The beginning of the USSR's military operations in Afghanistan. Why did the USSR fight in Afghanistan?

Afghan war 1979-1989 - a long-term political and armed confrontation between the parties: the ruling pro-Soviet regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with the military support of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan (OCSVA) - on the one hand, and the Mujahideen ("dushmans"), with a part of Afghan society sympathetic to them, with political and financial support foreign countries and a number of states of the Islamic world - on the other.

The decision to send troops of the USSR Armed Forces to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, in accordance with the secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee No. 176/125 “Towards the situation in “A””, “in order to prevent aggression from outside and strengthen the southern borders friendly regime in Afghanistan." The decision was made by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, A. A. Gromyko and L. I. Brezhnev).

To achieve these goals, the USSR sent a group of troops into Afghanistan, and a detachment of special forces from the emerging special KGB unit “Vympel” killed the current President H. Amin and everyone who was with him in the palace. By decision of Moscow, the new leader of Afghanistan was a protege of the USSR, former Ambassador Extraordinary Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Afghanistan in Prague B. Karmal, whose regime received significant and diverse - military, financial and humanitarian - support Soviet Union.

Background

"Big game"

Afghanistan is located in the very center of Eurasia, which allows it to play an important role in relations between neighboring regions.

WITH early XIX century, a struggle for control over Afghanistan begins between the Russian and British empires, called the “Great Game” (eng. TheGreatGame).

Anglo-Afghan Wars

The British attempted to establish dominance over Afghanistan by force, sending troops from neighboring British India in January 1839. Thus began the first Anglo-Afghan war. Initially, the British were successful - they managed to overthrow the emir Dost Mohammed and put Shuja Khan on the throne. Shuja Khan's reign, however, did not last long and he was overthrown in 1842. Afghanistan concluded a peace treaty with Britain and retained its independence.

Meanwhile, the Russian Empire continued to actively move south. In the 1860-1880s, the annexation of Central Asia to Russia was basically completed.

The British, concerned about the rapid advance of Russian troops towards the borders of Afghanistan, began the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1878. The stubborn struggle continued for two years and in 1880 the British were forced to leave the country, but at the same time leaving the loyal emir Abdur Rahman on the throne and thus maintaining control over the country.

In the 1880-1890s, the modern borders of Afghanistan were formed, determined by joint treaties between Russia and Britain.

Afghan independence

In 1919, Amanullah Khan declared Afghanistan's independence from Great Britain. The third Anglo-Afghan war began.

The first state to recognize independence was Soviet Russia, which provided Afghanistan with significant economic and military assistance.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Afghanistan was a backward agrarian country with a complete lack of industry, an extremely poor population, more than half of which were illiterate.

Republic of Daoud

In 1973, during the visit of the King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah to Italy, a coup d'état took place in the country. Power was seized by Zahir Shah's relative Mohammed Daoud, who proclaimed the first republic in Afghanistan.

Daoud established an authoritarian dictatorship and tried to carry out reforms, but most of them ended in failure. The first republican period in Afghanistan's history is characterized by strong political instability and rivalry between pro-communist and Islamist groups. Islamists launched several uprisings, but all of them were suppressed by government troops.

Daoud's reign ended with the Saur Revolution in April 1978, as well as the execution of the president and all members of his family.

Saur revolution

On April 27, 1978, the April (Saur) Revolution began in Afghanistan, as a result of which the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, proclaiming the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would overcome Afghanistan's lagging behind have encountered resistance from the Islamic opposition. Since 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war began in Afghanistan.

In March 1979, during the uprising in the city of Herat, the Afghan leadership made its first request for direct Soviet military intervention (there were about 20 such requests in total). But the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Afghanistan, created back in 1978, reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops at the Soviet-Afghan border and, by order of Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing of the 105th Guards Airborne Division into Afghanistan.

Further development The situation in Afghanistan - armed uprisings of the Islamic opposition, mutinies in the army, internal party struggle and especially the events of September 1979, when the leader of the PDPA N. Taraki was arrested and then killed on the orders of H. Amin, who removed him from power - caused serious concern among the Soviet leadership. It warily followed Amin's activities at the head of Afghanistan, knowing his ambitions and cruelty in the struggle to achieve personal goals. Under H. Amin, terror unfolded in the country not only against Islamists, but also against members of the PDPA, who were supporters of Taraki. The repression also affected the army, the main support of the PDPA, which led to a drop in its already low morale and caused mass desertion and rebellion. The Soviet leadership was afraid that a further aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the coming to power of forces hostile to the USSR. Moreover, the KGB received information about Amin’s connections with the CIA in the 1960s and about secret contacts of his emissaries with American officials after the assassination of Taraki.

As a result, it was decided to prepare for the overthrow of Amin and his replacement with a leader more loyal to the USSR. B. Karmal was considered as such, whose candidacy was supported by KGB Chairman Yu. V. Andropov.

When developing the operation to overthrow Amin, it was decided to use Amin’s own requests for Soviet military assistance. In total, from September to December 1979 there were 7 such appeals. At the beginning of December 1979, the so-called “Muslim battalion” was sent to Bagram - a detachment special purpose The GRU was specially formed in the summer of 1979 from Soviet military personnel of Central Asian origin to guard Taraki and carry out special tasks in Afghanistan. In early December 1979, USSR Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov informed a narrow circle of officials from among the top military leadership that a decision would obviously be made in the near future on the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. From December 10, on the personal orders of D. F. Ustinov, the deployment and mobilization of units and formations of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts was carried out. Boss General Staff N. Ogarkov, however, was against the introduction of troops.

According to V.I. Varennikov, in 1979 the only member of the Politburo who did not support the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan was A.N. Kosygin, and from that moment A.N. complete break with Brezhnev and his entourage.

On December 13, 1979, the Operational Group of the Ministry of Defense for Afghanistan was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General S. F. Akhromeyev, which began work in the Turkestan Military District on December 14. On December 14, 1979, a battalion of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment was sent to Bagram to reinforce the battalion of the 111th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, which had been guarding Soviet troops in Bagram since July 7, 1979 -transport aircraft and helicopters.

At the same time, B. Karmal and several of his supporters were secretly brought to Afghanistan on December 14, 1979 and were in Bagram among Soviet military personnel. On December 16, 1979, an attempt was made to assassinate Amin, but he remained alive, and B. Karmal was urgently returned to the USSR. On December 20, 1979, a “Muslim battalion” was transferred from Bagram to Kabul, which became part of the security brigade of Amin’s palace, which significantly facilitated preparations for the planned assault on this palace. For this operation, 2 KGB special groups also arrived in Afghanistan in mid-December.

Until December 25, 1979, in the Turkestan Military District, the field command of the 40th Combined Arms Army, 2 motorized rifle divisions, an army artillery brigade, an anti-aircraft missile brigade, an air assault brigade, combat and logistics support units were prepared for entry into Afghanistan, and in the Central Asian military district - two motorized rifle regiments, a mixed air corps directorate, 2 fighter-bomber air regiments, 1 fighter air regiment, 2 helicopter regiments, aviation technical and airfield support units. Three more divisions were mobilized as reserves in both districts. More than 50 thousand people from the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan were called up from the reserves to complete the units, and were transferred from National economy about 8 thousand cars and other equipment. This was the largest mobilization deployment of the Soviet Army since 1945. In addition, the 103rd Guards Airborne Division from Belarus was also prepared for transfer to Afghanistan, which was already transferred to airfields in the Turkestan Military District on December 14.

By the evening of December 23, 1979, it was reported that troops were ready to enter Afghanistan. On December 24, D. F. Ustinov signed directive No. 312/12/001, which stated:

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan; the procedure for the use of weapons, even for the purposes of self-defense, was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov’s order appeared to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that Soviet troops They will become garrisons and take under protection important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active action against opposition forces, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade crossed the pontoon bridge across the border river Amu Darya, which was tasked with capturing the high-mountainous Salang pass on the Termez-Kabul road to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops.

In Kabul, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division completed their landing by midday on December 27 and took control of the airport, blocking Afghan aviation and air defense batteries. Other units of this division concentrated in designated areas of Kabul, where they received tasks to blockade the main government institutions, Afghan military units and headquarters, and other important objects in the city and its environs. After a skirmish with Afghan soldiers, the 357th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Division and the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment established control over the Bagram airfield. They also provided security for B. Karmal, who was again taken to Afghanistan with a group of close supporters on December 23.

Storming of Amin's Palace

On the evening of December 27, Soviet special forces stormed Amin's palace, and Amin was killed during the assault. Government agencies Soviet paratroopers captured Kabul.

On the night of December 27-28, B. Karmal arrived in Kabul from Bagram and Kabul radio broadcast an appeal from this new ruler to the Afghan people, in which the “second stage of the revolution” was proclaimed.

Main events

In July 1979, a battalion from the 111th Parachute Regiment (111 pdp) 105th Airborne Division (105 Airborne Division), the 103rd Airborne Division also arrived in Kabul, in fact, after the regular reorganization in 1979 - a separate battalion 345 OPDP. These were the first military units and units of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.

From December 9 to 12, the first “Muslim battalion” arrived in Afghanistan - 154 ooSpN 15obrSpN.

On December 25, the columns of the 40th Army (40 A) Turkestan Military District cross the Afghan border along a pontoon bridge over the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and gave orders to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA to provide assistance to the incoming troops.

• January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government mutiny by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. About 100 rebels were killed during the battle; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded. At the same time, a directive from the Minister of Defense D. Ustinov appeared on the planning and commencement of military operations - raids against rebel detachments in the northern regions of Afghanistan adjacent to the Soviet border, using an equally reinforced battalion and the use of firepower from the army, including the Air Force, to suppress resistance.

• February 23 - tragedy in the tunnel at the Salang pass. When passing the tunnel by units 186 SME and 2 zrbr at complete absence The commandant's service caused a traffic jam in the middle of the tunnel due to an accident. As a result, 16 Soviet servicemen suffocated 2 zrbr. There are no data on Afghans who suffocated.
• February-March - the first major operation to suppress an armed rebellion in the mountain infantry regiment in Asmara, Kunar province of OKSV units against the Mujahideen - the Kunar offensive. On February 28-29, units of the 317th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division in the Asmara region entered into heavy bloody battles due to the blocking of the 3rd Parachute Battalion in the Asmara Gorge by dushmans. 33 people were killed, 40 people were injured, one soldier was missing.
• April - The US Congress authorizes $15,000,000 in "direct and open assistance" to the Afghan opposition.

The first military operation in Panjshir.

• May 11 - death of the 1st motorized rifle company of the 66th motorized rifle brigade (Jalalabad) near the village of Khara, Kunar province.
• June 19 - decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on the withdrawal of some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.
• August 3 - battle near the village of Shaest. In the Mashhad Gorge - the Kishim region near the city of Faizabad, the 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion of the 201st MSD was ambushed, 48 servicemen were killed, 49 were wounded. It was one of the bloodiest episodes in the history of the Afghan war.
• August 12 - Special forces of the USSR KGB “Karpaty” arrive in the country.
• September 23 - Lieutenant General Boris Tkach was appointed commander of the 40th Army.

• September - fighting in the Lurkoh mountain range in Farah province; death of Major General Khakhalov.
• October 29 - introduction of the second “Muslim battalion” (177 ooSpN) under the command of Major Kerimbaev (“Kara Major”).
• December - defeat of the opposition base in the Darzab region (Jawzjan province).

• April 5 - during military operation In western Afghanistan, Soviet troops mistakenly invaded Iran. Iranian military aircraft destroyed two Soviet helicopters.
• In May-June, the fifth Panjshir operation was carried out, during which a mass landing in Afghanistan was carried out for the first time: only during the first three days Over 4,000 airborne personnel were landed. In total, about 12,000 military personnel of various military branches took part in this confrontation. The operation took place simultaneously throughout the entire 120 km depth of the gorge. As a result of this operation, Panjshir was captured.
• November 3 - tragedy at the Salang pass. As a result of a traffic jam outside the tunnel, more than 176 people died in the tunnel.
• November 15 - meeting between Yu. Andropov and Zia ul-Haq in Moscow. Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani President, during which he informed him about “ the new flexible policy of the Soviet side and understanding of the need to quickly resolve the crisis" The meeting also discussed the feasibility of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops, Pakistan was required to refuse assistance to the rebels.

• January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Mujahideen kidnapped a group of Soviet “civilian specialists” numbering 16 people.
• February 2 - hostages abducted in Mazar-i-Sharif and kept in the village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan were released, but six of them died.
• March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation led by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordovez with Yu. Andropov. Andropov thanks the UN for “ understanding the problem" and assures the intermediaries that he is ready to undertake " certain steps”, but doubts that Pakistan and the United States will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.
• April - operation to defeat opposition forces in the Nijrab gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.
• May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan " set deadlines for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops».
• July - Mujahideen attack on Khost. The attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.
• August - the intense work of D. Cordovez's mission to prepare agreements for the peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country was developed, but after Andropov's illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of Politburo meetings. Now it was only about " dialogue with the UN».
• Winter - fighting intensified in the Sarobi region and the Jalalabad Valley (Laghman province is most often mentioned in reports). For the first time, armed opposition units remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and resistance bases began directly in the country.

• January 16 - Mujahideen shot down a Su-25 aircraft using Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first time successful application MANPADS in Afghanistan.

• April 30 - in the Khazar Gorge, during a large-scale military operation in the Panjshir Gorge, the 1st Battalion of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses.
• October 27 - Mujahideen shoot down an Il-76 transport plane over Kabul using Strela MANPADS.

• April 21 - Death of the Maravar company.
• April 26 - uprising of Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war in Badaber prison, located in Pakistan.
• May 25 - Kunar operation. Battle near the village of Konyak, Pechdara gorge, Kunar province, 4th company of the 149th Guards. Motorized rifle regiment. Finding themselves surrounded by Mujahideen and Pakistani mercenaries - the "Black Storks", the guardsmen of the 4th company and the forces of the 2nd battalion attached to it lost 23 dead and 28 wounded.
• June - army operation in Panjshir.
• Summer - a new course of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee towards a political solution to the “Afghan problem”.
• October 16-17 - Shutul tragedy (20 dead, several dozen wounded)
• The main task of the 40th Army is to cover the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are brought in. The creation of stronghold fortified areas began in hard-to-reach areas of the country.
• On November 22, 1985, while carrying out a mission, an outpost of the Motorized Maneuverable Group (MMG) of the Panfilov Border Detachment of the Eastern Border District of the KGB of the USSR was ambushed. In a battle near the village of Afrij in the Zardev Gorge of Badakhshan province, 19 border guards were killed. These were the largest losses of border guards in one battle in the Afghan War of 1979-1989.

• February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of developing a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.
• April 4-20 - operation to destroy the Javara base: a major defeat for the Mujahideen. Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan’s troops to break through the “security zone” around Herat.
• May 4 - at the XVIII plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, M. Najibullah, who previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence KHAD, was elected to the post of Secretary General instead of B. Karmal. The plenum proclaimed the intention to solve the problems of Afghanistan through political methods.
• June 16 - Military operation "Maneuver" - Takhar province. A long battle on Mount Yafsaj of the 783rd ORB of the 201st MSD - Jarav Gorge, in which 18 scouts were killed and 22 were wounded. This was the second tragedy of the Kunduz Intelligence Battalion.
• July 28 - M. Gorbachev publicly announced the imminent withdrawal of six regiments of the 40th Army (about 7,000 people) from Afghanistan. Later the withdrawal date will be postponed. There is debate in Moscow about whether to withdraw troops completely.
• August - Massoud defeated a government military base in Farhar, Takhar Province.
• August 18-26 - Military operation “Trap” under the command of Army General V.I. Varennikov. Assault on the Kokari-Sharshari fortified area in Herat province.
• Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group from 173 ooSpN 22obrSpN captures the first batch of three Stinger MANPADS in the Kandahar region.
• October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.
• November 13 - at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev noted: “ We have been fighting in Afghanistan for six years. If we don’t change our approaches, we will fight for another 20-30 years" Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev stated: “ There is not a single military task that was set but not solved, and there was no result.<…>We control Kabul and provincial centers, but we cannot establish power in the occupied territory. We have lost the fight for the Afghan people" At the same meeting, the task was set to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan within two years.
• December - an emergency plenum of the PDPA Central Committee proclaims a course towards a policy of national reconciliation and advocates an early end to the fratricidal war.

• January 2 - an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Army General V.I. Varennikov, was sent to Kabul.
• February - Operation Strike in Kunduz province.
• February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar province.
• March 8 - Mujahideen shelling of the city of Pyanj in the Tajik SSR.
• March - Operation Thunderstorm in Ghazni province.
• March 29, 1986 - during the fighting of the 15th brigade, when the Jalalabad battalion, with the support of the Asadabad battalion, defeated a large Mujahideen base in Karer.

Operation Circle in Kabul and Logar provinces.

• April 9 - Mujahideen attack on a Soviet border post. When repelling the attack, 2 Soviet soldiers were killed and 20 Mujahideen were killed.
• April 12 - the defeat of the Milov rebel base in Nangarhar province.
• May - Operation Salvo in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul.

Operation "South-87" in Kandahar province.

• Spring - Soviet troops begin to be used to cover the eastern and southeastern sectors state border"Barrier" system.
• November 23 - Operation Magistral begins to unblock the city of Khost.

• January 7-8 - battle at height 3234.
• April 14 - with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The USSR and the USA became guarantors of the agreements. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within a 9-month period, starting on May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
• June 24 - Opposition troops captured the center of Wardak province - the city of Maidanshahr. In September 1988, Soviet troops near Maidanshahr carried out an operation to destroy the Khurkabul base area.
• August 10 - Mujahideen took Kunduz

• January 23-26 - Operation Typhoon, Kunduz province. The last military operation of the SA in Afghanistan.
• February 4 - the last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul.
• February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the Limited Military Contingent, Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who, according to the official version, was the last to cross the border river Amu Darya (Termez). He stated: “There is not a single Soviet soldier left behind me.” This statement was not true, since both Soviet soldiers who were captured by the Mujahideen and border guard units who covered the withdrawal of troops and returned to USSR territory only in the afternoon of February 15 remained in Afghanistan. The border troops of the KGB of the USSR carried out tasks to protect the Soviet-Afghan border in separate units on the territory of Afghanistan until April 1989.

results

• Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army (led the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), in his book “Limited Contingent”, expressed the following opinion regarding the victory or defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan:

Indeed, before the start of the OKSVA withdrawal in May 1988, the Mujahideen had never managed to carry out a single major operation and had not managed to occupy a single large city. At the same time, Gromov’s opinion that the 40th Army was not given the task military victory, does not agree with the estimates of some other authors. In particular, Major General Yevgeny Nikitenko, who was deputy chief of the operational department of the 40th Army headquarters in 1985-1987, believes that throughout the war the USSR pursued constant goals - suppressing the resistance of the armed opposition and strengthening the power of the Afghan government. Despite all efforts, the number of opposition forces only grew from year to year, and in 1986 (at the peak of the Soviet military presence) the Mujahideen controlled more than 70% of the territory of Afghanistan. According to Colonel General Viktor Merimsky, former deputy. head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Afghan leadership actually lost the fight against the rebels for its people, could not stabilize the situation in the country, although it had 300,000-strong military formations (army, police, state security).

• After the outbreak of the Afghan war, several countries announced a boycott Olympic Games 1980, held in Moscow.

Humanitarian consequences

The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was a flow of refugees to Iran and Pakistan, a large percentage of whom remain there to this day. Photo of Sharbat Gula on the cover of the magazine National Geographic in 1985, entitled "Afghan Girl", became a symbol of the Afghan conflict and the refugee problem around the world.

The bitterness of the warring parties reached extreme limits. It is known that the Mujahideen subjected prisoners to torture, among which the “red tulip” is widely known. The weapon was used so widely that many of the villages were literally built from rockets left over from the departure of the Soviet army, residents used rockets to build houses, as ceilings, window and door beams, but statements by the US administration about the use of the 40th army chemical weapons, voiced in March 1982, were never documented.

Losses of the parties

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; Available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total. According to Harvard professor M. Kramer, an American researcher of the Afghan war: “During the nine years of war, more than 2.5 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, and several million more became refugees, many of whom fled the country.” . There appears to be no precise division of victims into government soldiers, mujahideen and civilians.

USSR losses

Total - 13,833 people. These data first appeared in the Pravda newspaper in August 1989. Subsequently, the final figure increased slightly, presumably due to those who died from the consequences of injuries and illnesses after dismissal from armed forces. As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:

• Soviet Army - 14,427
• KGB - 576
• Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28

Total - 15,031 people. Sanitary losses - almost 54 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 416 thousand sick.

According to the testimony of Vladimir Sidelnikov, a professor at the Military Medical Academy of St. Petersburg, the final figures do not take into account military personnel who died from wounds and illnesses in hospitals on the territory of the USSR.

In a study of the Afghan war conducted by officers of the General Staff under the leadership of prof. Valentin Runova, provides an estimate of 26,000 dead, including those killed in battle, those who died from wounds and illnesses, and those killed as a result of accidents. The breakdown by year is as follows:

Of the approximately 400 military personnel listed as missing in action during the war, a certain number of prisoners were taken by Western journalists to Western Europe and North America. According to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of June 1989, about 30 people lived there; three people, after the statement by the USSR Prosecutor General that former prisoners would not be subject to criminal prosecution, returned to the Soviet Union. According to data from 02/15/2009 of the Committee on the Affairs of Internationalist Soldiers under the Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth (CIS) Member States, 270 people remained on the list of missing Soviet citizens in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

Death toll Soviet generals according to press publications, it is usually four dead; sometimes the figure is 5 dead in Afghanistan.

Losses in equipment, according to official data, amounted to 147 tanks, 1,314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel tankers, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters. At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, information was not published on the number of combat and non-combat aviation losses, on the losses of airplanes and helicopters by type, etc.

Some Soviet military personnel who fought in Afghanistan suffered from the so-called “Afghan syndrome” - post-traumatic stress disorder. Testing conducted in the early 1990s showed that at least 35-40% of participants in the war in Afghanistan were in dire need of help from professional psychologists.

Other losses

According to Pakistani authorities, in the first four months of 1987, more than 300 civilians were killed as a result of Afghan air raids on Pakistani territory.

Economic losses of the USSR

About 800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government.

In works of culture and art

Fiction

• Andrey Dyshev. Reconnaissance. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-14711-X
• Dyshev Sergey. Lost Platoon. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-15709-3
• Mikhail Evstafiev. Two steps from paradise. - M.: Eksmo, 2006 - ISBN 5-699-18424-4
• Nikolay Prokudin. Raid battalion. - M.: Eksmo, 2006 - ISBN 5-699-18904-1
• Sergei Skripal, Gennady Rytchenko. Doomed contingent. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-16949-0
• Gleb Bobrov. Soldier's saga. - M.: Eksmo, 2007 - ISBN 978-5-699-20879-1
• Alexander Prokhanov. Tree in the center of Kabul. - M.: Soviet writer, 1982. - 240 p.
• Svetlana Alexievich. Zinc boys. - M.: Time, 2007. - ISBN 978-5-9691-0189-3
• Frolov I. A. Walks with the flight engineer. Helicopter pilot. - M.: EKSMO, 2007. - ISBN 978-5-699-21881-3
• Victor Nikolaev. Alive in help. Notes from an "Afghan". - M.: Soft Publishing, 2006. - ISBN 5-93876-026-7
• Pavel Andreev. Twelve stories. "Afghan War 1979-1989", 1998-2002.
• Alexander Segen. Lost armored personnel carrier. - M.: Armada-Press, 2001, 224 p. - ISBN 5-309-00098-4
• Oleg Ermakov. Afghan stories. Mark of the Beast.
• Igor Moiseenko. Firing sector. - M.Eksmo, 2008

Memoirs

• Gromov B.V."Limited contingent." M., Ed. group “Progress”, “Culture”, 1994. 352 p. The book by the last commander of the 40th Army contains many documents revealing the reasons for the deployment of troops and describes many events of the war.
• Lyakhovsky A. A. Tragedy and valor of Afghanistan M., Iskona, 1995, 720 pp. ISBN 5-85844-047-9 Large fragments of the text coincide with the book by B.V. Gromov.
• Mayorov A. M. The truth about the Afghan war Testimony of the chief military adviser. M., Human Rights, 1996, ISBN 5-7712-0032-8
• Gordienko A. N. Wars of the second half of the 20th century. Minsk., 1999 ISBN 985-437-507-2 A large section of the book is devoted to the background and course of hostilities in Afghanistan
• Ablazov V.I."Afghanistan. The Fourth War", Kyiv, 2002; “A cloudless sky over all of Afghanistan”, Kyiv, 2005; " Long haul from Afghan captivity and obscurity", Kyiv, 2005.
• Bondarenko I. N.“How we built in Afghanistan”, Moscow, 2009
• Podushkov D. L. Confession to yourself (about participation in hostilities in Afghanistan). - Vyshny Volochyok, 2002. - 48 s.
• David S. Insbee. Afghanistan. Soviet victory // Flame of the Cold War: Victories that never happened. = Cold War Hot: Alternative Decisions of the Cold War / ed. Peter Tsouros, trans. Yu.Yablokova. - M.: AST, Lux, 2004. - P. 353-398. - 480 s. - (Great Controversies). - 5000 copies. - ISBN 5-17-024051 (alternate war history)
• Kozhukhov, M. Yu. Alien stars above Kabul - M.: Olympus: Eksmo, 2010-352 pp., ISBN 978-5-699-39744-0

In cinema

• “Hot Summer in Kabul” (1983) - film directed by Ali Khamraev
• “Paid for Everything” (1988) - film directed by Alexey Saltykov
• "Rambo 3" (1988, USA)
• “Sergeant” (1988) - a film in the film anthology “The Bridge”, dir. Stanislav Gaiduk, production: Mosfilm, Belarusfilm
• “Scorched by Kandahar” (1989, director: Yuri Sabitov) - a Soviet Afghan officer, decommissioned due to injury, enters the fight against the mafia and, in the end, exposes the criminals at the cost of his own life
• “Cargo 300” (1989) - film from the Sverdlovsk film studio
• “Two steps to silence” (1991) - film directed by Yuri Tupitsky
• “Gorge of Spirits” (1991) - film directed by Sergei Nilov
• “Afghan Break” (1991, USSR-Italy) - a film by Vladimir Bortko about the war in Afghanistan
• “The Leg” (1991) - film directed by Nikita Tyagunov
• “Afghan” (1991) - film directed by Vladimir Mazur. Contrabalt
• “Afghan-2” (1994) - continuation of the film “Afghan”
• “Peshawar Waltz” (1994) - a film by T. Bekmambetov and G. Kayumov, in the opinion of “Afghan” veterans, one of the most poignant and truthful films about that war, dedicated to the events in Badaber
• “Muslim” (1995) - a film by Vladimir Khotinenko about a Soviet soldier who returned home after 7 years in captivity of the Mujahideen
• “9th Company” (2005, Russia-Ukraine-Finland) - film by Fyodor Bondarchuk
• “The Soldier’s Star” (2006, France) - a film by French journalist Christophe de Ponfilly about the story of a Soviet prisoner of war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The prototype of the main character was one of the participants in the armed uprising in the Badaber camp
• “Charlie Wilson's War” (2007, USA) - the film is based on the true story of how, during the Afghan War, Texas Congressman Charles Wilson organized the financing of a secret CIA operation to supply weapons to the Afghan resistance forces (Operation Cyclone).
• "The Kite Runner" (2007)
• “Afghan War” 2009 - documentary-fiction series with elements of historical reconstruction
• “Caravan Hunters” (2010) - a military drama based on the works of Alexander Prokhanov “Caravan Hunter” and “Muslim Wedding”.

In music

• “Blue Berets”: Our Afghan, Afghan break, Silver plane, War is not a walk in the park, Borders
• “Cascade”: Cuckoo, We leave at dawn, On the Bagram road, I will return, We are leaving, To the motorist warriors, Who needed this war?
• "Contingent": Cuckoo, Prisoners, Two meters
• “Echo of Afghanistan”: I was killed near Kandahar, Cigarette smoke
• "Lube": For you
• “Survival Instructions”: 1988 - Confrontation in Moscow - Afghan Syndrome
• Igor Talkov: Ballad of an Afghan
• Maxim Troshin: Afghanistan
• Valery Leontyev. Afghan wind (I. Nikolaev - N. Zinoviev)
• Alexander Rosenbaum. Monologue of the Black Tulip pilot, Caravan, In the Afghani mountains, Rain on the pass, We will return
• Yuri Shevchuk. War is childish, don't shoot
• Konstantin Kinchev. Tomorrow May Be Late (album “Nervous Night”, 1984)
• Egor Letov. Afghan syndrome
• N. Anisimov. The last monologue of the Mi-8, the song of the helicopter gunner
• M. Bessonov. My heart aches until it hurts
• I. Burlyaev. In memory of Afghan helicopter pilots
• V. Verstakov. Allah Akbar
• A. Doroshenko. Afghan
• V. Gorsky. Afghan
• S. Kuznetsov. An incident on the road
• I. Morozov. Convoy Talukan-Faizabad, Midnight toast, Helicopter pilots
• A. Smirnov. For KamAZ drivers
• I. Baranov. An incident in battle, in the mountains near Peshawar
• Sprint. Afghanistan
• Nesmeyana.“A Fur Coat from Afghanistan”, “Bottle”, “Elevator of Love”
• Collection of Afghan songs "Time has chosen us", 1988

In computer games

• Squad Battles: Soviet-Afghan War
• Rambo III
• 9 Rota
• The truth about the ninth company
• Front line. Afghanistan 82

The Soviet-Afghan War lasted more than nine years from December 1979 to February 1989. Rebel groups of “mujahideen” fought during it against the Soviet Army and allied Afghan government forces. Between 850,000 and 1.5 million civilians were killed and millions of Afghans fled the country, mostly to Pakistan and Iran.

Even before the arrival of Soviet troops, power in Afghanistan through 1978 coup captured by the communists and installed as president of the country Noor Mohammad Taraki. He undertook a number of radical reforms, which turned out to be extremely unpopular, especially among the rural population committed to national traditions. The Taraki regime brutally suppressed all opposition, arresting many thousands and executing 27,000 political prisoners.

Chronology of the Afghan War. Video

Armed groups began to form throughout the country for the purpose of resistance. By April 1979, many large areas of the country were in rebellion, and in December the government held only the cities under its rule. It itself was torn apart by internal strife. Taraki was killed soon after Hafizullah Amin. In response to requests from the Afghan authorities, the allied Kremlin leadership, led by Brezhnev, first sent secret advisers to the country, and on December 24, 1979, sent the 40th Soviet Army of General Boris Gromov there, declaring that it was doing this in fulfillment of the terms of the 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and good neighborliness with Afghanistan.

Soviet intelligence had information that Amin was making attempts to communicate with Pakistan and China. On December 27, 1979, about 700 Soviet special forces captured the main buildings of Kabul and stormed the Taj Beg presidential palace, during which Amin and his two sons were killed. Amin was replaced by a rival from another Afghan communist faction, Babrak Karmal. He headed the “Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan” and requested additional Soviet assistance.

In January 1980, the foreign ministers of the 34 countries of the Islamic Conference approved a resolution demanding the “immediate, urgent and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops” from Afghanistan. The UN General Assembly, by a vote of 104 to 18, adopted a resolution protesting Soviet intervention. President of the U.S.A Carter announced a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Afghan militants began to pass military training in neighboring Pakistan and China - and received huge amounts of aid, financed primarily by the United States and the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. In conducting operations against Soviet forces CIA Pakistan actively helped.

Soviet troops occupied cities and main lines of communication, and the Mujahideen fought guerrilla warfare in small groups. They operated on almost 80% of the country's territory, not subject to the control of the Kabul rulers and the USSR. Soviet troops widely used aircraft for bombing, destroyed villages where the Mujahideen could find refuge, destroyed irrigation ditches, and laid millions of landmines. However, almost the entire contingent introduced into Afghanistan consisted of conscripts who were not trained in complex tactics of fighting partisans in the mountains. Therefore, the war was difficult for the USSR from the very beginning.

By the mid-1980s, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan had increased to 108,800 soldiers. The fighting took place throughout the country with greater energy, but the material and diplomatic cost of the war for the USSR was very high. In mid-1987 Moscow, where a reformer had now come to power Gorbachev, announced its intention to begin withdrawing troops. Gorbachev openly called Afghanistan a “bleeding wound.”

On April 14, 1988, in Geneva, the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the participation of the United States and the USSR as guarantors, signed the “Agreements to resolve the situation in the Republic of Afghanistan.” They determined the schedule for the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent - it ran from May 15, 1988 to February 15, 1989.

The Mujahideen did not take part in the Geneva Accords and rejected most of their terms. As a result, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the civil war in Afghanistan continued. New pro-Soviet leader Najibullah barely held back the onslaught of the Mujahideen. His government split, many of its members entered into relations with the opposition. In March 1992, Najibullah was no longer supported by General Abdul Rashid Dostum and his Uzbek police. A month later, the Mujahideen took Kabul. Najibullah hid in the UN mission building in the capital until 1996, and then was captured by the Taliban and hanged.

The Afghan war is considered part Cold War . In Western media it is sometimes called “Soviet Vietnam” or “Bear Trap”, because this war became one of the most important reasons for the fall of the USSR. It is believed that about 15 thousand Soviet soldiers died during it, and 35 thousand were wounded. After the war, Afghanistan lay in ruins. Grain production there fell to 3.5% of pre-war levels.

And the republican system was established. This was the impetus for the start of the civil war between various socio-political and nationalist forces in the country.

In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party (PDPA) came to power in Afghanistan. The radicalism of the new Afghan leadership, the hasty destruction of the centuries-old traditions of the people and the foundations of Islam, strengthened the population's resistance to the central government. The situation was complicated by foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The USSR and some other countries provided assistance to the Afghan government, and NATO countries, Muslim states and China provided assistance to the opposition forces.

By the end of 1979, the situation in the country had become sharply complicated, and the threat of overthrowing the ruling regime loomed. In this regard, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) repeatedly appealed to the USSR with a request to send military units to the country. The Soviet side initially rejected this form of intervention, but, in the context of the worsening Afghan crisis, on December 12, 1979, the leadership of the USSR, fearing the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the Central Asian republics, decided to send troops to provide military assistance to the government of Afghanistan. The decision was made at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in accordance with Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan "Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation", concluded on December 5, 1978, and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee.

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was considered by the political leadership of the USSR as a short-term measure aimed at ensuring the security of the southern borders of the Soviet Union.

The main task of the limited contingent of Soviet troops (OCSV) was to create a “cordon sanitaire” at the borders of the USSR in the face of the looming threat of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism on the territory of the Soviet Muslim republics.

On December 16, 1979, an order was given to separate the field administration of the 40th Army from the administration of the Turkestan Military District (TurkVO) and its complete mobilization. The first deputy commander of the TurkVO troops, Lieutenant General Yuri Tukharinov, was appointed commander of the army. Formations and units of the 40th Army were fully mobilized 10-12 days before entry.

The commissioning and deployment of OKSV in the DRA began on December 25, 1979. By mid-January 1980, the introduction of the main forces of the 40th Army was basically completed. Three divisions (two motorized rifle and one airborne), an air assault brigade, two separate regiments and other units were introduced into Afghanistan.

Subsequently, the combat strength of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was constantly updated in order to strengthen it. The largest number of OKSV (1985) was 108.7 thousand people, including 73.6 thousand people in combat units. The composition of the OKSV mainly included: the command of the 40th Army, three motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, nine separate brigades and seven separate regiments, four front-line regiments and two army aviation regiments, as well as rear, medical, repair, construction and other units and divisions.

The general management of OKSV was carried out by the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was headed by Marshal of the USSR Sergei Sokolov, and since 1985 - Army General Valentin Varennikov. Direct control of the combat and daily activities of the OKSV was carried out by the commander of the 40th Army, who was subordinate to the command of the TurkVO troops.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan guarded and defended national economic facilities, airfields, and roads vital for the country, and carried out transport convoys with cargo through the territory under the control of the armed opposition.

To reduce the military activity of the opposition, OKSV conducted active military operations of various scales using the entire arsenal of conventional weapons, and carried out air strikes on opposition bases. In accordance with the decision of the political leadership of the USSR, Soviet troops, in response to numerous attacks on their garrisons and transport columns by opposition units, began to carry out military operations together with Afghan units to search for and eliminate the most aggressive armed groups of the enemy. Thus, the Soviet troops brought into Afghanistan found themselves involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the country's government against the opposition forces, to whom Pakistan provided the greatest assistance.

The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages.

Stage 1: December 1979 - February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of protection of deployment points and various objects.

Stage 2: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.

3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations primarily to supporting the actions of Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and engineer units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of six Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

Stage 4: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

Even after sending troops to Afghanistan, the USSR continued to look for opportunities for a political resolution of the intra-Afghan conflict. Since August 1981, he tried to ensure the negotiation process of the DRA with Pakistan and Iran, and since April 1986, to promote a systemic policy of national reconciliation.

On April 14, 1988, in Geneva (Switzerland), representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA signed five fundamental documents on issues of resolving the political situation around Afghanistan. These agreements regulated the process of withdrawal of Soviet troops and declared international guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of the republic, the obligations of which were assumed by the USSR and the USA. Deadlines for the withdrawal of Soviet troops were set: half of the limited contingent was withdrawn by August 15, 1988, the remaining units - after another six months.

On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of OKSV began, which was completed on February 15, 1989. The withdrawal of troops was led by the last commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

About 620 thousand military personnel completed military service in Afghanistan, including 525.2 thousand people in the OKSV.

The losses of the 40th Army personnel were: killed and killed - 13,833 people, including 1,979 officers and generals, wounded - 49,985 people. During the fighting on the territory of Afghanistan, in addition, 572 military personnel of state security agencies, 28 employees of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as 190 military advisers, including 145 officers, were killed. Due to injuries, 172 officers stopped serving in the Armed Forces. 6,669 Afghans became disabled, including 1,479 people disabled in the first group.

For military and other merits, over 200 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 86 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 28 of them posthumously.

(Additional

What were the prerequisites or interests of the USSR for introducing a limited contingent of Soviet armed forces into Afghanistan?

When did the Soviet armed forces fight in Afghanistan and how did it all end?

Afghan stalemate

On December 25, 1979, the USSR entered the last war in its history. It was officially announced that on December 24, 1979, the Minister of Defense of the USSR Ustinov D.F. Directive No. 312/12/001 was signed, stating that some of the units of the Central Asian and Turkestan military districts will be introduced into the DRA in order to provide assistance to the friendly people of Afghanistan and create conditions there that make any hostile actions on the part of states bordering the DRA impossible.

The history of the tender friendship of the two neighboring states begins back in 1919, when Soviet Russia was the first in the world to recognize the independence of Afghanistan and provide military and economic support. Which, however, did not help. Afghanistan was and remains a poor feudal country, “stuck” in the Middle Ages. What Soviet specialists managed to build, for example, the airport in Kabul, highways, everything remains the same.
On April 27, 1978, the Saur Revolution took place, proclaiming Afghanistan a Democratic Republic. Armed Islamic terrorists, unrest in the army, internal party bickering - these factors did not contribute to the authority of the people's government. The events taking place in Afghanistan were closely watched in Moscow. The Commission of the CPSU Central Committee reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee that direct intervention would have Negative consequences. Having received about twenty requests for help from Kabul, the “Kremlin elders” were in no hurry to respond.

The decision to bring in a limited contingent of Soviet troops was made at a secret meeting only on December 12, 1979. Chief of Staff Ogarkov N.V. turned out to be the only one who was against this decision. And the participation of our troops in battles with the Mujahideen was not envisaged; they were entrusted with security functions. The mission was supposed to be short-term.

The reasons for the entry of Soviet troops, in fact, were not a secret to the world community. Afghanistan's territorial neighbor was Pakistan, created not so long ago, which accepted American assistance in the form of financial support, the presence of military specialists, and the supply of weapons. Afghanistan was supposed to become a “layer” that would prevent Americans from appearing dangerously close to Soviet borders. Each of the superpowers, the USSR and the USA, sacredly looked after its geopolitical interests, extending its influence to the largest number of potential supporters.
On December 25, 1979, at 15:00, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade crossed the pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya. The countdown to losses has begun.
The entire history of war can be divided into several periods. About 50 thousand military personnel and civilian specialists were immediately sent to Afghanistan, so the first 2-3 months were devoted to their deployment. Active hostilities began in March 1980 and lasted about five years. At the beginning of April 1985, combat operations were carried out mainly by units of government troops and people's militia, with Soviet troops providing support with artillery, aviation and sapper units. A partial withdrawal of the Soviet contingent from Afghanistan is being prepared. Since January 1987, a policy of national reconciliation has been pursued. Preparations for the complete withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent began on May 15, 1988. General Gromov B.V., commander of the 40th Army, was the last to leave the territory of Afghanistan on February 15, 1989. For Soviet soldiers, the war was over.

Losses among Soviet military personnel were calculated, which amounted to 13,833 people during the fighting of 1979-1989. Ten years later, more accurate figures for irretrievable losses appeared: among military personnel of the Soviet Army - 14,427 people, KGB employees - 576 people, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people. 417 people are considered missing or captured.
The exact number of Afghans who died during the war has not yet been announced. The following figures appear in the press: 5 million became refugees, and one and a half million Afghans died.
Now let's look at economic losses. Every year, 800 million “evergreen” US dollars were allocated from the country’s budget to support the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The cost of maintaining the 40th Army and conducting military operations amounted to 3 billion US dollars annually.
And in what units can we calculate the mortal horror of parents whose children ended up serving in Afghanistan? How many decalitres of tears did mothers shed while burying their boys in zinc coffins? How much energy will a crippled 20-year-old boy need to continue living? But with 99% confidence we can say that the Afghan war was the biggest mistake of the “Kremlin sages”, which accelerated the collapse of the USSR.

A detailed description of the development of the situation in Afghanistan before the entry of Soviet troops there would take up too much space. In short, the coming to power in an extremely backward, early feudal and completely Islamized country of the communist party (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, PDPA) completely destabilized the situation and caused complete rejection from the local population. Accordingly, the leadership of the PDPA began to very persistently seek help from Moscow, which in the end could not refuse. At the same time, the Soviet leadership quite seriously expected that an invasion of Afghanistan by American troops would begin in the near future. In fact, the Americans never even thought of anything like this. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused panic in Washington: they decided that Soviet troops were going to go to the Persian Gulf in order to deprive the West of oil (and this was not even in the thoughts of the Soviet leaders). But what the United States understood absolutely correctly was that the opportunity had arisen to “give the Soviets their own Vietnam.”

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began on December 25, 1979. The initial grouping of ground forces (40th Army) included the 103rd Airborne, 5th, 108th and 201st Motorized Rifle Divisions. The aviation group included 14 MiG-21bis and 13 MiG-21PFM fighters, 10 MiG-21R reconnaissance aircraft, 17 Su-17 attack aircraft, 10 An-12 transport aircraft, 28 Mi-8 multi-purpose helicopters and only one combat Mi-24. On the very first day of the operation, an Il-76 crashed while landing in Kabul, killing 44 people (seven pilots, 37 paratroopers).

In the first months of their presence in Afghanistan, Soviet troops had to suppress rebellions in Kabul (both the local population and parts of the Afghan army). The troops did not suffer any particular losses from this. But gradually an anti-Soviet partisan movement began to unfold throughout the country. The population was already opposed to the government, especially since it did not tolerate foreign occupiers (as the British could once be convinced of).

At the same time, the Soviet army, like any normal regular army, was preparing for a classical, and not a counter-guerrilla war. She was going to fight with NATO troops on European plains and with the PLA on the hills of Manchuria and in the Mongolian steppes, and not with partisan formations in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan. In the same way, 15 years earlier, the Americans were completely unprepared for a war with guerrillas in the jungles of Vietnam.

And on the other hand, just as at that time the USSR, and initially China, actively helped Vietnam, so the Afghan partisans began to quickly receive foreign assistance. Naturally, the USA and Great Britain became its inspirers and organizers. Pakistan acted as a springboard for receiving and distributing this aid and for basing militants, and its military personnel (special forces and pilots) took a direct part in the hostilities. She made a huge financial and organizational contribution to the activities of anti-Soviet partisans Saudi Arabia. Finally, the most active participant in the coalition was China, which at that moment was considered the “16th member of NATO” (by the way, this country was then headed by the reformer Deng Xiaoping, beloved both there and here).

It should be borne in mind that anti-government forces most widely used weapons of Soviet origin. This was explained, firstly, by the fact that it was much easier to master than the Western one (a significant part of the partisans were illiterate, the vast majority had only primary education), and secondly, there was at least a theoretical possibility of replenishing weapons from trophies ( captured not so much from the Soviet army as from Afghan government troops). The main sources of such weapons were Egypt and China (the latter supplied copies of Soviet weapons own production). Western weapons were supplied only if there were no Soviet analogues from the indicated sources or if such analogues were, for some reason, insufficient in quantity. That is, in fact, at least 90% of the dead Soviet military personnel were killed either by Chinese weapons or by Soviet ones, which we supplied in gigantic quantities and practically free of charge to “brotherly Egypt” in the 60s and 70s.

The bulk of the partisan structures were based in Pakistan. In March 1982, the seven largest Islamic groups agreed on joint actions against Soviet troops. In addition, several independent anti-government groups operated directly on the territory of Afghanistan. The biggest problems for the Soviet and Afghan troops were created by the group of Ahmad Shah Massoud, which controlled the Panjshir Gorge 100 km northeast of Kabul and was the strongest threat to the route along which the main supply of units of the 40th Army from Soviet territory went.

An additional nuisance for the Soviet command was the rapid disintegration of the Afghan army under the influence, firstly, of Islamic propaganda, and secondly, constant conflicts in the PDPA and, accordingly, in the Afghan government. Desertion and defection to the enemy side not only of soldiers, but also of officers, including senior ones, became widespread already in 1980. And among those who did not desert, many worked for the enemy. By political reasons Soviet troops could not conduct operations alone. But interaction with the Afghan army led to the fact that in almost 100% of cases the plans of operations immediately ended up with the partisan commanders. As a result, they inflicted significant losses on our troops and/or quickly left controlled areas, avoiding defeat. Soviet troops did not have the ability to constantly hold the occupied territories (there simply weren’t enough people for this; the contingent in reality, and not just in name, was very limited) and transferred them to the Afghan army. Which immediately left them, and, as a rule, without a fight.

The limitations of the Soviet contingent were aggravated by the fact that counterinsurgency war is a war without a front and, accordingly, without a rear. An enemy attack could be expected almost anywhere and at any time. Because of this, significant forces were scattered across many garrisons, which began to guard themselves. Even more significant forces were spent on guarding communications and leading supply columns to these isolated garrisons. There was almost nothing left for active actions, and passive defense had never brought victory to anyone.

Finally, a significant part of Soviet equipment was created for the war in Europe and the Far East, but not in the Afghan climatic conditions. And the planning of operations by inertia followed the patterns of classical war in completely different theaters of operations.

Mujahid with a Stinger anti-aircraft missile. Photo: TASS

All this led to many failures. So, already in April 1980, Soviet-Afghan troops carried out the first Panjshir operation, and in 1981 - four more such operations. However, in all cases they followed the scenario described above - Masud’s militants inflicted significant losses on the Soviet and Afghan troops, and they themselves successfully evaded attacks, since Masud received all the operational plans in advance. As a result, it was not possible to gain a foothold in the gorge.

In 1980, the 40th Army lost 1.5 thousand people killed in Afghanistan, 200 armored vehicles, four combat and two transport aircraft, 42 helicopters, including 21 Mi-24. In 1981, losses even decreased - 1.3 thousand people, 150 armored vehicles, four combat aircraft and 22 helicopters, including five Mi-24s. But gradually the fighting intensified, since the Afghan army not only did not increase, but lost its combat effectiveness, but the partisan movement developed more and more widely.

In April 1982, Massoud's militants carried out a successful attack on Bagram air base. The answer was another Panjshir operation, again unsuccessful. The Afghan authorities decided to come to an agreement with Masud, but he replied that he was not going to talk to puppets, he needed true masters. The Soviet command entered into negotiations and in January 1983 signed a mutual non-aggression agreement with Massoud. It was in effect for more than a year. Total losses The USSR Armed Forces in 1982 grew to two thousand people, seven aircraft and 33 helicopters.

In 1983, Soviet troops did not conduct major operations. During the year, losses amounted to 1.5 thousand people, 200 armored vehicles, nine aircraft (including the Il-76 transport, shot down by the Strela-2 MANPADS right over Kabul) and 28 helicopters.

In April 1984, Afghan special forces tried to kill Massoud, thereby violating the truce. After which it was necessary to carry out another Panjshir operation with a traditional outcome. A number of other operations were more successful, in particular, the area around the city of Mazar-i-Sharif in the north of the country was cleared of the enemy. Losses over the year reached 2.5 thousand people, 17 aircraft, 49 helicopters (including 18 Mi-24).

Gradually, the Soviet command drew conclusions from what was happening. The modernization of armored vehicles has begun. Instead of the BMP-1 and BMD-1 with a 73-mm cannon that was useless in the mountains, the BMP-2 and BMD-2 appeared on the same chassis, but with a much more adequate 30-mm cannon, capable of firing, firstly, in bursts, and secondly , almost vertically upward. The BTR-60P was replaced by the BTR-70, and by the end of the war, the BTR-80. Here the previous weapons were retained, but the armor protection, engine and chassis were strengthened, and the layout of the fighting compartment was changed.

Tactics also began to change. In particular, the understanding came that it was best to fight partisans using their own methods. Accordingly, not motorized rifles, but airborne forces and special forces began to play an increasingly important role in the conduct of offensive combat operations. Their indispensable assistants, as well as the entire limited contingent, were the Mi-24 combat helicopters and the multi-purpose Mi-8. This tandem in the Afghan War was approximately the same as the T-34 tank during the Great Patriotic War.

Our paratroopers and special forces fought their first battles, not only with partisans, but also with Pakistani special forces, back in the spring of 1980. But a significant intensification of their actions began in 1984, when the main task became the search and destruction of caravans with weapons coming from Pakistan. In this struggle, sometimes very good results were achieved. So, at the end of 1984, the 173rd special forces detachment destroyed a caravan, destroying five vehicles and 44 militants without losses on their part. Then a real triumph followed when two companies of the 154th special forces detachment, together with a detachment of the Pashtun Mohmand tribe, defeated a caravan coming from Pakistan in Nangarhar province, killing 220 militants without losses. In February 1985, a reconnaissance detachment of the 154th special forces detachment, on a tip from the Afghan state security KHAD, destroyed 30 influential field commanders along with their guards. However, things were not always so successful. In April 1985, 29 special forces soldiers of the 334th detachment of the 14th special forces brigade of the Far Eastern Military District died in a battle with Pakistani colleagues and partisans for the village of Daridam. At the same time, Soviet troops carried out another Panjshir operation - again unsuccessfully. In total, in 1985, the 40th Army lost 1.9 thousand people, 200 armored vehicles, 18 aircraft and 53 helicopters (including 21 Mi-24).

As a result, after six years of war, a situation of strategic stalemate developed. Soviet and Afghan troops could not only defeat the enemy, but at least partially block the endless flow of weapons and militants from Pakistan. On the other hand, the partisans could not carry out any major offensive and capture even the most remote provincial center from Kabul in order to proclaim it their capital.

In April 1986, Soviet troops defeated one of the largest opposition bases, Jawara, in the Kunar Gorge. Unfortunately, the success again turned out to be useless: after the area was transferred to the Afghan army, it immediately handed it over to the partisans. In turn, the partisans tried to take Herat, at first they were close to success, but in the end they suffered a serious defeat. In the same month, the future first and last vice-president of the Russian Federation, Alexander Rutskoy, was shot down for the first time. His Su-25 fell victim to MANPADS (apparently Strela-2 or its Chinese copy HN-5). Pakistan's direct participation in the war became increasingly clear. In May, its F-16 fighters shot down two Afghan Su-22 attack aircraft.

In May, Moscow achieved the removal of the Secretary General of the PDPA (that is, the de facto leader of Afghanistan) Babrak Karmal, who was replaced by the leader of the KHAD, Mohammed Najibullah, who was considered more adequate.

By the beginning of July, the group of Soviet troops in Afghanistan included the 103rd Airborne Division (Kabul), the 5th Motorized Rifle Division and the 28th Air Regiment (Shindand), the 108th Motorized Rifle Division and the 345th Parachute Regiment (Bagram) , 201st motorized rifle division (Kunduz), 66th motorized rifle brigade and 14th GRU special forces brigade (Jalalabad), 70th motorized rifle brigade (Kandahar), 56th air assault brigade (Gardez), 15th brigade GRU special forces (Lashkargan), 191st (Ghazni) and 860th (Fayzabad) motorized rifle regiments. In total, these units and formations included 133 battalions and divisions, of which 82 (that is, almost 62%) performed security functions (23 guarded communications and facilities, 22 guarded authorities, 14 guarded airfields).

In August and November 1986, Massoud's militants inflicted several major defeats on Afghan troops. And since September, the partisans began to use American Stinger MANPADS, which were qualitatively superior to the first generation MANPADS they previously had (Strela-2, HN-5, American Red Eye, English Blowpipe), which led to a sharp increase losses, especially in helicopters.

The total losses of Soviet troops in 1986 amounted to 1.4 thousand people, about 150 armored vehicles, 20 aircraft (including eight Su-25 attack aircraft) and 47 helicopters (including 17 Mi-24). Of this number, 26 planes and helicopters were shot down by MANPADS, mostly Stingers.

Already on January 5, 1987, Soviet special forces captured the first Stinger (later several more were captured), which caused great sadness in the United States. However, this could not give quick results in terms of reducing losses in aviation. At the same time, the war in the air intensified. In March, a Pakistani F-16 shot down an Afghan passenger An-26 near Khost, an apparent war crime. But Pakistan could do it, since it fought against the “evil empire.” In April, an Afghan Su-22 was also shot down. The answer came just two weeks later when a Pakistani F-16 was shot down. According to the official Western version, he was shot down by mistake by his own wingman, although almost all independent experts consider the Pakistani to be a victim of a MiG-23MLD (Soviet or Afghan).

In May-July, reconnaissance groups of the 668th Special Forces Detachment destroyed several caravans, capturing 22 MANPADS (16 HN-5, four Stingers, two Blowpipes).

In November 1987, the largest operation of the Afghan war began, which at the same time became the last victory of the Soviet army in its history - Operation Magistral. It was carried out with the aim of releasing Khost, a city in eastern Afghanistan. The armed forces of this country, despite their low combat capability, managed to hold this city, completely blocked by partisans who really wanted to make Khost their capital. Everything arose in Khost more problems with food and ammunition. That is why the command of the 40th Army decided to carry out an operation to unblock it and restore supplies along the only road suitable for this, Gardez - Khost. The operation got its name in honor of this road.

The operation formally involved very large forces - two motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, three brigades (motorized rifle, air assault, GRU special forces) and two separate regiments (motorized rifle and parachute) of the 40th Army, two army corps ( four infantry divisions), tank and two air assault brigades of the Afghan Armed Forces. In fact, however, in mountainous areas the actions of large formations with a large amount of equipment were impossible. Each formation in reality was represented by separate units, rarely even battalions. Therefore, in fact, the Soviet group was equivalent to one brigade - a little more than 5.5 thousand people, about 30 tanks, up to 300 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, about 150 guns, mortars and MLRS. The enemy's manpower was at least no less, and the superiority of the Soviet side in technology was largely offset by the difficult mountainous terrain.

At the final stage of Operation Highway, on January 7–8, 1988, one of the most famous episodes of the Afghan war took place - the battle of the paratroopers of the 9th company of the 345th parachute regiment for height 3234. This height was one of those that dominated dear Gardez - Khost, ensuring either its unhindered functioning or, conversely, a blockade, depending on who controlled the height.

The height was defended by 39 paratroopers under the command of Senior Lieutenant Sergei Tkachev. Thus, this was not a company, but, in fact, a platoon. They were opposed, according to various sources, by 200 to 400 partisans. However, there is an opinion that in fact it was a group of Pakistani special forces, which have a very high level of training. The enemy had recoilless rifles, mortars, RPGs, and rocket launchers. True, the paratroopers also had artillery support. However, our own artillery was far away, and the enemy was nearby.

The battle lasted almost 12 hours, the paratroopers withstood 12 attacks, including several in full height. During the last attack, at 3 am, the enemy approached 10 meters to the positions of the paratroopers, who were almost out of ammunition. However, at that moment, the reconnaissance platoon of Senior Lieutenant Leonid Smirnov came to the rescue, delivered ammunition and restored the firepower of the defenders. After this, the partisans (or special forces?) realized the futility of their efforts and retreated. Their exact losses were at least 100 people killed alone. The losses of the paratroopers amounted to only six people killed and 28 wounded. Junior sergeant Vyacheslav Alexandrov and private Andrei Melnikov were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the remaining 37 paratroopers received the Order of the Red Banner or Red Star.

Stars of Heroes of the Soviet Union for Operation Magistral were also received by the commander of the 40th Army, Boris Gromov, and the commander of the 103rd Airborne Division, the future Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Pavel Grachev. Ironically, the partisan forces opposing the Soviet group were commanded by Jalaluddin Haqqani, then still a rising star, and now the largest commander of the Taliban, creating huge problems for the very Americans who supplied and armed him a quarter of a century ago.

The battle for height 3234 showed how high the level of combat and moral-psychological training was in the Soviet troops (according to at least- in the Airborne Forces). It cannot be emphasized enough that, in addition to five officers and one warrant officer, the remaining 33 paratroopers were conscripts. They won the battle against the most experienced professionals (regardless of who opposed them - Pakistani special forces or partisans with many years of war experience, trained by the same special forces), thereby proving the absurdity of the concept of a “professional army” so beloved in modern Russia. You just need to engage in combat, political and moral-psychological training with people.

It must also be said that the well-known film “The Ninth Company” has nothing to do with the battle for height 3234.

In general, the task was completed, the supply of the Host was restored. The main heights along the road were taken under the control of Soviet troops. 22 thousand tons of cargo were delivered to the city, 100 different warehouses, four tanks, nine armored personnel carriers, 46 guns, 121 mortars, 121 RPGs, 131 DShK machine guns, 19 MANPADS were captured.

In 1987, the losses of Soviet troops amounted to about 1.3 thousand people, about 150 armored vehicles, 19 aircraft (including eight Su-25), 49 helicopters (including 21 Mi-24). At the same time, Western observers in 1987, especially after the Magistral, began to note with great alarm that the Soviet army could well win the war.

However, by this time the USSR was already facing an economic catastrophe, which made the continuation of the war impossible. In addition, “glasnost” unfolded in the country, which made the comparison with Vietnam even more accurate - now the war began to be actively rejected by public opinion in the USSR.

On April 14, 1988, agreements were signed under which Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan by February 1989, and Pakistan and the United States stopped supporting the partisans. Moscow fulfilled its part of the agreements in full, Islamabad and Washington did not even imitate compliance, and London, Riyadh and Beijing were, as it were, “out of business” at all. That is, it was a complete and unconditional surrender of the USSR. The history of Vietnam repeated itself almost completely: the army lost not so much to the enemy in battle as to its own political leadership and public opinion.

The withdrawal of troops began in May, but the war still continued. So, in August, a Su-25 (naturally, a different one), piloted by Rutsky, was shot down for the second time. This time he became a victim of a Pakistani F-16. Rutskoi spent several months in Pakistani captivity. Also in August, in the Puli-Khumri area, an army ammunition depot was blown up by partisans, 1,200 wagons of ammunition, 200 engines for armored vehicles and much other property were destroyed. Before the end of the year, Pakistani F-16s shot down two Afghan MiG-23s and one Su-22, as well as a passenger An-32 (another war crime, so what?). In September, in the Shindand area, two Soviet MiG-23MLDs shot down two Iranian helicopters that violated Afghan airspace.

However, the withdrawal of troops was already in full swing and was irreversible. Moreover, Masoud, who posed the main threat to the departing troops, did not interfere with them in principle. He did not lose to the Soviet troops in battle, however, the fight against them cost him very dearly. That is why Masud, who appreciated his enemies, wanted them to leave as soon as possible. It happened on February 15, 1989.

The total losses of the USSR Armed Forces in killed amounted to 13,833 people, and taking into account other law enforcement agencies - 14,453. The most effective part of the 40th Army was, of course, the special forces. Having lost about 700 people killed, the special forces destroyed at least 17 thousand guerrillas and Pakistani special forces (that is, the loss ratio is approximately 24: 1). Thus, only from the actions of the special forces, the enemy lost more killed than the entire Soviet contingent for all reasons.

Official losses of the 40th Army in ground equipment amounted to 147 tanks, 1315 BRDM, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 433 guns and mortars. However, the real losses were greater; 385 T-62 tanks alone were written off.

The losses of the army aviation and the USSR Air Force amounted to 118 aircraft and 333 helicopters, the Afghan Air Force - 120 aircraft and 169 helicopters. The USSR's greatest losses, of course, came from attack aircraft - 32 Su-25s and 30 Su-17s. 127 Mi-24 attack helicopters were lost, 174 multi-purpose Mi-8 helicopters.

After the departure of the Soviet troops, everyone expected the collapse of the regime in Kabul and its army within a few days. However, as it turned out, in the second half of the 80s the Afghan army became quite combat-ready. The Battle of Jalalabad in March-June 1989 ended in a crushing defeat for the anti-government forces (now it was strange to call them partisans), who lost 12 thousand people in killed alone. The attacks on other major cities ended just as sadly for them.

At the end of 1989, active clashes began both within the PDPA and the Afghan army, and between anti-government groups (in particular, a war began between Massoud and Hekmatyar, the leader of the strongest group from the “Pakistan Seven”). After the collapse of the USSR, military assistance to Najibullah ceased, after which Afghanistan plunged into chaos and a war of all against all for several years. In 1995, Pakistani intelligence, with Saudi money, with the full consent of the United States, created the Taliban, who took Kabul in June 1996. Which was the first step towards the next Afghan war.

As for the political assessment of our Afghan war, it is still very difficult to give it today.

Did the soldiers of the 40th Army carry out the orders of the country's highest military-political leadership? Yes, definitely. From this point of view, there can be no claims against them.

Did the soldiers of the 40th Army fulfill their international duty? In front of whom? Before the puppet government of Karmal (and then Najibullah), which was supported by hardly even 20% of the country's population? The absurdity is obvious; there is hardly any need to argue with this today.

The war in Afghanistan was unnecessary and criminal, and the soldiers of the 40th Army were accomplices in this crime and/or unfortunate victims of the regime? But the answer to this question is still not obvious. Moreover, what is happening in Afghanistan today only complicates the search for an answer.

It was the anti-Soviet coalition described above, which included the USA, Great Britain, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China, that gave birth to Al-Qaeda, not by accident, but completely deliberately. Initially, this organization was a structure that recruited militants throughout the Islamic world for anti-Soviet and anti-government armed groups in Afghanistan. And then, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the structure took on a life of its own. And she began to bite her former owners and creators. Just like the Taliban, which were created by the same “actors” (only, apparently, without China).

But does this mean that if there were no Soviet troops in Afghanistan, there would be no Al-Qaeda and the Taliban? Because history doesn't know subjunctive mood, now it is extremely difficult to answer this question. The only thing we can say with absolute certainty is that Islamic extremism was not created by the 40th Army or even by the CIA. This phenomenon is much more complex, born within the Islamic world itself. External forces can manipulate it, but only to a very certain extent.

Moreover, it is Afghanistan, one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world, that is an almost ideal testing ground for Islamic radicals. It is likely that the Soviet invasion and the American reaction to it became catalysts for a process that was inevitable one way or another.

The Soviet leaders, when sending troops to Afghanistan, proceeded from a completely erroneous logic. And our troops had to engage in battle with a completely different enemy than they were supposed to fight (or who they were supposed to contain). But, as it turned out, this unexpected enemy turned out to be a very dangerous enemy in the future. With whom we would still have to fight (as happened in Chechnya). It is possible that precisely from the standpoint today the Afghan war looks much more justified from a military-political point of view than it seemed in the late 80s, when Soviet troops were returning to the USSR, which was in its final years.