Causes and results of the feudal war in Rus'. Feudal war in Rus' (1425-1453)

A feudal war is an inter-dynastic struggle for the throne within one state. The warring parties do not intend to share power and territory, but want to receive it completely.

Causes of the war:

1. Dynastic conflict of the princes of Moscow.

Vasily I died in 1425. In his spiritual 1423, he wrote: “And God will give my son a great reign, and I bless my son Prince Vasily.”

The son was not yet 10 years old, and the father named his father-in-law, Prince of Lithuania Vitovt, siblings Andrei, Peter and Konstantin, and second cousins ​​as guardians.

The eldest of Vasily I's siblings, Yuri Galitsky and Zvenigorodsky, was not named in the will, since according to the will of their father D. Donskoy, it was he who was to reign after his brother.

The conflict between Vasily I and Yuri began back in 1449, when in a preliminary version of his will Vasily called the great reign his patrimony and unconditionally bequeathed it to his son.

This is not just a clash of siblings. Two traditions of inheritance collided: the old one - from brother to brother, and the new one - from father to son.

Moscow managed to avoid this clash for a long time simply due to circumstances.

In addition, even at the end of the reign of D. Donskoy, the role of the Horde in the transfer of the label was obvious.

Now the Principality of Moscow is not afraid of the competition of other Russian princes for the label, and the role of the Horde is not important: Suzdal and Nizhny Novgorod belonged to Moscow, Tver is weak, and there is nothing to say about the rest of the former great principalities. Therefore, the struggle for the label begins in the Moscow Principality itself. At first, this is a confrontation between a young nephew and an uncle, since the senior guardian, grandfather Vitovt, is a serious opponent for Yuri.

With the help of Metropolitan Photius, the peace of Moscow and Galich was concluded in 1428. When Photius arrived in Galich, where Yuri’s subjects had gathered, he said to the prince: “Prince Yuri! I have never seen so many people dressed in sheep’s wool,” making it clear that people dressed in homespuns are bad warriors.

54-year-old Yuri recognized himself as the younger brother of his 13-year-old nephew and pledged not to seek a great reign.

Neither one nor the other went to the Horde. But Yuri has a reputation as an enemy of the Tatars, since even during his brother’s life he successfully went against the Bulgars and Kazan Tatars.

After the death of Vytautas in 1430, Yuri changed his mind.

In 1431, both rivals went to the Horde.

2. Dissatisfaction of the appanage princes and their boyars with the strengthening of the power of the Grand Duke of Moscow.

The active violation of feudal immunity under Vasily I did not bode well for the appanage principalities under his heir.

3. Dissatisfaction of the city elite with the complete elimination of city self-government in the Moscow Principality and large extortions in favor of the Moscow Prince.

Balance of power:

on the side of Vasily II

Peasants;

Residents of Moscow;

Nobles.

Some of the Moscow boyars who do not want to lose profitable places of service:

- (often) the Tver prince (betrothed his 4-year-old daughter Marya to Vasily’s 6-year-old son Ivan, 6 years later they were married);

Metropolitan Photius (died 1431);

Bishop Jonah;

on Yuri's side:

Citizens (except Moscow);

Some of the Moscow boyars counting on a career with a strong prince;

Appanage princes;

Boyars of appanage principalities;

Sons:

1) Vasily Kosoy,

2) Dmitry Shemyaka,

3) Dmitry the Red, the younger brothers hated Kosoy.

A long war between supporters of centralized grand-ducal power and the boyars of independent principalities flared up in the second quarter of the 15th century. The war was started by the prince of the appanage Galician principality Yuri Dmitrievich and his sons. The foreign policy situation was favorable to the plans of the Galician prince. At that time Lithuanian prince Vitovt, in alliance with the Tver prince Boris, launched an attack on Pskov and Novgorod. The princes of Ryazan and Pronsky went over to the side of the invaders.

The troops of the Galician prince occupied Moscow twice, forcing the Moscow prince Vasily II Vasilyevich to flee. Yuri's death did not interrupt the feudal strife between the princes. The struggle of opponents of the Grand Duke's policy was led by Yuri's sons - Vasily Kosoy and Dmitry Shemyaka. The territory covered by military operations expanded. The war has already spread beyond the boundaries of the Moscow principality. The Novgorod Boyar Republic and the lands of the possessions of Khlynov, Vologda, and Ustyug were drawn into the war.

The situation was complicated by the intervention of neighboring states in the outbreak of war. So the Polish king and Grand Duke Lithuanian Casimir IV concluded an agreement with the Novgorod boyars, according to which he received the right to collect indemnities from some Novgorod regions, as well as appoint his governors in the Novgorod suburbs.

The Roman Curia did not give up attempts to subordinate new lands to its sphere of influence. The war with Turkey forced Byzantium to ask non-European states for help from the pope and the West. Byzantium began to negotiate a church union. The Byzantine government proposed the Greek Isidore, who was a supporter of the conclusion of a church union, as a candidate for metropolitan in Rus'. In 1437, Isidore arrived in Moscow, and then went to Italy, Ferrara and Florence, where he actively advocated for a union. In 1439, the Council of Florence adopted a resolution on the union of churches on the terms of the Orthodox Church accepting Catholic dogmas and recognizing the primacy of the Pope while preserving Orthodox rituals. However, representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church refused to sign the act of union. On the initiative of Grand Duke Vasily II, the Council of the highest hierarchs of the Russian Church decided to depose Isidore.

In 1448, Bishop Jonah, who was actually in charge of the affairs of the Russian Church, was confirmed as metropolitan. The Patriarch of Constantinople recognized this decision as illegal and excommunicated the Russians from the church. Thus, the Russian Church acquired independence from the Byzantine Church, which increased its political position.

The Tatar princes still sought to seize Russian lands and strengthen their power over them. In the second quarter of the 15th century, Tatar-Mongol attacks on Rus' became more frequent. In the city of Belev, bordering the possessions of Moscow and Lithuania, one of the descendants of Jochi-Ulu Muhammad, expelled from the Horde by Edigei, settled. Then Ulu Muhammad moved with his horde to Nizhny Novgorod and from there carried out predatory raids on the surrounding Russian lands and even on Moscow.

In the spring of 1445, Tatar-Mongol troops led by the sons of Ulu Muhammad made another raid on Rus'. They defeated the Moscow army near Suzdal and captured the Moscow prince Vasily II himself. When the news of the prince's capture reached Moscow, panic began there. In addition, a terrible fire destroyed almost the entire capital. The princely family and boyars fled to Rostov. But the townspeople, just as during the invasion of Tokhtamysh, decided to defend their capital and brutally dealt with those who decided to flee. The Tatar troops did not dare to attack Moscow, which was prepared for defense, and retreated to Nizhny Novgorod.

After some time, Grand Duke Vasily II was released to his capital. He was made to promise to pay a ransom for himself. Vasily II returned to Moscow, bound by an oath to repay a huge debt. Due to miscalculations in domestic politics and military failures made by the prince during the fight against the Mongol conquerors, the Moscow population and service people stopped supporting him. Dmitry Shemyaka took advantage of this situation. He organized a conspiracy to overthrow the Moscow prince. The Tver and Mozhaisk princes, a number of Moscow boyars, monks of the Trinity-Sergius Monastery, and large merchants took part in the conspiracy. Vasily II was overthrown, blinded, hence his nickname “Dark,” and exiled to Uglich. Moscow passed into the hands of the Galician prince.

Unlike the Moscow princes who ruled before him, Dmitry Shemyaka pursued a policy of restoring the independence of individual parts of the state. So he recognized the independence of the Novgorod principality and returned the local princes to the Suzdal-Nizhny Novgorod principality. This policy of Dmitry Shemyaka caused acute discontent among the Moscow suburbs and service people. They began to seek the return of Vasily the Dark to the throne in Moscow. Dmitry Shemyaka, seeing that many former supporters were leaving him, was forced to release Vasily II from captivity.

Finding himself free, Vasily the Dark begins the fight to regain the Moscow throne. He goes to the Tver prince Boris Alexandrovich, who took his side. Moscow boyars and service people began to come to Tver to visit Vasily the Dark. At the end of 1445, Vasily the Dark regained power by sending a small detachment to Moscow led by the boyar Mikhail Pleshcheev. This detachment occupied Moscow without actually encountering any resistance. Dmitry Shemyaka, supported by the Novgorod boyars hostile to the Moscow prince, for a number of years carried out raids on the northern regions of the Moscow principality - Ustyug, Vologda.

After the defeat of Dmitry Shemyaka, almost all the principalities of North-Eastern Rus' submitted to the Moscow prince. The war with the Novgorod principality began in 1456. The Novgorod squads were defeated by Vasily the Dark. An agreement was concluded in Yazhelbitsy, according to which a large indemnity was imposed on Novgorod. Novgorod was significantly constrained in its right to conduct an independent policy. The sovereignty of the Pskov Boyar Republic was almost as severely limited.

The political unification of the main part of the Russian lands was completed under the son of Vasily the Dark - Ivan III, who ruled from 1462 to 1505.

Formation of the Russian centralized state in the XIV–XV centuries. Essays on the socio-economic and political history of Rus' Cherepnin Lev Vladimirovich

§ 11. Feudal war in Rus' in the second quarter of the 15th century. (its causes and progress until the 40s of the 15th century)

In the second quarter of the 15th century. A feudal war broke out in North-Eastern Rus', which lasted for almost thirty years. The path of political development of Rus', as well as a number of countries in Western Europe, led from a system of feudal principalities to a centralized monarchy. A strong centralized government was the organ of the ruling class of feudal lords. It gave him the opportunity to exploit the working people and provided them with protection from external enemies. But at the same time, the strengthening of central power meant that the feudal lords had to sacrifice in its favor part of their material benefits and political privileges that the possession of land and dependent peasantry gave them. At a certain stage in the development of feudal society, this contradiction in the relations between individual feudal lords and groups of feudal lords and the central state power, as the body of feudal domination over the working majority of the population, develops into a major feudal war. In this war a centralized state is forged.

In Russia, as well as in Western European countries (England, France, etc.), such a war occurred in the 15th century. The strengthened grand-ducal power, based on the service boyars, the emerging nobility, supported by the townspeople, managed to suppress the resistance of the appanage princely and boyar opposition coming from the feudal centers that defended their independence.

The course of the feudal war was influenced by the class struggle. The fighting parties each tried to use class contradictions to their advantage. And the aggravation of the latter was a significant factor that forced the feudal lords to stop internal strife and rally their forces in the face of the class danger that worried them all equally. Thus, the rise of the anti-feudal movement was an essential link in the chain of those reasons that determined the path of political development of feudal society in the direction of state centralization.

In the first quarter of the 15th century. The grand princely government, which did not yet have sufficient means to organize a centralized system of government throughout the territory annexed to Moscow, retained in a number of cases the system of appanages and even increased their number, while at the same time restricting the political rights of appanage princes. This was a step towards further state unification. By the second quarter of the 15th century. On the territory of the Moscow principality, several fiefs were formed, in which representatives of individual princely lines ruled. Earlier than others, the appanage Serpukhov principality was formed, which belonged to the descendants cousin Dmitry Donskoy - Vladimir Andreevich. After the death of the latter in 1410, the territory of the Serpukhov principality was divided between his widow and five sons. Almost all of the Serpukhov princes died during the plague epidemic in 1426–1427. The only representative of the Serpukhov princely line was the grandson of Vladimir Andreevich - Vasily Yaroslavich. He owned only part of the territory that belonged to his grandfather - Serpukhov and Borovsky, as well as some other volosts. After the death of the latter, the inheritance of Dmitry Donskoy's son Andrei was divided between his two sons: Ivan (to whom Mozhaisk and the volosts passed) and Mikhail (who became the owner of Vereya and the volosts). This is how two small ones were formed appanage principalities: Mozhaiskoe and Vereyskoe. The son of Dmitry Donskoy, Peter, received the Dmitrov and Uglich principalities as an inheritance from his father.

In favorable conditions for allocation into a special appanage possession was the Galician land (with its center in Galich Mersky), which was inherited by the spiritual charter of Dmitry Donskoy (together with Zvenigorod) to his second son Yuri (who in turn had three sons - Vasily Kosoy, Dmitry Shemyak and Dmitry Red). Principality of Galicia It was mainly located along the left tributaries of the Volga - Unzhe and Kostroma and in the Upper and Middle Vetluga basin. The lands around Galich were fertile and had a fairly dense population. Forests abounding in furs stretched along Unzha and Vetluga. Rich salt springs played a major role in the economic life of the region. The economic isolation of the Galician land contributed to its separation into a separate principality. Possessing significant material resources and maintaining a certain isolation (economic and political), the Principality of Galicia showed in the second quarter of the 15th century. pronounced separatism.

The grand ducal government, pursuing the policy of unifying Rus', sought to constrain state rights appanage princes. A similar tendency of the grand ducal power met with opposition from the princes of the specific centers. In the second quarter of the 15th century. An attempt to oppose the political order emerging in the Moscow principality, which contributed to the centralization of state power, was made by the Galician princes - Yuri Dmitrievich and his sons.

In 1425 c. Moscow Prince Vasily Dmitrievich died. His ten-year-old son Vasily II Vasilyevich became the Grand Duke; in fact, supreme power passed to the boyar government, in which Metropolitan Photius played a major role. Yuri Dmitrievich did not recognize his nephew as the Grand Duke and acted as a contender for the Grand Duke's throne. Thus began a long, exhausting feudal war for Rus'.

The beginning of the feudal war coincided with other severe disasters for Rus'. The chronicles speak of a terrible epidemic (“The plague was great”) that raged in 1425 and in the following years in Veliky Novgorod, Torzhok, Tver, Volokolamsk, Dmitrov, Moscow “and in all Russian cities and villages.” At this time, many working people, urban and rural, died. And now another misfortune befell the Russian people - the princely strife, disastrous in its consequences.

As soon as Vasily I died, Metropolitan Photius that same night sent his boyar Akinf Aslebyatev to Zvenigorod for Yuri Dmitrievich, who, obviously, was supposed to take the oath to his nephew in Moscow. But Yuri refused to come to Moscow, but went to Galich, where he began to prepare for war with Vasily II. To buy time for military training, Yuri concluded a truce with Vasily II, after which he began to gather armed forces. According to the chronicle, the Galician prince “sent the same spring throughout his fatherland to all his people, and as if everyone from all his cities had descended upon him, and wanted to attack the Grand Duke...” It is difficult to say who the army assembled by Yuri consisted of. But judging by the expression of the chronicle - “all from all his cities,” one can think that Yuri managed to attract the inhabitants of the cities of his inheritance.

Having learned about Yuri Dmitrievich’s military preparations, the Moscow government tried to seize the initiative from him. The Moscow army marched towards Kostroma. Then Yuri retired to Nizhny Novgorod, where he fortified himself “with all his people.” It is possible that he counted on the support of those Nizhny Novgorod feudal lords who sought to restore the independence of the Nizhny Novgorod principality. Following him, the armed Moscow forces moved under the leadership, according to some sources, of the appanage prince Konstantin Dmitrievich, according to others - Andrei Dmitrievich. But there was no clash between the Moscow and Galician armies; why, the chronicles speak differently about this. Those chronicles that attribute the leadership of the Moscow armed forces to Prince Konstantin Dmitrievich indicate that Yuri, “fearing” him, fled with his army across the Sura River, and Konstantin was unable to cross the river and, after standing on its bank for several days, turned to Moscow. In those vaults in which Prince Andrei Dmitrievich is named as the leader of the army that pursued Yuri Dmitrievich, it is said in an unclear form that he “did not reach Prince Yury’s brother, but returned.” And in the Ustyug chronicle there is an indication that Andrei, officially speaking on the side of the Moscow Grand Duke Vasily II, secretly acted in the interests of Yuri Dmitrievich (“and Prince Ondrei, trying to his brother Grand Duke Yury, did not get there, return”). It is quite possible to admit the existence of a secret conspiracy between the brothers of the late Vasily I against their nephew.

One way or another, Yuri this time avoided the battle with the Moscow army and returned through Nizhny Novgorod to Galich. From there he sent to Moscow a proposal to conclude a truce between him and Vasily II for a year. This issue was discussed in Moscow at a special meeting under the nominal chairmanship of the Grand Duke, with the participation of his mother Sophia Vitovtovna, Metropolitan Photius, appanage princes Andrei, Peter and Konstantin Dmitrievich and a number of “princes and boyars of the land...” At the council it was decided to seek Yuri’s consent to concluding not a truce, but a lasting peace, and for this purpose sending Metropolitan Photius to Galich. This decision was agreed upon with the Grand Duke of Lithuania Vytautas, with whom the Moscow government sought to maintain allied relations.

There are interesting data in the chronicles about Photius’s diplomatic trip to Galich. Wanting to demonstrate his power to the Metropolitan, Yuri Dmitrievich came out to meet him with representatives of the Galician feudal aristocracy (“with his children, and with his boyars, and with his best people”). In addition, Yuri collected a large number of the trade and craft population of the cities of the Galician principality and local peasants and ordered them all to stand on the mountain, where the metropolitan was supposed to enter the city. “... And you collected all the mob from your cities and volosts and from villages and hamlets, and there were many of them, and placed them on the mountain from the hail from the arrival of the metropolitan, showing him many of his people.” Obviously, Yuri wanted to clearly show Photius how strong his support was among the broad masses of the local population. But the metropolitan, according to the chronicle, was not impressed by this demonstration, or he pretended that he was not at all surprised by the number of people who met him. He, judging by the chronicle, even reacted with irony to Yuri’s attempt to amaze him with the number of troops that he could field. “Even though the prince appeared, since he had many people, the saint blamed himself for this mockery.” Since many of those who met Photius were dressed in homespun clothes, the Metropolitan fixed his attention on this circumstance and mockingly remarked to the Galician prince: “Son, I haven’t seen so many people in sheep’s wool.”

What conclusions can be drawn from the above story? It is clear that, speaking against the Moscow Grand Duke, the Galician prince counted on the support of not only his boyars, but also wide circles of townspeople, and finally, rural population. And, probably, such calculations had some real basis. The economic isolation of the Galician principality determined a certain conservatism of the residents of local cities and contributed to the preservation of elements of patriarchy in the relations between them and the Galician princes. The Galician townspeople were to a certain extent interested in preventing Moscow feudal lords and merchants from entering the Galician principality, who became their competitors by establishing trades and trades here. The seizure of land in the Galician appanage by Moscow boyars was accompanied by a deepening of serf relations here. Therefore, local peasants, dissatisfied with the strengthening of feudal oppression, probably supported the Galician princes for a certain time. Although they fought with the Moscow grand-ducal power for their own political interests, in the eyes of the peasants, this struggle was perceived as a struggle to improve their situation, for the return of the order that existed before the strengthening of the Moscow principality, accompanied by the growth of serfdom. It is difficult to admit that the Galician princes waged war with the Grand Duke of Moscow for almost thirty years, acting in alliance only with certain groups of feudal lords, without having a wider social base, which they could rely on.

How should we evaluate the attitude of Metropolitan Photius towards the “rabble” ostentatiously built in front of him by Prince Yuri? In the words of the metropolitan, cited in the chronicles, one can feel the contempt of the spiritual feudal lord for working people, for people simply dressed and smelling of sheep's wool. But Photius’s “gloom” covered up his fear, although he diplomatically tried not to reveal his state of fear in front of Prince Yuri.

During diplomatic negotiations between the Moscow Metropolitan and the Galician prince, both sides did not immediately reach a mutual agreement. Photius insisted that Yuri formalize a peace treaty with Vasily II. Yuri agreed only to conclude a truce. The disputes became so acute that the Metropolitan even left Galich, “without blessing” Yuri “and his city,” but then, at the request of the Galician prince, he returned. In the end, Yuri promised to send his boyars to Moscow for peace negotiations and solemnly released the Metropolitan.

To formalize the agreement between Yuri and Vasily 11, the first boyars, Boris Galichsky and Daniil Cheshko, came to Moscow. Peace was concluded on the condition that the rivals would hand over the decision on who should be the Grand Duke (Yuri or Vasily) to the Horde Khan: “whom the Tsar will grant and will be the Great Prince of Vladimir and Novgorod the Great and all Rus'...” Yuri clearly wanted to return to those orders under which any prince could count on receiving from the khan a label for a great reign. If the Moscow government agreed to resolve the issue of the future Grand Duke in this way, then, obviously, it did so because it counted on a diplomatic victory over Yuri at the khan’s court. Such a victory could be achieved both with the help of money and through political influence on certain groups of Horde feudal lords.

About further inter-princely relations until the beginning of the 30s of the 15th century. There is almost no data in the chronicles. They are partly supplemented by the material of princely treaty documents. Thus, we have reached the agreement between Vasily II and Yuri Dmitrievich, concluded by the princes in 1428. From it we learn that even after the princely end in 1425, strife continued between Vasily II and Yuri Dmitrievich. The treaty of 1428 eliminates the consequences of “dislike”, “wars” between the named princes, “robberies” in the territories of the great reign and the Galician appanage, which obviously took place in the three-year period from 1425 to 1428. Conditions were worked out for the release of the “Nyatz” by the princes ( Polonyanikov). The final document states that until 1428, the grand ducal governors, volostels, villages, tiuns “were in charge of ... the fatherland” of Yuri Dmitrievich and the boyar villages in his “fatherland” (i.e., they actually ruled the Galician principality on behalf of Vasily II). By 1428, many controversial cases had accumulated (primarily land litigation), and this year the princes decided to transfer them for analysis to the court of the boyars, appointed by both Vasily II and Yuri Dmitrievich.

According to the treaty of 1428, Prince Yuri officially renounced all claims to grand-ducal rights, recognizing them for his nephew. However, a somewhat ambiguous formula was included in the final charter: “And we may live in our homeland in Moscow and in the Woodles according to the spiritual charter of... Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich...” This article left Yuri the opportunity to resume the question of the great reign by referring to the testamentary disposition of Prince Dmitry Donskoy , according to which the eldest son of Donskoy, Vasily I, was appointed Grand Duke, and in the event of the death of the latter, his brother next in seniority.

The final letter of 1428, drawn up after the death of the childless Prince Peter Dmitrievich, passed over in silence the question of the fate of his escheated Dmitrovsky inheritance. But both Vasily II and Yuri Dmitrievich claimed the latter. Thus, the treaty of 1428 did not stop the hostility between Yuri of Galicia and the Moscow Grand Duke. Yuri continued to count on occupying the grand-ducal table and expanding his possessions.

The new open action of the Galician prince against Vasily II took place in a slightly changed international situation. From the second half of the 20s of the 15th century. The offensive of the Lithuanian feudal lords on the northwestern Russian lands intensified. In 1428, Vitovt, at the head of the Lithuanian army and hired Tatars, made a campaign against the Pskov suburbs - Opochka, Voronach, Kotelno. This campaign is etched in the memory of Pskov residents. It is no coincidence that a special story about him was included in the Pskov chronicles. The residents of Opochka heroically resisted the enemy. The Lithuanians and Tatars “started diligently to flattery the city,” and the opochans “beat them with stones, with wells, cutting them off from the fences, and beat a lot of them.” After standing near Opochka for two days and not being able to take the city, Vitovt’s soldiers retreated. Around Voronach, the Lithuanians established defects, from which stones rained down on the city (“and having eliminated the defects, great stones were thrown at the city”). Clashes between Lithuanian and Pskov troops also occurred near Kotelno, near Velia, and near Vrevo. The Pskovites turned to the Moscow Grand Duke with a request to act as a mediator between them and Vytautas, but Vasily II, being busy at that time with disputes with Yuri Dmitrievich on the issue of his rights to the great reign and needing the support of Vytautas, did not provide protection to the Pskovians, although he promised to do this: “and then he had a great fight with Prince Yuryem, he was focused on his great reign, but otherwise he did not bother about it all, he was distracted.” The Novgorodians did not help Pskov either. Vitovt demanded that the Pskov government pay him 1,000 rubles and only on this condition did he make peace with Pskov.

In 1427, Vitovt concluded an agreement with the Grand Duke of Tver Boris Alexandrovich, taking from the latter an obligation to subordinate the foreign policy of the Tver Principality to the interests of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. “We [Boris Alexandrovich] should be with him [Vytautas] together, at his side, and subsidize him for everyone, without washing anyone out,” we read in the above-mentioned Lithuanian-Tver agreement of 1427.

In 1428, Vytautas organized an attack on Novgorod land, obliging Vasily II not to provide military assistance neither Novgorod nor Pskov. The Pskovites also did not respond to the Novgorodians’ call for help. Lithuanian troops approached Porkhov, surrounded it and lifted the siege from the city only after the residents of Porkhov promised to pay Vitovt 5,000 rubles. The Novgorod ambassadors, led by Archbishop Euthymius, who came to Porkhov to make peace with Vitovt, for their part agreed to pay the Lithuanian government another 5,000 rubles. According to the Tver collection, Tver military forces took part in the siege of Porkhov along with the Lithuanian army.

Around 1430, the Grand Duke of Ryazan Ivan Fedorovich “gave himself into the service” of Vytautas, taking upon himself the obligation to be “at one with him against everyone” and “without the great prince... Vitovt’s will not to finish with anyone, nor to confuse anyone.” In the event of a war between Vytautas and Vasily II or his “uncles” and “brothers,” the Ryazan prince had to “assist the Grand Duke Vytautas, his master, against them without cunning.” On the same conditions, the Pronsky prince Ivan Vladimirovich “finished off ... with his forehead” and “gave himself ... into the service” of Vytautas around 1430.

The above material gives us the right to draw interesting conclusions. Firstly, it is clear that political relations between the rulers of individual Russian lands were becoming strained. Taking into account the strengthening of the Principality of Lithuania, the princes of Tver and Ryazan hope, with the help of the latter, to weaken the Principality of Moscow and restore to some extent their, by now lost, political position in Rus'. Another thing is no less clear: more and more clearly negative sides the feudal fragmentation that reigned in Rus', in which there were, in particular, no conditions for the real organization of the defense of Russian lands from enemies. It is enough to carefully analyze the events of 1426–1428 to be convinced of this. When Vitovt's troops destroyed the Pskov suburbs, the Pskov residents could not obtain military support from Novgorod. And when the Lithuanian army entered the Novgorod borders, the Tver armed forces acted together with it against the Novgorodians, and the Pskovites adhered to a policy of neutrality. Finally, it is necessary to note one more circumstance: Vitovt’s policy was clearly inclined to make the rulers of individual Russian lands, among them the Grand Duke of Moscow, directly dependent on himself. This meant diminishing the leading political role of the Moscow Principality in Rus'.

At the end of the reign of Vytautas, the position of the Principality of Lithuania was greatly strengthened. On the initiative of Emperor Sigismund, who was interested in breaking the Polish-Lithuanian union, in 1429 the question was raised about Vytautas’s acceptance royal title, which was supposed to mean the transformation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into an independent kingdom. The act of coronation of Vytautas was already being prepared, to participate in which the princes of Moscow, Ryazan, Metropolitan Photius, the great and Livonian masters, ambassadors of the Byzantine emperor, and Tatar khans came to Lithuania (first to Troki, then to Vilno). But in 1430 Vytautas died. In Lithuania, a feudal war began between two contenders for the Lithuanian grand-ducal throne: Svidrigailo Olgerdovich (supported by the feudal lords of the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian lands of the Principality of Lithuania) and Sigismund Keistutovich (a candidate nominated by the Polish gentry and accepted by a significant part of the Lithuanian feudal lords). In 1432, the Principality of Lithuania was divided into two parts: “... Lithuania... planted the Grand Duke Zhigimont Kiestoutevich for the great reign in Vilni and Trotsekh... and the princes of Rousko and the boyars, planted Prince Shvitrigail for the great reign in Rouskoe...” Both princes sought to extend their power throughout Lithuania.

It was no coincidence that the beginning of the feudal war in Lithuania coincided with the intensification of hostile actions of Prince Yuri Dmitrievich of Galicia against the Moscow Grand Duke Vasily II. Until 1430, peaceful relations were maintained between the named princes. So, when in 1429 the Tatars attacked Galich and Kostroma, Vasily II sent his regiments against them under the leadership of the appanage princes Andrei and Konstantin Dmitrievich and the boyar Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozhsky. Under 1430, a number of chronicles contain news that Yuri Dmitrievich broke peace with Vasily II (“that same summer, Prince Yuri Dmitrievich broke peace with Grand Duke Vasily Vasilyevich”). Probably, the impetus for Yuri’s speech was given by the death of Vytautas and the transfer of power in Lithuania to the “brother-in-law” (brother-in-law) of the Galician prince - Svidrigailo. In 1431, Metropolitan Photius died. And in the same year, Vasily II and Yuri Dmitrievich went to the Horde to sort out the question of which of them should be the Grand Duke. The coincidence of all these events is quite understandable. The almost simultaneous death of Vytautas, who was presented with the spiritual will of Vasily I (who appointed his son Vasily II as Grand Duke), and Photius (this will of the signatory) gave Yuri grounds to raise the question of revising the said spiritual order. When deciding on the order of succession to the throne, Yuri sought to return to the will of Dmitry Donskoy about the transfer of the Grand Duke's table to Vasily I, and after the death of the latter to his brother (in order of seniority).

But which prince took the initiative to travel to the Horde? It is not so easy to establish this from the chronicles. In the Novgorod first chronicle and in the chronicle of Avraamka it is said in very general form, that “the princes of Rustei went to Yuri Dmitrievich, Vasily Vasilyevich.” In somewhat more detail, but in approximately the same terms, the First Sofia Chronicle, the Typographical Chronicle and the Ustyug Chronicle tell about the visit to the Horde by Vasily II and Yuri: “That same summer in autumn, Grand Duke Vasily Vasilyevich and Prince Yuri Dmitrievich, hiding about the great reign, went to the Horde to Makhmet" (Horde Khan). From these chronicle texts it seems possible to conclude that both princes left for the Horde at the same time. But other chronicles emphasize that Vasily II was the first to go there. So, in the Tver collection we read: “Great Prince Vasily of Moscow went to the Horde and left the Horde the next summer, and Prince Yury.” The Chronicles of Sofia II, Lvov, Ermolin also indicate that Vasily II was ahead of Yuri of Galicia: “that same summer, the great prince went to the Horde and Prince Yuri after him, declaring a great reign.” A similar version (in a more expanded form) is available in the Moscow Code, in the Voskresenskaya, Simeonovskaya, Nikonovskaya chronicles. Attention should also be paid to the fact that back side The treaty letter of Vasily II and Yuri Dmitrievich in 1428 contains the note: “And this letter was sent to the great prince in a folded form by Prince Yuri, to the Horde of Ida.” Comparing all the above evidence from sources, we can, I think, come to the conclusion that the initiative to transfer the case of succession to the throne belonged to the Galician prince, who, as a sign of the rupture of peaceful relations with the Grand Duke of Moscow, returned to him his copy of the treaty of 1428. But Vasily II tried to warn Yuri earlier him to visit the Horde to achieve a resolution of the case in his favor. If Vasily II had not managed to do this, then Yuri would have had the opportunity to bring a Tatar detachment from the Horde to Rus', which would have caused unnecessary military complications.

Chronicles describe differently what happened in the Horde. Many of them briefly say that in 1432 the Horde Khan transferred the great reign to Vasily II, and gave Dmitrov to Yuri Dmitrievich. Some chronicles (for example, the Second Sofia, Lvov) indicate that Vasily II was “planted” in the great reign by the Horde ambassador Mansyr-Ulan who came to Rus'. According to the Pskov First and Novgorod First Chronicles, the question of who should be the Grand Duke remained unresolved in the Horde. In the Pskov First Chronicle it is written: “... the great prince Vasilei Vasilyevich came from the Horde from the tsar, and with him came his great prince Georgiy Dmitreevich, and all their boyars were kind and healthy with them, and not a single reign was taken" In short, the first Novgorod chronicle and the chronicle of Abraham say the same thing: “the princes of Rusti left the Horde without a great reign».

The Simeonovskaya, Voskresenskaya, Nikonovskaya chronicles contain a detailed account of the proceedings in the Horde of the case of Vasily II and Yuri Dmitrievich. In my other work I have already subjected this story to an analysis that I will not repeat now. I will only dwell on those points that I did not touch upon in that work. Each of the Russian princes tried to rely on one or another group of Horde feudal lords. Vasily II immediately came into contact with the Moscow “dear” Min-Bulat. Prince Yuri was patronized by the “Great Prince of Orda” Tyaginya (of the Shirinov family), who took him with him “to winter in the Crimea.” The interests of Vasily II were defended in the Horde by his boyar Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozhsky. In the absence of Tyagini, he tried to persuade the “Tatar princes” that if Yuri received a great reign in Rus', then with the help of his “brother” - the Lithuanian prince Svidrigail, he would help the rise of Tyagini in the Horde and the removal of other Horde princes from power. Vsevolozhsky’s agitation was a success: the Horde princes turned the khan against Tyagini. Therefore, at the time when the latter came to the Horde from Crimea and when the Khan’s trial took place in the case of the Russian princes, Vasily II had more supporters from among the Horde feudal lords than Yuri. At the trial, Vasily II motivated his rights to the great reign by the fact that it belonged to his grandfather and father and should pass in a direct line to him; Yuri Dmitrievich referred to the spiritual will of Dmitry Donskoy and to the chronicles, apparently selecting historical examples about the transition of the grand-ducal table to the eldest in the family (“the great prince of his fatherland and his grandfather, looking for his table, Prince Yury’s chroniclers, and old lists , and the spiritual father of his Grand Duke Dmitry"). Boyarin I. D. Vsevolozhsky, rejecting the arguments of Prince Yuri at the trial, diplomatically contrasted his father’s “dead letter”, as a documentary basis for occupying the right of the Grand Duke’s table, with another legal basis- Khan's "salary". This was a clever political move, designed to turn the court's decision in the interests of Vasily II. And this move turned out to be correct. The Khan passed a verdict on the transfer of the great reign to Vasily II. But then strife began in the Horde. Khan Ulug-Mukhammed was opposed by another contender for the Golden Horde table, Kichik-Mukhammed, who was supported by Tyaginya. In such a situation, the khan did not want to quarrel with Tyaginya and released the Russian princes “to their homelands,” handing over Dmitrov to Yuri, and leaving the question of the great reign unresolved.

Thus, the version of the First Pskov and First Novgorod Chronicles that at the time of their return to Rus' from the Horde, neither Vasily II nor Yuri were officially considered great princes, turns out to be correct. Only more than three months after the arrival of the indicated princes from the Horde in the Russian land and, obviously, after the end of the unrest there, the Khan’s ambassador Mansyr-Ulan appeared in Rus', confirming Vasily II on the grand-ducal table.

Meanwhile, feudal war resumed in Rus'. The troops of Vasily II occupied Dmitrov. The Galician governors were partially captured there and partially expelled from there by the Moscow army. Preparing to continue the war with the Galician prince, Vasily II at the beginning of 1433 tried to bind the appanage princes - Vasily Yaroslavich Borovsky, Ivan Andreevich Mozhaisky, Mikhail Andreevich Vereisky - with a chain of treaties (not fully extant to us). On behalf of Vasily II and the named appanage princes, a settlement was formalized with the Ryazan prince Ivan Fedorovich, who in 1430 surrendered under the patronage of Vytautas of Lithuania, and now went over to the side of the Grand Duke of Moscow.

Preparations for the continuation of the war were carried out not only by Vasily II, but also by his opponent Yuri, who established relations with some of the Moscow boyars. He was joined by the prominent Moscow boyar I. D. Vsevolozhsky, who so actively supported Vasily II in the Horde in 1432. Vsevolozhsky in 1433 fled from Moscow through Uglich (where Konstantin Dmitrievich reigned) and through Tver to Galich to Yuri Dmitrievich “and began to persuade him to a great reign.” Having betrayed Vasily II, I. D. Vsevolozhsky clearly began to test the waters in a number of feudal centers of Rus' in order to try to put together an opposition bloc against the Moscow Grand Duke. What explains such a sharp change in political course by a prominent Moscow boyar? To answer this question, it is necessary to say a few words about the general mood of the Moscow boyars of the time being studied, and then characterize I. D. Vsevolozhsky as one of the major representatives of the boyar environment.

In the paragraph devoted to the invasion of Rus' by Edigei, I raised the question of the split among the boyars, which was reflected in the chronicles about the named event. Speaking about such a split, the chronicles depict two political programs, put forward one by the “old”, the other by the “young” boyars. The first adhered to more conservative views, imagining political centralization in the form of unification on the basis of a certain equality of individual Russian principalities within the great reign of Vladimir. As for the “young” boyars, their program consisted of subjugating other Russian lands to the Moscow principality. In the field of foreign policy, the “old” boyars adhered to a moderate course, which was supposed to ensure the security of Russian lands from attacks by Horde and Lithuanian feudal lords; The “young” boyars spoke out in favor of offensive actions against the hostile neighbors of Rus'.

The ideology and political line of I. D. Vsevolozhsky were determined by the views of the “old” boyars. He occupied a prominent position at the Moscow grand-ducal court, was present at the drawing up of the spiritual letters of Vasily I, and played a major political role during the early childhood of Vasily II. A number of letters of grant issued on behalf of Vasily I and Vasily II (in the first years of the latter’s reign) were signed by I. D. Vsevolozhsky. The nature of I. D. Vsevolozhsky’s internal policy can be judged by one act associated with his name. I mean the Code of Law of Grand Duchess Sophia Vitovtovna, which came to us as part of the so-called Lip Record of the second half of the 15th century. This code of law was published in the first years of the reign of Vasily II, when his mother Sofya Vitovtovna was regent, and her right hand was I.D. Vsevolozhsky. Traces of the named Code of Law were preserved in the “Lip Record” in the form of the following text: “In the old days, it happened that all the courts and palace grand duchesses and appanage princes were all narrowed by the governor of the greater, there was no judge for him; but the princess did it great Sophia under John under Dmitrievich (Vsevolozhsk. - L. Ch.), who is the judge behind them.” From the above quote it is clear that Sofya Vitovtovna and I. D. Vsevolozhsky carried out a reform of judicial proceedings: if earlier (obviously, from the time of Dmitry Donskoy) the judge in Moscow was a “big” grand ducal governor, now the judicial rights of appanage princes were expanded, who were able to send to the court of the “great” governor of his representatives. Such a reform was consistent with the tasks of ensuring the path of political centralization that the “old” boyars adhered to.

The moderate nature of the foreign policy program of I. D. Vsevolozhsky can be judged by his active behavior in 1432 in the Horde, where he acted in the spirit of Ivan Kalita, trying to appease the Tatar feudal lords and thereby ensure their recognition of the rights of Vasily II to the great reign.

One must think that with the establishment of Vasily II on the Grand Ducal throne, the Moscow government (in which the role of the “young” boyars increased) began to take more decisive measures to restrict the privileges of the appanage princes and the boyar aristocracy. This led I. D. Vsevolozhsky to betrayal of the Moscow Grand Duke. And one more circumstance should be mentioned. In the second chapter of the monograph, I pointed out that from about 1433 the terms “children of the boyars” and “nobles” began to be systematically used in the official materials and chronicles. This means that that layer of the ruling class (small and middle grand ducal servants, holders of land under the condition of fulfilling military duties), which was the support of the centralization policy pursued by the grand dukes, became stronger. All of the above gives us the right to assert that the feudal war in question was indeed a decisive stage in the process of formation of the Russian centralized state, because during its course significant differences emerged among the ruling class, which could not be resolved without a sharp struggle.

The conclusions drawn must still be verified by analyzing one interesting story placed in a number of chronicles, which raise the question of the reasons for the aggravation of relations between Vasily II and Yuri of Galicia in 1433. The wedding of Vasily II and the sister of the Serpukhov-Borovsk prince Maria Yaroslavna is described. The grand ducal wedding was attended by the sons of Prince Yuri Dmitrievich of Galicia - Vasily and Dmitry Shemyaka. Vasily was wearing a “gold belt on a cap with stone.” This circumstance, according to the chronicler, was the reason for further princely strife (“we are writing for this reason, since much evil has begun from this”). One of the grand-ducal boyars (in different chronicles the name of either Peter Konstantinovich Dobrynsky or Zakhary Ivanovich Koshkin is indicated) identified this belt as an item that supposedly belonged to the grand-ducal regalia. Dmitry Donskoy allegedly received the said belt as a dowry from Prince Dmitry Konstantinovich of Suzdal, whose daughter he married. At the wedding of Dmitry Donskoy, Vasily Velyaminov managed to steal this belt from the Grand Duke, replacing it with another. From the thousand Vasily Velyaminov, the stolen belt went to his son Mikula, then to I. D. Vsevolozhsky, and finally to Prince Vasily Yuryevich, who appeared in it at the wedding of Vasily II. Here at the wedding it was established that the belt was stolen from the grand ducal treasury, as a result of which Sofya Vitovtovna publicly removed it from Vasily Yuryevich. After this, the latter, together with his brother Dmitry Shemyaka, “got angry,” ran to their father in Galich. Yuri “gathered with all his people to go against the Grand Duke.”

At first glance, the above story gives the impression of simple court gossip. However, there is a certain political meaning hidden in it. The main tendency of the chronicle story comes down to the ideological justification of the rights of the grand ducal power in its struggle with the appanage princely and boyar opposition. Chroniclers, speaking from the position of the Moscow grand-ducal power, proved the illegality of appropriation by appanage princes of regalia that did not belong to them. The golden belt appears in this story in the same role as the princely barmas, the “Monomakh cap” and other signs of princely dignity, which feudal political literature focused heavily on.

The chronicle text under consideration is interesting in one more respect. It makes it possible to reveal the connections of I. D. Vsevolozhsky and to a certain extent sheds light on his political views. The closeness of Vsevolozhsky to the Velyaminovs, from whose midst the Moscow thousanders came, is indicative. Speaking about the struggle for the post of thousand in Moscow during the reign of Semyon Ivanovich, I pointed out that V.V. Velyaminov was distinguished by a conservative political mood, that he was against the intensification of the foreign policy of the Moscow principality, and defended the line of its subordination to the Horde. The son of V.V. Velyaminov, I.V. Velyaminov, acted in alliance with Prince Mikhail Alexandrovich of Tver against Dmitry Donskoy. All this helps to understand the mood and actions of that boyar environment to which I. D. Vsevolozhsky belonged.

Yuri in short term organized a campaign to Moscow, and acted in such a way that his preparations remained unknown to Vasily II. When the Galician troops were already in Pereyaslavl, the Grand Duke received news of their attack on Moscow from the Rostov governor Peter Konstantinovich Dobrynsky. Having failed to properly prepare for the meeting of the enemy, Vasily II sent ambassadors Fyodor Andreevich Lzha and Fyodor Tovarkov to him for peace negotiations. Moscow ambassadors met with Yuri Dmitrievich when he was in the Trinity-Sergius Monastery. According to Simeonovskaya and some other chronicles, Yuri “did not care for the world,” and I. D. Vsevolozhsky, who was with him, “did not give a word about the world.” Between the boyars of Yuri and Vasily II, “great fighting and inappropriate words” began. Peace negotiations turned out to be fruitless, “and so they returned and ate the Grand Duke of idleness.”

Vasily II had to quickly gather the “people” “who were then around him” (i.e., obviously, the servants of his Moscow “court”). He also attracted Moscow townspeople (“guests and others…”) into his army. With these insignificant forces, Vasily II opposed Yuri. The battle between the troops of two opponents took place on the Klyazma River, 20 versts from Moscow. The army of Vasily II was defeated, and he fled “in trepidation and great haste” to Moscow, and from there he went with his wife and mother, first to Tver, and then to Kostroma. Yuri occupied Moscow and declared himself Grand Duke.

Chronicles explain the defeat of Vasily II in different ways. The most primitive explanation comes down to the fact that Yuri had God’s help (“God help Prince Yuri”). It is also said that Vasily II did not have time to organize resistance to the enemy (“did not have time to copulate”). Finally, the chronicles place responsibility for the capture of Moscow by the Galician army on the Moscow city militia (“there was no help from the Muscovites”), reproaching its participants for drunkenness (“drink a lot from them and take honey with you, what else to drink”).

Such a deliberate desire of the chroniclers to find justification for an unprecedented fact - the expulsion of the Grand Duke from Moscow by one of his relatives - involuntarily makes us wary. Obviously, contemporaries had something to think about. And no matter what justifications the chroniclers give for what happened, one cannot deny the obvious sluggishness shown by Vasily II. In the very first military clash in which he had to participate, he showed himself to be a poor organizer and warrior. On the other hand, there is no doubt that Yuri had good organizational skills and military experience. In addition, he had significant military forces at his disposal, and the latter circumstance indicates that he enjoyed support in various social strata (I spoke about this above). Finally, it should be noted that the Moscow boyars who went over to Yuri’s side (like I.D. Vsevolozhsky) also accumulated during the years in which they were in charge political life Moscow Principality, extensive organizational experience and enjoyed authority among various groups landowners and townspeople. The small princely servants, although they belonged to that ascending rank of the ruling class, for which the future lay, did not have the same economic weight as the “old” boyars, lagged behind them in many respects militarily, and on the way to victory over them they passed through a series of defeats. The attempt of the chroniclers to shift all the blame for the surrender of Moscow to the Galician troops onto the Moscow townspeople is clearly untenable.

By agreement with Vasily II, Yuri gave him Kolomna as his inheritance. Some chronicles indicate that this was done by the Galician prince on the advice of his beloved boyar Semyon Fedorovich Morozov: “the world was brought together by Semyon Ivanovich (need: Fedorovich. - L. Ch.) Morozov, lover of Prince Yuryev,” we read in the Ermolin Chronicle. The Nikon Chronicle speaks in more detail about the role of S. F. Morozov as an intermediary between Vasily II and Yuri: “Semyon Morozov has many mighty powers from his master, Prince Yury Dmitrievich, and brought peace and love to Grand Duke Vasily Vasilyevich and the inheritance of Kolomna.”

According to the official material, S. F. Morozov acts as a landowner and owner of salt pans in the Galician district. His political connection with Yuri Dmitrievich is quite understandable. At the same time, he apparently belonged to that part of the boyars that was distrustful of Yuri’s actions, foreseeing their ultimately unfavorable outcome. Therefore, while maintaining closeness to the Galician prince, S.F. Morozov tries, just in case, to ensure a favorable attitude towards himself from Yuri’s political opponent, Grand Duke Vasily II, and seeks to grant the latter the Kolomna inheritance. Judging by the Nikon Chronicle, this behavior of S. F. Morozov irritated I. D. Vsevolozhsky and his supporters. “Ivan Dmitrievich is indignant about this and does not like this very much, that he gives him a sheet, and also wants to give him an inheritance; and not only Ivan Dmitreevich, but also many other boyars and slaves were furious about this and they did not like this to happen to all of them.”

In Kolomna, Vasily II began to accumulate military forces in order to recapture Moscow with their help. The Simeonovskaya Chronicle and other chronicles say that “many people began to abandon Prince Yury for the Grand Duke and went to Kolomna without ceasing.” In a number of chronicles (for example, in Ermolinskaya), the somewhat vague term “people” is deciphered; it is specifically stated that “all the Muscovites, princes, boyars, governors, boyar children, and nobles, young and old, all went to Kolomna to the Grand Duke.” It is hardly possible to unconditionally and literally accept the given chronicle version that all representatives of the ruling class rushed to Kolomna. But the chronicles are unanimous that this influx was quite large. And the chronicles here can be believed, especially when they talk about the departure of the children of boyars and nobles from Moscow to Kolomna.

What is the reason for the mass transfer of boyars and servants from Yuri to the service of Vasily II? Least of all, probably, in the authority that the latter enjoyed as a ruler. It’s hard to even say how great his initiative was in recruiting Moscow service people to Kolomna. True, the Nikon Chronicle notes that Vasily II, having come to Kolomna, “began to invite people from everywhere.” But the point was, obviously, not so much in the organizational abilities and energy of Vasily II, but in the fact that, as the Ermolinskaya Chronicle indicates, the Moscow boyars, nobles, and boyar children “were not accustomed to serving as appanage princes...” Indeed, in the Moscow principality there had long been a a stable system of land relations between local boyars and servants, on the one hand, and the grand ducal power, on the other. The arrival of appanage princes with their “court” in Moscow, whose members were, in turn, interested in land acquisitions and promotions, was supposed to introduce disorganization into this system, entail a redistribution of land funds, and a search for the service people of Vasily II. Therefore, when the Moscow boyars and servants learned that their prince was not far from Moscow, in Kolomna, a stream of boyars, nobles, and boyar children moved towards him. It is no coincidence that I. D. Vsevolozhsky objected to the provision of the Kolomna inheritance to Vasily II. This was a risky move on Yuri's part. And he himself and his sons (Vasily and Dmitry Shemyaka) realized this when the Galician prince found himself isolated, and the ranks of his rival, who was in Kolomna, began to continuously increase. Yuri's sons blamed S.F. Morozov for all this and killed him as a “koromolnik” and a “liar.” But if S. F. Morozov played a role as one of the persons who contributed to the transition of a number of Moscow service people to the side of Vasily II, then the main reason for such a transition must (as indicated) be sought in general conditions the development of feudal land ownership and the formation of a new layer of the ruling class - the service nobility.