The first partisan detachments appeared in 1812. Guerrilla Warfare: Historical Significance

Protracted military conflict. Detachments in which people were united by the idea of ​​the liberation struggle fought on a par with the regular army, and in the case of a well-organized leadership, their actions were highly effective and largely decided the outcome of the battles.

Partisans of 1812

When Napoleon attacked Russia, the idea of ​​strategic guerrilla warfare arose. Then, for the first time in world history, Russian troops used a universal method of conducting military operations on enemy territory. This method was based on the organization and coordination of rebel actions by the regular army itself. For this purpose, trained professionals - “army partisans” - were thrown behind the front line. At this time, the detachments of Figner and Ilovaisky, as well as the detachment of Denis Davydov, who was lieutenant colonel Akhtyrsky, became famous for their military exploits

This detachment was separated from the main forces longer than others (for six weeks). The tactics of Davydov’s partisan detachment consisted in the fact that they avoided open attacks, attacked by surprise, changed directions of attacks, groped weak spots enemy. The local population helped: the peasants were guides, spies, and participated in the extermination of the French.

In the Patriotic War, the partisan movement was of particular importance. The basis for the formation of detachments and units was the local population, who were familiar with the area. In addition, it was hostile to the occupiers.

The main goal of the movement

The main task of guerrilla warfare was to isolate enemy troops from its communications. The main blow of the people's avengers was aimed at the supply lines of the enemy army. Their detachments disrupted communications, prevented the approach of reinforcements and the supply of ammunition. When the French began to retreat, their actions were aimed at destroying ferries and bridges over numerous rivers. Thanks to active actions army partisans, Napoleon lost almost half of his artillery during the retreat.

The experience of waging partisan warfare in 1812 was used in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). During this period, this movement was large-scale and well organized.

Period of the Great Patriotic War

The need for organization partisan movement arose due to the fact that most of the territory of the Soviet state was captured by German troops who sought to make slaves and liquidate the population of the occupied areas. The main idea of ​​partisan warfare in the Great Patriotic War is the disorganization of the activities of the Nazi troops, causing them human and material losses. For this purpose, fighter and sabotage groups were created, the network expanded underground organizations to direct all actions in the occupied territory.

Partisan movement of the Great Patriotic War was two-way. On the one hand, the detachments were created spontaneously, from people who remained in enemy-occupied territories, and sought to protect themselves from mass fascist terror. On the other hand, this process took place in an organized manner, under leadership from above. Sabotage groups were thrown behind enemy lines or pre-organized in the territory that they were supposed to leave in the near future. To provide such detachments with ammunition and food, they first made caches with supplies, and also worked out issues of their further replenishment. In addition, issues of secrecy were worked out, the locations of detachments based in the forest were determined after the front retreated further to the east, and the provision of money and valuables was organized.

Movement leadership

In order to lead the guerrilla war and sabotage struggle, workers from among the local residents who were well acquainted with these areas were sent to the territory captured by the enemy. Very often, among the organizers and leaders, including the underground, were the leaders of Soviet and party bodies who remained in the territory occupied by the enemy.

Guerrilla warfare played a decisive role in the victory Soviet Union over Nazi Germany.

The term “partisans” in the minds of every Russian person is associated with two periods of history - the people’s war that unfolded in Russian territories in 1812 and the mass partisan movement during the Second World War. Both of these periods were called the Patriotic Wars. A long time ago, a persistent stereotype arose that partisans first appeared in Russia during the Patriotic War of 1812, and their founder was the dashing hussar and poet Denis Vasilyevich Davydov. His poetic works were practically forgotten, but everything school course remember what he created the first partisan detachment in 1812.

Historical reality was somewhat different. The term itself existed long before 1812. Partisans were called partisans in the Russian army back in XVIII century military personnel sent as part of independent small separate detachments, or parties (from Latin wordpartis from French parti) for operations on the flanks, in the rear and on enemy communications. Naturally, this phenomenon cannot be considered a purely Russian invention.

Even before 1812, both the Russian and French armies experienced the irritating actions of the partisans. For example, the French in Spain against the Guerillas, the Russians in 1808-1809. during Russo-Swedish War against detachments of Finnish peasants. Moreover, many, both Russian and French officers, who adhered to the rules of the medieval knightly code of conduct in war, believed guerrilla methods(sudden attacks from behind on a weak enemy) are not entirely worthy. Nevertheless, one of the leaders of Russian intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Chuykevich, in an analytical note submitted to the command before the start of the war, proposed launching active partisan operations on the flanks and behind enemy lines and using Cossack units for this.

success Russian partisans in the campaign of 1812 contributed to the huge territory of the theater of military operations, their length, elongation and poor coverage of the communication line Great Army. And of course, huge forests. But still, I think the main thing is the support of the population. Guerrilla actions were first used by the Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Observation Army, General A.P. Tormasov, who in July sent a detachment of Colonel K.B. Knorring to Brest-Litovsk and Bialystok. A little later M.B. Barclay de Tolly formed the “flying corps” of Adjutant General F.F. Wintzingerode. By order of Russian military leaders, raid partisan detachments began to actively operate on the flanks of the Great Army in July-August 1812. Only on August 25 (September 6), on the eve of the Battle of Borodino, with the permission of Kutuzov, a party (50 Akhtyrka Hussars and 80 Cossacks) of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. was sent on a “search”. Davydov, that Davydov to whom Soviet historians attributed the role of the initiator and founder of this movement.

The main purpose of the partisans was considered to be actions against the enemy’s operational (communication) line. The party commander enjoyed great independence, receiving from the command only the most general instructions. The partisans' actions were almost exclusively offensive in nature. The key to their success was secrecy and speed of movement, surprise of attack and lightning withdrawal. This, in turn, determined the composition of the partisan parties: they included predominantly light regular (hussars, lancers) and irregular (Don, Bug and other Cossacks, Kalmyks, Bashkirs) cavalry, sometimes reinforced by several pieces of horse artillery. The party size did not exceed several hundred people, this ensured mobility. Infantry was rarely supplied: at the very beginning of the offensive, A.N.’s detachments received one Jaeger company each. Seslavin and A.S. Figner. D.V.’s party operated behind enemy lines for the longest time - 6 weeks. Davydova.

Even on the eve of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian command was thinking about how to attract the huge masses of peasants to resist the enemy, making the war truly popular. It was obvious that religious and patriotic propaganda was needed, an appeal to the peasant masses was needed, a call to them. Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Chuykevich believed, for example, that the people “must be armed and adjusted, as in Spain, with the help of the clergy.” And Barclay de Tolly, as the commander at the theater of military operations, without waiting for anyone’s help, turned on August 1 (13) to the residents of the Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces with calls for “universal armament.”

First of all, armed detachments began to be created on the initiative of the nobility in the Smolensk province. But since the Smolensk region was very soon completely occupied, the resistance here was local and episodic, as in other places where landowners fought off looters with the support of army detachments. In other provinces bordering the theater of military operations, “cordons” were created, consisting of armed peasants, whose main task was to fight looters and small detachments of enemy foragers.

During the stay of the Russian army in the Tarutino camp, the people's war reached its greatest extent. At this time, enemy marauders and foragers are rampant, their outrages and robberies become widespread, and partisan parties, individual militia units and army detachments begin to support the cordon chain. The cordon system was created in Kaluga, Tver, Vladimir, Tula and part of Moscow provinces. It was at this time that the extermination of marauders by armed peasants acquired a massive scale, and among the leaders of peasant detachments G.M. became famous throughout Russia. Urin and E.S. Stulov, E.V. Chetvertakov and F. Potapov, elder Vasilisa Kozhin. According to D.V. Davydov, the extermination of marauders and foragers “was more the work of the villagers than of the parties rushed to inform the enemy for a much more important purpose, which was only to protect property.”

Contemporaries distinguished a people's war from a guerrilla war. Partisan parties, consisting of regular troops and Cossacks, acted offensively in the territory occupied by the enemy, attacking his convoys, transports, artillery parks, and small detachments. Cordons and people's squads, consisting of peasants and townspeople led by retired military and civil officials, were located in a zone not occupied by the enemy, defending their villages from plunder by marauders and foragers.

The partisans became especially active in the fall of 1812, during the stay of Napoleon's army in Moscow. Their constant raids caused irreparable harm to the enemy, kept him in constant voltage. In addition, they delivered operational information to the command. Particularly valuable was the information promptly reported by Captain Seslavin about the French exit from Moscow and about the direction of movement of Napoleonic units to Kaluga. These data allowed Kutuzov to urgently transfer the Russian army to Maloyaroslavets and block the path of Napoleon’s army.

With the beginning of the retreat of the Great Army, the partisan parties were strengthened and on October 8 (20) they were given the task of preventing the enemy from retreating. During the pursuit, partisans often acted together with the vanguard of the Russian army - for example, in the battles of Vyazma, Dorogobuzh, Smolensk, Krasny, Berezina, Vilna; and acted actively right up to the borders Russian Empire, where some of them were disbanded. Contemporaries appreciated the activities of the army partisans and gave them full credit. Following the results of the 1812 campaign, all detachment commanders were generously awarded ranks and orders, and the practice of guerrilla warfare continued in 1813-1814.

It is indisputable that the partisans became one of those important factors(hunger, cold, heroic actions of the Russian army and the Russian people), which ultimately led Napoleon's Grand Army to disaster in Russia. It is almost impossible to calculate the number of enemy soldiers killed and captured by the partisans. In 1812, there was an unspoken practice - not to take prisoners (with the exception of important persons and “tongues”), since the commanders were not interested in separating a convoy from their few parties. The peasants, who were under the influence of official propaganda (all the French are “unchrists”, and Napoleon is “a fiend of hell and the son of Satan”), destroyed all the prisoners, sometimes in savage ways (they buried them alive or burned them, drowned them, etc.). But, it must be said that among the commanders of army partisan detachments, only Figner, according to some contemporaries, used cruel methods towards prisoners.

IN Soviet time the concept of “guerrilla warfare” was reinterpreted in accordance with Marxist ideology, and under the influence of the experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, it began to be interpreted as “the armed struggle of the people, mainly peasants of Russia, and detachments of the Russian army against the French invaders in the rear of Napoleonic troops and on their communications." Soviet authors began to view partisan warfare “as a people’s struggle, generated by the creativity of the masses,” and saw in it “one of the manifestations of the decisive role of the people in the war.” The peasantry was declared to be the initiator of the “people's” guerrilla war, which supposedly began immediately after the invasion of the Great Army into the territory of the Russian Empire, and it was argued that it was under their influence that the Russian command later began to create army partisan detachments.

The statements of a number of Soviet historians that the “partisan” people’s war began in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, that the government banned the arming of the people, that peasant detachments attacked enemy reserves, garrisons and communications and partially joined the army partisan detachments do not correspond to the truth. . The significance and scale of the people's war were enormously exaggerated: it was argued that the partisans and peasants “kept the enemy army under siege” in Moscow, that “the club of the people’s war nailed the enemy” right up to the Russian border. At the same time, the activities of the army partisan detachments turned out to be obscured, and it was they who made a tangible contribution to the defeat of Napoleon’s Grand Army in 1812. Today, historians are re-opening archives and reading documents, now without the ideology and instructions of the leaders that dominate them. And reality reveals itself in an unvarnished and unclouded form.

Denis Davydov is the most famous commander of a partisan detachment in the Patriotic War of 1812. He himself drew up a plan of action for mobile partisan formations against the Napoleonic army and proposed it to Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. The plan was simple: to annoy the enemy in his rear, capture or destroy enemy warehouses with food and fodder, and beat small groups of the enemy.

Under the command of Davydov there were over one and a half hundred hussars and Cossacks. Already in September 1812, in the area of ​​the Smolensk village of Tsarevo-Zaymishche, they captured a French caravan of three dozen carts. Davydov’s cavalrymen killed more than 100 Frenchmen from the accompanying detachment, and captured another 100. This operation was followed by others, also successful.

Davydov and his team did not immediately find support from the local population: at first the peasants mistook them for the French. The commander of the flying detachment even had to put on a peasant caftan, hang an icon of St. Nicholas on his chest, grow a beard and switch to the language of the Russian common people - otherwise the peasants would not believe him.

Over time, Denis Davydov’s detachment increased to 300 people. The cavalrymen attacked French units, which sometimes had a fivefold numerical superiority, and defeated them, taking convoys and freeing prisoners, and sometimes even captured enemy artillery.

After leaving Moscow, on the orders of Kutuzov, flying partisan detachments were created everywhere. These were mainly Cossack formations, each numbering up to 500 sabers. At the end of September, Major General Ivan Dorokhov, who commanded such a formation, captured the town of Vereya near Moscow. United partisan groups could resist large military formations of Napoleon's army. Thus, at the end of October, during a battle in the area of ​​the Smolensk village of Lyakhovo, four partisan detachments completely defeated the more than one and a half thousand brigade of General Jean-Pierre Augereau, capturing him himself. For the French, this defeat turned out to be a terrible blow. Russian troops, this success, on the contrary, encouraged and set me up for further victories.

Small army detachments for operating in the rear on enemy communications in the Russian army, as in other European armies, were used before the War of 1812. In particular, such units operated successfully during the Seven Years' War of 1756–63. By the way, in this war, a small detachment of Cossacks and hussars, operating in the rear and on the flanks of the enemy, was then commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Suvorov. And the Cossack detachments in the campaign of 1807 operated so successfully in the rear of Napoleon’s troops that in one of his bulletins he even called the Cossacks “a disgrace to the human race.”

During the War of 1812, the first large army flying detachment under the command of General F. F. Wintzingerode was created back in August by order of Barclay de Tolly (before the appointment of Kutuzov as commander-in-chief). The future chief of the gendarme corps A.H. Benckendorff, later also the commander of a flying detachment, and the future Decembrist Sergei Volkonsky, who received the rank of colonel for his distinction in battles, fought in this detachment. By the time Davydov turned to Bagration with a request to allow the creation of an army partisan detachment, Wintzingerode had long been smashing the rear of the French.

Shortly before the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov allowed Denis Davydov, who was at that time the commander of a hussar regiment, to form a small flying detachment (army detachments were not called partisans back then). Bagration personally wrote instructions to the detachment commander: “Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment to Mr. Lieutenant Colonel Davydov. Upon receipt of this, please take one hundred and fifty Cossacks from Major General Karpov and fifty hussars of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment. I order you to take all measures to harass the enemy and try to take their foragers not from his flank, but in the middle and in the rear, disrupt convoys and parks, break crossings and take away all means. In a word, I am sure that by making such an important power of attorney to you, you will try to prove your efficiency and diligence and thereby justify my choice. Send your reports to me when you have a convenient opportunity; No one should know about your movements and try to keep them in the most impenetrable secrecy. As for the food of your team, you must take care of that yourself.”

During this period, other similar units were created. But mass actions of army partisans began after leaving Moscow, when each detachment was assigned a specific area of ​​​​operation. Individual detachments consisted of several regiments and could independently solve large combat missions, for example, the detachment of General I.S. Dorokhov, which included 4 cavalry regiments. Large detachments were commanded by colonels Balabin, Vadbolsky, Efremov, Kudashev, captains Seslavin, Fischer. By the way, Davydov’s detachment was one of the smallest.

Army partisan detachments made a significant contribution to the defeat of Napoleonic troops in Russia. In a number of cases, several units were temporarily united to carry out major operations, and also attracted peasant partisan detachments to participate in them. Denis Davydov also maintained close ties with peasant detachments, who operated with his detachment in the area of ​​Medyn and Yukhnov, and then on the route of retreat of Napoleonic troops.

Why did it happen that the most famous were the actions of the partisans under the command of Denis Davydov, whose contribution to the expulsion of the French was much more modest than that of large detachments?

The answer is simple - the military glory of partisan Denis Davydov was ensured by the talented pen of the poet, publicist and military historian Denis Davydov. Back in 1821, he published “An Experience in the Theory of Partisan Action,” and after resigning, as he himself said, “he plunged into military notes.” Written in a fascinating language, his works were very popular in Russia. But these are not as historical and journalistic as literary works. It is not for nothing that former cavalryman, and later Decembrist and writer A.A. Bestuzhev-Marlinsky noted in one of his letters: “Judge Denis Davydov by his words; but let it be said between us, he wrote out more than he cut down his reputation as a brave man.”

Denis Davydov was the first to cover partisan actions in detail in Russian literature. And he did it with talent and fun. Not devoid of ordinary human vanity, we will forgive him this weakness; he often ascribed to himself much more than was in reality. But thanks to his works, it was he who began to be considered in society as the initiator and one of the organizers of the partisan movement, especially since he was already. True, there was a scandal. General Wintzingerode was justifiably indignant, publicly convicting Davydov that he was significantly exaggerating his own merits. But then the matter was quickly hushed up. The rest of the leaders of the partisan detachments, if they were indignant, did so in private correspondence and private conversations, without bringing their opinions to the public court. When Davydov became aware of their statements, he innocently replied: “Thankfully, I have something to say about myself, why not say it?”

Despite Denis Davydov’s personal approach to stories about the Patriotic War of 1812, it was thanks to him that we received a detailed description of the partisan struggle and the selfless actions of many real participants in those events. The first one also belongs to him. theoretical generalization experience of partisan detachments in the Patriotic War. By the way, it was Davydov’s works that Leo Tolstoy used when creating War and Peace, making Denis himself the prototype of one of his heroes. At the same time, Tolstoy, who thoroughly studied the War of 1812, perfectly understood Davydov’s true role in organizing the partisan movement.

In one of his later poems, Denis Davydov said about himself: “I am not a poet, I am a partisan, a Cossack.” He was very proud of his partisan deeds, fortunately, and in fact there was something to be proud of. And the fact that he exaggerated his role in partisan actions is not the case with any memoirist, and even more so with a hussar.

Patriotic War of 1812. Guerrilla movement

Introduction

The partisan movement was a vivid expression of the national character of the Patriotic War of 1812. Having broken out after the invasion of Napoleonic troops into Lithuania and Belarus, it developed every day and became more and more active forms and became a formidable force.

At first, the partisan movement was spontaneous, consisting of performances by small, scattered partisan detachments, then it captured entire areas. Large detachments began to be created, thousands appeared folk heroes, talented organizers of the partisan struggle came forward.

Why did the disenfranchised peasantry, mercilessly oppressed by the feudal landowners, rise up to fight against their seemingly “liberator”? Napoleon did not even think about any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their powerless situation. If at first promising phrases were uttered about the emancipation of the serfs and there was even talk about the need to issue some kind of proclamation, then this was only a tactical move with the help of which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landowners.

Napoleon understood that the liberation of Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which is what he feared most. Yes, this did not meet his political goals when joining Russia. According to Napoleon's comrades, it was “important for him to strengthen monarchism in France and it was difficult for him to preach revolution to Russia.”

The purpose of the work is to consider Denis Davydov as a hero of the partisan war and a poet. Work objectives to consider:

1. Reasons for the emergence of partisan movements

2. Partisan movement of D. Davydov

3. Denis Davydov as a poet

1. Reasons for the emergence of partisan detachments

The beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of Alexander I of July 6, 1812, which supposedly allowed the peasants to take up arms and actively participate in the struggle. In reality the situation was different. Without waiting for orders from their superiors, when the French approached, residents fled into the forests and swamps, often leaving their homes to be looted and burned.

The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position than they had been in before. The peasants also associated the fight against foreign enslavers with the hope of liberating them from serfdom.

At the beginning of the war, the struggle of the peasants acquired the character of mass abandonment of villages and villages and the movement of the population to forests and areas remote from military operations. And although this was still a passive form of struggle, it created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic army. The French troops, having a limited supply of food and fodder, quickly began to experience an acute shortage of them. This did not take long to affect the deterioration general condition armies: horses began to die, soldiers began to starve, and looting intensified. Even before Vilna, more than 10 thousand horses died.

The actions of peasant partisan detachments were both defensive and offensive in nature. In the area of ​​Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev, detachments of peasant partisans made frequent day and night raids on enemy convoys, destroyed their foragers, and captured French soldiers. Napoleon was forced more and more often to remind the chief of staff Berthier about the large losses in people and strictly ordered to allocate all large quantity troops to cover the foragers.

2. Partisan detachment of Denis Davydov

Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played a major role in the war. The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly.

Its commander was General F.F. Wintsengerode, who led the united Kazan Dragoon, Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of ​​​​Dukhovshchina.

After the invasion of Napoleonic troops, peasants began to go into the forests, partisan heroes began to create peasant detachments and attack individual French teams. The struggle of the partisan detachments unfolded with particular force after the fall of Smolensk and Moscow. The partisan troops boldly attacked the enemy and captured the French. Kutuzov allocated a detachment to operate behind enemy lines under the leadership of D. Davydov, whose detachment disrupted the enemy’s communication routes, freed prisoners, and inspired the local population to fight the invaders. Following the example of Denisov’s detachment, by October 1812, 36 Cossacks, 7 cavalry, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and other units, including artillery, were operating.

Residents of the Roslavl district created several mounted and foot partisan detachments, arming them with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their district from the enemy, but also attacked the marauders making their way into the neighboring Elny district. Many partisan detachments operated in Yukhnovsky district. Having organized defense along the Ugra River, they blocked the enemy’s path in Kaluga and provided significant assistance to the army partisans of Denis Davydov’s detachment.

The detachment of Denis Davydov was a real threat for the French. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment. Together with his hussars, he retreated as part of Bagration’s army to Borodin. A passionate desire to bring even greater benefit in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov to “ask for a separate detachment.” He was strengthened in this intention by Lieutenant M.F. Orlov, who was sent to Smolensk to clarify the fate of the seriously wounded General P.A. Tuchkov, who was captured. After returning from Smolensk, Orlov spoke about the unrest and poor rear protection in the French army.

While driving through the territory occupied by Napoleonic troops, he realized how vulnerable the French food warehouses, guarded by small detachments, were. At the same time, he saw how difficult it was for flying peasant detachments to fight without a coordinated plan of action. According to Orlov, small army detachments sent behind enemy lines could inflict great damage on him and help the actions of the partisans.

D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment to operate behind enemy lines. For a “test,” Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and -1280 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids behind enemy lines. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaimishch, Slavkoy, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments and captured a convoy with ammunition.

In the fall of 1812, partisan detachments surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring.

A detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Davydov, reinforced by two Cossack regiments, operated between Smolensk and Gzhatsk. A detachment of General I.S. Dorokhov operated from Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk. Captain A.S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow.

In the area of ​​Mozhaisk and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks. Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of captain A. N. Seslavin. Colonel N.D. Kudashiv was sent to the Serpukhov road with two Cossack regiments. On the Ryazan road there was a detachment of Colonel I. E. Efremov. From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of F.F. Wintsengerode, who, separating small detachments from himself to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked access for Napoleon’s troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region.

Partisan detachments operated in difficult conditions. At first there were many difficulties. Even residents of villages and villages at first treated the partisans with great distrust, often mistaking them for enemy soldiers. Often the hussars had to dress in peasant caftans and grow beards.

The partisan detachments did not stand in one place, they were constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The partisans' actions were sudden and swift. To swoop down out of the blue and quickly hide became the main rule of the partisans.

The detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, and took dozens and hundreds of prisoners.

Davydov’s detachment on the evening of September 3, 1812 went to Tsarev-Zamishch. Not reaching 6 versts to the village, Davydov sent reconnaissance there, which established that there was a large French convoy with shells, guarded by 250 horsemen. The detachment at the edge of the forest was discovered by French foragers, who rushed to Tsarevo-Zamishche to warn their own. But Davydov did not let them do this. The detachment rushed in pursuit of the foragers and almost burst into the village together with them. The convoy and its guards were taken by surprise, and an attempt by a small group of French to resist was quickly suppressed. 130 soldiers, 2 officers, 10 carts with food and fodder ended up in the hands of the partisans.

3. Denis Davydov as a poet

Denis Davydov was a wonderful romantic poet. He belonged to the genre of romanticism.

It should be noted that almost always in human history, a nation that has been subjected to aggression creates a powerful layer of patriotic literature. This was the case, for example, during the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus'. And only some time later, having recovered from the blow, having overcome pain and hatred, thinkers and poets think about all the horrors of the war for both sides, about its cruelty and senselessness. This is very clearly reflected in the poems of Denis Davydov.

In my opinion, Davydov’s poem is one of the outbursts of patriotic militancy caused by the invasion of the enemy.

What did this unshakable strength of the Russians consist of?

This strength was made up of patriotism not in words, but in deeds the best people from the nobility, poets and simply the Russian people.

This strength consisted of the heroism of the soldiers and best officers of the Russian army.

This invincible force consisted of the heroism and patriotism of Muscovites who left hometown, no matter how sorry it is for them to leave their property to destruction.

The invincible strength of the Russians consisted of the actions of partisan detachments. This is Denisov's detachment, where the most the right person- Tikhon Shcherbaty, people's avenger. Partisan detachments destroyed Napoleonic army piece by piece.

So, Denis Davydov in his works depicts the war of 1812 as a people’s war, a Patriotic War, when the entire people rose to defend the Motherland. And the poet did this with enormous artistic power, creating a grandiose poem - an epic that has no equal in the world.

The work of Denis Davydov can be illustrated as follows:

Who could cheer you up so much, my friend?

You can hardly speak from laughter.

What joys delight your mind, Or do they lend you money without a bill?

Or a happy waist has come to you

And did the pair of trantels take the endurance test?

What happened to you that you don’t answer?

Ay! give me a rest, you know nothing!

I'm really beside myself, I almost went crazy:

Today I found Petersburg completely different!

I thought that the whole world had completely changed:

Imagine - with debt<арышки>n paid;

There are no more pedants and fools to be seen,

And even wiser<агряжск>oh, S<вистун>ov!

There is no courage in the unfortunate rhymers of old,

And our dear Marin does not stain papers,

And, deepening into the service, he works with his head:

How, when starting a platoon, shout at the right time: stop!

But what I was more delighted by was:

Co.<пь>Ev, who pretended to be Lycurgus,

For our happiness he wrote laws for us,

Suddenly, fortunately for us, he stopped writing them.

A happy change has appeared in everything,

Theft, robbery, treason have disappeared,

No more complaints or grievances are visible,

Well, in a word, the city took on a completely disgusting appearance.

Nature gave beauty to the ugly,

And L himself<ава>did he stop looking askance at nature,

B<агратио>became an inch shorter on the nose,

I D<иб>I frightened people with my beauty,

Yes, I, who myself, from the beginning of my century,

It was a stretch to bear the name of a person,

I look, I’m happy, I don’t recognize myself:

Where the beauty comes from, where the growth comes from - I look;

Every word is bon mot, every look is passion,

I’m amazed how I manage to change my intrigues!

Suddenly, oh the wrath of heaven! suddenly fate struck me:

Among the blissful days Andryushka woke up,

And everything I saw, what I had so much fun with -

I saw everything in a dream, and lost everything in the dream.

In a smoky field, on a bivouac

By the blazing fires

In the beneficial arak

I see the savior of people.

Gather in a circle

Orthodox is all to blame!

Give me the golden tub,

Where fun lives!

Pour out vast cups

In the noise of joyful speeches,

How our ancestors drank

Among spears and swords.

Burtsev, you are a hussar of hussars!

You're on a crazy horse

The cruelest of frenzy

And a rider in war!

Let's hit cup and cup together!

Today it’s still too late to drink;

Tomorrow the trumpets will sound,

Tomorrow there will be thunder.

Let's drink and swear

That we indulge in a curse,

If we ever

Let's give way, turn pale,

Let's pity our breasts

And in misfortune we become timid;

If we ever give

Left side on the flank,

Or we'll rein in the horse,

Or a cute little cheat

Let's give our hearts for free!

Let it not be with a saber strike

My life will be cut short!

Let me be a general

How many I have seen!

Let among the bloody battles

I will be pale, fearful,

And in the meeting of heroes

Sharp, brave, talkative!

Let my mustache, the beauty of nature,

Black-brown, in curls,

Will be cut off in youth

And it will disappear like dust!

Let fortune be for vexation,

To multiply all troubles,

He will give me a rank for shift parades

And "Georgia" for the advice!

Let... But chu! This is not the time to walk!

To the horses, brother, and your foot in the stirrup,

Saber out - and cut!

Here is another feast God gives us,

And noisier and more fun...

Come on, put your shako on one side,

And - hurray! Happy day!

V. A. Zhukovsky

Zhukovsky, dear friend! Debt is rewarded by payment:

I read the poems you dedicated to me;

Now read mine, you are smoked in the bivouac

And sprinkled with wine!

It's been a long time since I chatted with either the muse or you,

Did I care about my feet?..

.........................................
But even in the thunderstorms of war, still on the battlefield,

When the Russian camp went out,

I greeted you with a huge glass

An impudent partisan wandering in the steppes!

Conclusion

It was not by chance that the War of 1812 received the name Patriotic War. The popular character of this war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in the victory of Russia. Responding to accusations of “war not according to the rules,” Kutuzov said that these were the feelings of the people. Responding to a letter from Marshal Bertha, he wrote on October 8, 1818: “It is difficult to stop a people embittered by everything they have seen; a people who for so many years have not known war on their territory; a people ready to sacrifice themselves for their Motherland... ". Activities aimed at attracting the masses to active participation in the war were based on the interests of Russia, correctly reflected the objective conditions of the war and took into account the broad opportunities that emerged in the national liberation war.

During the preparation for the counteroffensive, the combined forces of the army, militia and partisans constrained the actions of Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on enemy personnel, and destroyed military property. The Smolenskaya-10 road, which remained the only guarded postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subject to partisan raids. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable ones were delivered to the main apartment of the Russian army.

The partisan actions of the peasants were highly appreciated by the Russian command. “The peasants,” wrote Kutuzov, “from the villages adjacent to the theater of war inflict on the enemy greatest harm... They kill the enemies in large numbers, and take those captured to the army." The peasants of the Kaluga province alone killed and captured more than 6 thousand French.

And yet, one of the most heroic actions of 1812 remains the feat of Denis Davydov and his squad.

Bibliography

1. Zhilin P. A. The death of Napoleonic army in Russia. M., 1974. History of France, vol. 2. M., 2001.-687p.

2. History of Russia 1861-1917, ed. V. G. Tyukavkina, Moscow: INFRA, 2002.-569 p.

3. Orlik O. V. Thunderstorm of the twelfth year.... M.: INFRA, 2003.-429 p.

4. Platonov S. F. Textbook of Russian history for high school M., 2004.-735p.

5. Reader on the History of Russia 1861-1917, ed. V. G. Tyukavkina - Moscow: DROFA, 2000.-644 p.