “non-apparatus” candidates acted much more inventively and effectively than the official structures, which actually ruined the elections in Moscow and Leningrad. After the elections, on the initiative of “independent” deputies from Moscow (G. Kh. Popov, S. B. Stankevich, N. Yeltsin, A. M. Emelyanov, A. N. Murashev, T. Kh. Gdlyan), the Moscow Deputy Club was created89 . At its very first meeting, it was decided to unite a group of democratically oriented deputies at the future congress into a group of democratically oriented deputies and develop alternative options for the regulations of the congress, testing decisions90. On the eve of the opening of this forum, on May 21, 1989, “mocracy groups and movements in Moscow held a 150,000-strong rally in Luzhny-7!X in support of democratic deputies?” congress. During his work, such “pressure rallies* were held repeatedly.

At the 1st SND, in contrast to the “aggressively obedient majority”, it was announced that the “democratic” deputies were moving to a position. On June 7, 1989, deputy from Orenburg V. Shapovalenko announced the creation of an Interregional Group of Deputies (MGD), which initially included 150 people. In the summer of 1989, the group grew to 388 members, 286 of whom represented the RSFSR91. The final organizational constitution of the MHD took place on July 29 at the first general conference of its members. It was attended by five co-chairs: Yu. N. Afanasyev, B. N. Yeltsin , I. A. Palm, G. X. Popov and A. D. Sakharov. The Coordination

council of more than 20 people. B. N. Yeltsin spoke with the group’s programmatic theses, highlighting the following fundamental ideas: recognition of private property, decentralization of power, economic independence of the republics, their real economic sovereignty. The reform of the political system proposed turning the Soviets into the main source of power, which in political language meant the need to abolish Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, which secured the leading role of the CPSU. In the economic sphere, emphasis was placed on an accelerated transition to market relations. One of the main ones was the proposal to redistribute public property: only those sectors that required centralized management should remain in the hands of the state. In the social sphere, the creation of a system of benefits for low-income people and the provision of all free social services on a competitive basis between institutions working in this area were declared. Subsequently, the ideas of the MHD were “coined” in five “ds”: decentralization, demonopolization, departmentization, de-ideologization, democratization92.

Given the popularity of democratic deputies in both capitals and some large cities, their positions were not so strong as to influence the adoption of serious decisions or to put pressure on official structures. Therefore, initially they faced the problem of attracting political allies, who also emerged in the pre-Congress period. The emerging rapprochement with the nationalists and separatists ended in the formation of a political alliance at the First Congress. Representatives of the Baltic republics, speaking for sovereignty, received support from the deputies of the Moscow City Duma: G. Kh. Popov, Yu. N. Afanasyev interpreted the Estonian and Lithuanian demands as fair and democratic. B.N. Yeltsin also spoke from the same positions. “Inter-regionals” and at other congresses in discussions between the Center and the sovereignizing republics took the side of the latter, refusing to notice manifestations of separatism and complete chauvinism among their allies. Justifying their position, they believed that extremism and separatism are completely compatible with the democratic movement93. In response, the “democrats” received support from the “separatists” in denouncing the “outdated” economic, political and ideological “totalitarian” institutions personified by the allied power structures.

The strike movement became another ally of the constituting opposition. Interest in work initiatives in the

The beginning of the reform of the political system of the USSR.

in the wet" environment existed for a long time94, but in the summer of 1989 it became more substantive. By this time, purely political associations were being created in regions affected by miners' strikes. On August 17, 1989, at a conference of strike committees of mines, industrial associations and cities of Donbass, the Union of Donbass Strike Committees was established. Its Charter was adopted and the Coordination Council was organized95. The miners of Vorkuta and Karaganda coordinated their actions with Donbass. Of the leaders of the Moscow City Duma, the closest contacts with the leaders of the strike committees were maintained by G. Kh. Popov and N. I. Travkin, who, during their trips to the mining regions, negotiated the coordination of actions with the worker leaders96. The objective basis of this alliance was the same hostility towards the central power structures: the miners “pressed” the union departments, demanding a quick solution to the problems that had accumulated over decades. "Demo-| The krats* “suggested” when and what steps (slogans, protests, strikes) should be taken, connecting the miners to the general political battle for power.

In 1994, G. Kh. Popov defined the strategy and tactics of the MHD as follows: “We proceeded from the fact that the apparatus will be in power for a long time, and we need to learn to fight while remaining in the minority: requests, first amendments, revelations. Therefore, we were preparing for a long-term opposition. I believed that 3-4 years would pass until, speaking from the tribunes of parliament, we would educate the masses, create our own organizations, structures, and newspapers. To approach with greater chances the next elections in five years”97. However, the author was clearly disingenuous, as evidenced by his speech at a closed conference of the Moscow Association of Voters and the Moscow Association of Voters in September 1989. “We have every chance of victory. 1Every deputy of the RSFSR must be registered. He must raise (according to another version - “he needs to be taught”) that if he votes differently from what the Moscow City Duma says, then it will be impossible for him to live in this country,” said Gavriil Kharitonovich98. At the shelter, the bet was made on “popular indignation,” for which it was proposed to “bring the trading system to such a state that it would be impossible to acquire anything.” At the conference there was a voice of confidence that during the election campaign there would be fights, violations of public order, and blood would be shed. Questions arose: “Who will protect us from trial? Who cares about paying fines and protecting you from the law?” An indicative answer came from the presidium: “We have money to pay

fines. There is a list of 30 lawyers who will defend our people. The progress will be made by those who are not afraid to sit down for 15 days or more." It seems that the means of achieving the goal chosen by the young opposition can hardly be considered democratic - they were rather radical. Therefore, the self-name "democratic opposition" is also conditional.

In the camp of this opposition in the second half of 1989 - early 1990, important processes took place. Firstly, there was a further all-Union and all-Russian consolidation of “democratic”, and essentially anti-communist organizations. Secondly, the formation of mobilization electoral structures began, which had a great influence on the voting results in the elections to the republican authorities of Russia in the spring of 1990.

At this time, the Leningrad Popular Front was created - one of the largest and most active political organizations of the RSFSR: according to estimates, it included 6-7 thousand people. The FLNF initiated the unification of democratic forces throughout the entire Soviet Union. At the founding congress, the idea was voiced of creating a “democratic super party” as a counterweight to the CPSU1"1". In development of the idea, on October 28-29, 1989, the Founding Conference of Democratic Organizations and Movements was held in Chelyabinsk. At the end of its work, the Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations and Movements (MADO) was created. Bee program documents stated that “the basis of the association’s platform is the principles of recognition of the priority of human rights and universal values ​​over any public and national interests.” MADO supported the demands for the abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution, the demonopolization of state property, and the transformation of the USSR into a federation of sovereign republics. Some activists stated that the association's goal was to transform it into a radical political party capable of steering the country along a non-socialist path of development. The situation in the country and the general tasks of the democratic movement were considered in December 1989 at the next MADO conference in Tallinn101. At the same time, due to a series of reasons102, the Russian Popular Front did not become an organization coordinating the activities of “democratic” organizations at the republican level. A certain vacuum was created here, which, however, was quickly filled.

At the same time, the improvement of “election mechanisms* continued. In July 1989, MSU held its founding

The beginning of the reform of the political system of the USSR..

Nfsrenpii of the Interregional Association of Voters - MY. MYI included voters' clubs from 30 districts of Moscow, the voters' club of the USSR Academy of Sciences, "Memorial", the Moscow Popular Front, the organizing committee of MYI was headed by L. Shemaev, L. A. Pomarok. V. Boxer. Several independent groups with the characteristic names “Strike” and Work Detachments were formed through the IOI.” Shemaev was known as an organizer of rallies and actions in support of Yeltsin since 1988. The so-called “Shemaev’s thousand”, an activist group that formed the constant basis of rallies and personal marches, became widely known103. A kind of “truth division” took shape: the MHD acted as the official parliamentary opposition,

MY - as the organizer of mass events and “external influence” on the authorities.

In development of this process, in October 1989, the founding congress of the All-Union Voters Association (VAI) was held in Moscow. The association has set the following tasks: conducting an active? itation campaign against reactionary forces, the nomination of Voih and support for progressive candidates for the Soviets. It is interesting to note that at the congress the role of the VAI VVK “proto-party” was repeatedly emphasized.

At the end of 1989, the center of gravity in political activity shifted to preparations for the elections of delegates to the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. The creation of an all-Russian movement coordinating the activities of both political organizations and literary associations became especially urgent. The desire for their definite unity became evident. In December, the “Democratic Mbor” movement was formed in Vierdlovsk to support the candidacy of B. N. Yeltsin. In Moscow, on the initiative of “Democratic Perestroika,” a meeting of 15 informal groups was held, where the issue of preparing

The upcoming elections. At the same time, the All-Union Conference of the Voter Movement was held in the capital, in which more than 300 representatives of voter clubs from 50 cities of 1 union republic took part. The most important practical goal of the created Interregional Association of Voters was declared to be

rzhka MHD and similar deputy groups in the regions of Russia and the republics of the USSR. The main forms of activity were stated to be: participation in the electoral and parliamentary process, monitoring the work of people’s deputies and Soviets, studying public opinion104. As a result of a series of consultations

of the coordinating and governing bodies of Moscow and all-Union socio-political organizations, on January 4, 1990, the working committee of the “Elections-90” bloc was formed. Over the next two weeks, his platform was discussed, and he himself received the name “Democratic Bloc.” Its final design took place on January 20-21, 1990, when the final name was chosen - “Democratic Russia”. The bloc's platform was aimed at attracting the widest possible range of democratically minded candidates. Its main ideas were as follows. The SND, the RSFSR must take full power, become a permanent body and declare the sovereignty of Russia. The CPSU should be deprived of its monopoly on power, and its activities should be placed under public control. It was supposed to limit the functions of the KGB, which was also to be controlled. It was pointed out that the living standards of the population, and primarily the low-income groups, should not be reduced. The publication of its program in one of the most popular publications of those years - the magazine Ogonyok105 - contributed to attracting attention to the movement. The hopes of Russian “democrats* were fueled by the success of the “velvet revolutions” that took place in the countries of Eastern Europe in the second half of 1989. In addition to the possibility of a peaceful transfer of power to the opposition, they also showed the great attractiveness of anti-communist ideology and contributed to a more rapid improvement of the entire spectrum of opposition forces.

The opposition's capabilities in the struggle for power were greatly enhanced by the presence in its ranks of a bright, charismatic populist leader. The rise of Yeltsin as a national leader in 1989 was facilitated by a number of objective and subjective circumstances. Firstly, he was a “promoted” politician of the first echelon, who gained all-Union fame in 1986-1987. its fight against Brezhnev's legacy in Moscow. Secondly, the unclear circumstances of his resignation created around him the mysterious aura of a martyr who suffered from “party bureaucrats* for fighting “against their privileges.” Thirdly, Yeltsin’s star rose as the socio-economic situation worsened, when awareness of the need for policy changes began to be associated with the need for a change in leaders. Fourthly, quite powerful forces have formed in the country that are interested in radicalizing changes and need a bright, attractive leader. In consolidation

The beginning of the reform of the political system of the USSR.

The West was also interested in the democratic* opposition, which also did little to support its leaders. Fifthly, the personal qualities of Yeltsin himself certainly played a major role; those who write about him note his most powerful intuition, his ability to capture mass moods, his ability to communicate with the most prominent audience. However, his colossal power and ambition, which suppressed any ideological attachments and allowed him to “easily" change his values ​​depending on the political situation. In less than five years, he went from the main metropolitan commune to the main Russian anti-communist, who banned the CPSU and elevated anti-communism to the rank of national policy. El-I like no one else Another of the politicians had the ingenious ability to justify the necessary political slogan with an understandable Italian motive.He was one of the first in modern Russian history who knew how to so effectively use the enormous power of populism in the struggle for power.

One way or another, in 1989, the degree of Yeltsin’s popularity was a mirror reflection of the level of decline in Gorbachev’s authority. The first slap in the face to Gorbachev was the triumphant victory of El-1n in the elections in Moscow in the spring of 1989. The irrational character of the perception of the co-chairman of the Moscow City Duma as the antithesis of the Secretary General in the fall of JP89 .was especially clearly manifested in the assessment of three episodes of a dubious nature from Yeltsin’s life, each of which could undermine the other’s reputation or even his career. In the case of Yeltsin, rumor attributed all three situations to the machinations of his opponents, while Boris Nikolayevich himself again cut off his popularity coupons as “undeservedly offended”10*. At a time when the opposition movement was on the rise, there was a dynamic regrouping of its various parts, the creation of ever greater ideological certainty and organizational unity, the situation in the CPSU was different. Traditional parliamentary structures turned out to be of little use for competition with bright non-apparatus candidates for deputy seats. The lag between democratization in the party and democratization in society manifested itself during the work of the First Congress of People's Deputies; the highly centralized, strictly hierarchical structure of the CPSU came into direct conflict with the new tasks of perfection and vulnerability of Soviet society. However, changes in the work of the company itself were clearly not enough. Already in mid-1989, a feeling began to arise in the party environment that the party was unwittingly

(and maybe deliberately) “set up”. Due to the specifics of the organization, in the structure of which “centralism” was traditionally much stronger than “democracy,” the possibility of its reform was associated with the initiative “from above,” on the part of the central party structures. However, the Party Central Committee was in no hurry to fully determine the strategy for restructuring the activities of the CPSU in the new conditions, starting from the lower levels and ending with the central apparatus. This issue was specifically discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee on July 18, 1989. The usually reserved N.I. Ryzhkov actually publicly accused Gorbachev of inactivity in this direction, demanding that he, as Secretary General, “pay more attention to his party duties” and free himself from “petty issues” “that overwhelm him.”17 Ryzhkov’s alarming warning was timely, although and not early, since with the delay in reform “from within,” impulses began to come from outside." On August 2, 1989, at a meeting of the Moscow Party Club, a decision was made to create a Democratic platform in the CPSU. Its leaders were V. N. Lysenko, I. B. Chubais, V. N. Shostakoisky - announced the creation of an organization of communists - supporters of a multi-party system and radical democratization of the CPSUSHK.The initiative was quickly picked up in the regions, and on September 30, 1989, a working meeting of organizations advocating reform of the CPSU was held. Representatives of party clubs of seven union republics adopted an appeal to the country's communists, where they outlined specific demands for the party leadership: the immediate abolition of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution; the introduction of factional pluralism in the CPSU; transition to the creation of the Communist Party of Russia; transformation of the CPSU into a parliamentary party. By the end of 1989, several dozen structures focused on these ideas already existed throughout the country109. And although some initially assessed the “Dem Platform” as a “fifth column,” it posed real-life problems that the official party leaders were in no hurry to solve. As one of the organizers of the movement, V.N. Lysenko, writes, on the eve of the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Democratic Platform was ideologically supported by over 40% of the CPSU members. DSMplatforma was the only structure after the CPSU that had branches not only in Russia, but also in all the union republics110.

By the end of 1989, Soviet society had arrived with ambiguous political results, which was reflected in the course of work and in the materials of the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (December

1989). At the congress, N.I. Ryzhkov outlined a plan for the country's transition to a market economy, which was assessed by radical deputies as conservative, and this assessment was replicated in the press. At the congress, constitutional laws were adopted that specified the tasks of reform of the political system for 1990 - changes in the system of power were supposed to descend from the “union* to the “union-republican” level111. The discussion of the “Tbilisi case” caused a violent reaction. And although The parliamentary commission prepared a generally balanced conclusion about what happened; the very discussion of the issue at the congress was turned into a political struggle, into an attack on “party conservatives”, which led to a condemnation in principle of the possibility of using armed forces in the context of flaring up interethnic conflicts112.

Equally politically destructive were the results of the discussion of the issue of the circumstances surrounding the entry of the Baltic republics into the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. The decisions taken only emboldened the separatists in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The anti-Russian and anti-Russian rhetoric on the part of some deputies from the republics was so harsh that Gorchev was even forced to intervene in order to rein in the “carried away”3.

The winter of 1989/90 was a time of active regrouping of political forces. On the one hand, the process of ideological demarcation gradually grew in the CPSU. On the other hand, there was a consolidation of radical democratic forces that were actively preparing for the struggle to seize the republican level of power in the spring

An analysis of the main events of 1989 will not be complete without reference to the processes that unfolded at that time in the countries of the “socialist community” in Europe. Until the end of 1988, the leaders of these countries seemed to expect the Soviet leaders to show initiative in the urgent reform of social relations, but such an initiative never followed. On the contrary, the Soviet leadership persistently emphasized that it was no longer going to interfere in the internal affairs of countries that had previously been under the close tutelage of the USSR. Under these conditions - first in Poland and Hungary - the anti-communist opposition declared its claims to power and, using the “round drain” mechanism, received this power. Contemporaries were struck by the lack of reaction to this from the Soviet leadership, which, in fact, for the first time in the post-war years behaved as if

then these events did not concern him. This position was the actual encouragement of those forces that opposed the ruling communist regimes. As a result, revolutionary actions followed in the GDR, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. As V.K. Volkov, a researcher on this problem, noted, “events developed according to the principle of a chain reaction; it was noteworthy that in none of these cases was force used, although in each of these states the army and security services existed in sufficient numbers . It seemed that the leadership of the communist parties was everywhere seized by the paralysis of power."4 There was a not unreasonable assumption in the literature that the reason for this behavior was the influence of the Soviet leadership. As a result, by the end of 1989, "velvet" events occurred everywhere in Eastern Europe (with the exception of Romania ) anti-communist revolutions. It was hard to believe that in just one year such dramatic changes were possible. In all Eastern European states, new political systems were formed, in which there was no place for the “leading role of the communist party,” political pluralism, a multi-party system were established, and radical market reforms began reforms, an active reorientation towards the West began in foreign policy.

Academician O. T. Bogomolov called the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe “the prologue of future changes in the USSR”*, and philosopher A. S. Tsipko even believes that Eastern Europe was “the main subject of our anti-communist revolution”6. One way or another ", everything that happened in the socialist countries in 1989 led to the cessation of the existence of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the unification of Germany and the formation of a new geopolitical situation in Europe, little controlled by the Soviet Union. The “Eastern European prologue" was no less important for the internal political situation in the USSR. " The country's democratic and nationalist oppositions had the opportunity to clearly see that the Soviet leadership was unlikely to use force in the political struggle, no matter how radical the slogans of the movements and politicians opposing the official authorities were.

The beginning of the reform of the political system of the USSR...

Notes-.-.-.-

1 Ryzhkov N.I. Ten years of great upheavals. M., 1995. P. 404; Saburov E. F. Reforms in Russia: the first stage. M., 1997. P. 28; Gaidar E. T. Days? Orazhny and victories. M., 1997. pp. 58-59.

2 History of modern Russia. 1985-1994. M., 1995. P. 51.

3 Andriyanov V.I., Chernyak A.V. Lonely Tsar in the Kremlin. M. 1999. Book 1 S. 221-224.

4 Gorbachev M. S. Life and reforms. M., 1995. Book. 1. P. 460-463; Ryzh-shov N. I. Perestroika: a history of betrayals. M., 1992. S. 214-215.

: 5 Russia-2000. Modern political history (1985-1999). T. 1. “Roinka and analytics”. 3rd ed. M., 2000. P. 73-82. (Next - Chronicle...)

6 History of modern Russia. P. 51.

7 Ibid. P. 52.

8 A large, informative article by O. V. Kryshta-Npskaya is devoted to this topic. See: Kryshtanovskaya O. V. Transformation of the old nomenclature of the new Russian elite // Transformation of social structure and strafification of Russian society. M., 1996. pp. 281-288.

9 Gaidar E. T. State and evolution. M., 1995. P. 150.

110 See: Shkaratan O.I., Figatner Yu.Yu. Old and new masters of Russia (from power relations to property relations) // World of Russia. 1992. T 1. Shch 1. P. 77-78.

11 See: Andriyanov V.I., Chernyak A.V. Decree. Op. P. 154.

12 Ibid. pp. 150-154. "Chronicle... P. 583.

" 14 Chetko S. V. The collapse of the Soviet Union. 2nd ed. M., 2000. P. 229.

1 15 The ideologemes of nationalism are most fully analyzed in: Shshkp S.V. Decree. Op. pp. 229-237.

I 16 National histories in the Soviet and post-Soviet states?.. 1999. P. 215.

| 17Ibid. pp. 171, 196.

18 Konstantinov S, Ushakov A. Perception of the history of the peoples of the USSR in the Soviet Union and historical images of Russia in the post-Soviet space // National histories in the Soviet and post-Soviet states. P. 77.

19 Using the example of Ukraine, this is well illustrated in: Naomi Asano. The transition in the USSR and socio-political life in Ukraine: the problem of periodization. M., 1999.

\ 21 The concept is analyzed in most detail in our literature in the article: Vdovin A.I. New national policy in the USSR//Bulletin of Oskovsky University. Ser. 8. History. 1990. No. 4. P. 9-11.

| 22 Chetko S.V. Decree. Op. P. 233. 23 Ibid. pp. 198-211.

i 24 Emelyanov Yu. Big game. The stakes of the separatists and the fate of peoples. Sh, 1990.

23 Ibid. P. 201.

27 Primakov E. M. Years in big politics. M., 1999. P. 250.

29 One of the first to draw attention to this was A. S. Tsipko (Tsipko A. S. Restoration or complete and final Sovietization? // Russian Empire-USSR-Russian Federation: the history of one country? M., 1993) And although not all provisions The work is indisputable, nevertheless it contains a number of interesting observations.

30 Struve P.B. Historical meaning of the Russian revolution and national tasks // From the depths (Collection of articles on the Russian revolution). M., 1991. P. 296.

31 Stalin I.V. About the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union M., 1951. P. 4.

32 Ibid. P. 30.

33 Tsipko A. S. Decree. Op. P. 105.

36 Ibid. P. 73. 37Ibid. P. 101.

38 Ibid. P. 136.

39 This was most clearly manifested in his report at the September plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1989. See: Materials of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. September 19-20, 1989 pp. 14-43, 205-211.

41 Ibid. P. 54.

42 Ibid. pp. 81-86.

43 Ibid. P. 98.

44 Ibid. P. 102.

45 For example: “The sea of ​​Great Russian chauvinistic trash” (V. Lenin and Pol. sobr. soch. T. 45. P. 352-357).

46 What you need to know about the peoples of Russia. Handbook for civil servants/Rep. ed. V. A. Mikhailov. M., 1999. P. 69. One of the sections of the work of ethnologist V.I. Kozlov is even called “Lenin-Stalin national policy. Fundamentals of Russophobia (Kozlov V.I. History of the tragedy of the great people. Russian question. 2nd ed. M., 1997. P. 117-133).

47 Failed anniversary. M., 1992. P. 185.

48 Ibid. P. 181.

49 Secrets of the national policy of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). The fourth meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP with senior officials of national republics and regions in Moscow, June 9-12, 1923. Verbatim report. M., 1992 P. 63.

50 Ibid. P. 229.

51 Ibid. P. 254.

52 Mikoyan A.I. So it was. Reflections on the past. M., 1999. P. 567.

The beginning of the reform of the political system of the USSR.

53 “Lenigrad case”. L., 1990. P. 70.

54 Kunyaev S. Post scriptum 1//Our contemporary. 1995. No. 10.S. 193. S5CM.: VdovinA. I. Russian federalism and the Russian question. M., 2001.

56 Quoted. by: Solovey V.D. Russian nationalism and power in the era of Gorbachev // Interethnic relations in Russia and the CIS. M., 1994. P. 52.

57 Power and opposition. M., 1995. P. 300.

58 Quoted. by: Vorotnikov V.I. And it was like this... M., 1995. P. 341.

59 Medvedev V. A. Epiphany, myth or betrayal? M., 1998. P. 236. “Ibid.S. 321.

61 Shusharin D. Notes of a Russian nationalist // Burn of the native hearth. M, 1990. P. 74.

63 Ibid. P. 69.

64 Chernyaev A.S. Decree. Op. P. 297.

65 Gorbachev M. S. Life and reforms. Book 1. P. 520.

67 This absurd accusation can be found, in particular, in the book by A. S. Chernyaev (Chernyaev A. S. 1991. Diary of an Assistant to the President of the USSR). M, 1997. P. 27.

68 Vorotnikov V.I. Decree. Op. pp. 269, 290.

70 Government Gazette. 1989. No. 12; Vorotnikov V.I. Russia, open to perestroika // Soviet Russia. 1989. September 3; Vlasov A.V. Interests of Russia//Izvestia. 1989. September 2; Matyukha V.N. Speech at the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR // Pravda. 1989. December 18; Vlasov A.V. Speech at the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR // Pravda. 1989. 14 Dec.

71 Platonov O. A. The Crown of Thorns of Russia. M., 1997. T. 2. P. 589-592.

72 Vorotnikov V.I. And it was like this... P. 317, 320, 338, 354, etc.

73 Questions of history. 1990. No. 1. P. 3, 6.

74 Ibid. pp. 13-14.

75 Ibid. P. 10.

76 Ibid. P. 17.

77 Ibid. P. 6.

78 Medvedev V.A. Decree. Op. P. 304.

79 See: Historians argue. M., 1987; History provides a lesson. M., 1988; Correspondence on historical topics. M., 1990; The regime of Stalin's personal power. M., 1989; Bordyugov G. A., Kozlov V. A. History and conjuncture. M., 1992; and etc.

80 Through thorns. M., 1990. P. 269.

81 Ibid.S. 730.

82 Ibid. P. 398.

83 Ibid. P. 35.

84 Ibid. pp. 217, 222, 227.

85 Ibid. pp. 22-23.

86 Ibid. P. 227.

87 Ibid. P. 263. And also: Rakitsky B.V., Rakitskaya G.Ya. Strategy and tactics of perestroika. M, 1990. P. 62-95.

88 Chronicle... P. 71.

89 Ibid. P. 73.

90 Popov G. X. Decree. Op. P. 72.

91 Andriyanov V.I., Chernyak A.V. Decree. Op. Book 1. P. 229.

94 Andriyanov V.I., Chernyak A.V. Decree. Op. pp. 178-179.

95 Chronicle... P. 81.

96 Popov G. X. Again in opposition. P. 70.

97 Ibid. P. 67.

98 This important material was introduced into scientific circulation by L. N. Dobrokhotov in the book “Power and Opposition” (M, 1995. P. 309).

99 Andriyanov V.I., Chernyak A.V. Decree. Op. P. 169.

100 Russia: parties, associations, unions and clubs. T. 2. P. 172, 175. 101 Ibid. T.4.S. 19.22.

102 Ibid. T. 7. pp. 130-131.

104 Chronicle... P. 86; Russia: parties, associations, unions, clubs. T. 4. P. 78.

105 Russia: parties, associations, unions, clubs. T. 1. P. 93.

106 A selection of various information about the incidents is contained in the book: Andriyanov V.I., Chernyak A.V. Decree. Op. pp. 188-248.

107 Ryzhkov N.I. Rethink the functions and role of the party in society//Democratization of Soviet society. M., 1989. P. 166.

108 Chronicle... P. 81.

109 Russia: parties, associations, unions, clubs. T. 1. pp. 242-243.

110 V. N. Lysenko refers to sociological surveys conducted by the Higher Party School. See: Lysenko V.I. 10 years of the “democratic platform in the CPSU” and the evolution of the party system in Russia. M., 2000. P. 6.