Prut campaign 1710 1711. Prut campaign

The successes of the Russian army in the Baltic states and on the Karelian Isthmus created the conditions for a further attack on Sweden, but these plans were interrupted by the war with the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan, under pressure from the Swedish monarch, the French ambassador and the Crimean Khan, decided to start a war with the Russian state.

The Poltava victory made a dual impression on Istanbul: on the one hand, the complete defeat of the “invincible” Swedish army inspired the Turks with respect for the “Muscovites,” but on the other, fear of their formidable neighbor grew. Russia owned the approaches to Sea of ​​Azov, a strong fleet in the south and could gain access to the Black Sea. In Istanbul they began to fear for their possessions in the northern Black Sea region and for the Crimea. Charles XII and the Crimean Khan played on these fears. As a result, the Russian command had to postpone its well-established operations in the Baltic states and plans to invade the Swedish Empire. The main forces had to be transferred south for operations on the Danube Front.

Background to the conflict

It should be noted that during the Northern War, Russia tried to maintain good relations with Turkey in order to have freedom of action in the war with Sweden. Outright bribery of Turkish dignitaries was also used - the Russian ambassador Pyotr Tolstoy generously distributed money and furs. Before Battle of Poltava A document signed by Peter was sent to the capital of the Ottoman Empire, which confirmed the terms of the peace treaty of 1700 (peace for 30 years). In addition, Peter ordered 10 ships of the Voronezh and Azov flotillas to be scrapped, which caused great satisfaction in Istanbul. After the peace of 1700, Russia's relations with Turkey and Crimea were relatively normal, although they could not be called good neighbors. For example, the Crimean Tatars violated the Russian border more than once.

Karl tried to drag Turkey into a war with Russia back in 1708-1709, but without success. Poltava changed the situation; part of the Turkish elite began to fear the sharp strengthening of Russia. In August 1709, the Russian ambassador to Turkey P. A. Tolstoy informed Chancellor G. I. Golovkin: “The Turks see that the Tsar’s Majesty is now the winner of the strong Swedish people and wants to arrange everything according to his wishes in Poland, and then, having no longer no obstacle, he can start a war with them, the Turks.” After the defeat at Poltava, Karl fled to the possessions of the Ottoman Empire and organized a camp in Bendery. He suggested that the Porte enter into an alliance with Sweden, but the Turks had doubts and took an evasive position. The “Peace Party” turned out to be stronger, and on January 3 (14), Istanbul confirmed its loyalty to the peace agreement of 1700. This caused Peter great joy; magnificent celebrations were organized in Moscow and Krakow.

But, unfortunately, this was not the end. The situation remained uncertain. There was a strong “war party” - it included the vizier and Crimean Khan Devlet II Giray. In addition, the Turks had a desire to expel Charles from their possessions so that he would continue the active war with Russia, while Turkey would remain on the sidelines. Karl was in no hurry to leave Bendery, his envoys - S. Poniatovsky and I. Pototsky - conducted intensive negotiations with the Turks. Charles drew up a plan for a simultaneous invasion of Poland from the north and south. From Pomerania and Bremen, 18 thousand Krassau corps were supposed to strike Saxony and Poland. And the Turkish army will move out from the area of ​​​​Bendery and Ochakovo. These forces should have been enough to defeat the troops of the Polish king Augustus II and the Russian auxiliary corps. After this, Karl wanted to restore Stanislav Leszczynski to the throne of Poland and strike Russia again.

Soon the Porte began to lean toward war with Russia. Vizier Numan Köprülü Pasha actually presented an ultimatum to Russia. He said that Karl with a Turkish “escort” of 40 thousand people would pass through Poland to Pomerania. The Russian auxiliary corps was “suggested” not to interfere and leave Poland. Russian intelligence reported in August that the Ottoman Empire was preparing to invade Polish territory.

Russia tried to resolve the matter peacefully. On July 17 (28), Peter sent a letter to Sultan Ahmed III, in which he warned that the presence of 40 thousand troops under Charles would be taken as a “clear break in the peace.” Russia agreed to 3 thousand escorts, and from the Turks, and not the Crimean Tatars, prone to “destroying the world.” Russia's attempts to resolve the matter diplomatically were perceived in Istanbul as weakness. The Turks behaved more and more aggressively. The royal couriers were detained at the border and thrown into prison. Relations with Turkey were severed. The agents reported that 10 thousand troops were already stationed in Bendery, artillery and engineering specialists were being assembled. On October 18 (29), 1710, Peter sent a new letter to the Sultan, where he asked about the Porte’s intentions regarding Charles and demanded the immediate expulsion of the Swedish king from Turkish territory. The Tsar promised that otherwise Russia would begin military preparations and move troops to the Turkish borders. Istanbul ignored this message.

The Russian ambassador Tolstoy was arrested and imprisoned in the Seven Tower Castle, but he was able to report that the war had begun. The Turks were busy with the war in Lebanon, so the main striking force was initially supposed to be the Crimean Tatars, Polish supporters of Stanislav Leshchinsky, Zaporozhye Cossacks of Konstantin Gordienko, Ukrainian Cossacks of Hetman of Right Bank Ukraine Philip Orlik (he was chosen to replace the deceased Mazepa). A formal declaration of war followed on November 20, 1710.

Plans of the parties, concentration of troops

In December 1710, Khan of the Crimean Horde Devlet II Giray met with the Swedish monarch in Bendery Charles XII and Hetman of Right Bank Ukraine Pylyp Orlyk. It was decided to strike Right Bank Ukraine with the combined forces of the Khan’s son Mehmed Giray with the Orlik Cossacks and Poles (opponents of the Russian Tsar). At the same time, the forces of the Crimean Khan himself were supposed to advance in Left Bank Ukraine together with the Zaporozhye Cossacks.

The Russian government, having received information about the outbreak of war with Turkey, immediately responded. Field Marshal Sheremetev received orders to begin transferring 22 infantry regiments under the command of Repnin and Allart to the area of ​​Minsk and Slutsk. Recruitment replenishments were supposed to go there through Smolensk. The redeployment of artillery under the command of Bruce began. The commander of the Russian forces in Poland, M. M. Golitsyn, was ordered to concentrate his forces at Kamenets-Podolsky on the border with Moldova. To increase his forces, the Ingermanland and Astrakhan regiments were sent from the Baltic states. Golitsyn had to prevent Charles from passing through Poland, and when trying to take Kamenets-Podolsky, hold him back. He had the right to retreat only when “excessive Turkish force” appeared. Golitsyn and the Russian ambassador to Poland were also instructed to monitor the mood of the Polish gentry and prevent them from going over to the Turkish or Swedish side. Kiev governor D. M. Golitsyn and hetman I. I. Skoropadsky received orders to defend Ukraine and the Azov region. Admiral F. M. Apraksin, together with Kalmyk detachments, was responsible for protecting the southeastern borders of the state. For troops being transferred from the Baltic states, it was planned to establish food stores in the Kyiv region and the Moldovan border. Peter paid considerable attention to preparing troops to fight a new enemy. Considering the fact that the basis of the enemy army was cavalry, the tsar ordered an emphasis on fire training of dragoons. The Turkish and Tatar cavalry were going to be opposed by rifle and artillery fire from infantry protected by slingshots.

Turkey's entry into the war on Karl's side radically changed the military-political situation. It was necessary to temporarily abandon active hostilities against Sweden and direct the main efforts against the new enemy. In order to cover the main group of the Russian army from a possible attack by Krassau forces from Pomerania, a separate corps was created in Poland. To form it, a 6 thousand detachment of brigadier Yakovlev’s dragoons was sent, and 8-10 thousand Boura dragoons were transferred from Livonia. The remaining forces in the Baltic States were headed by Menshikov. The Riga garrison was to be replenished with 10 thousand soldiers from internal garrisons and recruits.

In addition, Peter also tried to resolve the matter through peaceful negotiations. In January 1711, he sent a new letter to the Turkish Sultan, proposing not to bring the matter to war. But this letter also remained unanswered.

In February 1711, it became known that Turkey was ready to field up to 120 thousand people, and together with the troops of the Crimean Khan, the number of enemy armed forces would grow to 200 thousand. The essence of the strategic plan of the Turkish command was to concentrate the main forces in the area of ​​​​Bendery and the Lower Danube, and then launch an offensive in the direction of Bendery - Iasi - Kamenets-Podolsky and further deep into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Charles was to follow with the Turkish army to link up with the forces of Crassau in Pomerania. In order to divert the main Russian forces, two auxiliary strikes were launched - on the Right Bank and Left Bank Ukraine. An attack was planned on Azov and Taganrog, as well as Voronezh.

The Russian command was deciding which strategy to choose - offensive or defensive. Wait for an invasion on your territory or transfer the fighting to enemy territory. In general terms, the plan was ready by the end of 1710. Peter decided to lead the army and go on a decisive offensive in order to thwart the plans of the Turkish command and Charles. The final version of the plan was adopted at the military council on January 1 (12), 1711. They decided to cover the border with the Crimean Khanate with an auxiliary corps and launch an offensive on the Danube. Thus, the Russian command was going to prevent the enemy from occupying Moldova as a springboard for the invasion of Poland. The Russian plan was largely focused on the fact that Moldavia and Wallachia would be good allies. Delegations of Moldavian and Wallachian boyars “knocked down the thresholds” of Russia, begging the tsar for the Orthodox state to accept them into its composition (both Christian principalities were vassals of the Ottoman Empire). The ruler of Wallachia, Constantin Brancoveanu, back in 1709 promised 30 thousand troops and food supplies if Russia opposed the Turks and promised to take the principality under its protection. In April 1711, Peter I concluded the secret Treaty of Lutsk with the Moldavian ruler Dmitry Cantemir. Cantemir became a vassal of the Russian Tsar, promised his army and assistance in food supplies, receiving as a reward a privileged position in Moldova and the opportunity to pass on the throne by inheritance. In addition, they expected that the Serbs and Montenegrins would act against Turkey, drawing off part of the forces of the enemy army.

Beginning of the war

In January 1711, the Crimean Khan moved 80-90 thousand troops to Ukraine. The horde was divided into two parts: on the left bank of the Dnieper, the khan led up to 40 thousand soldiers, on the right bank Mehmed Giray went to Kiev with 40 thousand Tatars, who united with the Cossacks, Orlik’s supporters, Poles and a small detachment of Swedes.

There were no significant Russian forces in Left Bank Ukraine: 11 thousand soldiers of Major General F. F. Shidlovsky stood in the Kharkov region, part of Apraksin near Voronezh and 5 thousand Don Cossacks. Devlet-Girey, without encountering much resistance, reached the Kharkov region. He planned to unite with the forces of the Kuban Horde and strike Voronezh, destroying the shipyards and the Voronezh flotilla. But the Nogais were detained by Kalmyks allied with Russia. The Crimean army faced the Belgorod and Izyum defensive lines. As a result, in mid-March the Crimean Tatars retreated to Crimea.

In Right Bank Ukraine, the combined forces of the Crimean Tatars, Orlikovites, Cossacks and Poles were also initially successful. They captured a number of fortifications, but soon disagreements began between them. Poles and Cossacks argued about the future of Ukraine, the Crimean Tatars were more interested in the capture and abduction of people for sale into slavery than war. At the end of March, the garrison of Belaya Tserkov (1 thousand people) repelled the assault and made successful forays; the Crimean Tatars suffered heavy losses. Soon Golitsyn forced the enemy to retreat to Bendery.

Prut campaign

At this time, the main forces of the Russian army under the command of Sheremetev were moving from the Baltic states to Ukraine. On April 12-13 (23-24) a military council was held in Lutsk. It focused on the timing and places of concentration of troops, the problem of supply, and the preparation of ships for crossing the Dniester. On May 30 (June 10), troops were gathered near the city of Bratslav near the borders of Moldova.

The advanced units of the Russian army safely crossed the Dniester. The local population greeted the Russian army kindly. The ruler of the Moldavian principality, Dmitry Cantemir, went over to the side of Russia and called on the people to revolt against the Turks. But problems immediately arose: there was no ready-made food prepared, and it was difficult to obtain it. Cantemir added only 5-6 thousand people (and poorly armed ones) to the Russian vanguard. A message was received that approximately 40 thousand Turkish army was seven marches away from the Danube, Russian troops had to make ten marches. Sheremetev had 15 thousand people and at the military council on June 8 (19) they decided to wait for the main forces to arrive.

The main forces, led by Peter, advanced to the city of Soroca in June. On June 9 (20) they moved towards Iasi and after a difficult march joined the vanguard of Sheremetev. The supply situation continued to deteriorate. The fields of Moldova were devastated by locusts. On June 28 (July 9), the military council decided to send a 7 thousand cavalry detachment of General K. Renne to Brailov in order to seize the food supplies collected there by the Turks. In addition, this raid was supposed to prompt the ruler of Wallachia Brincovean to go over to the side of Russia. The main forces were supposed to go along the right bank of the Prut to the Falchi tract, and from there to the Siret River, where they were going to link up with the Renne detachment at Galati.

Battle

A few days later, the Russian command received a message that the main forces of the Turkish army, led by the vizier Baltaji Mehmed Pasha, were standing at the town of Trayan near the mouth of the Prut. A detachment of Janus von Eberstedt was sent to meet the Turks. He received the task of preventing the enemy from crossing the river. On the morning of July 7 (18), Eberstedt’s detachment was on the spot and discovered the Turkish vanguard, which was preparing to cross. The general did not fulfill his duty. He retreated without interfering with the crossing. In addition, he deceived the command - he reported that Turkish forces crossed the Prut, although the main enemy forces approached the river only in the evening and began crossing the next day. This led to serious consequences, the Russian army was cut off from the Renne detachment. The army at that time was in the Stanilesti region. Peter assembled a military council. It was decided to retreat north along the Prut River and give battle in a convenient place. The property that slowed down the movement was destroyed and the Russian army began an organized retreat.

The Preobrazhensky Regiment and the bombardment company, marching in the rearguard, repelled the attacks of the Turkish and Tatar cavalry for six hours. The movement was short-lived; after a few kilometers the army stopped at the New Stanilesti tract. They began to build a fortified camp. It was an irregular triangle, the base of which was facing the Prut River, and the apex was facing the enemy. There were troops on both sides of the triangle. Within the battle formation there were artillery and cavalry. A Wagenburg was built closer to the river. The right flank was covered by swamps, so on this side we limited ourselves to protection with the help of slingshots. The left flank was strengthened not only with slingshots, but also with solid trenches.

Soon the Turks surrounded the Russian camp, part of their army occupied the commanding heights on the other side of the river. On July 9 (20), three hours before sunset, 20 thousand Janissaries (a selected part of the Turkish armed forces), without waiting for the main forces and artillery to approach, went on the attack. The Allart division met them with a powerful volley almost point-blank, which cooled the enemy's ardor. The Turks were confused and retreated. They made several more attacks, but they were repulsed by skillful rifle and artillery fire. The Turks lost 7-8 thousand people. The Russian army lost 2.6 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners. The energetic resistance of the Russian army and huge losses produced a huge negative impression on the enemy. The assistant vizier told the military adviser to the Turkish army S. Poniatovsky: “... we risk being defeated, and this will inevitably happen.” But Peter, not knowing general situation, did not dare to lead the army in a counterattack and defeat the Turkish forces piecemeal. Peter also refused the night sortie. Some researchers believe that this was a big mistake. The Russian army could take advantage of the demoralization of the best Turkish forces and turn the situation in its favor.

By nightfall the battle had died down. The Turks began to build fortifications and brought up artillery. An artillery duel began, which continued until the morning. Night attempts by the Turks to go on the offensive were repulsed. The situation was difficult: there was a shortage of ammunition and food, people did not rest for more than three days, most of the cavalry left Renne. The Russian army was inferior in the number of fighters and in the number of gun barrels: Russian regiments numbered about 38 thousand people with 122 guns, the Turks had 130-135 thousand people (with the Crimean Tatars their army increased to 200 thousand) and more than 400 guns. At the same time, the Russian army was a formidable monolithic force with high morale. The Turks were dejected by the heavy losses, and when in the morning the vizier tried to raise the soldiers for a new attack, they responded with a categorical refusal.

On the morning of July 10 (21), the Turks continued artillery shelling of Russian positions. It was conducted from the opposite bank of the Prut and lasted until two o'clock in the afternoon. This made it difficult to supply troops with water. A military council was convened: it was decided to offer the vizier a truce, and in case of refusal, to launch a decisive attack with all his might: “not to the stomach, but to death, not showing mercy to anyone and not asking for mercy from anyone.” The Turks did not respond to the message. The Russians continued to strengthen the camp and at the same time prepare for a breakthrough to the north. A second message was sent to the Turks, it said that if there was no response again, the army would go on the attack. The Turks again remained silent. Peter gave the order to form up and launch an attack, but as soon as the Russian regiments had passed a few dozen fathoms, the Turkish command announced that they were ready for negotiations. The representative of the Swedish king S. Poniatovsky and the Crimean Khan were against the negotiations; they believed that they had to wait a few days, then the Russians would begin to starve and they would capitulate. But their opinion was not taken into account. A truce was concluded for 48 hours and negotiations began.

Peaceful agreement

The negotiations were entrusted to Vice-Chancellor Pyotr Pavlovich Shafirov. He received the broadest powers and consent to difficult conditions, except for the surrender of the army. The Turks demanded to give up Azov, destroy the fortresses of Taganrog, Kamenny Zaton, Samara, extradite the Moldavian ruler Cantemir, the representative of Russia in Montenegro and Moldova Savva Raguzinsky, reimburse the tribute not received from Moldova, liquidate the Russian embassy in Istanbul, give up all artillery and equipment. Shafirov immediately refused a number of conditions - the extradition of Cantemir, Raguzinsky, artillery, and reimbursement of Moldavian tribute. The Turks did not insist. But they demanded Sheremetev, his son and Shafirov as hostages as a guarantor of Russia’s fulfillment of the terms of the peace treaty. At this time, two meetings were held in the Russian camp; it was decided to make a breakthrough if the negotiations failed.

On June 12 (23) the peace treaty was signed. It should be noted that at this time Renne successfully continued his raid - on July 14 (25) he took Brailov by storm, capturing large supplies of food. Two days later, Peter ordered him to leave. The Swedes tried to change the situation. Poniatowski gave money to the Janissaries so that they would rebel against the vizier, they took the money and expressed condolences to the Swedes. Karl rode up from Bendery. The Swedish king demanded to break the peace and give him an army to attack Russian positions. The vizier refused. The Turks decided the matter little blood– Russia agreed to destroy the fortresses on the border with the Crimean Khanate, and lost access to the Sea of ​​Azov. As a result, the main goal of the Porte was fulfilled, and the Turks did not want to die for the interests of Sweden. The Turkish command was so pleased that they treated the recent enemy favorably - the vizier made a gift of 1,200 carts of bread and rice. Shafirov reported from the vizier's headquarters that they were being treated kindly. In the capital of the Ottoman Empire, having learned about peace, they celebrated for several days (this war was not popular).

After the peace was signed, the Russian army with unfurled banners and the beating of drums moved north. The Prut campaign was completed. This campaign in Once again showed the high fighting qualities of the Russian army, the courage and tenacity of Russian soldiers and officers. It demonstrated the superiority of a well-organized and disciplined army over large numbers of brave but poorly controlled Turkish soldiers. At the same time, this operation revealed a number of serious shortcomings: the Russian command launched an offensive in an unfamiliar theater of military operations without thorough reconnaissance and preparation of the rear, and supplying troops. Too much hope was placed on the allies. In some respects, Peter repeated the mistakes of Charles (though not with such a catastrophic result). In addition, some foreign officers played a negative role in this war. After the campaign, Peter carried out a “cleansing” of the command staff: 12 generals, 14 colonels, 22 lieutenant colonels and 156 captains were dismissed from service.

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Peter I, after his victory over Charles XII, who was considered the best commander in Europe at that time, apparently believed in the power of his army and in his abilities as a strategist. And not only he himself believed in it, but also his entire court, the government and even his generals. The frivolity in the preparation, organization and implementation of the campaign was simply incredible. As a result, only some miracle allowed him, his wife Catherine and members of Peter’s government, who for some reason were dragged along with the army, to remain alive. But Peter lost the army, the one that defeated the Swedes. The corpses of soldiers were lying all along the retreat route.

Prut campaign of 1711.

Peter I's plan was specific - to cross the Danube a little higher from its confluence with the Black Sea and move across Bulgaria to the southwest until the second capital of the Sultan, Adrianople, was threatened. (The Turkish name of the city is Edirne. It was the capital of Turkey in 1365 - 1453). In Adrianople, Peter hoped for reinforcements from 30 thousand Vlachs and 10 thousand Moldovans. To justify his campaign in the Balkans, Peter used a proven ideological weapon - the Orthodox faith. His address to the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula who professed Christianity said: “It is necessary for all good, pure and noble hearts, despising fear and difficulties, not only to fight for the Church and the Orthodox faith, but also last blood shed".

There were a lot of people who wanted to take part in the celebration of Moscow weapons. Everyone wanted to be present at the great victory over Turkey, and especially over the Crimean Khanate. After all, back in 1700, Peter and his Muscovite kingdom paid a humiliating tribute to the Crimean Tatars. The whole world knew about this humiliation and constantly reminded the Muscovites. So Dosifei, the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, wrote: “There are only a handful of Crimean Tatars... and yet they boast that they receive tribute from you. The Tatars are Turkish subjects, it follows that you are Turkish subjects.” That is why the Chancellor of the State G.I. Golovkin, Vice-Chancellor P.P. Shafirov, clergyman Feofan Prokopovich, Catherine, about two dozen court ladies and many others ended up in Peter’s convoy. It was supposed to recapture Constantinople from the Turks and subordinate to Moscow the lands that were once part of the Byzantine Empire. Our intentions were serious, but we were going on a picnic.

Having celebrated the two-year anniversary of the Poltava victory with his guards regiments on June 27 (July 8, 1711) in the steppes of Moldavia and drinking his favorite Magyar wine, Peter on the same day sent his cavalry, 7 thousand sabers, under the command of General Rene for the capture of the Danube city of Brailov, where the Turkish army, moving towards the Muscovites, concentrated its supplies. General Rene had to capture them, or, as a last resort, burn them. And three days later the infantry crossed the Prut and moved south along the western bank in three columns. The first was led by General Janus, the second by the Tsar, and the third by Repnin. On July 8, the vanguard units of General Janus met the Turkish troops and retreated to the royal column. The Tsar's orders to Repnin to urgently bring a third column to help the first two were in vain. Repnin's soldiers were pinned down by the Tatar cavalry in Stanilesti and could not move. The alarmed king ordered a retreat towards Stanileshti. The retreat began at night and continued all morning. It was a terrible transition. The Turks were hot on their heels and continuously attacked Peter's rearguard. Tatar detachments galloped back and forth between the carts of the convoy, and almost all of it perished. The exhausted infantry suffered from thirst. The Turks completely surrounded the defenders' camp on the banks of the Prut. Turkish artillery approached - the guns were deployed in a wide semicircle so that by nightfall 300 guns were looking at the camp with their muzzles. Thousands of Tatar cavalry controlled the opposite bank. There was nowhere to run. The soldiers were so exhausted from hunger and heat that many could no longer fight. It was not easy to even get water from the river - those sent for water came under heavy fire.

They dug a shallow hole in the middle of the camp, where they hid Catherine and the accompanying ladies. This shelter, fenced with carts, was a pitiful defense against Turkish cannonballs. The women cried and howled. The next morning a decisive Turkish offensive was expected. One can only imagine what thoughts overwhelmed Peter. The likelihood that he, the Moscow Tsar, the Poltava winner, would be defeated and transported in a cage through the streets of Constantinople was very high.

What did the king do? Here are the words of Peter's contemporary F.I. Soimonov: "... the Tsar's Majesty did not order to enter into the general battle... He ordered... to place a white flag among the trenches..." The white flag meant surrender. Peter ordered his envoy, P.P. Shafirov, to agree to any conditions “except slavery,” but to insist on immediate signing, because the troops were dying of hunger. And here are the lines from P.P. Shafirov’s report to the tsar: “... the vizier ordered to be with him. And when we came to him, the Crimean Khan and a man with ten Kube-viziers and a pasha, including the Janissary aga, were sitting with him ... and the khan stood up and went out angry and said that he had told them before that we would fool them.”

To ensure the safety of signing the Act of Surrender, on the night of July 12, a dense corridor of Turkish guard soldiers was built between the surrounded camp and the vizier’s tent. That is, although negotiations with the vizier were conducted by Vice-Chancellor P.P. Shafirov, Peter I had to personally sign the Act of Surrender in the vizier’s tent. (The peace treaty between the kingdom of Moscow and the Ottoman Empire was signed in Adrianople in 1713).

If the Turkish commanders really received huge bribes - ransom for the tsar and his courtiers, then the Crimean Khan did not receive any ransom from Peter I. It was the Crimean Khan Davlet-Girey who spoke out so that “the Poltava winner in a cage would be taken through the streets of Constantinople.” Despite the fact that the Crimean Khan was very dissatisfied with the signed document, he still did not destroy the remnants of the tsarist army during the retreat, although he could easily have done this. From the 54-thousand-strong army, Peter withdrew about 10 thousand people beyond the Dniester on August 1, completely demoralized. The Moscow army was destroyed not so much by the Turks and Tatars as by ordinary famine. This hunger haunted Peter's army from the first day of its crossing of the Dniester, for two whole months.

Petr Pavlovich Shafirov.

According to the testimony of "Sheets and papers...Peter the Great". From July 13 to August 1, 1711, the troops lost from 500 to 600 people every day who died of starvation. Why then did the Crimean Khan Davlet-Girey, having the opportunity, not destroy the Moscow army and the Tsar of Moscow? After all, in order for the Crimean Khan to release the Moscow Tsar, his tributary, from his hands, the power of the vizier Batalji Pasha was not enough. The Khan was a ruler on his territory and had enough strength and capabilities to destroy his eternal enemy after the Turkish army retreated to the south and the Moscow army to the north.

However, Davlet-Girey did not do this. Apparently the Moscow Tsar took some tactical steps, since the Crimean Khan let him out of his hands. What Peter I did to save himself, his wife and the remnants of his army is still being hidden most carefully. He signed a letter of oath confirming his vassal dependence on the Chingizid family. There is quite serious evidence that Prince Peter of Moscow (the Crimean khans never recognized the royal title of the Moscow Grand Dukes, which, in their opinion, was completely illegally appropriated by Ivan the Terrible), was forced to sign just such a shameful document.

And about some more events and legends associated with this campaign.
150 thousand rubles were allocated from the treasury to bribe the vizier; smaller amounts were intended for other Turkish commanders and even secretaries. The vizier was never able to receive the bribe promised to him by Peter. On the night of July 26, the money was brought to the Turkish camp, but the vizier did not accept it, fearing his ally, the Crimean Khan. Then he was afraid to take them because of the suspicions raised by Charles XII against the vizier. In November 1711, thanks to the intrigues of Charles XII through English and French diplomacy, Vizier Mehmed Pasha was removed by the Sultan and, according to rumors, was soon executed.

According to legend, Peter's wife Ekaterina Alekseevna donated all her jewelry for bribery, however, the Danish envoy Just Yul, who was with the Russian army after it came out of encirclement, does not report such an act of Catherine, but says that the queen distributed her jewelry to save the officers and then, after peace was concluded, she gathered them back.

Catherine I

And now let's fast forward 25 years, during the time of Anna Ioannovna, when, for a completely unknown reason, in 1736, the Russian army of 70 thousand soldiers and officers, together with the corps of Ukrainian Cossacks, under the command of Field Marshal Minich (the German Minich did a lot for the development Russian army, in particular, he introduced field hospitals for the first time) set out from the area of ​​​​the present city of Tsarichanka, Dnepropetrovsk region, and by May 17 approached Perekop. On May 20, Perekop was taken and the field marshal’s army moved deep into the Crimea. In mid-June, Minikh approached the city of Kezlev (Evpatoria) and took it by storm. After this, Minich's army headed to the capital of the Crimean Khanate - Bakhchisarai and took it by storm on July 30. The main goal of the campaign was the state archive of the Crimean Khanate. Minikh removed many documents from the archive (possibly the charter of Peter I), and the remaining documents were burned along with the archive building. It is believed that Anna Ioannovna organized a raid on the Crimean archives in pursuance of the secret will of Peter I. Field Marshal Minikh completed his main task (which very few knew about) - to seize the Khan’s archives, so already in early August he left Bakhchisarai, and on August 16 passed Perekop and with the remnants of the shabby army moved to Hetman Ukraine. Minich lost more than half of the army, mainly due to epidemics, but the empress was pleased with the work done and generously rewarded the general with estates in different parts countries.

Anna Ioannovna.

Apparently Anna Ioannovna did not receive all the documents she wanted. That is why in 1737 the army of Field Marshal Lassi made a second campaign to the Crimea. He no longer visited either Evpatoria or Bakhchisarai. He was interested in others ancient cities Crimea, mainly Karasu-Bazar, where the Crimean Khan moved after the pogrom of Bakhchisarai. We were looking for something! By the way, the generals of his army, unaware of the true objectives of the campaign, offered many very practical ideas about the routes and methods of conducting this military campaign, but Lassi remained unshaken and even threatened to expel the generals from the army.

Field Marshal Minich

The march of Minich's army in 1736

The epic of classifying ancient Crimean documents did not end there. Since most of the archival materials of the Crimean Khanate were not found either during the campaigns of 1736-1737, or after the Russian occupation of Crimea in 1783 (here A.V. Suvorov was involved in the search), Russian the authorities sent one expedition after another to conduct searches. Many interesting documents were found, but all of them are still classified.

I shared with you the information that I “dug up” and systematized. At the same time, he is not at all impoverished and is ready to share further, at least twice a week. If you find errors or inaccuracies in the article, please let us know. I will be very grateful.

Image caption Map of the Prut campaign

300 years ago, an event occurred that is not very pleasant for Russian people to remember: the Prut campaign of Peter I ended in a crushing failure.

The history of this campaign can still serve today as a warning against mischief and unbridled expansionism.

Two years earlier, the victory at Poltava elevated Russia to the rank of great powers. The Swedish king Charles XII with a handful of associates fled to Turkey and sat there, according to historians, not wanting to return to his homeland, where his popularity fell below zero.

Military experts have no doubt: if Peter, after Poltava, had launched an offensive in Finland or landed an amphibious assault on the Swedish coast, the Landtag, without hesitation, would have deposed the king and made peace on the terms of recognition of all Russian conquests in the Baltic.

However, the tsar, inspired by success, decided that nothing was impossible for him now, and set out to solve the “southern issue” at the same time. As a result, Russia lost in the Black Sea region all the acquisitions of Peter’s predecessors and the achievements of his two Azov campaigns, and the war with Sweden dragged on for another 10 years.

"Giant Plans"

At times, Peter generally lacked a sense of reality.

In 1716, he sent 6,100 soldiers and Cossacks under the command of the captain of the Preobrazhensky regiment Bekovich-Cherkassky with the task of conquering the Khiva and Bukhara khanates, and at the same time digging a canal through which one could get from the Caspian to the Amu Darya (all members of the expedition were killed by many times superior forces Khivans).

A year later, he went to Paris to propose his daughter Elizabeth as a wife to Louis XV, as if he did not understand that the marriage of the King of France with the daughter of a former laundress and a soldier’s slut could not be discussed under any circumstances.

Having barely completed the war with Sweden, he began to plan a naval expedition to found a colony in Madagascar, although the Russian fleet had only eight ships capable of sailing from the Baltic to the ocean.

“Gigantic plans were brewing in the head of the Russian emperor!” - Soviet writer Nikolai Pavlenko admired, although one should rather talk about gigantic adventurism.

Empty promises

The formal reason for the war was the stay of Charles XII on Turkish territory, although the fact that he was away from his country and army was beneficial to Russia.

The Turks were not going to listen to the king’s advice, since they respected only real power and pursued exclusively their own interests, and they did not want to fulfill Peter’s demands for his expulsion for reasons of prestige.

Military historians point out that Charles XII, planning a campaign against Russia that ended in defeat near Poltava, simply made a complete set of all conceivable strategic mistakes: he attacked with insufficient forces, without ensuring communications; underestimated the enemy; did not organize reconnaissance; placed fantastic hopes on the allies, who did not seriously think of helping.

Surprisingly, two years later Peter repeated all these mistakes, as they say, one to one.

He set out with insufficient forces on a poorly prepared campaign, not really knowing the situation, being confident in the weakness of the Turks and relying on the help of the Romanians, Serbs and Montenegrins.

With an excessive supply of hopes for Turkish Christians, empty promises from the Moldavian and Wallachian rulers and a significant supply of his own Poltava self-confidence, but without a sufficient supply and study of the circumstances, Peter set off into the sultry steppe, not with the goal of protecting Little Russia, but to defeat the Turkish Empire Vasily Klyuchevsky

As the Romanian historian Armand Gosu points out, immediately after Poltava, “delegations of Moldavian and Wallachian boyars began to knock on the thresholds of St. Petersburg, asking the tsar to be swallowed up by the Orthodox empire.”

The rulers of Wallachia [modern Romania] and Moldavia, Constantin Brancoveanu and Dmitry Cantemir, promised, as soon as Russia moved out, to announce their withdrawal from Turkish citizenship, to send a 30,000-strong army to help Peter and to provide the Russian troops with food.

According to them, it turned out that the terrain in Moldova was ideal for combat operations, there would be no problems with water and food, and the Turks were incapable of combat and were terribly afraid of the Russians.

Having listened to these tales, Peter wrote to Sheremetyev: “The Lords write that as soon as our troops enter their lands, they will immediately unite with them and induce all their numerous people to revolt against the Turks; looking at this, the Serbs (from whom we we have the same request and promise), also the Bulgarians and other Christian peoples will rise up against the Turks, and some will join our troops, others will rise up in rebellion against the Turkish regions; in such circumstances, the vizier will not dare to cross the Danube, most of his troops will flee, and maybe maybe there will be a riot."

When the war began, Brancoveanu pretended that what was happening did not concern him. Cantemir, however, came to Peter’s camp (his descendants became Russian nobles), but brought only five thousand irregular cavalry, armed with bows and pikes.

In fact, the situation of two years ago was repeated, only Kantemir ended up in the role of Mazepa, and Peter in the role of Charles XII.

It was in 1711 that a long tradition of reckless, often to the detriment of its own interests, Russian support for the Balkan Orthodox “brothers” was laid, who either did not ask to be saved from anyone at all, or were not eager to fight, hoping to rake the heat with Russian hands. It ended, as we know, with the First World War and the death of the empire created by Peter.

Short campaign

The Russian army consisted of 79,800 bayonets and sabers and about 10 thousand Cossacks with 160 guns. Field Marshal Sheremetyev and seven generals, including Bruce and Repnin, who distinguished themselves at Poltava, went on a campaign with Peter.

On June 27 (June 16, old style) we crossed the Dniester. Then we had to go through the waterless steppe, with sweltering heat during the day and cold nights. Diseases began to decimate the army. Some soldiers, having reached the water, drank themselves to death, others shot themselves, unable to withstand the torture.

On July 14, the army reached the Prut. On July 17, a review was held, at which 19 thousand people were missing, and about 14 thousand more had to be left behind to protect communications.

“The soldiers turned black from thirst and hunger. Dying people lay in multitudes along the road, and no one could help their neighbor or save him, since no one had anything,” recalled Rasmus Erebo, secretary of the Danish envoy Just Juhl, who accompanied Peter on the campaign. .

An army marched towards Peter under the command of the Grand Vizier Baltaji Mehmed Pasha and the Crimean Khan Devlet Giray II, numbering 190 thousand people with 440 guns.

After three days of fighting, the superior forces of the Turks on July 21 pressed the Russian army to the Prut and surrounded it with a semi-ring of earthen fortifications and artillery batteries. Peter, according to Erebo’s memoirs, “ran back and forth around the camp, beat his chest and could not utter a word.” Death or captivity seemed inevitable.

"Everything but Slavery"

The Tsar sent a messenger to St. Petersburg with a letter to the Senate not to carry out any instructions that he might be forced to give while in captivity, and to the Turkish camp - the dodgy diplomat Pyotr Shafirov.

A note from Peter to Shafirov has been preserved: “Bet with them on everything except shklafstvo [slavery].”

He was ready to cede the previously conquered Baltic coast to the Swedes, except for his favorite “paradise”, St. Petersburg, and even Pskov.

Fortunately for Russia, the Turks did not even think of defending Swedish interests. But they had to return Azov to them, demolish the Taganrog and Kamenny Zaton fortresses, abandon the maintenance of warships in the Azov and Black Seas, and those already built at the Voronezh shipyards at the cost of incredible efforts and many lives were either burned or transferred to Turkey for minor compensation.

Russia was forced to declare non-interference in the affairs of Right-Bank Ukraine. In addition, she lost the right to have a permanent embassy in Istanbul, which, according to the concepts of that time, was considered a great humiliation.

Russia managed to restore its position in the Black Sea region only under Catherine.

The only concession from the Turks was the promise to expel Charles XII from the country.

The negotiations took less than two days. Already on July 23, the agreement was sealed, and at six in the evening of the same day, the Russian army set out on the return journey with guns and banners.

The next day, Charles XII rode into the Turkish camp, attacking the vizier with angry reproaches and accusations of corruption. The Swedish king convinced Mehmed Pasha to give him 30 thousand soldiers and swore that by the evening he would bring Peter with a rope around his neck.

The losses of the Turks and Tatars during the short campaign amounted to about eight thousand people. 37 thousand Russians died, of which only five thousand were in battle.

Bought world

Historians find a prosaic explanation for the quick conclusion and relatively easy terms for Russia of the treaty: Peter simply paid off the Turks.

For bribes to the Grand Vizier, dignitaries and even secretaries, Shafirov received a huge sum of 150 thousand rubles at that time.

Already in November 1711, the Grand Vizier was removed from power for corruption and subsequently executed. They reminded him, among other things, of relations with the Russians.

Mehmed Pasha claimed that he did not take any money and that Shafirov apparently pocketed it.

It’s hard to believe in the vizier’s selflessness, but there could be some truth in his words. Shafirov was famous for his enchanting embezzlement, for which he was later also sentenced to death (the beheading was replaced by exile at the last moment) - however, in cases that had nothing to do with the Prut campaign.

Bendery defense

Among historical figures Two categories stand out sharply: successful pragmatists, about whom, as they say, no one can write a song, and brave romantic madcaps.

The most famous among the Swedish kings, Charles XII, was reminiscent of Richard the Lionheart in character, lifetime and posthumous fate. Having lost everything he could and senselessly died at the age of 35 during the siege of an insignificant Norwegian fortress, he remained a hero in the eyes of his contemporaries and descendants, and his portraits hung in the aristocratic houses of Europe for a long time.

After the Treaty of Prut, Charles XII played for time for another two years, categorically refusing to leave Turkey.

When the authorities finally sent a military team to expel the king from the house he occupied in Bendery, he raised his bodyguards, ordered muskets to be distributed to the lackeys, and, together with his men, fired from the window until the Turks set fire to the house.

Then Karl, the great master of a spectacular pose and a good face in a bad game, declared that he could not wait a day, since urgent matters called him to Sweden, and, driving his horses, galloped to his homeland, which he had not been to for 14 years.

Order in memory of the defeat

There is a legend that Peter’s wife Ekaterina Alekseevna, who accompanied her husband on the Prut campaign, gave her jewelry to bribe the Turks.

According to the trustworthy recollections of participants in the events, both Russians and foreigners, she did not make such a sacrifice, but behaved with dignity, although she was seven months pregnant.

Under Peter, it was highly discouraged to doubt the story of the jewelry.

“In memory of Her Majesty’s presence in the battle with the Turks at the Prut, where in such a dangerous time, not like a wife, but like a man, everyone was visible.” Peter established the female Order of St. Catherine, which was considered second in value after the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called. On the obverse of the order badge there was the motto “For Love and the Fatherland”, and on the reverse side: “Through your labors you are compared with your spouse.” Until 1917, it was awarded to grand duchesses and princesses, as well as the wives of the highest dignitaries of the empire, called “cavalry ladies.”

The establishment of the order was the only positive result of the Prut campaign.

Everyone knows about Poltava in Russia, and mostly history buffs know about the Prut Campaign.

This is probably wrong. They are proud of victories, and learn from defeats.

In the summer of 1711, during the Russian-Turkish war, the Russian army under the leadership of Peter I went on the Prut campaign. Our 38,000-strong army found itself pressed to the right bank by the allied 120,000-strong Turkish army and 70,000-strong Crimean Tatar cavalry. The determined resistance of the Russians forced the Turkish commander to conclude a peace agreement and save the army from hopeless encirclement. There is a widespread legend that the conclusion of peace was facilitated by the jewelry that Peter I’s wife, Catherine, sent to bribe the vizier. Where did such a legend come from and to what extent does it correspond to reality, as well as about other legends of the Prut campaign, you will learn in the article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Yaroslav Evgenievich Vodarsky “Legends of the Prut campaign of Peter I (1711)”.

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Prut campaign of 1711 was the main event of the Russian-Turkish war of 1710-1714. The Russian army, commanded nominally by B.P. Sheremetev, and in fact Tsar Peter himself, found herself in a difficult situation, finding herself surrounded by a numerically superior Turkish-Tatar army led by the Grand Vizier and the Crimean Khan on the banks of the Prut River. Peter was forced to make peace, under the terms of which he returned to Turkey the fortress of Azov, which he had taken in 1696.

These dramatic events are reflected contradictory and inaccurately in the memoirs of the participants in the campaign and other contemporaries; legends have developed around them, which are still uncritically presented by historians. They write that the Russian army, surrounded by Turks and Tatars, was threatened with complete extermination; that before the conclusion of peace, Peter wrote to the Senate so that in the event of his capture, the senators would choose a new king from among themselves (despite the presence of Tsarevich Alexei); that negotiations with the Turks were unsuccessful, and then the future Empress Catherine I, without asking her husband’s permission, convened a military council and persuaded Peter to send another letter to the vizier asking for peace; that she, secretly from the king, sent the vizier with this letter all her jewelry; that the bribed vizier, seduced by the shine of diamonds, agreed to make peace; that one of the reasons for the vizier’s consent was the capture of Brailov by General Renne, etc. Questions are avoided about why the Russian army was caught by the Turks on the march; why in the Prut Peace Treaty there were no conditions in favor of Sweden, although Charles XII, who found refuge in Turkey, made a lot of efforts to induce the Sultan to start a war with Russia, and also why two official versions of the treaty were published.
I critically studied published and archival materials: decrees and correspondence of Peter I, reports of Russian and foreign diplomats, generals and secret agents, memories of participants in the campaign, works of historians and tried to reconstruct the course of events by day and hour. I briefly outlined the results of this work in comments to the text of “Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great” (Vol. XI, issue 1), in a review of an article by the Turkish historian Kurat and in an article about the campaign in one of the provincial collections 1, but, Apparently, they went unnoticed, since legends and inaccuracies are repeated in reference books, works of historians, and popular science works. Therefore, it seems useful to me to give my own, generalized and expanded, in comparison with published works, version of events and the origin of legends.

There is still only one special work on the Prut campaign - a 2-volume study by A.N. Kurata “The Prut Campaign and Peace”, published in 1951-1952. in Turkish. Its main provisions were outlined by him in 1962 in an article in German 2 . Kurat's research is fundamental: he used a lot of sources, including published and unpublished reports of diplomats, materials from Turkish archives (from the funds of the grand viziers, a participant in the campaign of state treasury official Ahmed bin Mahmud, etc.), works of Turkish, Russian, German, Swedish and Polish historians. Kurata's work contains important conclusions about the goal that the Turks were striving for when starting the war, about the development of peace conditions, about the size of the Turkish-Tatar army, etc. But many sources remained unknown to Kurat, especially those stored in Russian archives and published after the publication of his works, and he himself admitted (in his article) that much here remains unexplained. In particular, Kurat was unable to explain some of the contradictions and perplexities that arise when reading official documents, letters and memoirs of contemporaries and the writings of historians; incorrectly conveyed the peace conditions originally put forward by the Turks; believed that the Turks missed a favorable moment because of their greed, and although he did not directly say about the decisive role of bribing the vizier, he nevertheless emphasized it great importance. He also erroneously reported that the jewelry for the vizier arrived in the Turkish camp before the conclusion of peace; repeated the legend about the decisive role of Catherine; did not explain why the text of the Prut Peace Treaty was published in two versions, etc. Despite these shortcomings, today this is the most complete and detailed work on the history of the Prut campaign, the author of which not only introduced new information from previously unknown sources into scientific circulation, but also made valuable observations and conclusions.
In addition, the history of the campaign is briefly covered in the relevant sections of generalizing works, in works that examine related problems, in the biographies of Peter and other figures of the era. The best description of it so far is the section in the work of S.F. Oreshkova about Russian-Turkish relations at the beginning of the 18th century, based on the study great circle sources, including Turkish 3. However, she and other researchers do not explain the contradictions in the sources and repeat old legends.

The scope of the article forces us to limit ourselves to clarifying only the most significant questions: 1) Was Peter really so confused when he was surrounded that Catherine herself had to convene a military council, achieve a decision at it to offer peace and send sub-chancellor P.P. Shafirov, supplying him with his jewelry to bribe the Grand Vizier, and if not, then how, when and why did the legend about the role of Catherine arise? 2) Was bribery the main reason that the Grand Vizier agreed to make peace and did not put forward conditions in favor of Charles XII, and if not, what were these reasons and how, when and where did the legend about the decisive role of the bribery of the Grand Vizier arise? 3) Is the so-called “letter of Peter the Great from the banks of the Prut” a forgery, in which he ordered the Senate, in the event of his capture by the Turks, to elect a new king from among the senators, and if so, who forged it and why?
Brief answers will be given to the following questions, indicating sources that allow them to be substantiated in detail: 1) Why was the Russian army caught by the Turks on the march? 2) Why do the sources indicate different numbers of the Turkish-Tatar army: a) 120 thousand Turks and 20-30 thousand Tatars and b) 270 thousand Turks and Tatars combined? What was the true number, and where did the false one come from? 3) Did the capture by the Russian detachment of the Brailov fortress on the Danube in the rear of the Turks influence the Grand Vizier’s agreement to make peace and its terms? 4) Which of the two significantly different versions of the text of the Prut Peace Treaty is genuine, why did the second one appear?

Why was the Russian army caught on the march and what was the size of the armies of both sides?

Peter had long been negotiating with the rulers of Moldavia D. Cantemir and Wallachia C. Brancovan about their transition to the side of Russia. When the Russian army at the end of June 1711. approached Iasi, Cantemir arrived at the Russian camp, but brought with him only 6 thousand people, poorly armed and untrained 4 . In this situation, Peter could act in two ways: wait for the Turks on the Dniester, giving them the opportunity to defeat the Wallachian militia in the event of his coming against them, or go towards the enemy in the hope of Brankovan joining with troops and food. Peter chose the second option, not imagining the difficulties of marching through a country devastated by locusts, 5 and even with the active actions of significantly superior forces of the Turkish-Tatar cavalry. The main army set out on a campaign along the right (northern) bank of the Prut, and a cavalry detachment of General K. Renne was sent to Wallachia to the Brailov fortress on the Danube to induce Brankovan to go over to the side of Russia. The detachment included 5,600 people (half of the Russian cavalry) 6. But since the Turkish army had already approached the borders of Wallachia, Brankovan remained on the side of the Turks. Subsequently, Peter himself admitted that “this march” was “very desperately carried out to reassure the ruler of Multyansky” 7.
Having received information about the movement of the Turks along the left (southern) bank of the Prut, on July 7 Peter gave the order to General Janus von Eberstedt, who commanded the cavalry, to move forward and prevent the Turks from crossing the Prut: it was important to gain time so that Renne would take Brailov and encourage Brankovan to move against the Turks in their rear. As Moreau writes, “having listened to the order and understood it well, we began to execute it, although the general and I, not without laughing, saw that dragoons and cavalry were used to attack the fortified bridges” 8. A few miles later the detachment unexpectedly came across a bridgehead. Instead of attacking, Janus, violating Peter's orders, ordered a retreat. The Turkish cavalry and Tatars immediately rushed to the attack, the detachment had to line up in a square and slowly retreat, repelling their attacks. Janus told Peter that the Janissaries with artillery were attacking him (which was not true), in the evening he sent another letter, and Peter sent an infantry division to help him 9.

Meanwhile, the bridges Janus and Moreau saw on July 7 were false: the real ones were built only the next day, and the vizier, out of caution, crossed the cavalry on the 8th (the Tatars crossed by swimming) and only on the 9th - the infantry (Janissaries), and all the artillery crossed the river only on the night of July 10, 10. As a result, the Russian army was caught on the march and, having lost part of the convoy, was forced to retreat, subjected to continuous attacks by enemy cavalry. On July 9, at about two o'clock in the afternoon, due to fatigue she had to stop at an uncomfortable position on the bank of the Prut.
Peter's order, which made Janus and Moreau laugh, was real. This is evidenced by the actions of General Renne: he besieged and stormed not some bridgehead fortification, but the Brailov fortress on the Danube. True, Renne had already served for a long time under the command of Peter and, obviously, had adopted the military ideas of the Russian commander, new and advanced for that time. In any case, the “use” of dragoons to capture the fortress did not seem strange to him. Therefore, Peter had every reason to hope that Janus would be able to delay the crossing of the Turks. Subsequently, he wrote that “the Turks had not yet crossed over, but they were on the other side, and of course Janus could have detained them if he had done as [as] a good man should” 11 .
The Russian army found itself in a difficult situation: it was surrounded by Turkish-Tatar cavalry, which carried out incessant attacks, in the valley on the banks of the Prut. In addition, the enemy placed cannons on the hill located on the opposite bank, which, however, were unable to inflict damage 12 . The Russian army had 38 thousand people and 122 guns, the enemy, according to Kurat's calculations, had about 100-120 thousand Turks and 20-30 thousand Tatars, and the number of guns reached 255-407 13 . The number of Turks and Tatars, 270 thousand people, indicated in the Daily Note, was reported to Peter by Shafirov from the words of the Turks 14 . It is clear that it was beneficial for the latter to inflate it. But the most dangerous thing was that for 6.6 thousand Russian cavalrymen there were 57.8 thousand Turkish cavalrymen, not counting the Tatars. If we take into account that the Russian cavalry no longer had fodder, the pasture was eaten, and the supply routes were cut off by the Tatars, then the situation that arose through the fault of General Janus could not but be considered critical.

The legend of Catherine's decisive role in concluding peace

On the evening of July 9, the Janissaries attacked the Russian camp three times and were repulsed all three times. But Peter did not dare to counterattack for fear that the Turkish-Tatar cavalry would capture the convoy with food and ammunition. The Janissaries showed extraordinary courage, but their commanders lacked military knowledge: the attack was carried out on one section of the Russian camp, which Peter reinforced with men and guns as needed. But the people and horses had not rested for three days in a row, the convoy with provisions on its way to the Russian army was intercepted by the Tatars, the army was surrounded on all sides, many horses had died, and the survivors had been eating only leaves and bark of trees for several days. But discipline among the soldiers did not waver, and the army continued to remain a formidable force 15.
With the onset of darkness, the Janissaries stopped attacks 16. Peter again assembled a council of war, which decided to attack the Turks at night, but almost immediately the king canceled it for the same reason as the counterattack earlier.
It was not surprising that Peter, realizing that he, the conqueror of Charles XII, could be defeated and even captured along with his wife, lost his composure for some time. A few days later he wrote that “never since I started serving have I been in such dispersion” 17 . Apparently, he had a nervous breakdown, which was learned from various sources by the French agent La Motreuil, who was in the Turkish army, and the Danish ambassador to Russia, Just Yul, who came to Peter in the army that left Moldova after the conclusion of peace. La Motreuil writes that he spoke with Swedish officers who entered Russian service after Poltava and defected to the Turks on July 10. The Swedes told him the following: on the evening of July 9, “Peter was confused and, saying: “I found myself in the same difficult situation as my brother Karl near Poltava,” he retired to his tent..., forbidding anyone to enter it. He either had a normal (according to them) seizure, or he faked it” 18. Yust Yul wrote in his diary: “As they told me, the king, being surrounded by the Turkish army, fell into such despair that he ran back and forth around the camp like a madman, beat himself in the chest and could not utter a word. Most thought that he had suffered a blow" 19.
Peter was indeed subject to such fits, during which only Catherine could calm him down. But I don't think it was a seizure in this case. Simply, having lost his composure for some time, Peter quickly came to his senses and went into the tent to think about what to do in the current conditions. Sources provide conflicting information about what happened after this. Summarizing them, A.S. Pushkin, in his preparatory texts for “The History of Peter,” after notes about sending a letter to the vizier with a proposal to make peace, placed the following entry: “According to other news: Peter called the generals to himself, ordered them to attack the enemy the next day, and he himself went to his tent , ordering the sentries not to let anyone in. Then Catherine gathered a council and offered to interpret the world. - She entered his tent - etc. Then non-commissioned officer Shepelev was sent, and the queen sent (secretly from Peter) money and diamonds as a gift to the vizier and kegaya, his governor.” After this, Pushkin wrote: “All this is nonsense” 20. Kurat was unable to clarify this issue and was forced to state: “One thing is clear - Catherine played a certain role, but she should not be overestimated” 21.
Let's turn to the sources. La Motreuil, after the above story of the Swedes-defectors, continues: “They added that after his [Peter’s] departure the generals met at a council of war and came to the conclusion that the Janissaries were afraid of the Russians, since they did not resume their attacks, as they had done the night before. . Therefore, the generals decided to attack the Turks themselves, and even if they failed to win, then perhaps the enemy’s confusion would make it easier to retreat. Shafirov objected that this would be a desperate attempt, which could be the last chance for salvation, and that he would offer to enter into negotiations with the vizier to end the bloodshed for an agreement. His advice was accepted, and since the queen was the only one who was not affected by the king’s prohibition [to enter his tent], the wish was expressed that it was she who conveyed to the king the proposal, which she successfully carried out. Apparently, it took a lot of persistence to get an order from the Tsar for Field Marshal Sheremetev to write a letter to the Vizier” 22. In the second book of his memoirs, La Motreuil outlined the above version of the Swedish officers with clarification: “The queen... brought his advisers into the tent where the king was, who did not want to see anyone, and used her influence to achieve his consent to give Shafirov authority to conclude peace " Immediately in the note, he emphasized: “All that the queen did... was to bring advisers to his tent, where he was alone” 23.
But there is direct evidence of a military council at which a decision was made to enter into negotiations with the Turks. Janus, who was invited to it, took Moreau with him, who told about him: On July 10, “at about nine o’clock in the morning... the sovereign, General Janus, Lieutenant General Osten and the field marshal held a long secret meeting. Then they all approached General Baron Alart, who was lying in the carriage due to the wound he had received, and then... it was decided that the field marshal would write to the Grand Vizier, asking him for a truce in order to safely begin to reconcile the two sovereigns. General Janus' trumpeter went with a letter, and we
awaited an answer, each at his post." 24 - Moro's story is confirmed by Alart, who cited in his diary, published by Kurat, the decision of this military council: "Offer a truce to the Grand Vizier in order to agree on eternal peace with the Sultan. If the vizier does not agree to this, then burn and destroy the carts, build a Wagenburg from a few carts and place Volokhs and Cossacks in it, reinforcing them with several thousand infantry. With the army... attack the enemy" 25.

In addition, La Motreuil has news confirming the messages of Moreau and Alart. He writes that in order to ensure compliance with the terms of the Prut Peace Treaty, the Turks demanded that Russian ambassadors go to Istanbul as hostages. Peter gave them a guard of Russian officers. La Motreuil met them and told them about the Swedes' version. Russian officers, he writes, “who, according to them, were with the Tsar’s person..., refuted all these details as fiction and argued that the Tsar behaved heroically, that he usually performed the duties of a lieutenant general, but, seeing the difficult situation affairs, assumed full power and convened the generals for a military council under his chairmanship, at which it was decided that Field Marshal Sheremetev would write a letter to the vizier proposing acceptable peace terms. The letter was sent with the trumpeter of General Janus" 26.
Thus, there is no doubt that the reports of Moreau, Alart and the Russian officers at La Motreuil are reliable, and they do not mention Ekaterina and Shafirov, although it is strange that the responsible decision to move from military action to diplomacy was made without the participation of Chancellor Golovkin and Vice-Chancellor Shafirov. So, it can be considered established that Peter went to his tent. Most likely, Catherine was already there or entered there after him to calm him down. Further, on the one hand, it is reported that after Peter left for the tent, i.e. on the evening of July 9, Catherine convened a council at which she or Shafirov made a proposal to enter into negotiations, and the council decided to offer peace to the Turks, write a letter on behalf of Sheremetev and entrust negotiations to Shafirov, after which Catherine brought the generals and Shafirov to Peter’s tent for approval of this decision. On the other hand, it has been established that: a) on the morning of July 10, a military council was held, held by Peter himself, at which there were no Russian generals except Sheremetev, nor Catherine and Shafirov, but at which it was decided to send a parliamentarian with a letter from Sheremetev to the vizier , containing a proposal to enter into negotiations, and b) July 9, i.e. on the eve of this council, Shafirov received instructions on conducting negotiations (a draft with Peter’s own handwritten edits has been preserved) 27 .
From a comparison of these data, the conclusion suggests itself that two military councils took place, the first on the evening of July 9, the second on the morning of July 10. We know about the second advice from Moreau. About the first one, there is an entry by Alart, which mentions Peter’s secret council with generals and ministers, at which it was decided to send Shafirov to the Turks. True, it is placed after the above information about the decision of the military council to enter into negotiations and send a trumpeter to the vizier, but this is clearly a different council, with a different composition of participants 28. In addition, the report of the French ambassador to Russia de Baluz on September 11 states: “They assure... that the tsar held a military council in his camp, to which General Janus was not invited, that this monarch, being in difficulty, went to him to find out his opinion in private" 29. The latter, as we know from Moreau’s story, is incorrect, which means that this information does not come from Moreau (who, apparently, did not know about the first advice, without Janus). In addition, Baluz reported his meeting with Moreau on September 30, therefore, they did not see each other until the 11th.
Let's try to restore the course of events. So, Peter went into the tent and decided (perhaps on the advice of Catherine) to enter into negotiations with the Turks, and first discuss at the council the possible conditions of the Turks and the candidacy of the ambassador. The draft instructions to Shafirov were dated July 9, therefore, the council was convened immediately, on the evening of July 9. The composition of its participants is directly indicated by Alart: generals and ministers. Indirect confirmation: the absence of ministers and Russian generals from the council on the morning of July 10 (Sheremetev does not count: he is the commander-in-chief), indicating that on the evening of July 9 a council was held at which only ministers and Russian generals were present. This is quite natural: of course, before turning to mercenaries, it was necessary to discuss such an important issue with our own.
Alart called it a secret council, perhaps because it was convened in secret from foreign generals (including Alart), whom Peter assembled on the morning of July 10 after he had made a decision and appointed Shafirov as envoy, and this second council was also the decision approved. But the advisers had to be invited to the tent, and Peter, apparently, instructed Catherine to bring them. The Swede defectors could see how Catherine, leaving the tent, ordered the ministers and Russian generals to be found. The appearance of generals at the tent suggests a military council. Hence the version that it was Catherine who convened a military council, at which she (or Shafirov) proposed to enter into negotiations with the Turks.
It is known that Peter appreciated Catherine’s behavior in the Prut campaign so highly that in 1714 he established a new Russian Order of Liberation specifically to reward her, soon renaming it the Order of the Holy Great Martyr Catherine (according to the charter, only women could be awarded this order). At the same time, Peter said that the order “was created in memory of Her Majesty’s presence in the battle with the Turks at the Prut, where in such a dangerous time not like a wife, but like a man was visible to everyone” 31. This is confirmed by the order itself: it depicts St. Catherine with a cross on which the first letters of the words: “Lord, bless the king,” and on the reverse side there is a Latin inscription: “Through labors one is compared with one’s husband” 32 . In addition, in the manifesto of November 15, 1723 on the coronation of Catherine, Peter mentioned that Catherine helped him in the Northern War and in the Battle of the Prut and “acted like a man, not like a woman” 33 .

However, maybe Peter was really so confused that Catherine had to take the initiative: call advisers to the tent, make a proposal to start negotiations and encourage her husband to send Shafirov to the Turks? Undoubtedly, Catherine had a certain (and considerable) influence on Peter, but nothing indicates that she had a statesman's mind. On the contrary: having become empress after the death of Peter, Catherine was an obedient instrument in the hands of Menshikov. And yet, being an uneducated woman, she undoubtedly had a sound mind and understood people - otherwise she would not have been able to live for so long with such a complex and extraordinary person as Peter was, and enjoy his respect. Peter, for all his shortcomings, undoubtedly was not afraid to take responsibility for his actions. Therefore, it is impossible to imagine that in the presence of Peter, Catherine could make any independent decision. Everything we know about their characters and relationships does not correspond to the version about Catherine’s decisive role in the decision to propose peace to the Turks. It was, of course, accepted by Peter himself, and the council supported this decision. An instruction was immediately drawn up for Shafirov (taking into account the demands of the Turks sent in November 1710) and, probably, a letter from Sheremetev to the vizier.

Why did the Turks agree to make peace?

The Turks went to war with reluctance and fear of Russian troops. Starting it, they counted on the help of the Swedish corps stationed in Pomerania (northern Germany). The Turks attached such great importance to this that in the demands that they sent to Peter in November 1710, i.e. on the eve of the declaration of war, there were a number of points in favor of the Swedes: “To completely dissolve the alliance concluded with Augustus, to recognize Stanislav as the King of Poland; return all of Livonia and, in general, everything conquered by the Russians to the Swedish king, and ruin and raze St. Petersburg to the ground1; conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with kings Charles and Stanislav against Augustus and oppose him if he resumes his claims to the Polish throne, which he ceded to Stanislav Leszczynski; return in kind "or else, everything that the king of Sweden lost through Battle of Poltava» 34.
But the Swedes were unable to replenish their small Pomeranian corps, and they did not dare to break through the Russian troops blocking their path. There were also rumors that Charles promised the Janissaries payment and deceived them 35 . In addition to the violation of royal promises, personal hostility between the vizier and the king was added: Charles demanded command of the Turkish army, he, naturally, was politely refused, but was invited to accompany the vizier on the campaign. Charles rejected this proposal and sent in his place his representative - General Sparre and the representative of the Polish king S. Deschinsky (appointed by Charles XII) - General Poniatowski. Then the vizier was offended and, according to Poniatowski, told the Crimean Khan that he was sure that the Swedish king, “this arrogant wicked man,” would never give the Turks such an honor - to personally accompany them 36. Thus, counting on Charles’s help, the Turks did not at all want to fight for his interests 37 . The Swedes' failure to fulfill their obligations, the Turks' fear of the Russian army and the fear of an uprising of the Balkan peoples were the reasons why the Sultan gave the Grand Vizier the authority to make peace on terms beneficial only to the Turks. And the goal of the war on their part, at least in 1711 before the start of the campaign, was the return of Azov and the destruction of newly built fortresses in the Black Sea region. Therefore, Kurat’s conclusion that the Turks, when starting hostilities, did not have a serious intention of supporting Charles XP and wanted to get rid of him, seems completely justified 38.
The British ambassador to Turkey R. Sutton reported on June 14 (25): “I am assured that they [the Turks] have already begun to desert in significant numbers... In addition, the soldiers are very dissatisfied and are suspected of the possibility of mutiny” 39 . One of Peter’s secret informants in Turkey, Luka Barca, wrote on June 22: “The Asian army, almost everything, came here, only two pashas remained there. And the Turks consider it a great shame for themselves to see such an army, for the people are bad, ragged, without a gun, and tired from a long journey, and therefore they go to war without a heart... Although the Turkish army is numerous, it is nevertheless hasty, irregular, without heads [chiefs] are smart, which army has no fear either from the vizier or from other officers” 40. On July 9, when the Turks surrounded the Russian army, shortly before sunset, Sutton wrote, “a Janissary appeared at the vizier’s tent and began to shout: “Shall we lie here until we die of disease in adversity? Let all true Muslims come and fight with me.” with the infidels!" He grabbed one of the banners standing near the tent and ran forward. Others immediately followed him, grabbed other banners, and... gathered together, with the usual shouts in disorder, they rushed at the enemy. Seeing such a disorder, the vizier sent the kegaya, with whom he was talking at that moment and from whom I learned these details, to lead them.” General S. Poniatovsky adds in his memoirs: “Emitting wild screams, calling, according to their custom, to God with repeated cries of “Alla, Alla,” they rushed at the enemy with sabers in their hands, and, of course, would have broken through the front, if not slingshots that the enemy threw in front of them... Strong fire almost at point-blank range not only cooled the ardor of the Janissaries, but also threw them into confusion and forced them to a hasty retreat. Kegaya [deputy grand vizier] and the chief of the Janissaries cut down the fugitives with sabers and tried to stop them and put them in order. The bravest ones renewed their cries and attacked a second time. The second attack was not as strong as the first, and the Turks were again forced to retreat." The third attack was also repulsed and then the kegaya said to Poniatowski: “We risk being defeated, and this will inevitably happen.”
Panic gripped the Janissaries and the Turkish command. Sutton wrote that “each time they [the Turks] fled back in disorder. After the third attack, their confusion and frustration were so great that one can certainly believe that if the Russians had counterattacked them, they would have fled without any resistance. The head of the Janissaries later told the Sultan: “And if Moscow had attacked, then they [the Turks] would never have been able to hold the place... the rear Turks had already begun to flee, and if the Muscovites had come out of the camp, the Turks would have abandoned the guns and ammunition " This is confirmed by La Motreuil, who was in the Turkish army: “This frightened them [the Janissaries] so much that their courage left them” 41 . And yet, at dawn on July 10, when the artillery arrived, they again attacked the Russian camp and were again repulsed. When ordered to repeat the attack, the Janissaries, according to Luca Barca, “everyone refused, saying that they did not want to attack and could not stand against Moscow’s fire.” Sutton wrote: “The resistance given by the Russians so greatly shook the courage of the Turks that they also did not want to attack again, just as the Russians did not want to be attacked” 42.
Having received a letter with an offer to enter into peace negotiations, the Grand Vizier and his entourage, being confident in the strength of the Russian army, considered this a military trick and did not respond. Peter wrote later: “Then, when there was a delay in answering, then they sent to talk to them, so that they would quickly give a short rebuke, whether they want the world or not, for we can’t wait any longer. Then, when the rebuke was delayed even on that parcel, then they ordered the regiments to move out. And when this happened, and our several dozen fathoms set out, then the Turks immediately sent word not to go, for they accept peace, and in order to carry out the withdrawal of weapons, and to send someone with whom to discuss this peace” 43 . Moreau writes that he asked one of the Turkish pashas sent to the Russian camp to protect the departing army from attacks by the Tatars: “For what reason and on what conditions did they make peace? He replied that our firmness amazed them, that they did not think to find such terrible opponents in us, that, judging by the position in which we were, and by the retreat we made, they saw that our life would cost them dearly, and decided, without wasting time, to accept our proposal for a truce in order to remove us... and that they acted prudently, concluding peace on terms honorable for the Sultan and beneficial for his people” 44.

Moreover, apparently, the Turks had no hostile feelings towards the Russians: Alart writes that “the Turks began to be very friendly towards our people, rode around us on horseback, even approached the slingshots themselves and talked to our people, so that in the end I had to post sentries... The Turks gave these sentries tobacco and cookies, and in return they supplied them with water, for which the Turks had to go far.” As the negotiations progressed, the activity of ordinary Turks increased: La Motreuil says that the Janissaries, “without waiting for the announcement of peace, without permission rushed to the Russian camp to sell provisions, calling the Russians the word “kardash”, i.e. brothers." This is confirmed by Sutton 45. There was another reason for the fear of defeat: when Poniatowski tried to give advice to the Kegae, he answered him “that if they have the misfortune of being defeated, following a new way of fighting, then the blame for this misfortune will fall on them, and both of them will have their heads cut off.” : to him, kegae, for acting, and for Poniatovsky, for advising him.” Thus, the Turks negotiated because they were afraid of losing the battle, and they had good reasons for this. Many contemporaries understood this. For example, Daniel Defoe (the famous author of “Robinson Crusoe” and less known as one of the organizers of English intelligence) in the book “An Impartial History of the Life and Deeds of Peter Alekseevich, the Current Tsar of Muscovy” published in 1723, talking about the Prut Campaign, wrote that The vizier, appreciating the courage of the Russians, realized that the battle could end in the defeat of the Turks, and decided to find out whether it was possible to take advantage of the current report. A beneficial peace could prevent bloodshed now and in the future, as well as further military costs 46 .

The legend that the peace terms presented by the Turks were influenced by the bribery of the Grand Vizier

The terms of peace were discussed at a military council convened by the vizier. Did this happen before or after Shafirov’s arrival and was he accepted after the council worked out the conditions? This is how Poniatovsky describes Shafirov’s reception: “They announced that the tsar’s plenipotentiary ministers had arrived. It was agreed with Count Poniatowski that the vizier would not receive them and that they would be taken to the tent of his secretary Umera Effendi. The tent was specially erected for this purpose... But the plenipotentiary ministers, instead of descending in front of him, descended in front of the grand vizier's tent and were introduced there... When they appeared, instead of a stern meeting, stools were demanded to seat them... Naturally , they themselves should have stated the purpose of their mission, but the Grand Vizier preceded them with his very kind greeting and by ordering them to be seated. Then the vizier... ordered to ask the plenipotentiary ministers why they came to the state of the Sultan” 47. Actually, there was one plenipotentiary minister, Shafirov, and the rest were three translators (including A.I. Osterman), a clerk and two couriers (one of them was D.P. Volynsky) 48, but Poniatovsky, apparently, did not go into such details didn't get into it. However, it did not escape him that the Russians were “amazed by such gentleness and such a reception that they did not expect.”
Three important details need to be noted here: firstly, Shafirov did not wait for the reception - he was immediately received by the Grand Vizier himself; secondly, they were seated, i.e. according to Turkish custom, they were received with honor; thirdly, the vizier greeted them kindly and addressed them first. Shafirov knew the intricacies of Eastern etiquette and understood that the Turks were interested in making peace. Of course, the curious gathered around the tent. Among them was La Motreuil, who saw the gifts that were brought in after Shafirov, as was required by the diplomatic etiquette of that time. The gifts, naturally, were not from the tsar, but from Field Marshal Sheremetev, on whose behalf negotiations were proposed. According to Sheremetev’s Journal, the vizier was sent “2 good gilded squeaks, 2 pairs of good pistol[s], 40 sables worth 400 rubles.” 49 Gifts were sent not only to the vizier, but also to his associates. According to La Motreuil, they consisted of sable and silver fox furs, as well as gold, but, apparently, not a very large amount: “One of the pashas,” writes La Motreuil, “who was in the tent, told me that Osman [kegaya] received no more than 13 thousand gold ducats” 50.
Then the vizier immediately expressed the demands of the Turks. I would like to emphasize that they were not formulated solely by the vizier, but were discussed and adopted at a council with the participation of the Crimean Khan and the Sultan’s personal representative, as reported by a variety of sources. Shafirov wrote to Peter on August 17 from the Turkish camp: “He, the vizier, sent to us... and ordered to announce that... he made peace with us publicly and with the advice of the Crimean Khan and the Cuban viziers and others.” Sutton reports that the vizier began negotiations and made peace with the consent of “the pashas and officers.” Moreau, from the words of the Turkish Pasha, writes: the vizier told Charles HP, who came to him with reproaches for the peace terms, that “he did nothing without the consent of one minister who was in the camp and his military council.” Finally, the Turkish report said that in response to the Russians’ appeal, “the Grand Vizier and other ministers responded with agreement to make peace” 51 .
Kurat 52 also came to the conclusion that the conditions of the Turks were not personal proposals of the Grand Vizier, but were worked out in council. True, he believes that the council took place after Shafirov’s arrival, but this contradicts Poniatovsky’s statement that the Russians “descended in front of the grand vizier’s tent and were introduced there” and that the vizier immediately presented the conditions, i.e. Shafirov did not wait for the Turks to work them out . But Poniatowski was there, and he does not mention that the Turks discussed among themselves the conditions they put forward, while Kurat writes that there was a discussion and that the Crimean Khan was against negotiations, but said that peace could only be agreed upon if the Russians gave up Azov, Taganrog and other fortresses they built will not interfere in the affairs of the Zaporozhye Cossacks and will leave Poland 53. Looking ahead, I will say that it was these conditions that became the main ones. Therefore, we can reasonably assume that the council was convened not after Shafirov’s arrival, but after the vizier received Sheremetev’s first letter, and the second letter was received when the discussion of peace conditions had already begun. In any case, they were formulated before Shafirov’s arrival and not by the vizier alone, but by the council. The vizier spoke about this to Charles XII and Shafirov 54. I managed to find in the archive an entry with the note “The first demands from the Turkish side near the Prut, which did not materialize.” Here they are: “With God’s help and the power of the All-Highest, according to a peaceful agreement, so that Azov with all its fortresses, as before, would be given back to Taganrog, Kamennaya Zaton and the new fortification at the mouth of the Samara would be completely ruined. And henceforth the Cossacks, Cossacks, and Poles should not be disturbed. And all the places that previously belonged to the Porte will be ceded. Lord Voloskogo and Savu [Raguzinsky], as traitorous subjects, in order to give so that henceforth our friendship would be inviolable. The tribute is that the Volos land pays for one year, and until then that Volos land will return to its previous state, so that that money will also be given for three years. And besides the merchants, there would be no ambassador in Constantinople. And all the ammunition and guns would have been given to us. And from then on the king of Sweden came under the protection of the Illustrious Ports, and so that on both sides for the friendship of the Ottoman Ports there would be no unfriendship. And henceforth, as our subjects, no loss or disgust will be caused to our subjects from [the word is lost]. And if the perpetrator is under the above conditions, the vizier will ask Saltan’s Majesty to consign those enemy actions to oblivion. And according to the above-mentioned measure, so that the Galans will also be guarantors of the British. And then on both sides there will be two copies” 55. The main thing in these conditions is the return of Azov and the destruction of newly built fortresses. And nothing in favor of the Swedes.

Let us now return to Poniatowski’s story. According to him, Shafirov replied “that they lived in Moldova with their own money; that the invasion of the Tartars into their state last winter prompted them to take revenge; that in order to maintain friendship with the Sultan, the Tsar would return Azov and demolish Taganrog, but that they needed Stone Zaton to hide from Tatar raids. Since they [the Russians] were afraid, they said, of forgetting something of the vizier's demands, they asked him to put everything in writing. After this, the vizier sent them to the secretary’s tent.” While the conditions were being discussed in the secretary's tent, in the vizier's tent Poniatowski, as he wrote in his Notes, in the presence of the assembled dignitaries, began to heatedly reproach the vizier, saying that “with all the advantages that God had given him over his enemies, he was able to demand and get different conditions." The vizier, amazed and enraged by his insolence, “used very insulting words and threats towards Count Poniatowski, who answered him in the same tone and left.” But he remained nearby and returned to the tent after Shafirov.
There is no information about how the discussion took place in the secretary's tent, but one curious circumstance is connected with it. In the text of Poniatowski’s letter to Leszczynski describing the negotiations, published in the appendix to La Motreuil’s first book in English, there is the following phrase: “The Vizier and his minions, bribed during negotiations in another tent, agreed to everything [what Shafirov wanted]” 56 . But this phrase is not in the French text of the letter, although Poniatowski wrote to Leszczynski either in French or Polish, but certainly not in English. Most likely, in French, since letters of this kind were intended at that time to disseminate the information they contained. La Motreuil, in the preface to his second book (printed in 1732), wrote: “In the editions of my book in English and French English translators and Hague publishers made various additions and insertions in my absence and without my knowledge” 57. Why this was done is unknown. It can be assumed that for opportunistic political reasons. But it is quite plausible that it was in the secretary’s tent that Shafirov promised large gifts to Turkish dignitaries, as was customary among the Turks. Of course, not for them to put forward conditions acceptable to Russia, because they have already been presented. No, we could only talk about creating a friendly atmosphere during negotiations. True, the Turks were interested in Russia accepting their terms, but Shafirov’s observance of the custom of giving gifts and Peter’s generosity had a certain significance. But there is no reason to talk about bribing the Grand Vizier.
After the translation of the text of the conditions in the secretary's tent, the actual peace negotiations with the Grand Vizier were to begin. Entering his tent, Shafirov gave an answer to the demands made by the Turks. According to Poniatovsky, Shafirov said that although under the previous agreement Azov had forever passed to Russia, the tsar would return it out of friendship for the Porte; that Taganrog, Kamenny Zaton and Samara (newly built fortresses in the Black Sea region) will be razed; that the Russians will stop engaging in the affairs of Poland, in which they would not have interfered if the Swedish king had not intervened in them (the vizier remained silent about this); that the Zaporozhye Cossacks, at the request of the Porte, will begin to enjoy their former freedom; that the Russians received nothing from Moldova, where they hounded their money, and they have nothing to return; that the Moldavian ruler cannot be extradited, since he has already fled for 3 days; that Savva is unknown to them. During the negotiations, the vizier dropped the demands for the extradition of Kantemir and Savva Raguzinsky, which were of little importance to the Turks, and agreed to take guns from Azov instead of army artillery. But he put forward new demands: about the free passage of the Swedish king to his army, about the resumption of the annual payment of “commemoration” (tribute) to the Crimean Khan, and about the stay of Shafirov and the son of Field Marshal Sheremetev, Colonel Mikhail Petrovich Sheremetev, in Turkey as hostages until the conditions are fulfilled peace treaty.
Regarding the payment of tribute to the Crimean Khan, Sutton reported on August 10 that “the king undertook, in a separate article, which at his request was not included in the text of the treaty, in order to hide the dishonor, to pay the usual previous tribute to the Khan in the amount of 40,000 ducats annually, from which he was exempted according to the last world" 58. But this is inaccurate: “a separate article”, i.e. there was no written commitment, and the amount was not determined during the negotiations. This can be seen from Shafirov’s letter to Peter dated October 16, 1711: “If, sir, it comes to the point that need will persuade the khan, so as not to be disgusted, then we will be forced to promise him some dacha and ask for a decree for this, since in the agreement on that's what they told us. And although I fought back then, so as not to write it into the contract, I was forced to promise in words that you would be willing to send him gifts if he kept the peace” 59 . Apparently, a rumor reached the diplomats that the Crimean Khan intended to demand exactly this amount. The vizier did not remove another demand important for the prestige of Russia: that Russia should not have an ambassador in Istanbul and communicate with the Turkish government through the Crimean Khan. The terms were agreed on the same day, July 10. The Article List notes that Shafirov “spent the night in the Tour convoy.” Consequently, the entire evening of July 10, and probably even the night and morning of July 11, the final text of the treaty was formulated and translated for presentation to Peter. The compiler of a collection of Peter’s letters to Sheremetev, published in 1774, writes: “The Turkish treatise was written on July 21/10... And so, the vizier, upon Shafirov’s arrival to him in the evening, without hesitating at all, wrote the treatise on the same night. .. It was necessary to translate it into some familiar language, translate from it into Russian... The first translation was made into Greek on July 11..., as precisely explained in it” 60.

Peter was nervous: the time favorable for an attack was passing, the provisions had run out, and the hungry horses were losing strength. “Our army,” writes Moreau, “had no provisions; on the fifth day most of the officers did not eat bread; especially the soldiers who enjoy less comfort... the horses licked the ground and were so exhausted that when they had to put them into action, they didn’t know whether to saddle or harness them or not” 61 . The military council convened by Peter on the evening of July 10 adopted next solution: “At the council, all the generals and ministers put their best foot forward. If the enemy does not want to be satisfied with those conditions, but wants us to surrender to their discretion and put down our guns, then everyone agreed that we should go to the diversion near the river” 62 . It is not surprising that on the morning of July 11, Peter wrote a desperate letter to Shafirov: “My lord. I understood from the words sent that the Turks, although inclined, are slow towards peace, for this reason, do everything according to your own reasoning, as God instructs you, and if they truly talk about peace, then bet with them on whatever they want, except mischief. And let us know today, of course, so that we can, with God’s help, begin our dispersed path. If there is a genuine inclination of the Yavits towards peace, and today they cannot end the agreement, then at least do something today to mow down the transition. Otherwise, verbal orders are given. Peter. From Lagoru, July 11, 1711" 63 "But the terms had already been agreed upon. Shafirov returned from the Turks in the afternoon with the text of the agreement and, having received Peter’s consent, went back to formalize it. 64 In the evening M.B. also arrived to the Turks. Sheremetev, promoted to the rank of major general “for the best respect” 65. On July 12, the treaty was signed, sent to Peter, and on the same day at 6 pm the Russian army set out on the return journey.
Thus ended the battle on the Prut. In general, the Russian army lost about 3 thousand people killed and wounded. But these are only losses in battle, and losses from exhaustion should also be taken into account. Sutton reported that “even before meeting the Turkish army, they [the Russians] lost, according to some, 5,000 people, according to others, more from hunger and disease” 66. One of the correspondents of Prince Eugene of Savoy, from the words of an unknown Swede, wrote that in the Russian army, leaving after the Battle of the Prut, soldiers could not march more than two hours a day, and 400-500 people died daily 67. This is probably an exaggeration, but it reflects the impression of a contemporary. There is no exact information about the losses of the Turks; they range from 2 to 9 thousand killed and the same number wounded 68 . The Turkish army also had non-combat losses: Sutton reported that “during the Turks’ stay on the Danube, dysentery was rampant among the troops and 300 or 400 people died daily” 69 . The vizier sent the king provisions: according to La Motreya, 4000 quintals of bread (quintal - 100 pounds), 2000 quintals of rice and 1000 ok coffee (approx - 3 pounds); according to Sutton, 1200 carts with bread and rice and 500 ca coffee. The Turkish report on the campaign reported that food was sent for 11 days 70 . Poniatowski wrote to Leszczynski that the tsar came out “from his camp with all the badges of honor, equipped with his new friends with everything he lacked to feed his frustrated army” 71 .
Notified of the peace negotiations, Karl HP rushed to the Turkish camp an hour after the Russian army set out, but got nothing from the vizier, and the next day Shafirov, in another letter to Peter, said: “Nothing was remembered about the Swedish king today, and I tea that they spat on him" 72.

The Legend of the Bribery of the Vizier and Catherine's Jewels

To begin with, gifting gifts to officials in Turkey was a widely practiced system. Moreover, in the 17th century. there was even a special institution that took into account bribes received by officials and allocated a certain percentage to the treasury 73 . Therefore, the money promised to the vizier and his assistants were traditional gifts, and not bribery at all.
On July 12, after the signing of the treaty, Shafirov, having sent Peter a letter of congratulations, reported in a special encrypted “cedula” (note): “I inform you that it was promised: the vizier did not dare to assign a date; kegayu 50,000 levki; Chaush Pasha 5,000 red rubles; Kegain's brother 1000 red coins and 3 sable furs; the stableman 1000 ducats; translator 500 chervonny; to the secretary to whom the treatise was written, 1000 ducats; on other offices there are 1000. This number, Your Majesty, please order it to be sent immediately. And I promised, and they will question me. But only 3,700 chervonnies were released to me, and I truly don’t know what to do. And it’s difficult to send it so that it doesn’t get lost and it gets publicized. And I don’t see any other way, so that they would deign to send thirty thousand efimki and chervonnies before they moved away, with a good escort, and order bills to be sent from Moscow for the sufficient number” 74 .
On July 13, Shafirov wrote to Golovkin about his conversation with the vizier’s secretary: “The same secretary told me from the vizier that he was very inclined towards his royal majesty and wanted to send kind argamaks to him, as well as to the generals and ministers, after the conclusion of peace, but I was afraid of the Swedish king, so as not to inflict a saltan on him... And I said that... the royal majesty is extremely grateful for the vizier’s kindness... and intends to send the vizier, after the conclusion of peace, a noble gift, namely for [blank] thousand but time there was no need for that, and even now that money is ready if they want to send a convoy along it to spend the money. He then listened with great desire and said: It would be better if I called them my things and ordered them to be brought here, but he will report this to the Ezar, and so that this is really secret... At this hour I received an answer from the kegai, so that I but to send money and things of your own and order them to be brought... Please, your high-ranking excellency, for God’s sake, release that money: first, for the vizier 150 thousand rubles, 50 kegs, and for other distributions, according to my promise, fifty thousand" 75 - Here, for the first time, the amount promised to the vizier was stated in writing - 150 thousand rubles. and the total amount is 250 thousand rubles.

It was impossible to hide the fact that money was sent with the Turkish convoy, and it was probably Moreau who first reported this in print in his “Notes” 76 . The money was Russian and not gold, but silver, and this, of course, caused difficulties for the ambassadors. July 28 Shafirov and M.B. Sheremetev reported to Golovkin: “The eleven forty sables sent for 5 thousand rubles were accepted. And we regret that only a few of them were sent, because... everyone is running away from Russian money, and they don’t dare accept it, and it’s so cheap that a levok of our money costs 40 altyns. To this day, no one has taken them yet, they are afraid that someone will not recognize them. And the vizier told us his promised news to Sakchiya.” In 1872, an act of verification of part of the amount sent was published, from which it is clear that the money being verified was collected in Moscow from townspeople of various settlements during the collection of the salt tax in 1709 and the customs tax in 1710. 77 Thus, Peter sent Russian money to Shafirov from the army treasury, from which current expenses were made.
Sutton reported that on July 23, the kegai of the Grand Vizier, Osman Agha, brought the signed agreement, on the 23rd, the Sultan sent an equerry to the vizier to approve the agreement, and on the 24th, Mirza arrived from the Crimean Khan with “a lengthy protest against the behavior of the Grand Vizier.” “Under the influence of the khan, the sultan showed dissatisfaction with the vizier’s moderation, but he was supported by the mufti and ulema, Ali Pasha (the sultan’s favorite), Kizlyar Agha (chief eunuch), the chief of the Janissaries and all the officers” 78 . Note that the khan has not yet raised the issue of bribing the vizier. Shafirov and M.B. Sheremetev wrote to Golovkin on August 4: “A letter from the King of Sweden was sent to the vizier... from Saltan, which he wrote against him with a complaint that he [the vizier], having our army in his hands, allowed us to deceive himself, made peace without calling him into the council and not including him in that [world]. And under his letter from the saltan it was only signed that his last vizier would give him an answer. And the desir sent that letter... to him, the king, with his letter, in which he wrote to him so that he should immediately leave their land” 79. The absence of an accusation of bribing the vizier in Karl’s complaint indicates that the Swedes had not yet come up with the idea of ​​​​presenting a traditional gift as a bribe. I note that the complaint was sent for consideration to the one against whom the complaint was made - the vizier, which speaks of the Sultan’s trust in him.
But the accusation of bribing the vizier appeared in the same August. Having received back his letter to the Sultan and a letter from the vizier demanding that he leave Turkey, Charles realized that he could only influence the Sultan by discrediting the vizier. The latter's position was difficult. The return of Azov was the main goal of the war. Peace has been signed, the Russian army has left, but Azov is still not given up. Why? How to explain this to the Sultan? Peter did not give up Azov, citing the fact that the Swedish king had not yet been expelled, but in the Treaty the return of Azov was not conditional on the expulsion of the king. And then Karl sent the Sultan a drawing of the location of Russian and Turkish troops on the banks of the Prut, clearly showing that if the vizier wanted, he could take prisoner the entire Russian army” 80

The explanation that the vizier was bribed suggested itself. Discussions about this began in August. Here is what Sutton wrote in a dispatch dated September 4: the vizier’s behavior “is approved completely and in every detail by the Sultan and all the people, despite everything that was blamed on him, and despite the intrigues of the Swedish king and khan. The Vizier is supported not only by the Sultan and his ministers, but also by the ulema, the largest and best part of the people, the chief of the Janissaries and, in general, all the military leaders and officers, in accordance with whose advice he acted... Only a few of the mob listen to the words of the Swedes and Tatars... ., that the vizier was generously bribed by the king in order to make peace and make it possible to safely withdraw the army” 81. The fact that it was Karl who brought forward this accusation, supported by the Crimean Khan, was confirmed by the secretary of the Dutch ambassador, V. Theils, in his memoirs, published in 1722. According to him, Karl wrote a letter to the Sultan, where he accused the vizier and his kegaya of , having the king in his hands, “taking the amount of money, they released him, changing the honor and true interests of the Ottoman Empire into the love of money” 82.
Closely intertwined with the version of bribery and widely circulated among historians is the legend that Catherine bribed the vizier with her jewelry. Let us consider its emergence 83 . Yust Yul reports that on the morning of July 10, during the confusion that gripped the Russian convoy, “the queen gave away all her precious stones and jewelry to the first servants and officers she came across, and after the conclusion of peace, she took these things back from them, declaring that they were given to them only for savings" 84 . The publisher of the notes, Yulia, in a note to this place, quite correctly posed the question: “Isn’t this incident the basis for the well-known story that Catherine gave away her jewelry and personally collected money from the soldiers in order to bribe the High Vizier?” This is quite likely. Of course, those who received them were silent about the queen’s gifts, but when she began to take them back, naturally, many were disappointed and dissatisfied, and it became impossible to avoid publicity. The rumor of bribing the vizier was spread throughout Europe by the Swedes and foreign officers dismissed after the campaign, including Moreau. It was natural to connect it with the story that Catherine played a decisive role in Peter’s decision to enter into negotiations and that it was her jewelry that persuaded the vizier to make peace. In 1712, they tried to back it up with a rumor that the queen’s ring was allegedly found in the property of the executed kegai Osman 85 . But who in Turkey could know her jewels well enough to recognize him? So this is, of course, just a rumor. But here’s what’s interesting: neither Moreau in his book, published in 1716, nor La Motreuil in the first book, published in 1723, reported on Catherine’s jewelry.

In January 1725, after the death of Peter, the guard elevated Catherine to the throne. In the same year, a biography of Peter, written by the German Rabener, was published in Leipzig. In it, the legend about Catherine’s jewelry is also conveyed as a rumor: “They say,” writes Rabener, “that even before the conclusion of the truce, the vizier received all the cash of the officers and the jewelry of their wives... Even the queen herself did not spare in such a grave need, contrary to her custom floor, your best jewelry" 86. In 1726, the book “Notes on the Reign of Peter the Great” was published, the author of which hid under the pseudonym “Baron Ivan Nestesuranoi”, and in 1728 the anonymous “Notes on the Reign of Catherine” 87. Both books, as was later established, were written by French writer Rousset de Missy, commissioned by the Russian government. In them, the literary processed and embellished legend of Catherine is presented as a completely reliable event. In 1732, Voltaire, in his book about Charles XII, repeated the legend, but La Motreuil objected to him: in “Remarks” on Voltaire's book and in his second book of travels, published in the same year, he strongly denied that Catherine had sent her jewelry. Here is what La Motreuil wrote in his “Remarks”: “I received information from various Muscovite officers ... that Madame Catherine, who became then empress, had very little jewelry, [and] that she did not collect any silver for the vizier." 88 The second book said: the public loves everything extraordinary, and they say "that the queen could not have saved the king if she had sacrificed all her jewelry and other gifts to the vizier. But I was there and I know for sure that the vizier did not receive a single piece of jewelry or a single penny." 89 There, in a special note about Shafirov, La Motreuil emphasized that “it was only thanks to his abilities, and not at all to the imaginary gifts of the queen, that the king owed his deliverance on the Prut. As I have already said elsewhere, about all the gifts made to the vizier after the conclusion of the peace treaty, I was very well informed (I repeat this again) not only by the pasha with whom I was then, but by many other Turks, even the enemies of this vizier. 90.

However, Voltaire's book became widely known, and the legend, growing in detail, continued its triumphal march through the pages of books by other authors. So, for example, A. Gordon, who was then serving in Russia, but did not participate in the campaign, reported in 1755 that the merit of concluding peace belongs entirely to Catherine, who gave her jewelry to the vizier 91 . And a participant in the campaign, Captain P. Bruce, a relative of Y.V. Bruce, wrote (published in 1782) that Catherine not only collected the debt of jewelry and money, but also gold and silver dishes and sent all this to the vizier 92. Because of its dramatic nature, the legend became widespread in memoirs of the 18th century, in scientific, reference and fiction XIX-XX centuries and has survived safely to this day.
Thus, the assertion about the decisive influence of the bribery of the Grand Vizier on the conditions of peace was put forward by the Swedes in August 1711 and taken up by the vizier’s opponents in the Sultan’s entourage, and it was first expressed in print, apparently in 1716, in the anonymously published notes of Moreau . The terms of the peace treaty were worked out collectively at the council even before Shafirov’s arrival and before the promise of a gift. Catherine, it seems, influenced Peter’s decision to enter into negotiations with the Turks. It is even possible that the initiative came from her. We will never know what really happened, but it doesn’t matter. It is important that the decision about this was made by Peter himself - after all, it is not the one who gives the advice who is responsible, but the one who decides whether to accept it or not.

The legend of the “letter of Peter I from the banks of the Prut”

In 1735, Jacob von Staehlin (1712-1785), a native of the German city of Meiningen, was invited to the Russian Academy of Sciences “for verbal sciences and allegorical inventions for fireworks, illuminations and medals.” In 1738, he was appointed professor of “eloquence (eloquence - Ya.V.) and poetry” and a member of the Academy of Sciences. When he arrived in Russia, his contemporaries still vividly remembered the legendary emperor. Shtelin began to collect stories about him, without trying to separate truth from fiction, reliable from rumors. He published the collected stories in 1785 in Leipzig in German under the title “True Stories about Peter the Great.” The book contains a recommendation from the book. MM. Shcherbatov (dated 1780), which states that “all these anecdotes are confirmed by the testimony of eyewitnesses from whom you (Shtelin - Ya.V.) received these anecdotes.” This is expressed in the indication after each story from whom Stehlin heard it. The book was published in Russia in 1786 in Moscow and St. Petersburg 93.
Among other “anecdotes”, a letter from Peter to the Senate was published, which said: “I hereby inform you that I, with all my army, without fault or error on our part, but solely based on false news received, are so surrounded by four times the strongest Turkish force that all paths to obtaining provisions have been stopped, and without God’s special help I cannot foresee anything other than complete defeat, or that I will fall into Turkish captivity. If this last thing happens, then you should not honor me as your king and sovereign and not fulfill anything that I, even by my own command, demanded of you, until I myself appear among you in my person. But if I die, and you receive true news of my death, then choose among yourselves the most worthy person to be my heir.” 94 There is no address, signature, date or place of writing in the letter.
Before the text of the letter, Shtelin placed a story about how Peter, having been encircled with his army on the banks of the Prut, called a trusted officer and gave him this letter. The officer managed to get through the Turkish-Tatar army surrounding the Russian camp and after 9 days delivered the letter to the senators in St. Petersburg. But the story is untrue, first of all, in that the Senate was still in Moscow, and not in St. Petersburg, and the indicated delivery time is too short. “The original of the letter entered here,” Shtelin wrote, “is in the office of Peter the Great at the St. Petersburg Imperial Court, among many other handwritten letters of this Monarch, and was shown to many noble persons by the overseer assigned to this office, Prince Mikhail Mikhailovich Shcherbatov.” Under Peter’s letter, he indicated that “this is known from Prince Mikhaila Mikhailovich Shcherbatov, Chamberlain and Master of Arms of the Governing Senate” 95. Peter's letter in 1830 was published in the official publication “Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire” (PSZ). The publishers provided it with the address “Gentlemen Senate” and the date July 10, but they printed the letter not in the text, but in a footnote with an explanation: “This decree does not appear in the text and under a special number because the original was not found in the manuscripts of Emperor Peter I.” 96.
In the PSZ and some historians, the text of the letter is somewhat different from the text in Shtelin: instead of “four times” it is printed: “seven times”. This amendment was made by I.I. Golikov, publishing the letter in his “Acts of Peter the Great, the Wise Transformer of Russia” 97. This is how he explained his audacity in a footnote: “In the original it is worth four times, but I put it at seven times, following the Journal; for this letter was written when the number of enemies was not yet known exactly.” Let me remind you that in the Journal (Day Note) the number of the Turkish-Tatar army is indicated at 270 thousand people, i.e. 7 times more than in the Report on the Prut Campaign, but this very inflated number, as already mentioned, was reported to Peter by Shafirov from the words of the Turks.
In the 19th century Historians had doubts about the authenticity of the letter, and a controversy ensued. The first to doubt was, apparently, A.S. Pushkin: in 1832 he began collecting materials for the “History of Peter the Great” and in 1711 he wrote that “Stellin assures that the glorious letter to the Senate is kept in His Majesty’s office at the imperial palace. But, unfortunately, the joke seems to have been made up almost by himself. At least the letter has not been found" 98. In 1962 E.P. Podyapolskaya studied the text of the letter, considered the arguments of historians and came to the conclusion that, after all, the letter was genuine 99. At her insistence, it was included in the publication “Letters and Papers of Emperor Peter the Great” among Peter’s letters, but by decision of the editors it was published with the subtitle: “Letter attributed to Peter I” 100. N.I. Pavlenko believes that the letter was forged by Shtelin. However, it relies only on logical reasoning 101.
The answer to the question about the authenticity or forgery of the letter (and in this case about the author of the forgery) can be threefold: the letter is genuine, the letter is forged by Shcherbatov, the letter is forged by Shtelin with the knowledge and consent of Shcherbatov (and, perhaps, with his direct help), since Shcherbatov confirmed its authenticity and, therefore, became a participant in the forgery and an accomplice of Shtelin. As Podyapolskaya pointed out, “M.M. Shcherbatov..., during whose lifetime several editions of Shtelin’s “Anecdotes” were published in three languages, did not refute Shtelin’s reference to his name and thereby confirmed his involvement in the anecdote about the Prut campaign” 102. Moreover, Shcherbatov did not refute Shtelin’s report that he, Shcherbatov, showed the original letter to “many noble persons.”

S. M. Soloviev believed that the original could have been destroyed. Podyapolskaya supported and developed his statement: “Inducements to destroy the original could, in Solovyov’s opinion, come from Peter’s successors. Let us add that this kind of motivation could have come from Peter himself, since the letter dated July 10 spoke of a “terrible moment” on the banks of the Prut, which Peter I was not interested in remembering.” But both Soloviev and Podyapolskaya lost sight of the fact that Shcherbatov, as Shtelin wrote, showed “many noble persons” the original (and Shcherbatov did not deny this). This means that neither Peter nor his successors are innocent in the disappearance of the letter, and the original (if there was one at all, of course) disappeared after its publication.
The absence of an original and a copy of the letter and no mention of it in the records, correspondence and memoirs of Peter’s contemporaries is not evidence of its forgery: firstly, not all documents of the era have reached us, and secondly, if it existed, it would have been strictly secret . But if Shcherbatov really showed it, then why did none of his contemporaries even casually mention it? According to Podyapolskaya and Pavlenko, judging by the style and description of the situation, the letter could have been written by Peter. But, firstly, it is impossible to judge with certainty the authorship of Peter based on the language, style and content of the letter: Shtelin’s book contains a German text, which means it is a translation, and then, during the preparation of Russian editions, translations were made from German into Russian; secondly, the archive contains many letters from Peter, from which it was possible to study his style, and the Report on the Prut Campaign, the Daily Note, the memoirs of the participants in the campaign and his contemporaries, which vividly described the situation, were published before the publication of Shtelin’s book.
Thus, analysis of the contents of the letter and clarification of the purpose of its possible forgery become crucial. Analysis of the content, as has already been noted in the literature, poses two questions to the researcher: why is the heir to the throne, Tsarevich Alexei, deprived of the right to inherit his father’s throne and why does Peter command that a new king be elected only by the Senate and only from senators? Some historians point out that Peter had long threatened to deprive his son of the right to inherit the throne, and that, although in 1711 relations between father and son were not openly hostile, in 1715 Peter also made such a threat. This means that he could have had this thought in 1711. But all these are just assumptions.
Podyapolskaya tried to substantiate the assumption that Peter was cooling off towards Alexei by the fact that the draft marriage contract drawn up by representatives of the Tsarevich’s bride, Princess Charlotte of Wolfenbüttel (the agreement was concluded in the spring of 1711), stated that she would lead a “blessed marriage and statehood” with the Tsarevich, but Peter crossed out the word “government”. Podyapolskaya concluded that by this Peter “reduced the chances of Alexei and his wife becoming a state,” and considered this evidence of Peter’s cooling towards Alexei 103. But the word “government” means “reign,” therefore, during Peter’s life, the prince could only lead a blessed marriage with Charlotte, since Peter himself led the state. It is quite understandable that Peter crossed out this word from the marriage contract. And if he “lost interest” in Alexei to the point that he internally ceased to consider him his heir (although he hid it for now), why then did he even bother about his marriage, which, especially in the event of an heir, strengthened Alexei’s position? But if even Peter on the Prut wanted to remove the prince, then why didn’t the letter directly say that the prince was deprived of the right to inherit the throne? It was clear that Alexei and his supporters would not calmly look at the election of a new tsar, and the struggle for the throne in the conditions of a war with Sweden and Turkey was nothing good Russia didn't promise. Couldn't Peter not understand this? Therefore, in my opinion, it is incredible that in such a letter Peter kept silent about the removal of Alexei.

Why did the Senate have to elect the king, and only from among its own members? The Senate was created by Peter's decree of February 22, 1711 to resolve current affairs due to the fact that the tsar was absent from the capital for months and, being busy with important military and political affairs, could not pay much attention to current affairs of internal administration. The following were appointed senators: N.P. Melnitsky- Head of the Military Order, G.A. Nephews- head of the Admiralty order, V.A. Apukhtin- Quartermaster General, MM. Samarin- General-Tsalmeister, Count I.A. Musin-Pushkin- Head of the Monastery Prikaz, Prince P.A. Golitsyn- Arkhangelsk governor prince, G. I. Volkonsky- Chief Commandant of the Yaroslavl Province, T.N. Streshnev- former head of the Discharge Order, Prince M.V. Dolgoruky- room, table. Their fate is interesting. Ceased to be senators: Melnitsky - in 1712, Golitsyn - in 1713 (appointed governor of Riga), Plemyannikov - in 1714, Apukhtin and Volkonsky - in 1715 (convicted of embezzlement), Dolgoruky - in 1718 (accused in the case of Tsarevich Alexei, but in 1724 he was appointed Siberian governor), Samarin - in 1719 (appointed head of the Local Prikaz), Streshnev died in 1718, and only Musin-Pushkin remained a senator during the entire reign of Peter 104.
IN. Klyuchevsky emphasized that the Senate had “an administrative and supervisory nature of an institution without advisory significance or legislative authority.” “Peter,” he wrote, “needed... a simple state government of a few smart businessmen capable of guessing the will, catching the tsar’s unclear thought hidden in the laconic charade of a hastily sketched personal decree, developing it into an understandable and executable order and authoritatively looking after its execution... The majority of the Senate was made up of businessmen who were far from the top bureaucratic nobility... Such people understood the military economy, the most important subject of Senate jurisdiction... and they could probably steal less than Menshikov” 105. In general, the composition of the Senate was to a certain extent accidental. Why did Peter limit the circle of candidates for the throne and voters only to these “businessmen”? And in general, given the character of Peter and his attitude towards Russia, is it possible to imagine him avoiding the appointment of his successor and agreeing in advance to the election of some Plemyannikov, Samarin, Apukhtin, Melnitsky as Tsar of All Russia? Did Peter really not take into account how the relatives of the Romanov dynasty would react to this? What about representatives of other noble families? Did he really not understand that this order would inevitably unleash civil war? And Peter could not forget that in Russia there is experience in transferring the throne by electing a tsar by the All-Russian Zemsky Sobor (this is how Boris Godunov and Peter’s great-grandfather, Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, were elected). Therefore, such an order of his, like the default on the removal of Alexei, is also incredible. Thus, the contents of the letter seem to me to be completely inconsistent with the character of Peter, who was always aware of his responsibility before God for the fate of Russia entrusted to him.

Who could have forged the letter? Obviously, only those who studied the language and style of Peter were well acquainted with the tsar’s letters, documents on the history of the campaign and the memoirs of its participants and - most importantly - who needed it for some purpose. The main suspects are Shtelin and Shcherbatov. Podyapolskaya believed that both of them could not forge the letter, since “both of them, especially Shtelin, were unable to compose a letter that was fully consistent with the historical situation.” But both had at their disposal archival documents, the Journal or Daily Note of Peter, memoirs of participants and contemporaries of the campaign (Poniatowski, La Motreuil, Moreau, Peter Bruce, Gordon), Voltaire’s book about Charles XII and the works of other authors. Why, having such sources, was it “beyond the power” of either Shtelin or Shcherbatov to describe the situation on the Prut? Both were highly educated people, both were accustomed to working with documents, both had no difficulty expressing their thoughts on paper. Of course, Shcherbatov, who sorted out Peter’s papers, was much more familiar than Shtelin with his style and manner of writing and with the situation on the Prut. But still, both of them could well have forged the letter.
N.I. Pavlenko believes that Shcherbatov could not do this because he had professional training as a historian, for whom such a forgery would have been too crude. Pavlenko sees the “rudeness” of the forgery in the fact that Peter’s order to the Senate not to take into account his letters from captivity if he is in captivity, and to elect a new tsar from among its members in the event of his death, is implausible. But it was Shcherbatov who passed off that document as an authentic letter from the tsar. If he knew that it was Stehlin’s fake, then why didn’t he correct it and make it more plausible? And since he did not do this, it means that he considered the letter plausible and, therefore, could have forged it himself.

But which of them benefited from this? Pavlenko believes that the letter was forged by Shtelin, who, although “did not derive direct benefits..., could simply find pleasure in making legends.” Let's assume this is true. In fact, perhaps this was the dream of his whole life: to publish a forgery of the royal letter and secretly revel in the surprise of those around him, who could not help but be amazed by its content. It is clear then why he secured Shcherbatov’s statement that it was he, and not Shtelin, who found the letter: firstly, Shcherbatov had uncontrolled access to Peter’s papers, and not he, and secondly, it’s one thing to forge literary work, for example, some ancient bard or scribe, and something completely different - a letter from the tsar, and even with political content, which certainly could not have pleased Catherine II.
Was it not too dangerous for a simple professor to forge a political document directed against the Empress? Was the pleasure of making legends really so strong that it outweighed the fear of exposure and subsequent punishment? Where is the guarantee that Catherine would not have ordered a search: how did he get into the royal archive? Why were you rummaging through the royal papers? Indeed, at that time, even a sincere confession could not save you from torture - the investigators had to be convinced of its veracity. Did Shtelin, who had already lived for 50(!) years in Russia (and what years! Bironovism, coups...), not understand this?
It is impossible to believe that Stehlin would have decided to do such an act. Could Shcherbatov decide to do it and why might he need it? What is main idea letters? To prove that Peter allegedly attached great importance to the Senate: from the letter it follows that only the Senate, as the highest authority in the state, can decide who will take the throne, and, moreover, can even choose a king from among its members. And who needed to raise the importance of the Senate like that? Under Catherine II, this was needed by part of the nobility, who had projects to limit the rights of the monarch in favor of the Senate. Shcherbatov also belonged to it (but not Shtelin!). He very disapproved of the unbridled luxury of the royal court and the queen’s passion for favorites, who acquired decisive influence on the course of state affairs. In this situation, a letter from the legendary transformer of Russia, whose direct successor in spirit Catherine II considered herself, a letter where Peter the Great himself pointed out the exceptional position of the Senate in the state, could have been of considerable importance. Such a letter from Peter could be considered by Shcherbatov and his like-minded people as a compelling argument in favor of expanding the rights of the Senate. This is precisely what explains the silence in the letter about Tsarevich Alexei and other possible candidates outside the Senate. For Shcherbatov, its contents were of great political significance, especially since it was practically impossible to convict him of a forgery: at the behest of the Empress, he brought the archives of the Tsar-Transformer to the authorities and found the letter. And the attitude towards a well-born shyazy was not at all the same as towards a rootless foreigner-mercenary. As we would say now, a letter could serve as a good propaganda tool. Shcherbatov used it exactly in this way: first he showed it to “many noble persons,” then he published it in Shtelin’s book.
True, according to Podyapolskaya, “Prince Shcherbatov would hardly have allowed himself to forge the royal letter.” But I think that since the letter did not give him any personal benefit, he could decide on this forgery “in the interests of the Fatherland.” But the loyal subject Stehlin could well consider this “lese majeste” and be afraid of the risk associated with it. All this, of course, is just logical reasoning, but there is one more circumstance that has not yet been noticed by historians. In 1790, after a short Russian-Swedish war, peace was concluded. It was marked by a celebration in St. Petersburg, at which the Chief Prosecutor of the Senate gave a speech. Shcherbatov was dissatisfied with her and wrote “A citizen’s response to a speech given by E.I. V. Chief Prosecutor of the Senate Neklyudov, due to the triumph of the Swedish peace, September 5, 1790.” In it, Shcherbatov, after a number of critical remarks, writes: “I do not approve of his published letter in Anecdotes, which at least has the appearance of truth; His heroic spirit, showing that he was fighting not for himself, but for the fatherland, ordered him to order his Senate, so that, in case of misfortune, his captivity would not cause any harm to Russia, to elect someone from among himself as Russian Monarchs” 106.

What do the words mean: “I do not approve of his published letter in Anecdotes, which at least has the appearance of truth”? They can only mean that, although the letter looks genuine (“has the appearance of truth”), Shcherbatov does not claim that it is genuine, i.e. admits that it may be fictitious. But Shcherbatov himself, as Shtelin wrote, showed this letter to “many noble persons” and gave it for publication precisely as an authentic letter from Peter, stored in his Office, and after publication Shcherbatov did not refute this information. So when did he lie: in 1785, passing off the letter as genuine, or in 1790, expressing doubt about its authenticity? Of course, he could have made such a reservation out of caution, realizing that the letter was unpleasant for Catherine, but he could not have mentioned it at all. And was he telling the truth to Stehlin when he claimed that he showed this letter to “noble persons”, and even “many”? And wasn’t he afraid of Catherine’s wrath? There is no mention of this in the published memoirs of contemporaries and reports of diplomats, but the letter is a sensation. But “noble persons” might not have read Shtelin’s book - how many of them were interested in stories about Peter?
In my opinion, the letter is still fake, and Shcherbatov forged it. But he either did not show it to anyone, or showed it to a few in strict confidence, and by 1790, when some of Catherine’s liberalism disappeared under the influence of the Great French Revolution (this can be seen in the example of the empress’s anger at Radishchev), he began to fear her possible reaction to the letter and in the “Response” he showed caution. It has not yet been clarified whether Shcherbatov made it public or not. He died that same year, so most likely “The Answer” remained unknown to his contemporaries. As for the story about the delivery of the letter, professional historians also make mistakes. Or maybe they were allowed intentionally? In order to, if anything happens, refer to them as proof that the letter, like the story, is also just a story!

When was Brailov captured?

Surprisingly, most researchers did not pay attention to the fact that the report on the Prut campaign, which was published in Peter’s Vedomosti in the same 1711 and was reprinted several times, included an abbreviated text of the report to Renne Sheremetev indicating the date capture of Brailov - July 14, two days after the conclusion of the Prut Peace 107. Renne's report was not intercepted by the Turks, as some historians thought. But even if this were so, the vizier would still have received it only a few days after the signing of the treaty. Therefore, the capture of Brailov could not be one of the reasons for the Turks’ consent to conclude peace and influence its terms. However, the raid of the Renne detachment into the Turkish rear undoubtedly instilled fear in the Turks and could have influenced both their decision to enter into negotiations and their position when discussing peace terms.

Why did the version of the Prut Peace Treaty appear?

The text of the Prut Peace Treaty was changed by Peter himself. I was able to find a copy of the contract with its handwritten corrections 108. In the first article, the indication that the proposal to start peace negotiations came from the Russians, and the words that the tsar promises to do such and such are replaced with: “it is demanded that peace be made” and “it has been agreed to do such and such.” " The second article talks about Russia's obligation not to interfere in the affairs of Poland. The wording has been changed so that the obligation is mutual. In the third, the prohibition to have an ambassador in Turkey was crossed out, and in the sixth, the condition on leaving Ambassadors Shafirov and Sheremet hostages in Turkey until the terms of the peace treaty were fulfilled was crossed out. In general, conditions that were humiliating for Russia’s prestige were completely excluded from the text and the wording was softened.
But why was the text changed? This was also established: on one of the copies of the corrected text there was a note: “This treatise is not genuine, but has been forwarded for communication” 109 . Consequently, the text revised by Peter, from which conditions and formulations humiliating for Russia and for him personally were excluded, was intended for the governments of Western European powers. Indeed, in a collection of diplomatic documents published in 1731, this very text, translated into Latin, is included, with a note that this copy, “as they say,” was handed over by the Russian ambassador to the Dutch government 110.
The copy of the treaty, to which Peter amended, has the heading: “Treatise given from the Russian side. Black" and the note: "For this reason a copy was sent to the secret expedition on June 17, 1736" 111. Probably, when the text of the Prut Peace Treaty was needed in 1736, this document with Peter’s own handwritten amendments was considered a draft of the original treaty. This, apparently, misled the compilers of the PZZ, who published it as the text of the original treaty, but out of caution, placed after it the Russian translation of the original, written in Turkish 112.

* * *
Let's summarize. The Russian army found itself in a difficult situation on the Prut, but it was not hopeless. The courage and discipline of the Russian regular troops and the disinterest (let's say) in the war of ordinary Turks made the outcome of the general battle doubtful for the Turks, even with their undeniable courage. The battle was interrupted. It would be wrong to call it a military defeat for the Russian army. Peter could have taken the risk and won, but given the lack of cavalry, this risk was too great. As befits a wise ruler, he chose not to take risks. His decision to achieve peace even through concessions to Sweden was strategically correct, since by this he preserved the army for further struggle. The capture of Brailov was an undoubted victory, and, from the point of view of military art, it was a victory of Peter’s ideas, which were new to the military science of that time. Thus, although in 1711 access to the Sea of ​​Azov was lost - Azov and the territory surrounding it - and Russia was forced to make certain political concessions, but in the context of the main task that Peter was solving then - the crushing of Sweden, the return of the lands it had seized and ensuring access to the Baltic Sea - it was a relatively small price to pay.

1 Vodarsky Y.E. Regarding the work of the Turkish historian about the Prut campaign of 1711 // History of the USSR. No. 6.1963. pp. 207-212 (hereinafter references: Vodarsky. Review); him. About some events of the Prut campaign of Peter I (1711) // New pages of the history of the Fatherland. Penza, 1992. pp. 82-95.
2 Ksh-at A.-N. Prut seferi ve barisi 1123 (1711). Ankara. 1951-1953. In 2 volumes (hereinafter referred to as Kurat-1 and Kurat-2); Jurat A.-N. Der Prutfeldzug und der Prutfrieden von 1711 // Jahrbiicher fur Geschichte Osteuropas. Keue Folge. Bi 10. Heft 1. April 1962 (hereinafter referred to as Kurat. Article).
3 Oreshkova S.F. Russian-Turkish relations at the beginning of the 18th century. M., 1971 (hereinafter references: Oreshkhova).
4 Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great. T. X. M., 1956 (hereinafter references: PB X). P. 549.
5 . Memoires politiques, amusants et satiriques de messier N.d.B.c.de Lion, colonel du regiment de dragons de Casanski et brigadier des armies de sa m. czarienne, a Veritopolischez Jean Disant-vrai. 3 volumes. Vol. I-III. Veritopolies. 1716. Description of the Prut campaign translated, published and commented by A.S. Pushkin (Pushkin A.S. Collected works. In 6 volumes. T. 6. M., 1950. P. 600-652 (hereinafter references: to Notes of Moreau in Pushkin's translation - Moreau, to Pushkin's comments - Pushkin S. 624 ; YulYust. Notes of Just Yul, Danish envoy to Peter the Great (1709-1711). M., 1899 (hereinafter references: Yul). P. 459-460; Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great. T. XI. Issue 1. M., 1962 (hereinafter referred to as PB KhM), pp. 286-288, 546-548.
6 PB X. S. 558; Letters and papers of Emperor Peter the Great. T. XI. Vol. 2. M., 1964 (hereinafter referred to as PB XI-2). P. 38.
7 Essays on the history of the USSR. The period of feudalism. Russia in the first quarter of the 18th century. Transformations of Peter I M., 1954. P. 533.
8 Moreau. P. 630.
9 PB XI-1. pp. 310, 564, 573; Kur at-1. pp. 451-452; Kurat-2. P. 798; Extract from the journal of Alexander Andreyanovich Yakovlev, who was under Emperor Peter the Great during the battle of the Prut in 1711 // Domestic Notes, ed. P. Svinin. Part XIX. No. 51. July. St. Petersburg, 1824. P. 15-24 (hereinafter referred to as Yakovlev). P. 18; M o r o. pp. 634-635; S u 11 o n R. The Despatches of Sir Robert Sutton, Ambassador in Constantinople (1710-1714). London, 1953 (hereinafter: Sutton). P. 65.
10 Teils V. News serving to the history of Charles XII... M., 1789 (hereinafter referred to as Teils). P. 19; Central Bank XI-1. P. 564; Sutton. pp. 58, 65; Hurmuzaki E. Documente privitore de la istoria Romanilor. Vol. VI gu_ curesci. 1878 (hereinafter references: Hurmuzaki). pp. 84-85, 87, 115; La M o t g e y, A. de. Voyages en Anglois et en Francois... en diverses Provinces et Places de la Prusse Ducale et Roiale, de la Russie, de la Pologne... A la Haye, 1732 (hereinafter references: La Motreuil-2). P. 25; Kurat-2. P. 767.
11 PB HY.S. 564.
12 Kurat. Article. P. 43, 45. M o r o. P. 639.
13 PB XI-2. pp. 34-38, 353, 371; Kurat-1. pp. 423-425; Kurat. Article. pp. 42-43; Sutton. pp. 62.76; Hurmuzaki. P. 646; Moro. pp. 634-635; RG ADA, Relations with Turkey, op. 1. 1711, No. 6, l. 3839.
14 PB XI-2. P. 372.
15 July P. 372; PB XI-1. P. 569; N.G. Peter the Great on the banks of the Prut // Journal of the Ministry of Public Education. 1847. February. Dept. 2. P. 98-99; RGADA, Cabinet of Peter I, department I. book. 13, l. 99 rev. (further links: Alart. History).
16 Kurat-1. P. 478.
17 PB XI-2. P. 12.
18 La Motrey, A. de. Travels through Europe, Asia and into part of Africa. Vol. 2. London. 1723 (hereinafter references: La Motreuil-1).
19 July P. 371.
20 Pushkin. P. 437.
21 Kurat. Article. P. 62.
22 La Moutreuil-1. pp. 11-12.
23 La Moutreuil-2. P. 234 and footnote.
24 Moreau. pp. 639-640.
25 PB HY.S. 314.
26 La Moutreuil-1. pp. 11-12.
27 PB HY.S. 313.
28 RGADA, f. 9, op. 6, l. 8 rev.
29 Sat. RIO. T. 34. St. Petersburg, 1881. P. 81.
30 Ibid. P. 89.
31 Anisimov E.A. Catherine! // The Romanovs. Historical portraits. 1613-1762. Mikhail Fedorovich-Petr Sh. M., 1997. P. 353.
32 Vsevolodov I.V. Conversations about faleristics. From the history of reward systems. M., 1990. P. 70.
33 Voskresensky N.A. Legislative acts of Peter I. T. 1. M.; L., 1945. P. 180.
34 Moreau. pp. 608-609.
35 Myshlaevsky A.Z. War with Turkey of 1711 (Prut operation). Materials // Collection of military historical materials. Vol. XII. St. Petersburg, 1898 (hereinafter references: Sat. VIM). pp. 330-331.
A la Haye, 1741 (hereinafter referred to as Poniatowski), p. 97.
37 Sutton. pp. 48, 54, 62-63; La Moutreuil-1. S. 5; PB XM. P. 577.
38 Sutton. Preface. S. 5.
39 Ibid. P. 55.
40 PB XI-1. P. 570.
41 Ibid. pp. 568-569; S u t t o n. pp. 61, 76; La M o t r e y-2. P. 10.
42 PB X-1.S. 569; Sutton. P. 71. See also: With ant emir. The History of Growth and Decoy of the Othman. London. 1734; Yakovlev. pp. 15-24.
43 PB X-1. pp. 570-571.
44 Moreau. pp. 646-647.
45 July P. 368; La Moutreuil-1. P. 12; Sutton. P. 65.
46 Defoe D. An Impartial History of the Life and Actions of Peter Alexowitz, the Present Czar of Muscovy. London.,723. P. 330.
47 Poniatowski. pp. 117-124.
48 PB XI-1. P. 580.
49 Quoted. by: Oreshkova. P. 134.
50 La Motreu A. de Remarques historiques et critiques sur l "Histoire de Charles XII, roi de Suede, par M. de Voltaire- Pour servir de supplement a cet ouvrage. A Londres. 1732 (hereinafter references: La Motreuil. Remarks). P. 44.
51 PB XI-2. P. 391; Moro. P. 648; Sutton. pp. 61, 69; Persimmon for k and. P. 117.
52 PB XI-1. P. 578.
53 Kurat-2. pp. 496-504; Kurat. Article. P. 48.
54 Moreau. P. 648.
55 RGADA, f. 89, op. 3. 1711. No. 17, l. 12 and rev. Published by: Vodarsky. Review. P. 210.
56 La Moutreuil-1. Application. P. 9.
57 La Moutreuil-2. Preface.
58 Sutton, pp. 64-65. See also: Hurmuz a k i. P. 95; Voltaire. Histoiie de Charles XII, roi de Suede. And Basle. 1732. P. 246.
59 PB XI-2. From 580.
60 Letters from Peter the Great, written to Field Marshal Count Boris Petrovich Sheremetev, mostly in the sovereign’s own hand, and others from the originals, M., 1774. P. XLVI.
61 Moreau. P. 642.
62 PB HY.S. 316.
63 PB XI-1. P. 317.
64 July. P. 368.
65 PB X-1. pp. 580-581.
66 Sutton. P. 65. See also: Yul. P. 461.
67 Hurmuzaki. P. 88. See also: Sutton. P. 66.
68 Moreau. pp. 642, 647; Sutton. pp. 59, 66, 67, 69.
69 Sutton. pp. 68-69.
70 PB X-1. P. 578; Sutton. P. 61.
71 PB X-1. pp. 583-584.
72 Ibid. P. 354.
73 Sat. RIO. T. 66. St. Petersburg, 1889.P.74; Oreshkova.S. 132.
74 PB Xb2. P. 351.
75 Ibid. pp. 352-353.
76 Moreau. pp. 642-643, 648; Hurmuzaki. pp. 109, 103; PB XI-2. P. 18.
77 PB XI-2. pp. 365, 939-940.
78 Sutton. pp. 58, 62,67.
79 PB XI-2. pp. 375-376.
80 Ibid. P. 453.
81 Sutton. C71.
82 Tails. pp. 25-26. See also: Barki's letter (RGADA, Relations with Turkey, no. 13, no. 49-50); Alart. History, l. 97.
83 See: Vodarsky. Review. pp. 207-211.
84 Yul. P. 373.
85 Waliszewski K. Peter the Great. Case. M., 1990 (Reprint). P. 74.
86 Rabener J.G. Leben Petri des Ersten und Grossen, Czaars von Russlands. Leipzig. 1725. S. 217.
87 Nestesuranoi Iwan, par m.le b. Memoires du regne de Pierre le Grande... A la Haye. Amsterdam. Vol. 3. P. 362; Memoires du regne de Catherine, imperatrice... A la Haye. 1728. P. 29-32.
88 La Moutreuil. Notes. pp. 43-44.
89 La Moutreuil-2. pp. 155-156.
90 Ibid. P. 234 and footnote.
91 Gordon of Achintoul A. The History of Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia. Vol. II. Aberdeen, 1755. From 28-31.
92 Bruce P H. Memoirs of Peter Henry Bruce... London, 1782. P. 44.
93 Stahlin, Jacob von. Original Anekdoten von Peter dem Grossen Von Jacob von Stahlin. Leipzig,
1785. S. 382. Quoted from: Podyapolskaya E.P. Question about the reliability of Peter I’s letter from the banks of the Prut // Research on domestic source studies. Sat. articles. M.; L., 1964 (hereinafter: Podyapolskaya). P. 316. Translations into Russian. language: Curious and memorable tales about Emperor Peter the Great... St. Petersburg. St. Petersburg, 1786. True anecdotes of Peter the Great... M., 1786.
94 Quoted. by: PB HY. pp. 314-315.
95 True anecdotes about Peter the Great... P. 79.
96 PSZ. T. IV. St. Petersburg, 1830. P. 712, note 2.
97 Golikov I.I. The acts of Peter the Great, the wise transformer of Russia, collected from reliable sources and arranged by year. Part III. M., 1788. pp. 378-379.
98 Pushkin. P. 438.
99 Podyapolskaya. P. 316.
100 PB XY. pp. 314-315.
101 Pavlenko N. I. Petr I. M., 2003. P. 197.
102 Podyapolskaya. P. 316.
103 PB XI-1. P. 574 (commentary written by E.P. Podyapolskaya).
104 PB H.S. 72.382-383.
105 Klyuchevsky V O. Works. T. 4. M., 1958. pp. 164-165.
106 Shcherbatov M, M. A citizen's response to the speech given to his and [imperial] Majesty by the chief prosecutor of the Senate Neklyudov due to the triumph of the Swedish peace, September 5, 1790 // Readings in the imp. Society of Russian History and Antiquities. 1860. Book. 5. Department V. P. 46-47.
107 See: PB XI-2. S, 37-38. For the full text of Renne’s report, see: RGADA, Cabinet of Peter the Great, department 1 book. 30, l. 45-46.
108 PB XI-1. pp. 322-326.
109 RGADA, Relations with Turkey, op. 1. 1711, No. 8. l. 3 rev; PB XI-1. P. 326.
110 Du Mont. Corps universel diplomatique. T. VIII. Partie I. P. 275-276; PB XI-1. S 326. See also: Sat RIO. T-34. P. 81.
111 PB XI-1. P. 326.
112 PSZ. No. 2398.

Charles XII stayed in Turkey for a long time, inciting the Sultan against Russia. At the end of 1710, the Turks declared war on Peter I. The Ottomans then controlled most of the Balkans, and the Orthodox Greeks, Slavs and Wallachians who lived there had long called Russian armies to the peninsula, promising with their arrival to raise a general uprising against the Ottoman oppressors. Such promises were also given to Peter by the rulers of Moldova (Cantemir) and Wallachian (Brancovan). Relying on them, the king in the spring of 1711 moved to the so-called Prut campaign, which was not part of the Northern War, but had a significant influence on its course. This campaign immediately went against Peter’s calculations. Augustus of Poland did not help him, and there was no general uprising of the Moldovans and Wallachians. The Turks blocked Peter's path to the Danube. The main forces of the king and himself were surrounded on the Prut River by a 200,000-strong horde of the Ottoman vizier. Cut off from food, the Russians could only surrender, but Peter, through cunning diplomacy and bribery, persuaded the vizier to peace. The Tsar returned Azov, which he himself had previously taken, to the Turks. In the situation in which Peter found himself, such peace conditions should have been considered quite favorable.

1. Continuation of the Northern War in the Baltics and the project of the Russian-Swedish alliance (briefly)

Returning to Russia, the Tsar continued the Northern War. Russian troops occupied almost all of Finland. On July 5, 1714, a Russian squadron, with the personal participation of Peter, defeated the Swedish fleet at Cape Gangut (southwest of Finland), occupying the Åland Islands, from where they could threaten the Swedish capital Stockholm. England and Prussia joined the military coalition against Charles XII. Russian troops fought together with the allies in Northern Germany, taking many enemy fortresses there and by 1716 finally ousting the Swedes from the southern coast of the Baltic.

Peter I now held most of Finland, Courland, Estland, and exerted a strong influence on the affairs of Poland and North German Mecklenburg and Holstein. Such power of the king caused great fears throughout Europe. Russia's allies began to treat her with distrust. At first, it was decided to continue the Northern War with a joint landing of the allies on the southern coast of Sweden, but due to the mutual hostility that arose, this expedition did not take place. Having quarreled with his allies, Peter I decided to abruptly change the front in the Northern War: to get closer to the former sworn enemy, Charles XII and his ally France and start fighting with their own recent friends. In 1717 the tsar was received with honor in Paris. Charles XII, meanwhile, returned from Turkey to Sweden and began friendly negotiations with the Russians in the Åland Islands. Things were moving towards the creation of a Russian-Swedish coalition against Poland and Denmark. Karl wanted to compensate for the loss of the Baltic states by capturing Norway from the Danes, and Peter agreed to help him with this.

End of the Northern War. Peace of Nystadt (briefly)

The plans were frustrated after the unexpected death of Charles XII, who died in 1718 from an accidental shot during the siege of a fortress. The Swedish throne passed to his sister, Ulrike-Eleonora, who changed government policy. The new Swedish government made peace with its German opponents and Denmark, broke off negotiations with Peter and resumed its stubborn struggle with the Russians. But Sweden was already completely exhausted. In 1719 and 1720, the commanders of Peter I staged several invasions of Sweden across the sea, ravaging even the outskirts of Stockholm. On August 30, 1721, at negotiations in the Finnish town of Nystadt, a Russian-Swedish peace was concluded, ending the Northern War. Sweden ceded Livonia, Estland and the shores of the Gulf of Finland to Russia. Peter returned Finland to the Swedes and paid them two million efimki.

Thus ended the war, which turned Russia into the strongest power in the European north. At the celebrations marking its completion, Peter I accepted the imperial title. The Northern War had not only foreign policy significance: it also had a strong influence on the internal life of Russia, predetermining the course of many of Peter’s reforms. During the Northern War, the tsar created a new permanent recruit army. To the moment Peace of Nystadt there were about 200 thousand regular troops and 75 thousand irregular Cossacks. The Russian state, which previously did not have naval forces, now had a fleet of 48 battleships and 800 small ships with 28 thousand crew.