Deployment of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

Afghan war 1979-1989 - a long-term political and armed confrontation between the parties: the ruling pro-Soviet regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with the military support of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan (OCSVA) - on the one hand, and the Mujahideen ("dushmans"), with a part of Afghan society sympathetic to them, with political and financial support foreign countries and a number of states of the Islamic world - on the other.

The decision to send troops of the USSR Armed Forces to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, in accordance with the secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee No. 176/125 “Towards the situation in “A””, “in order to prevent aggression from outside and strengthen the southern borders friendly regime in Afghanistan." The decision was made by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, A. A. Gromyko and L. I. Brezhnev).

To achieve these goals, the USSR sent a group of troops into Afghanistan, and a detachment of special forces from the emerging special KGB unit “Vympel” killed the current President H. Amin and everyone who was with him in the palace. By decision of Moscow, the new leader of Afghanistan was a protege of the USSR, former Ambassador Extraordinary Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Afghanistan in Prague B. Karmal, whose regime received significant and diverse - military, financial and humanitarian - support Soviet Union.

Background

"Big game"

Afghanistan is located in the very center of Eurasia, which allows it to play an important role in relations between neighboring regions.

WITH early XIX century, a struggle for control over Afghanistan begins between the Russian and British empires, called " Big game"(English) TheGreatGame).

Anglo-Afghan Wars

The British attempted to establish dominance over Afghanistan by force, sending troops from neighboring British India in January 1839. Thus began the first English Afghan war. Initially, the British were successful - they managed to overthrow the emir Dost Mohammed and put Shuja Khan on the throne. Shuja Khan's reign, however, did not last long and he was overthrown in 1842. Afghanistan concluded a peace treaty with Britain and retained its independence.

Meanwhile, the Russian Empire continued to actively move south. In the 1860-1880s, the annexation was basically completed Central Asia to Russia.

The British, concerned about the rapid advance of Russian troops towards the borders of Afghanistan, began the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1878. The stubborn struggle continued for two years and in 1880 the British were forced to leave the country, but at the same time leaving the loyal emir Abdur Rahman on the throne and thus maintaining control over the country.

In the 1880-1890s, the modern borders of Afghanistan were formed, determined by joint treaties between Russia and Britain.

Afghan independence

In 1919, Amanullah Khan declared Afghanistan's independence from Great Britain. The third Anglo-Afghan war began.

The first state to recognize independence was Soviet Russia, which provided Afghanistan with significant economic and military assistance.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Afghanistan was a backward agrarian country with a complete lack of industry, an extremely poor population, more than half of which were illiterate.

Republic of Daoud

In 1973, during the visit of the King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah to Italy, a coup d'état took place in the country. Power was seized by Zahir Shah's relative Mohammed Daoud, who proclaimed the first republic in Afghanistan.

Daoud established an authoritarian dictatorship and tried to carry out reforms, but most of them ended in failure. The first republican period in Afghanistan's history is characterized by strong political instability and rivalry between pro-communist and Islamist groups. Islamists launched several uprisings, but all of them were suppressed by government troops.

Daoud's reign ended with the Saur Revolution in April 1978, as well as the execution of the president and all members of his family.

Saur revolution

On April 27, 1978, the April (Saur) Revolution began in Afghanistan, as a result of which the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, proclaiming the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would overcome Afghanistan's lagging behind have encountered resistance from the Islamic opposition. Since 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war began in Afghanistan.

In March 1979, during the uprising in the city of Herat, the Afghan leadership made its first request for direct Soviet military intervention (there were about 20 such requests in total). But the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Afghanistan, created back in 1978, reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops at the Soviet-Afghan border and, by order of Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing of the 105th Guards Airborne Division into Afghanistan.

The further development of the situation in Afghanistan - armed uprisings of the Islamic opposition, mutinies in the army, internal party struggle and especially the events of September 1979, when the leader of the PDPA N. Taraki was arrested and then killed on the orders of H. Amin, who removed him from power - caused serious concern among the Soviet manuals. It warily followed Amin's activities at the head of Afghanistan, knowing his ambitions and cruelty in the struggle to achieve personal goals. Under H. Amin, terror unfolded in the country not only against Islamists, but also against members of the PDPA, who were supporters of Taraki. The repression also affected the army, the main support of the PDPA, which led to a drop in its already low morale and caused mass desertion and rebellion. The Soviet leadership was afraid that a further aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the coming to power of forces hostile to the USSR. Moreover, the KGB received information about Amin’s connections with the CIA in the 1960s and about secret contacts of his emissaries with American officials after the assassination of Taraki.

As a result, it was decided to prepare for the overthrow of Amin and his replacement with a leader more loyal to the USSR. B. Karmal was considered as such, whose candidacy was supported by KGB Chairman Yu. V. Andropov.

When developing the operation to overthrow Amin, it was decided to use Amin’s own requests for Soviet military assistance. In total, from September to December 1979 there were 7 such appeals. At the beginning of December 1979, the so-called “Muslim battalion” was sent to Bagram - a detachment special purpose The GRU was specially formed in the summer of 1979 from Soviet military personnel of Central Asian origin to guard Taraki and carry out special tasks in Afghanistan. In early December 1979, USSR Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov informed a narrow circle of officials from among the top military leadership that a decision would obviously be made in the near future on the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. From December 10, on the personal orders of D. F. Ustinov, the deployment and mobilization of units and formations of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts was carried out. Boss General Staff N. Ogarkov, however, was against the introduction of troops.

According to V.I. Varennikov, in 1979 the only member of the Politburo who did not support the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan was A.N. Kosygin, and from that moment A.N. complete break with Brezhnev and his entourage.

On December 13, 1979, the Operational Group of the Ministry of Defense for Afghanistan was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General S. F. Akhromeyev, which began work in the Turkestan Military District on December 14. On December 14, 1979, a battalion of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment was sent to Bagram to reinforce the battalion of the 111th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, which had been guarding Soviet troops in Bagram since July 7, 1979 -transport aircraft and helicopters.

At the same time, B. Karmal and several of his supporters were secretly brought to Afghanistan on December 14, 1979 and were in Bagram among Soviet military personnel. On December 16, 1979, an attempt was made to assassinate Amin, but he remained alive, and B. Karmal was urgently returned to the USSR. On December 20, 1979, a “Muslim battalion” was transferred from Bagram to Kabul, which became part of the security brigade of Amin’s palace, which significantly facilitated preparations for the planned assault on this palace. For this operation, 2 KGB special groups also arrived in Afghanistan in mid-December.

Until December 25, 1979, in the Turkestan Military District, the field command of the 40th Combined Arms Army, 2 motorized rifle divisions, an army artillery brigade, an anti-aircraft missile brigade, an air assault brigade, combat and logistics support units were prepared for entry into Afghanistan, and in the Central Asian military district - two motorized rifle regiments, a mixed air corps directorate, 2 fighter-bomber air regiments, 1 fighter air regiment, 2 helicopter regiments, aviation technical and airfield support units. Three more divisions were mobilized as reserves in both districts. More than 50 thousand people from the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan were called up from the reserves to complete the units, and were transferred from National economy about 8 thousand cars and other equipment. This was the largest mobilization deployment Soviet army since 1945. In addition, the 103rd Guards Airborne Division from Belarus was also prepared for transfer to Afghanistan, which was already transferred to airfields in the Turkestan Military District on December 14.

By the evening of December 23, 1979, it was reported that troops were ready to enter Afghanistan. On December 24, D. F. Ustinov signed directive No. 312/12/001, which stated:

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan; the procedure for the use of weapons, even for the purposes of self-defense, was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov’s order appeared to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that Soviet troops would become garrisons and take protection of important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active action against opposition forces, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade crossed the pontoon bridge across the border river Amu Darya, which was tasked with capturing the high-mountainous Salang pass on the Termez-Kabul road to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops.

In Kabul, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division completed their landing by midday on December 27 and took control of the airport, blocking Afghan aviation and air defense batteries. Other units of this division concentrated in designated areas of Kabul, where they received tasks to blockade the main government institutions, Afghan military units and headquarters, and other important objects in the city and its environs. After a skirmish with Afghan soldiers, the 357th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Division and the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment established control over the Bagram airfield. They also provided security for B. Karmal, who was again taken to Afghanistan with a group of close supporters on December 23.

Storming of Amin's Palace

On the evening of December 27, Soviet special forces stormed Amin's palace, and Amin was killed during the assault. Government agencies Soviet paratroopers captured Kabul.

On the night of December 27-28, B. Karmal arrived in Kabul from Bagram and Kabul radio broadcast an appeal from this new ruler to the Afghan people, in which the “second stage of the revolution” was proclaimed.

Main events

In July 1979, a battalion from the 111th Parachute Regiment (111 pdp) 105th Airborne Division (105 Airborne Division), the 103rd Airborne Division also arrived in Kabul, in fact, after a regular reorganization in 1979 - separate battalion 345OPDP. These were the first military units and units of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.

From December 9 to 12, the first “Muslim battalion” arrived in Afghanistan - 154 ooSpN 15obrSpN.

On December 25, the columns of the 40th Army (40 A) Turkestan Military District cross the Afghan border along a pontoon bridge over the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and gave orders to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA to provide assistance to the incoming troops.

• January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government mutiny by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. About 100 rebels were killed during the battle; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded. At the same time, a directive from the Minister of Defense D. Ustinov appeared on the planning and commencement of military operations - raids against rebel detachments in the northern regions of Afghanistan adjacent to the Soviet border, using an equally reinforced battalion and the use of firepower from the army, including the Air Force, to suppress resistance.

• February 23 - tragedy in the tunnel at the Salang pass. When passing the tunnel by units 186 SME and 2 zrbr in the complete absence of the commandant's service, a traffic jam formed in the middle of the tunnel due to an accident. As a result, 16 Soviet servicemen suffocated 2 zrbr. There are no data on Afghans who suffocated.
• February-March - the first major operation to suppress an armed rebellion in the mountain infantry regiment in Asmara, Kunar province of OKSV units against the Mujahideen - the Kunar offensive. On February 28-29, units of the 317th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division in the Asmara region entered into heavy bloody battles due to the blocking of the 3rd Parachute Battalion in the Asmara Gorge by dushmans. 33 people were killed, 40 people were injured, one soldier was missing.
• April - The US Congress authorizes $15,000,000 in "direct and open assistance" to the Afghan opposition.

The first military operation in Panjshir.

• May 11 - death of the 1st motorized rifle company of the 66th motorized rifle brigade (Jalalabad) near the village of Khara, Kunar province.
• June 19 - decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on the withdrawal of some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.
• August 3 - battle near the village of Shaest. In the Mashhad Gorge - the Kishim region near the city of Faizabad, the 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion of the 201st MSD was ambushed, 48 servicemen were killed, 49 were wounded. It was one of the bloodiest episodes in the history of the Afghan war.
• August 12 - Special forces of the USSR KGB “Karpaty” arrive in the country.
• September 23 - Lieutenant General Boris Tkach was appointed commander of the 40th Army.

• September - fighting in the Lurkoh mountain range in Farah province; death of Major General Khakhalov.
• October 29 - introduction of the second “Muslim battalion” (177 ooSpN) under the command of Major Kerimbaev (“Kara Major”).
• December - defeat of the opposition base in the Darzab region (Jawzjan province).

• April 5 - during a military operation in western Afghanistan, Soviet troops mistakenly invaded Iranian territory. Iranian military aircraft destroyed two Soviet helicopters.
• In May-June, the fifth Panjshir operation was carried out, during which a mass landing in Afghanistan was carried out for the first time: only during the first three days Over 4,000 airborne personnel were landed. In total, about 12,000 military personnel of various military branches took part in this confrontation. The operation took place simultaneously throughout the entire 120 km depth of the gorge. As a result of this operation, Panjshir was captured.
• November 3 - tragedy at the Salang pass. As a result of a traffic jam outside the tunnel, more than 176 people died in the tunnel.
• November 15 - meeting between Yu. Andropov and Zia ul-Haq in Moscow. The Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani President, during which he informed him about “ the new flexible policy of the Soviet side and understanding of the need to quickly resolve the crisis" The meeting also discussed the feasibility of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops, Pakistan was required to refuse assistance to the rebels.

• January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Mujahideen kidnapped a group of Soviet “civilian specialists” numbering 16 people.
• February 2 - hostages abducted in Mazar-i-Sharif and kept in the village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan were released, but six of them died.
• March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation led by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordovez with Yu. Andropov. Andropov thanks the UN for “ understanding the problem" and assures the intermediaries that he is ready to undertake " certain steps”, but doubts that Pakistan and the United States will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.
• April - operation to defeat opposition forces in the Nijrab gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.
• May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan " set deadlines for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops».
• July - Mujahideen attack on Khost. The attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.
• August - the intense work of D. Cordovez's mission to prepare agreements for the peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country was developed, but after Andropov's illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of Politburo meetings. Now it was only about " dialogue with the UN».
• Winter - fighting intensified in the Sarobi region and the Jalalabad Valley (Laghman province is most often mentioned in reports). For the first time, armed opposition units remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and resistance bases began directly in the country.

• January 16 - Mujahideen shot down a Su-25 aircraft using Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first time successful application MANPADS in Afghanistan.

• April 30 - in the Khazar Gorge, during a large-scale military operation in the Panjshir Gorge, the 1st Battalion of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses.
• October 27 - Mujahideen shoot down an Il-76 transport plane over Kabul using Strela MANPADS.

• April 21 - Death of the Maravar company.
• April 26 - uprising of Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war in Badaber prison, located in Pakistan.
• May 25 - Kunar operation. Battle near the village of Konyak, Pechdara gorge, Kunar province, 4th company of the 149th Guards. Motorized rifle regiment. Finding themselves surrounded by Mujahideen and Pakistani mercenaries - the "Black Storks", the guardsmen of the 4th company and the forces of the 2nd battalion attached to it lost 23 dead and 28 wounded.
• June - army operation in Panjshir.
• Summer - a new course of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee towards a political solution to the “Afghan problem”.
• October 16-17 - Shutul tragedy (20 dead, several dozen wounded)
• The main task of the 40th Army is to cover the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are brought in. The creation of stronghold fortified areas began in hard-to-reach areas of the country.
• On November 22, 1985, while carrying out a mission, an outpost of the Motorized Maneuverable Group (MMG) of the Panfilov Border Detachment of the Eastern Border District of the KGB of the USSR was ambushed. In a battle near the village of Afrij in the Zardev Gorge of Badakhshan province, 19 border guards were killed. These were the largest losses of border guards in one battle in the Afghan War of 1979-1989.

• February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of developing a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.
• April 4-20 - operation to destroy the Javara base: a major defeat for the Mujahideen. Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan’s troops to break through the “security zone” around Herat.
• May 4 - at the XVIII plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, M. Najibullah, who previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence KHAD, was elected to the post of Secretary General instead of B. Karmal. The plenum proclaimed the intention to solve the problems of Afghanistan through political methods.
• June 16 - Military operation "Maneuver" - Takhar province. A long battle on Mount Yafsaj of the 783rd ORB of the 201st MSD - Jarav Gorge, in which 18 scouts were killed and 22 were wounded. This was the second tragedy of the Kunduz Intelligence Battalion.
• July 28 - M. Gorbachev publicly announced the imminent withdrawal of six regiments of the 40th Army (about 7,000 people) from Afghanistan. Later the withdrawal date will be postponed. There is debate in Moscow about whether to withdraw troops completely.
• August - Massoud defeated a government military base in Farhar, Takhar Province.
• August 18-26 - Military operation “Trap” under the command of Army General V.I. Varennikov. Assault on the Kokari-Sharshari fortified area in Herat province.
• Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group from 173 ooSpN 22obrSpN captures the first batch of three Stinger MANPADS in the Kandahar region.
• October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.
• November 13 - at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev noted: “ We have been fighting in Afghanistan for six years. If we don’t change our approaches, we will fight for another 20-30 years" Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev stated: “ There is not a single military task that was set but not solved, and there was no result.<…>We control Kabul and provincial centers, but we cannot establish power in the occupied territory. We have lost the fight for the Afghan people" At the same meeting, the task was set to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan within two years.
• December - an emergency plenum of the PDPA Central Committee proclaims a course towards a policy of national reconciliation and advocates an early end to the fratricidal war.

• January 2 - an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Army General V.I. Varennikov, was sent to Kabul.
• February - Operation Strike in Kunduz province.
• February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar province.
• March 8 - Mujahideen shelling of the city of Pyanj in the Tajik SSR.
• March - Operation Thunderstorm in Ghazni province.
• March 29, 1986 - during the fighting of the 15th brigade, when the Jalalabad battalion, with the support of the Asadabad battalion, defeated a large Mujahideen base in Karer.

Operation Circle in Kabul and Logar provinces.

• April 9 - Mujahideen attack on a Soviet border post. When repelling the attack, 2 Soviet soldiers were killed and 20 Mujahideen were killed.
• April 12 - the defeat of the Milov rebel base in Nangarhar province.
• May - Operation Salvo in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul.

Operation "South-87" in Kandahar province.

• Spring - Soviet troops begin to be used to cover the eastern and southeastern sectors state border"Barrier" system.
• November 23 - Operation Magistral begins to unblock the city of Khost.

• January 7-8 - battle at height 3234.
• April 14 - with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The USSR and the USA became guarantors of the agreements. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within a 9-month period, starting on May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
• June 24 - Opposition troops captured the center of Wardak province - the city of Maidanshahr. In September 1988, Soviet troops near Maidanshahr carried out an operation to destroy the Khurkabul base area.
• August 10 - Mujahideen took Kunduz

• January 23-26 - Operation Typhoon, Kunduz province. The last military operation of the SA in Afghanistan.
• February 4 - the last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul.
• February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the Limited Military Contingent, Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who, according to the official version, was the last to cross the border river Amu Darya (Termez). He stated: “There is not a single Soviet soldier left behind me.” This statement was not true, since both Soviet soldiers who were captured by the Mujahideen and border guard units who covered the withdrawal of troops and returned to USSR territory only in the afternoon of February 15 remained in Afghanistan. The border troops of the KGB of the USSR carried out tasks to protect the Soviet-Afghan border in separate units on the territory of Afghanistan until April 1989.

results

• Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army (led the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), in his book “Limited Contingent”, expressed the following opinion regarding the victory or defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan:

Indeed, before the start of the OKSVA withdrawal in May 1988, the Mujahideen had never managed to carry out a single major operation and failed to occupy a single one large city. At the same time, Gromov’s opinion that the 40th Army was not given the task military victory, does not agree with the estimates of some other authors. In particular, Major General Yevgeny Nikitenko, who was deputy chief of the operational department of the 40th Army headquarters in 1985-1987, believes that throughout the war the USSR pursued constant goals - suppressing the resistance of the armed opposition and strengthening the power of the Afghan government. Despite all efforts, the number of opposition forces only grew from year to year, and in 1986 (at the peak of the Soviet military presence) the Mujahideen controlled more than 70% of the territory of Afghanistan. According to Colonel General Viktor Merimsky, former deputy. head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Afghan leadership actually lost the fight against the rebels for its people, could not stabilize the situation in the country, although it had 300,000-strong military formations (army, police, state security).

• After the outbreak of the Afghan war, several countries announced a boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games held in Moscow.

Humanitarian consequences

The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was a flow of refugees to Iran and Pakistan, a large percentage of whom remain there to this day. Photo of Sharbat Gula on the cover of the magazine National Geographic in 1985, entitled "Afghan Girl", became a symbol of the Afghan conflict and the refugee problem around the world.

The bitterness of the warring parties reached extreme limits. It is known that the Mujahideen subjected prisoners to torture, among which the “red tulip” is widely known. The weapon was used so widely that many of the villages were literally built from rockets left over from the departure of the Soviet army, residents used rockets to build houses, as ceilings, window and door beams, but statements by the US administration about the use of the 40th chemical weapons army, announced in March 1982, were never documented.

Losses of the parties

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; Available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total. According to Harvard professor M. Kramer, an American researcher of the Afghan war: “During the nine years of war, more than 2.5 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, and several million more became refugees, many of whom fled the country.” . There appears to be no precise division of victims into government soldiers, mujahideen and civilians.

USSR losses

Total - 13,833 people. These data first appeared in the Pravda newspaper in August 1989. Subsequently, the final figure increased slightly, presumably due to those who died from the consequences of wounds and illnesses after leaving the armed forces. As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:

• Soviet Army - 14,427
• KGB - 576
• Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28

Total - 15,031 people. Sanitary losses - almost 54 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 416 thousand sick.

According to the testimony of Vladimir Sidelnikov, a professor at the Military Medical Academy of St. Petersburg, the final figures do not take into account military personnel who died from wounds and illnesses in hospitals on the territory of the USSR.

In a study of the Afghan war conducted by officers of the General Staff under the leadership of prof. Valentin Runova, provides an estimate of 26,000 dead, including those killed in battle, those who died from wounds and illnesses, and those killed as a result of accidents. The breakdown by year is as follows:

Of the approximately 400 military personnel listed as missing in action during the war, a certain number of prisoners were taken by Western journalists to Western European countries and North America. According to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of June 1989, about 30 people lived there; three people after the statement Prosecutor General The USSR that former prisoners would not be subject to criminal prosecution returned to the Soviet Union. According to data from 02/15/2009 of the Committee on the Affairs of Internationalist Soldiers under the Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth (CIS) Member States, 270 people remained on the list of missing Soviet citizens in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

Death toll Soviet generals according to press publications, it is usually four dead; sometimes the figure is 5 dead in Afghanistan.

Losses in equipment, according to official data, amounted to 147 tanks, 1,314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel tankers, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters. At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, information was not published on the number of combat and non-combat aviation losses, on the losses of airplanes and helicopters by type, etc.

Some Soviet military personnel who fought in Afghanistan experienced the so-called “Afghan syndrome” - post-traumatic stress disorders. Testing conducted in the early 1990s showed that at least 35-40% of participants in the war in Afghanistan were in dire need of help from professional psychologists.

Other losses

According to Pakistani authorities, in the first four months of 1987, more than 300 civilians were killed as a result of Afghan air raids on Pakistani territory.

Economic losses USSR

About 800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government.

In works of culture and art

Fiction

• Andrey Dyshev. Reconnaissance. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-14711-X
• Dyshev Sergey. Lost Platoon. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-15709-3
• Mikhail Evstafiev. Two steps from paradise. - M.: Eksmo, 2006 - ISBN 5-699-18424-4
• Nikolay Prokudin. Raid battalion. - M.: Eksmo, 2006 - ISBN 5-699-18904-1
• Sergei Skripal, Gennady Rytchenko. Doomed contingent. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-16949-0
• Gleb Bobrov. Soldier's saga. - M.: Eksmo, 2007 - ISBN 978-5-699-20879-1
• Alexander Prokhanov. Tree in the center of Kabul. - M.: Soviet writer, 1982. - 240 p.
• Svetlana Alexievich. Zinc boys. - M.: Time, 2007. - ISBN 978-5-9691-0189-3
• Frolov I. A. Walks with the flight engineer. Helicopter pilot. - M.: EKSMO, 2007. - ISBN 978-5-699-21881-3
• Victor Nikolaev. Alive in help. Notes from an "Afghan". - M.: Soft Publishing, 2006. - ISBN 5-93876-026-7
• Pavel Andreev. Twelve stories. "Afghan War 1979-1989", 1998-2002.
• Alexander Segen. Lost armored personnel carrier. - M.: Armada-Press, 2001, 224 p. - ISBN 5-309-00098-4
• Oleg Ermakov. Afghan stories. Mark of the Beast.
• Igor Moiseenko. Firing sector. - M.Eksmo, 2008

Memoirs

• Gromov B.V."Limited contingent." M., Ed. group “Progress”, “Culture”, 1994. 352 p. The book by the last commander of the 40th Army contains many documents revealing the reasons for the deployment of troops and describes many events of the war.
• Lyakhovsky A. A. Tragedy and valor of Afghanistan M., Iskona, 1995, 720 pp. ISBN 5-85844-047-9 Large fragments of the text coincide with the book by B.V. Gromov.
• Mayorov A. M. The truth about the Afghan war Testimony of the chief military adviser. M., Human Rights, 1996, ISBN 5-7712-0032-8
• Gordienko A. N. Wars of the second half of the 20th century. Minsk., 1999 ISBN 985-437-507-2 A large section of the book is devoted to the background and course of hostilities in Afghanistan
• Ablazov V.I."Afghanistan. The Fourth War", Kyiv, 2002; “A cloudless sky over all of Afghanistan”, Kyiv, 2005; " Long haul from Afghan captivity and obscurity", Kyiv, 2005.
• Bondarenko I. N.“How we built in Afghanistan”, Moscow, 2009
• Podushkov D. L. Confession to yourself (about participation in hostilities in Afghanistan). - Vyshny Volochyok, 2002. - 48 s.
• David S. Insbee. Afghanistan. Soviet victory // Flame " cold war": Victories that never happened. = Cold War Hot: Alternative Decisions of the Cold War / ed. Peter Tsouros, trans. Yu.Yablokova. - M.: AST, Lux, 2004. - P. 353-398. - 480 s. - (Great Controversies). - 5000 copies. - ISBN 5-17-024051 (alternate war history)
• Kozhukhov, M. Yu. Alien stars above Kabul - M.: Olympus: Eksmo, 2010-352 pp., ISBN 978-5-699-39744-0

In cinema

• “Hot Summer in Kabul” (1983) - film directed by Ali Khamraev
• “Paid for Everything” (1988) - film directed by Alexey Saltykov
• "Rambo 3" (1988, USA)
• “Sergeant” (1988) - a film in the film anthology “The Bridge”, dir. Stanislav Gaiduk, production: Mosfilm, Belarusfilm
• “Scorched by Kandahar” (1989, director: Yuri Sabitov) - a Soviet Afghan officer, decommissioned due to injury, enters the fight against the mafia and, in the end, exposes the criminals at the cost of his own life
• “Cargo 300” (1989) - film from the Sverdlovsk film studio
• “Two steps to silence” (1991) - film directed by Yuri Tupitsky
• “Gorge of Spirits” (1991) - film directed by Sergei Nilov
• “Afghan Break” (1991, USSR-Italy) - a film by Vladimir Bortko about the war in Afghanistan
• “The Leg” (1991) - film directed by Nikita Tyagunov
• “Afghan” (1991) - film directed by Vladimir Mazur. Contrabalt
• “Afghan-2” (1994) - continuation of the film “Afghan”
• “Peshawar Waltz” (1994) - a film by T. Bekmambetov and G. Kayumov, in the opinion of “Afghan” veterans, one of the most poignant and truthful films about that war, dedicated to the events in Badaber
• “Muslim” (1995) - a film by Vladimir Khotinenko about a Soviet soldier who returned home after 7 years in captivity of the Mujahideen
• “9th Company” (2005, Russia-Ukraine-Finland) - film by Fyodor Bondarchuk
• “The Soldier’s Star” (2006, France) - a film by French journalist Christophe de Ponfilly about the story of a Soviet prisoner of war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The prototype of the main character was one of the participants in the armed uprising in the Badaber camp
• “Charlie Wilson's War” (2007, USA) - the film is based on the true story of how, during the Afghan War, Texas Congressman Charles Wilson organized the financing of a secret CIA operation to supply weapons to the Afghan resistance forces (Operation Cyclone).
• "The Kite Runner" (2007)
• “Afghan War” 2009 - documentary-fiction series with elements of historical reconstruction
• “Caravan Hunters” (2010) - a military drama based on the works of Alexander Prokhanov “Caravan Hunter” and “Muslim Wedding”.

In music

• “Blue Berets”: Our Afghan, Afghan break, Silver plane, War is not a walk in the park, Borders
• “Cascade”: Cuckoo, We leave at dawn, On the Bagram road, I will return, We are leaving, To the motorist warriors, Who needed this war?
• "Contingent": Cuckoo, Prisoners, Two meters
• “Echo of Afghanistan”: I was killed near Kandahar, Cigarette smoke
• "Lube": For you
• “Survival Instructions”: 1988 - Confrontation in Moscow - Afghan Syndrome
• Igor Talkov: Ballad of an Afghan
• Maxim Troshin: Afghanistan
• Valery Leontyev. Afghan wind (I. Nikolaev - N. Zinoviev)
• Alexander Rosenbaum. Monologue of the Black Tulip pilot, Caravan, In the Afghani mountains, Rain on the pass, We will return
• Yuri Shevchuk. War is childish, don't shoot
• Konstantin Kinchev. Tomorrow May Be Late (album “Nervous Night”, 1984)
• Egor Letov. Afghan syndrome
• N. Anisimov. The last monologue of the Mi-8, the song of the helicopter gunner
• M. Bessonov. My heart aches until it hurts
• I. Burlyaev. In memory of Afghan helicopter pilots
• V. Verstakov. Allah Akbar
• A. Doroshenko. Afghan
• V. Gorsky. Afghan
• S. Kuznetsov. An incident on the road
• I. Morozov. Convoy Talukan-Faizabad, Midnight toast, Helicopter pilots
• A. Smirnov. For KamAZ drivers
• I. Baranov. An incident in battle, in the mountains near Peshawar
• Sprint. Afghanistan
• Nesmeyana.“A Fur Coat from Afghanistan”, “Bottle”, “Elevator of Love”
• Collection of Afghan songs "Time has chosen us", 1988

In computer games

• Squad Battles: Soviet-Afghan War
• Rambo III
• 9 Rota
• The truth about the ninth company
• Front line. Afghanistan 82

On December 25, 1979, at 15.00, in the Kabul direction, the TurkVO motorized rifle division stationed in Termez began crossing the pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya and marching to Kabul. At the same time, BTA planes with personnel and military equipment of the airborne division crossed the border, which landed at the Kabul airfield.

Nine years, one month and eighteen days... That’s how long the “Afghan war” lasted. The war that became the “swan song” of the Soviet Army and the Soviet Union.

A war that claimed 14,427 lives, through which a total of 620 thousand people passed, and which became one of the powerful preconditions for a radical change in the geopolitical situation in the world.

What events preceded the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan? Was it vital for our country or was it pure gamble?

Soviet troops were sent to Afghanistan after repeated requests from the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which took the helm as a result of a coup d'etat unexpected for the USSR in April 1978. But even then the PDPA party did not represent a single whole, but consisted of two opposing factions - “Khalq” (“People”) and “Parcham” (“Banner”). The division into factions occurred almost immediately after the formation of the party in 1965. The Khalq faction adhered to the class principle of admission to the party, stood on radical left political positions, and set as its main task “the establishment of national democracy”, “resolving the land issue in favor of landless and land-poor peasants with the broad participation of the entire peasantry in this process.” The leader of the Khalq faction, Nur Muhammad Taraki, who later became the head of Afghanistan, considered the party “the vanguard of the working class,” not taking into account the fact that in Afghanistan the working class, if present, constituted a very insignificant part of Afghan society. In such conditions, the ideological work of the “Khalqists” was aimed primarily at the democratic intelligentsia and officers of the Afghan army. Ultimately, the Khalqists wanted to build a socialist society in Afghanistan.

Parcham, on the other hand, took a more moderate position and proposed accepting people into the party based not on class principles, but on a person’s desire to work. They considered themselves the most prepared revolutionaries, “Marxists-Leninists.” Their ultimate goal was the establishment of a democratic society in Afghanistan; For this, they intended to widely use the methods of parliamentary struggle, relying on the intelligentsia, civil servants, and the military, considering these layers to be the most real force with which they could achieve their goals.

It should be noted that at that time (late 1960s-early 1970s) the Soviet Union was not interested in fundamental changes government system Afghanistan. At that time, Kabul had a strong central government, personified by King Zahir Shah. Afghanistan has been a traditionally friendly state for our country. Soviet specialists took an active part in building the Afghan economy and in training their own Afghan personnel. Under the leadership of specialists from the USSR, the famous Salang tunnel was built in 1964, which made it possible to connect Kabul with the northern provinces of the country by the shortest route. Under the strong rule of the king, all the numerous tribes of Afghanistan lived peacefully and did not conflict with each other.

In July 1973, an anti-monarchist coup took place in Afghanistan, led by cousin Zahir Shah - Mohammad Daoud, who personified the moderate nationalist “third force” that stood between the traditional Islamic forces and the PDPA.

Already in August 1973, armed protests by supporters of the Islamic-monarchical system of Afghanistan began in the Panjshir Gorge, organized, as it was announced, by Pakistani military and political circles. From then on, the protests of Daoud's opponents began to expand.

In April 1978, a coup d'état took place in the country, the cause of which was the contradictions between the leadership of Afghanistan and the PDPA, which claimed power. On April 25, by order of M. Daoud, they were arrested senior managers PDPA Central Committee, including Nur Muhammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal. The reason for the arrest was the accusation of the leaders of the PDPA of violating the Constitution, which prohibited the activities of any political parties. And already at 9 am on April 27, mass demonstrations began, led by the remaining leaders of the PDPA, including Hafizullah Amin. Already at 17.30 the arrested PDPA leaders were released from prison. During the storming of M. Daoud's palace by rebel military personnel, he and members of his family were killed. On April 30, Afghanistan was proclaimed a Democratic Republic, and on May 1, a new government consisting of 20 ministers was appointed.

This development of events was actually a surprise for the Soviet leadership. which turned out to be unprepared for such rapid developments. And the PDPA itself, tormented by internal contradictions, was in no way suitable for the role of the leading and guiding force of Afghan society, which, being under the strong influence of Islamic religious and secular authorities, was not inclined to immediately begin to destroy the established traditional foundations. Moreover, having come to power, the new leadership of Afghanistan, led by the Khalqist Taraki, immediately began a radical restructuring of all spheres of Afghan society. For example, surplus land was confiscated from large landowners, and a land ownership limit was set at 6 hectares. Poor peasants were freed from debt bondage. 296 thousand families were allocated land due to the seizure of land from wealthy landowners. However, landless peasants cautiously and cautiously accepted such “gifts” from the new government, because traditional principles were strong in Afghan society, according to which the poor could not lay claim to the riches of the rich, “for it is so pleasing to the Almighty (“inshallah”).”

Another major miscalculation of the new government was the proclamation of the “Saur uprising” (“Saur” - “April” on one of official languages Afghanistan) “a proletarian revolution, part of the world proletarian revolution.” And this in a country where there were only about 100 thousand low-skilled workers for a population of 16 million. Most likely, statements about the proletarian nature of the revolution were made counting on the full assistance of the USSR. Considering the generally positive response of the population to the overthrow of Daoud as approval of its rise to power, the PDPA began drastic socio-economic reforms that directly affected the interests of a fairly wide segment of Afghan society. The new authorities began to behave arrogantly towards farmers, completely ignoring the traditions and foundations that had developed in a virtually closed cell - the Afghan village. Thus, they provoked a massive influx of the Afghan peasantry into the ranks of the political and armed opposition, the first units of which began operations during the reign of Daoud. In addition, the sharply anti-religious policy of the new authorities (for example, on the first day of the new government, more than 20 mullahs were shot in Kabul alone) did not contribute to mutual understanding between atheist communists and the deeply religious Afghan people. All this led to a sharp intensification of anti-government protests in July-September 1978. This is due to a sharp increase in funding for intra-Afghan anti-government Islamic groups from such international Islamist groups as the Muslim Brotherhood.

By the beginning of the summer of 1979, the military-political situation in Afghanistan had sharply worsened. Almost the entire eastern province of Paktia was controlled by opposition units, and mutinies of the Afghan regular army broke out in the garrisons every now and then. In the current situation, the Afghan leadership was unable on its own, without a combat-ready army and without the support of the people, to stop the large-scale onslaught from outside of large armed groups financed from abroad.

Beginning in the spring of 1979, the Afghan leadership repeatedly appealed to the USSR to send a limited military contingent to Afghanistan to help repel the external and internal “counter-revolution”. There are 14 such requests. Here are some of the requests:

“June 16th. Send Soviet crews in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to the DRA to protect the government and Bagram and Shindand airfields.”

But the Soviet leadership refused every time.

However, the opinion of the Soviet leadership changed dramatically in September 1979, when one of the leaders of the PDPA, Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, removed President Nur Muhammad Taraki. The intra-party struggle, which had died down, flared up with new strength, which threatened instability on the southern borders of the USSR. In addition, in foreign policy, Amin leaned more and more towards the West and the United States. And the internal political situation in Afghanistan sharply worsened due to the fact that Amin began brutal political repressions against the “Parchamists.” It was necessary to take control of the situation in Afghanistan. After a comprehensive study of the situation around Afghanistan, the top Soviet leadership decided to eliminate Amin, install a more predictable leader and send troops to provide moral support to the Afghan people. The political decision to send troops was made on December 12, 1979 in the office of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev. However, according to the leadership of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the introduction of troops into Afghanistan would lead to an intensification of the rebellious movement, which, first of all, would be directed against Soviet troops (which subsequently happened). But no one listened to the opinion of the military.

2. Deployment of troops. The tasks initially faced by OKSV.

On December 25, 1979, at 15.00, in the Kabul direction, the TurkVO motorized rifle division stationed in Termez began crossing the pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya and marching to Kabul. At the same time, military aviation aircraft with personnel and military equipment of the airborne division crossed the border, which landed at the Kabul airfield (From the certificate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR “On the issue of the circumstances of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan”).

On December 27, 1979, the USSR KGB special unit “A” (the famous “Alpha”), led by Colonel Boyarinov, who died during this assault, began an operation to storm the palace of H. Amin, as a result of which the latter was liquidated. At this time, Soviet units were already crossing the border. On December 28, 1979, the situation in Kabul was completely controlled by Soviet troops. On this day, Babrak Karmal, who was “on armor”, addressed the Afghan people on the radio. Soviet tanks returned in triumph from “honorable exile” from Czechoslovakia, where he was ambassador. Now he, a member of the Parcham faction, has become the new ruler of Afghanistan.

Before January 1, 1980, about 50 thousand military personnel were introduced into Afghanistan, namely: two airborne and two motorized rifle divisions, support units). One motorized rifle division, numbering 12 thousand people, entered Afghanistan in the direction of Kushka, Kandahar, while the main forces were in the direction of Termez, the Salang pass to Bagram and Kabul.

In January 1980, two more motorized rifle divisions were sent to Afghanistan. The total number of troops was 80 thousand people. The first commander of the 40th Army, which formed the backbone of the Limited Contingent of the Soviet Forces, was Colonel General Yuri Tukharinov.

By mid-January 1980, the introduction of the main forces of the 40th Army into Afghanistan was largely completed. Three divisions (2 motorized rifle divisions, 1 airborne division), an air assault brigade, and two separate regiments were concentrated on the territory of Afghanistan. Subsequently, the combat composition of the OKSV was clarified, and some units were reorganized in order to strengthen them. Finally, the OKSV included:

4 divisions (motorized rifle - 3, airborne - 1),

5 separate brigades (motorized rifle - 2, air assault - 1, special forces - 1)

4 separate regiments (motorized rifle - 2, parachute - 1, artillery - 1)

4 combat aviation regiments

3 helicopter regiments.

1 pipeline crew

1 logistics brigade.

Be that as it may, for peacetime such a transfer of troops, unprecedented in its scale, was generally successful, without serious complications.

The initial combat missions facing the Soviet troops were: protecting the main transport routes (Kushka-Herat-Shindand-Kandahar; Termez-Kabul; Kabul-Jalalabad; Kunduz-Fayzabad); protection of economic infrastructure facilities in Afghanistan, ensuring safe passage of convoys with national economic cargo. But the situation has made significant adjustments to these tasks...

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan has been causing conflicting emotions among many scientists, military men and politicians for three decades. On the one hand, the operation itself, key point which was the storming of Amin's palace in Kabul, is still a model for the actions of special forces in similar situations. On the other hand, one cannot consider the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in isolation from the subsequent aggravation of international tension, as well as from the fact that this event ultimately became one of the reasons

Meanwhile, in order to understand the deep meaning of the events that took place more than thirty years ago, it is necessary to take into account the situation that developed in this Central Asian country in 1979.

It all started in April 1978, when the PDPA, led by the famous writer N. Taraki, came to power in Kabul as a result of a military coup. At that time, this development of events was considered a major miscalculation by the United States, since Taraki and his associates saw their main ally as the Soviet Union, where a rather decrepit government headed by L. Brezhnev was then in power.

The leadership of the USSR and the CPSU sought to support the young government of the Afghan republic in every possible way. Throughout 1978, significant funds were sent here, military and economic advisers traveled here, who became the main organizers of land and educational reforms.

At the same time, discontent grew within Afghanistan both among the common population and among the ruling elite. At the beginning of 1979, this resistance resulted in an open rebellion, behind which, as it turned out today, was the United States. Even then, Taraki demanded that Brezhnev authorize the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, however, he received a firm refusal.

The situation changed dramatically in September 1979, when one of Taraki's associates, Amin, carried out a coup and came to power instead of the former president, who was strangled in prison. Amin's coming to power dramatically changed both the state of affairs within Afghanistan and its position on the international stage. At the same time, judging by the recently published memoirs of the famous American public figure Z. Brzezinski, the United States played the most direct role in this coup, with its sole goal of plunging the USSR into “its Vietnam War.”

Thus, the main reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan were the extremely important strategic position of this country, as well as the fact that after Amin’s coup, the Soviet government was forced to intervene in the internal affairs of this state so as not to have a hotbed of tension on its border.

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was sanctioned by a decision of the highest party body - the Politburo. At the same time, the decision indicated that in its actions the leadership of the USSR relied on the friendship treaty that was signed between the countries back in 1978.

On the eve of the new year, 1980, as a result of the storming of the presidential palace, Amin was killed and B. Karmal, a protege of the USSR, was appointed. For some time, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan contributed to the normalization of the internal life of the country, however, subsequently Soviet troops were drawn into heavy armed clashes with the Mujahideen, which resulted in more than 15 thousand deaths on the Soviet side.

Assessment of the situation. More and more reports were received from Kabul with requests from Kh. Amin to send Soviet troops into the DRA, as well as with assessments of the situation developing in Afghanistan. Moreover, representatives of various departments often gave conflicting information.

Strategic situation in the Near and Middle East in the late 1970s. was not in favor of the Soviet Union. The Camp David Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, the defeat of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the elections, the military coup in Iraq, and the Islamic Revolution in Iran significantly weakened Soviet positions in the region. In this regard, the possibility of losing Afghanistan, which had “taken the socialist path of development,” was perceived extremely painfully by the Soviet leadership.

According to Soviet analysts of that time, the events in the DRA became part of the world revolutionary process, and the leadership of the USSR was recommended to prevent the export of counter-revolution and provide assistance " healthy forces» Afghanistan in defense of revolutionary gains. This position was in tune with the sentiments of the Soviet leaders. The opportunity to have a reliable ally on its southern borders, connected with the Soviet Union by a common ideology and interests, seemed too tempting. But Kh. Amin seemed to be a man capable of reorienting himself to the West at any moment. This was the most feared development of events. The changes in exchange rates in Egypt, Chile, Somalia were still fresh in my memory... And then “information” surfaced about Amin’s involvement in the CIA.

Gradually, the idea emerged to eliminate Kh. Amin and replace him with a more loyal figure. At that time, the leader of the Parcham faction, B. Karmal, was already in Moscow. According to experts, he enjoyed the support of a certain part of the Afghan party members and the population. Therefore, he was asked to lead the fight to overthrow the regime of H. Amin.

Letter from Andropov. In early December, Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yu.V. Andropov wrote to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev received a letter in which he outlined the situation in Afghanistan as critical and proposed measures to ensure the protection of our interests in this region. Obviously, this letter gave a new impetus to the discussion and elaboration of the issue of the need to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

The leadership of the USSR came to the conclusion that without Soviet troops it would be very difficult to create conditions for removing Amin from power. There was also no guarantee that the Afghan army would support B. Karmal and his new government. And even if he manages to seize power, will he be able to repel the attacks of the armed opposition?

Last meeting. On December 8, a meeting was held in Brezhnev’s office, in which a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee took part: Yu.V. Andropov, A.A. Gromyko, M.A. Suslov and D.F. Ustinov. They discussed the situation in and around Afghanistan for a long time, weighing the pros and cons of sending Soviet troops there. Yu.V. Andropov and D.F. Ustinov gave the following arguments in defense of such a step: efforts allegedly undertaken by the US CIA (resident in Ankara Paul Henzi) to create a “new Great Ottoman Empire” with the inclusion of the southern republics of the USSR; the absence of a reliable air defense system in the south, which, in the event of the deployment of American Pershing-type missiles in Afghanistan, jeopardized many vital facilities, including the Baikonur Cosmodrome; the possibility of using Afghan uranium deposits by Pakistan and Iraq to create nuclear weapons, the establishment of opposition power in the northern regions of Afghanistan and the annexation of this region to Pakistan. As a result, they decided to work on two options: to eliminate Kh. Amin with the help of the KGB intelligence services and transfer power in Afghanistan to B. Karmal; send a certain number of troops to Afghan territory for the same purposes.

General Ogarkov's surprise. December 10, 1979 USSR Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov summoned the Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov and informed him that the Politburo had made a preliminary decision to temporarily send Soviet troops into Afghanistan, and set the task of training 75-80 thousand people. N.V. Ogarkov was surprised by this decision, saying that 75 thousand would not stabilize the situation and he was against sending troops, as it was reckless. But the minister besieged him: “Are you going to teach the Politburo? You just have to follow orders...”

On the same day N.V. Ogarkov was urgently summoned to L.I.’s office. Brezhnev, where the so-called “small Politburo” (Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov) gathered. The Chief of the General Staff again tried to convince those present that the Afghan problem must be solved politically, and not rely on forceful methods. He referred to the traditions of the Afghans, who did not tolerate foreigners on their territory, and warned about the likelihood of our troops being drawn into hostilities, but everything turned out to be in vain.

Board of the Ministry of Defense. In the evening D.F. Ustinov gathered the board of the USSR Ministry of Defense and said that in the near future, obviously, a decision would be made on the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and it was necessary to prepare the appropriate group. Directive G 312/12/00133 was sent to the troops. Starting from December 10 D.F. Ustinov began to give verbal instructions to the Chief of the General Staff on the formation of a new combined arms army in the Turkestan Military District, in particular - to prepare an airborne division and a separate parachute regiment for landing, to increase the combat readiness of two divisions in the Turkestan Military District, to complete the pontoon to full strength - a bridge regiment in the Kiev Military District and send it to the Termez region. All events were carried out secretly.

The Politburo was inclined to use troops even more confidently after receiving a report from Kabul from a representative of the USSR KGB with a negative assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. The report said that the Afghan leadership's requests for help had a basis in reality. The threat of collapse loomed over the country's Marxist regime. Sober assessments of the situation by Soviet military leaders were regarded by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee as a misunderstanding or underestimation of the political importance of the processes taking place in Afghanistan.

The last straw that tipped the scales in favor of sending troops into Afghanistan was the decision of the NATO foreign and defense ministers at a meeting on December 12 in Brussels, which approved the deployment scenario in Western Europe new American medium-range missiles Cruz and Pershing-2. These missiles could hit almost the entire European part of the USSR.

The final decision. It was on that day - December 12 - that the final decision was made to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The Special Folder of the CPSU Central Committee contains the minutes of this meeting of the Politburo, written by the Secretary of the Central Committee K.U. Chernenko. It is clear from the protocol that the initiators of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan were Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and A.A. Gromyko. All members of the Politburo voted unanimously for the deployment of troops. However, it is noteworthy that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. was absent from the Politburo meeting. Kosygin, who was categorically against sending troops into Afghanistan. Either he himself chose not to attend the meeting, or he was advised to do so, or the meeting was held without his knowledge. The latter still looks unlikely.

Cipher telegrams. The encrypted telegrams that later arrived from Afghanistan seemed to confirm the correctness of the steps taken by the leadership of the USSR in relation to Afghanistan. According to a representative of the USSR KGB, H. Amin, during meetings with him on December 12 and 17, said that the Afghan leadership would welcome the presence of the Soviet Armed Forces in a number of strategically important points in the northern provinces of the DRA. The Soviet side must determine the forms and methods of providing military assistance.

The then leadership of the CPSU did not consider it necessary to make such important question, like sending troops into a neighboring country, for discussion by state authorities - the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Neither the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, nor the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, nor any other document on the issue of sending troops was adopted. All instructions were given orally, citing the need to provide and mislead Kh. Amin.

Official reason. The officially declared goal of the Soviet military presence in the DRA was formulated unambiguously - to provide assistance in stabilizing the situation and repelling possible external aggression. Soviet troops were supposed to stand as garrisons and not get involved in internal conflict and military operations. They were instructed to protect the local population from gangs, as well as distribute food, fuel and basic necessities. It was believed that the very presence of Soviet troops would be a powerful stabilizing factor, significantly strengthen the PDPA regime, have a restraining influence on the opposition movement and ensure the stability of the military-political situation in Afghanistan. At the same time, it was emphasized that if the deployment of troops happens, it will be of a short-term nature.

At the same time, the most important fact was hushed up that the first task that our troops would have to solve would be the overthrow and elimination of Kh. Amin and replacing him with his Soviet protege B. Karmal. Consequently, the reference to the fact that the entry of Soviet troops into Afghan territory was carried out at the request of the legitimate government of the DRA is hardly justified.

In general, the decision of the Soviet leadership to send troops into the DRA was made without a corresponding analysis of the situation and forecast of the development of the situation, an assessment of the causes, nature, scale and methods of resolving the conflict, as well as without setting clear general political and strategic goals. As a result, Afghanistan became a “quagmire” for the Soviet Union, similar to what Vietnam was for the United States.

The reaction of the world community to the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

Soviet soldiers fight with dushmans

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of December 1979 shocked the world community. US President Carter, in one of his first statements on this matter, said: "... it changed my attitude towards the foreign policy of the USSR more than anything else during my years in office." The Western press, historians, politicians and the wider public had their own point of view on the events that took place, almost unchallenged by anyone outside the socialist camp: in 1978, a coup d’etat took place in Afghanistan under the leadership of the Communist Party with the undoubted complicity of the USSR. As a result, a pro-Soviet regime led by Noor Mohamed Taraki and, later, Hafizullah Amin came to power. The Soviet Union supplied the new rulers with technical and military assistance and advisors to combat the growing opposition movement.

American and European historians and analysts attributed the reasons for the crisis in Afghanistan to the April Revolution of 1978, and most of them denied the existence of real socio-economic preconditions and a revolutionary situation, and associated the events that took place with Soviet influence and with the activities of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) , to which one of the American magazines attributed "...inexperience, disunity and radicalism, which predetermined such a rapid catastrophe in Afghanistan."

The situation in Afghanistan, according to the Western press, “sharply aggravated relations between East and West and led to a reassessment of the international situation as a whole in connection with a new and more sober view of the danger that the policies of the USSR pose to global stability and international peace.” For example, relations between the two nuclear superpowers in the area of ​​bilateral agreements on arms limitation deteriorated immediately and for a long time.
The onset of the crisis caused particular panic in the Western world, as it was regarded as a turning point in Soviet foreign policy and new stage international relations around the world. For the first time, the Soviet Union used organized armed force outside its borders and the countries of the universally recognized pro-Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. The introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was undoubtedly an undisguised attempt by brute force to decide the fate of a sovereign and formally non-allied country, to which far-reaching consequences were attributed.
The natural reaction of the Western world was to counter Soviet aggression, which pushed capitalist countries to get closer. An exceptional place in this formal (within the UN and NATO) and informal alliance was occupied by the United States, which further established its position as a superpower. After several rounds of meetings with its European allies, who still did not want to simply carry out what the Americans told them, the Carter administration managed to develop the main directions of a joint policy aimed at pacifying the aggressor and stabilizing the situation in the region and throughout the world as a whole. It was supposed, firstly, to provide all possible military and economic assistance to Pakistan. Secondly, to put the Soviet Union before a choice: either continue its aggressive policy in Afghanistan and pay for it with its barely established relations with the West, or preserve its good name in the system of international relations. Thirdly, as a more distant prospect, the United States, without its allies, planned to strengthen its military presence and develop a network of defense systems and military institutions in the region
Third world countries dealt another blow to the USSR. For example, the conference of Islamic countries in Islamabad by a majority condemned the actions of the USSR as aggressive, despite the long-term assistance provided by the Soviet Union to many of these countries. The unity of Muslim states, however, was significantly disrupted by the Iran-Iraq War, and therefore they could not influence to any significant extent foreign policy THE USSR.
Western countries played a leading role in pushing the USSR to negotiate the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. It was even possible to retain part of the contingent in the capital and some large centers of the country to maintain the communist regime. French President Valry Guiscard d'Estan and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt personally spoke with Brezhnev about the possibility of such negotiations, but in vain. The reasons for this were clear: the Afghan communist regime was obviously hatched in the USSR and had almost no chance of surviving without the military support of its patron. “It’s unlikely that anything will force the Russians to abandon their regime in Afghanistan to the mercy of fate,” this was the opinion of the majority of politicians in the West, not without reason.
Now, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the “Red Menace,” the significance of the Afghan crisis is assessed somewhat differently. Military intervention in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan caused a sharp deterioration in the international situation and for some time slowed down negotiations on arms reduction. The Soviet-Afghan war claimed about 15,000 lives Soviet soldiers and about a million Afghan insurgents and civilians. In addition, this war brought the deepest economic and political crisis in the USSR, the collapse of the Union and the collapse of the communist regime closer for many years.