Creation of the legal foundations of the new Russian statehood. Formation of Russian statehood

After the collapse of the USSR, the liquidation of the previous structures of power and management began. Some former union institutions and departments were transferred to the disposal of Russian management structures. The Moscow Kremlin became the residence of the country's president.

April 21, 1992 was changed official name Russian state. The RSFSR was renamed the Russian Federation - Russia (with both names being equivalent).

With the collapse of the USSR, the nature of the relationship between the President, on the one hand, and the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies, on the other, did not change. The lack of a clear delineation of powers between them caused an acute confrontation between the two branches of government - legislative and executive. The relationship between them became especially aggravated during the development of the constitutional project of the Russian state. Anti-presidential sentiments have intensified among parliamentarians. Many members of the deputy corps advocated returning the country to the path of previous political development and for the restoration of the USSR.

The opposition sentiments of parliamentarians found support among a significant part of the population. Many Russians were dissatisfied with the continuation of the course towards the development of a market economy, the ongoing economic crisis and the lack of social guarantees. In December 1992, under pressure from the legislative branch, the government of E. T. Gaidar resigned. V.S. Chernomyrdin, who had previously held administrative leadership positions, became the new Prime Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers. But this did not relieve tension in society and in the relationship between President B.N. Yeltsin and parliament.

In April 1993, on the initiative of the Congress of People's Deputies, a referendum was held on confidence in the president, on early elections of the president and people's deputies. The results of the referendum, which meant a victory for the presidential forces, deepened the political crisis.

The confrontation between the branches of power intensified in the fall of 1993. By this time, the president and his advisers had prepared a draft of a new Constitution of the Russian Federation. However, parliamentarians, trying to limit the omnipotence of the president, delayed its adoption. On September 21, 1993, B. N. Yeltsin announced the dissolution of representative bodies of power - the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation and the Congress of People's Deputies. Elections for a new parliament were scheduled for December 12. Some deputies refused to recognize the legality of the president’s actions and announced his removal from power. Was sworn in new president- A.V. Rutskoy, who until that moment held the post of Vice President of the Russian Federation.

In response to the unconstitutional presidential act, opposition forces organized demonstrations in Moscow and made a failed attempt to storm the city hall and the Ostankino television center. The desire to change the course of social economic reforms united several tens of thousands of people. A state of emergency was declared in the capital, and troops were sent into the city. During the events, several of its participants died or were injured.

In October 1993, decrees were adopted on the reform of representative bodies of government and local self-government. In accordance with them, the activities of Soviets at all levels were terminated. Their responsibilities were transferred to the hands of local administration and elected councils.

Russian Constitution of 1993

On December 12, 1993, the Constitution of the Russian Federation was adopted by popular vote. Russia declared itself a democratic federal legal state with a republican form of government. The head of state was the president, elected by popular vote. The Russian Federation included 21 republics and 6 territories, 1 autonomous region and 10 autonomous districts, 2 federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg) and 49 regions. The principles for constructing the highest bodies of state power and administration were determined. The bicameral structure of the Federal Assembly, the permanent legislative body of the Russian Federation, was legislated. The independence of the bodies of the three branches of government - legislative, executive and judicial - was emphasized.

The Constitution delimited the powers between the authorities of the Russian Federation and its subjects.

The most important national issues were assigned to the competence of the highest authorities of Russia: the adoption of laws and control over their implementation, management of federal state property, the financial system, fundamentals pricing policy, federal budget. They were responsible for resolving issues of foreign policy and international relations, declaring wars and concluding peace, and managing foreign economic relations. Federal civil service was also subordinate to the federal government. Issues of environmental management, protection of historical and cultural monuments, education, and science were under the joint jurisdiction of the authorities of the Federation and its constituent entities.

Political multi-party system, the right to freedom of labor and the right to private property were legally enshrined. The Constitution created the conditions for achieving political stability in society.

Send your good work in the knowledge base is simple. Use the form below

Students, graduate students, young scientists who use the knowledge base in their studies and work will be very grateful to you.

Introduction

2. Economic indicators

2.2 Privatization of the 90s

2.3 1996 crisis

3.1 Development prospects for the coming years

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

By the fall of 1990, it was already obvious that after five and a half years of perestroika, the Soviet Union had entered a new stage in its history, both in terms of domestic politics and in the development of relations with the whole world. A genuine revolution of minds took place, making it impossible to return to the previous state. However, and this was a grave danger for the future of the experiment undertaken by Gorbachev and his team to modernize the country, none of the three key problems that arose after 1985 were resolved:

the problem of political pluralism, an organic component of any process of democratization;

the problem of creating a market economy. The main provisions of the program adopted by the Russian government, dubbed the “500-day Trust Mandate” and providing for the privatization of state property and freeing prices, were published in the press. This "Yeltsin Plan" was presented as an alternative program to Ryzhkov's more cautious plan. Be that as it may, this program turned out to be stillborn;

the problem of the federal contract. The initial draft of the new union treaty was presented in the press, which was supposed to be presented to the plenipotentiary delegations of the republics for discussion in the fall. Closely related to the transition to a market economy, the new federal agreement was supposed to expand the rights of the republics, first of all, replacing the existing central structures and vertical connections with direct horizontal relations between the republics without the mediation of the center. But here, too, events were destined to get ahead of legislators.

These issues dominated the political debate in the last year of the Soviet Union. It was they who served as the catalyst for the political crisis, which in December 1991 led to the collapse of the USSR and the resignation of Gorbachev.

From the point of view of political analysis, the year from the autumn of 1990 to the winter of 1991 is divided into three parts:

the period before Gorbachev, representing the union center, and the leaders of the nine republics signed a document known as the “9 + 1 Statement”, which declared the principles of the new union treaty. The agreement in principle was the most important condition for ending the increasingly escalating conflict between Yeltsin, the undisputed leader in the camp of those who supported the decisive continuation of reforms, and Gorbachev, who wanted to maintain a fragile balance between reformers and conservatives and preserve the interests of the center in the face of increasing demands from the republics seeking independence and sovereignty and even complete independence. Against the background of this confrontation, and fueled by it, a real “war of laws” unfolded between the parliaments of Russia and the Union, paralyzing all constructive activity, every day aggravating the economic crisis, the ineffectiveness of government bodies, especially in the localities, giving rise to an increasingly obvious “power vacuum”;

a period marked by a kind of “truce” seemed to be established in the relationship between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, who were mutually concerned about the decline in the authority of any state power. Gorbachev played a more subtle game, ceasing to systematically resort, as was evident during the January events in Vilnius, to using conservative forces to create a counterweight to Yeltsin. Meanwhile, the political and economic situation in the country deteriorated so much that in August an attempt by conservative forces to carry out a coup d'état became possible;

the period after the failure of the putsch, when the defeat inflicted on the conservative camp catastrophically accelerated the collapse of the Union, led to the abolition of previous government structures, including the KGB, the suspension of activities and the subsequent ban of the CPSU.

In December 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed a statement in Belovezhskaya Pushcha on the liquidation of the USSR and the creation of a special interstate alliance - the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Thus, in 1991 The history of Soviet statehood ended. However, this did not mark the end of Russian statehood. On the contrary, it has entered a completely new stage. In fact, the defeat of the putschists meant the failure of the conservative version of reforms, while at the same time clearing the way for a radical model of reforms.

1. Formation of a new Russian statehood

The independence of Russia was proclaimed by the Declaration on June 12, 1990. at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. But within the USSR, Russia's independence could only be nominal. Russian authorities authorities, the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and its Chairman, began to fight the allied authorities. The confrontation between two centers of power was personified in the struggle of two presidents - President of the USSR M. Gorbachev, elected on March 15, 1990 at the Union Congress of People's Deputies, and President of Russia B. Yeltsin, elected on June 12, 1991 by popular vote.

The confrontation between the Russian and allied authorities had a destabilizing effect on the socio-political and socio-economic life of the country. Russia made one of the main methods of crushing the Union center the worldwide support of national sovereignties and awakened national movements on the outskirts of the Union. The Union leadership, in an effort to preserve everything to its heart's content, was increasingly inclined to use force.

The culmination of the confrontation between the two authorities was the events of August 19 - 21, 1991, known as the August putsch of the State Emergency Committee. The Russian leadership, which led the fight against the putschists, who acted, in all likelihood, with the tacit approval of Gorbachev, crushed not only the State Emergency Committee, but also ensured the victory of Russia and its supreme bodies over the allied Center. Since the fall of 1991, the Constitution and laws of the RSFSR, the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, the President of the RSFSR received full supremacy on the territory of Russia. The independence of the Russian Federation has become real. Afanasyev Yu.K. “Rising Russia” // Obshchaya Gazeta 1998. No. 37 p. 6

The newly independent Russia faced very difficult and large-scale tasks. And the most noticeable and realized achievements of Russia in foreign policy. The state of the “Cold War” was effectively ended, and the threat of a global military conflict between the socialist East and the capitalist West was removed. The ideologization of foreign policy stopped, and with it the support of anti-American regimes in the “third world” and the inspiration of regional conflicts. But military-political concessions were often made unilaterally and were not accompanied by real integration of the Soviet Union into world communities. The USSR was gradually losing its position as a world power, and this foreshadowed serious foreign policy problems for the new Russia. Namely, foreign policy was divided into two directions: relations with independent states, formerly union republics - “near abroad”, and relations with states that were previously “external” to the USSR - “far abroad”.

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia shrank not only geographically, but also politically. It lost a number of important seaports, military bases, resorts, and the Kaliningrad region appeared, separated from Russia by Belarus and Lithuania. It not only lost its traditional allies in Eastern and Central Europe (the socialist camp collapsed), but also received a number of states with unfriendly leadership along its “transparent” borders (especially in the Baltic states). Russia seemed to move away from Europe and became an even more northern and continental country.

The defense capability suffered significantly; there were practically no borders with the former republics. Russian fleet lost bases in the Baltic Sea, it was necessary to share the Black Sea Fleet with Ukraine. The former republics nationalized the most powerful military groups on their territories. It was necessary to withdraw troops from Germany, Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic states. The unified air defense system collapsed. The former influence on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was lost. Former partners in CMEA and the Warsaw Pact linked their plans for the future with the European Union and NATO.

The problems of Russians in the near abroad and refugees from neighboring countries to Russia have worsened. Military conflicts grew near its borders (Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Abkhazia in Georgia, Tajikistan). All this raised fundamentally new foreign policy questions. Relations with neighboring countries became a priority, but management did not immediately realize this. Bokhanov A.N., Gorinov M.M. History of Russia 20th century. October 1996 from 56

At the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992, the President of Russia spoke for the first time on foreign policy issues. He officially stated that nuclear missiles are not aimed at US territory. The 1992 Camp David Declaration, signed during President Yeltsin’s visit with the United States, recorded the end of the Cold War and stated that “Russia and the United States do not consider each other as potential adversaries. Their relations are now characterized by friendship and partnership based on mutual trust, respect and a shared commitment to democracy and economic freedom." The desire of foreign policy departments to strengthen ties with the West at any cost led to the fact that Russia in those years followed in the wake of the United States. Borisov N.S. “The key to the history of the fatherland.” February 1997 from 35

Formally, the Russian Federation was sovereign, although part of the CIS, but the country had no borders, no army, no customs, no concept of citizenship, no economic management system. In relations with its CIS partners, Russia has moved away from two extreme positions - imperial attempts to forcefully restore the union state and self-elimination from the problems of the former Union. It was thanks to this that a serious conflict within the CIS was avoided. All former republics of the USSR, having become members of the UN, somewhat “distanced themselves” from Russia. However, this did not last long; each of these countries had many problems that they were unable to solve. Armed conflicts arose and escalated in Tajikistan, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Moldova.

Under these conditions, there was no other way out than strengthening the CIS. In 1992, over 250 documents were adopted regulating relations within the Commonwealth. At the same time, the Collective Security Treaty was signed by 6 out of 11 countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan).

The failure of the Emergency Committee and the collapse of perestroika meant not only the end of socialist economic reform, but also the victory of supporters of liberal reforms. The Russian leadership chose the liberal path, proclaiming in October 1991 the transition to market relations and then to a liberal political model. In world practice, there are 2 models of transition from a command-administrative to a market economy: gradual and “shock therapy”.

1.1 Russian Constitution of 1993

The Constitution delimited the powers between the authorities of the Russian Federation and its subjects.

The most important national issues were included in the competence of the highest authorities of Russia: the adoption of laws and control over their implementation, management of federal state property, the financial system, the basics of pricing policy, the federal budget. They were responsible for resolving issues of foreign policy and international relations, declaring wars and concluding peace, and managing foreign economic relations. The federal civil service was also subordinate to the federal government. Issues of environmental management, protection of historical and cultural monuments, education, and science were under the joint jurisdiction of the authorities of the Federation and its constituent entities.

After the collapse of the USSR, relations between the federal authorities and individual constituent entities of the Russian Federation were not easy.

One of the hotbeds of interethnic conflicts was in the North Caucasus. Only with the help of the Russian army was it possible to stop the armed clashes that arose due to territorial disputes between the Ingush and Ossetians. In 1992, Checheno-Ingushetia was divided into two independent republics.

On March 31, 1992, a Federative Treaty was signed between the autonomous republics of Russia. It provided for the division of powers between federal and republican authorities. The agreement recorded the refusal of the federal government to seek dictatorship. The document became the basis for the state unity of the country, the development of subsequent relationships between the center and the national-state formations of the Russian Federation. Tatarstan joined the treaty in 1994, stipulating special conditions that do not contradict the fact that it remains a full-fledged subject of the Federation. Specific relations developed with the leadership of the Republic of Ichkeria (Chechnya), which not only did not sign the Federative Treaty, but persistently sought to secede from Russia.

The adoption of the 1993 Constitution was an important step in strengthening the unity of the Russian state. At the same time, tensions remained in relations with individual constituent entities of the Federation. The development of the separatist movement in Chechnya led to a split in the leadership of the republic and armed conflicts between the separatists and the official authorities. In December 1994, the Russian Armed Forces were introduced into the territory of Chechnya with the aim of restoring constitutional order there. This marked the beginning of a protracted and bloody Chechen war, which ended only in August 1996. The Peace Agreement signed in November 1996 in Khasavyurt between the Russian and Chechen leadership provided for the withdrawal of federal armed forces from Chechnya and the holding of presidential elections in the republic. The agreement and the cessation of hostilities did not eliminate the separatist aspirations of the Chechen leadership. The situation in the republic remained extremely tense and explosive. Encyclopedia. Volume 5, part 3. History of Russia. XX century; compiled by Ismailova S. T. - Moscow: Avanta+, 1996 p. 165

2. Economic indicators

The main architect of the “shock therapy” was the Deputy Prime Minister of the government Gaidar with his like-minded young economists, supporters of monetarist methods of economic management Chubais, Shokhin and others. Their program of economic reforms included 3 main directions: price liberalization, free trade, privatization. As a result of the release of prices from January 1, 1992, the population's funds practically depreciated, as a result, it turned out that there was no longer anything to buy shares of privatized enterprises with. On October 1, 1992, the issuance of vouchers to the entire population began (privatization checks, which can then be used to buy shares of enterprises).

Uncontrolled purchasing of vouchers from the population by new entrepreneurs and bankers began. With the help of vouchers, initial capital was made, and many huge fortunes were created in the process of privatization. Simultaneously with the liberation of prices, the system of centralized distribution of resources was abolished. The government tried to achieve stabilization primarily at the macroeconomic level (i.e., stabilize the economic performance of the entire country by controlling the main indicators - GDP, budget deficit, inflation, production volumes). Utkin A.G. “The crisis of reform, different views on why monetarism in Russian conditions turned out to be an abstraction” // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 18, 1998. from 10

Microeconomic indicators (at the enterprise level) fell out of sight of the government and enterprises, in conditions of free prices that soared hundreds of times, experienced enormous difficulties - they could not purchase raw materials and components or sell goods. There were huge distortions in the Russian economy: raw materials industries and the military-industrial complex (military-industrial complex) dominated, monopolies flourished, many outdated industries produced unnecessary products, and the consumer market was empty. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia suffered not only its problems, but also problems associated with its collapse: a huge external and internal debt remained, enterprises previously connected by the production cycle ended up in different countries, markets for many goods disappeared.

As a result, the economic situation worsened. Industrial production fell by 35% in 1992. This trend continued until 1996.

With a high degree of monopolization of production, producers dictated their prices, which led to their increase by 100-150 times, with an increase in average wages by 10-15 times. Public sector employees suffered the most; the outflow of scientific personnel and military-industrial complex specialists to commercial structures and abroad began. The privatization of state property and its decentralization unfolded slowly, in contrast to the privatization of the trade sector.

The conditions were such that a significant share of state property in enterprises went to the management apparatus, and the labor collectives who were given advantages were unable to take advantage of them. Shares of many promising enterprises were bought up by new entrepreneurs and bankers.

The standard of living of the population has decreased (consumption has decreased, the nutritional structure has deteriorated, and the poor are unable to receive qualified medical care and medicine), which has led to a reduction in life expectancy. Unemployment is rising.

Results of the first (92) year of reforms:

decline in industrial production - 35%, mutual non-payments of enterprises reached 3.5 trillion. rubles;

it was not possible to achieve success in financial reform - a tough credit policy, under pressure from the directors, deputies, and trade unions, was replaced by a policy of concessions (new loans were given to unprofitable enterprises, the money supply increased 4 times);

the increase in the money supply led to a new wave of inflation;

external debt grew, servicing it took a third of the country’s annual income;

declining living standards, rising social tension, rising unemployment, strikes. . Seleznev G.K. Contemporary history of Russia and the West. October 1998 from 25

By the summer, dozens of subjects of the Federation - Tatarstan, Bashkorstan, Yakutia (Sakha), Udmurtia, Novosibirsk, Tyumen regions - delayed or stopped transferring taxes to the federal budget. Moreover, they began to set their own prices for goods produced on their territory.

Individual subjects of the Federation increasingly insistently proposed transforming it into a confederation. The situation was complicated by the inconsistency of the government itself. Advisor on Interethnic Relations G.V. Starovoitova, for example, believed that the full sovereignty of all the peoples of the former USSR is an inevitable stage in the formation of the state, and in the future the Russian Federation will turn into one of the forms of confederation (the unification of states with their complete political and legal independence, the absence of central authority, and general legislation). But this point of view did not find support in the government. During 1992, financial subsidies to the republics that set a course for secession continued, despite the refusal to pay taxes to the federal budget.

At the heart of separatism was the desire of the republics to independently dispose of the fruits of their labor. And that is why it was so painfully perceived that, for example, oil was pumped almost free of charge in Tatarstan, and diamonds were pumped in Yakutia. The region, which provides more than 80% of Russia's diamond revenues, was not able to feed itself.

The first serious step towards preserving the unity of Russia was the Federative Treaty, which included three similar agreements on the division of powers between federal government bodies and bodies of the subjects of the Federation of all three types (republics, territories, regions, autonomous regions and districts, the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg). Work on this agreement began back in 1990, but progressed very slowly. Nevertheless, in 1992, a Federal Agreement was signed between the subjects of the Federation (89 subjects).

Agreements were later signed with some entities on special conditions that expanded their rights; this began with Tatarstan.

Interethnic relations are aggravated in some regions - the conflict between Ossetians and Ingush in 1992. First, the Chechen-Ingush Republic was divided into two parts, then bloody clashes occurred between the Ingush and North Ossetians. Particularly tense relations developed between the federal center and Chechnya, which subsequently led to a protracted military conflict “to establish constitutional order,” notable for heavy casualties on both sides and the death of civilians under bombing. A stream of refugees from the North Caucasus, Transcaucasia and Central Asia has poured into Russia (since 1991, their total number has reached 1 million people). Two thirds of them are Russian by nationality.

An important issue for Russia in the early 90s was the choice of form of government: a presidential republic (a strong president who forms the government and has the right to dissolve parliament under certain conditions) or a parliamentary republic (a strong parliament that appoints the government) or a mixed form - presidential-parliamentary republic. Throughout 1992, there was a struggle between the legislative and executive branches of government. Disappointment with the progress of radical reforms among a significant part of society and economic difficulties deprived the reform forces of support from many segments of the population and strengthened the bloc of the old nomenklatura. In conditions when power continued to be the main source of property, the opposition's strategy changed. She was no longer satisfied with the opportunity to influence the executive branch through numerical dominance in parliament. The goal became power and the ability to control the government. It was this goal that was reflected in the slogan of the rallies of “Working Russia” and the National Salvation Front - “All power to the Soviets.” In turn, by the spring of 1992, hardliners surrounded by the President headed for the dissolution of parliament.

2.1 Political situation at the end of the 90s

In December 1993, elections were held to a new government body - the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, consisting of two chambers: the Federation Council and the State Duma. On the eve of the elections, several political blocs and coalitions emerged. The blocs “Russia’s Choice” and “Yavlinsky, Boldyrev, Lukin” (“Yabloko”), the Russian Movement of Democratic Reforms, and the election association “Fatherland” have become widely known. Most associations and parties advocated for a variety of forms of ownership, strengthening social protection of the population, and for the unity and integrity of Russia. However, on issues of nation-state building, their positions fundamentally diverged. The Yabloko bloc defended the idea of a constitutional federation, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation - the restoration of the union state on a new basis, the Liberal Democratic Party - the revival of the Russian state within the pre-1977 framework.

As a result of elections held on a multi-party basis, representatives of 8 parties entered parliament. The largest number of seats went to Russia's Choice, LDPR, Agrarian Party and Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

The first chairman of the Federation Council was V. Yu. Shumeiko, former director of one of the country's large industrial enterprises. The State Duma was headed by I.P. Rybkin. From the first days of the work of the State Duma, several party factions arose within its composition. The most numerous among them was the “Choice of Russia” faction, headed by E. T. Gaidar.

Issues of economic and national policy, social security and international relations occupied a central place in the work of the State Duma of the first convocation. During 1993-1995 Deputies adopted over 320 laws, the vast majority of which were signed by the president. These include laws on the government and the constitutional system, on new forms of property, on peasant and farming, about joint stock companies, about free economic zones.

In the elections to the State Duma of 1995, public associations and parties came with clear demands in the economic and political fields. The central place in the election platform of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation - G. A. Zyuganov) was occupied by demands for the peaceful restoration of the Soviet system in Russia, the cessation of the process of denationalization and nationalization of the means of production. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation advocated the termination of foreign policy treaties that “infringed” on the interests of the country.

Formed on the eve of the elections, the all-Russian socio-political movement “Russia is Our Home” united representatives of the executive structures of government, economic and business strata. Participants in the movement saw the main economic task in the formation of a mixed economic system on the principles inherent in a market economy. The role of the state was to create favorable conditions for the development of small and medium-sized businesses and business activity of the population.

450 deputies were elected to the State Duma of the second convocation. The overwhelming majority of them were employees of legislative and executive authorities, many of them were members of the previous deputy corps, 36% of the total number of seats in the Duma was received by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, 12% - “Our Home is Russia”, 11% - LDPR, 10% - Bloc G A. Yavlinsky (“Yabloko”), 17% - independent and 14% - other electoral associations.

The composition of the State Duma predetermined sharp character inter-party struggle on all domestic political issues considered in it. The main struggle unfolded between supporters of the chosen path of economic and political reform and the opposition, in whose ranks were the factions of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party and the bloc of G. A. Yavlinsky. In fierce confrontation, decisions were discussed and made on issues related to the regulation of new socio-economic relations. A significant portion of the deputies were rejected by the government policy in Chechnya and foreign policy actions aimed at rapprochement with NATO. The position of the parliamentarians was supported by some sections of the Russian population.

The forces opposing the government tried to present a united front in the presidential elections in the summer of 1996. 11 people ran for the presidency, including B. N. Yeltsin, G. A. Zyuganov, V. V. Zhirinovsky, M. S. Gorbachev, G. A. Yavlinsky. As a result of two rounds of elections, B. N. Yeltsin again became the President of Russia. 55% of the total number of voters voted for him. G. A. Zyuganov, the main competitor of B. N. Yeltsin, received 40% of the votes. The results of the presidential elections showed that the overwhelming majority of citizens supported the president’s course towards creating a market economy and a democratic state. Tonkikh V. A., Yaretsky Yu. L. History of political and legal thought in Russia. - Moscow, 1999.p.66

2.2 Privatization of the 90s

At the end of 1992, the Congress of People's Deputies replaced the head of government, and V. Chernomyrdin replaced E. Gaidar. With his arrival, an adjustment to the course of reforms began, or rather, the course remained (market economy), but the emphasis was placed on supporting state-owned (including unprofitable) industries. Particular attention was paid to the fuel and energy (gas, oil, coal, electricity) and military-industrial (MIC) complexes, i.e. a policy of protectionism was pursued. A unified tariff system of remuneration was adopted, which softened the situation in the budgetary sphere. All this required new Money, offsets of debts of enterprises and, as a result, a new round of inflation. Only by tightening financial and credit policy by the end of 1993 was it possible to reduce the growth rate.

But inconsistency in decision-making in the financial sector and protectionism were characteristic of the government in subsequent years.

In 1993, voucher privatization continued, the number of commercial banks grew, no more than 15% of collective farms remained state-owned in agriculture, but farmers went bankrupt without state support. The decline in industrial production (16%) and agriculture (4%) continued, and freight transportation decreased. The non-state sector already employed 40% of workers. Budget deficit - 12 trillion. rub. Prices have increased 9 times, the population is stratified into rich and poor, 10% of the rich have incomes 11 times higher than the rest. But the number of strikes is gradually decreasing. Although the official number of unemployed is not large, hidden unemployment (part-time work, forced leaves) is growing.

By the end of 1993, the first stage of privatization (“voucher”) was completed, as a result, private property actually appeared, and economic methods of regulation emerged. There was a partial adaptation of producers and consumers to the market, and the consumer market began to work. The center of business activity has moved to the non-state sector. It was possible to ensure the convertibility of the ruble and replenish the gold and foreign exchange reserves. Russia gradually integrated into the world economy.

In 1994, the government focused its efforts on stabilizing the standard of living of the population, encouraging entrepreneurship, targeted support for the most vulnerable segments of the population, and obtaining Western loans and investments.

In 1995, the priority was tight fiscal policy to curb inflation.

In 1996, the decline in production ceased and the economy stabilized. The inflation rate was reduced, but the associated hopes for investment and an increase in production were not justified. The unstable political situation (elections to the State Duma in 1995 and the President in 1996), inconsistent financial and credit policies did not help stabilize the economy and scared off Western investors.

The ongoing 2nd stage of privatization (monetary) revealed contradictions in the political and industrial-financial elite, scandals broke out over the conditions of privatization and its results. Against the backdrop of a decline in production (many industries with a high level of technology were dying out), the bias towards the production of raw materials became more and more noticeable. For example, the share of contributions to the budget of such a monopolist as Gazprom is 25%. The share of imports, especially food, increased against the backdrop of a decline in food production.

In 1997, it was possible to stop the decline in production, but investments were not enough to recover. The high energy intensity of Russian industry and outdated equipment made products uncompetitive. Exports, the only thing that grew during the years of reform, are now declining; in 1997, exports fell by 2%. The budget deficit in 1997 was 6.8%.

The drop in production over all previous years reached 50%, 45% of enterprises became unprofitable, mutual non-payments between enterprises and non-payment of taxes to the budget, in the absence of investment in production, replacement and renewal of equipment. Inflation was not high, the dollar exchange rate was largely stable thanks to the Central Bank's sufficient gold and foreign exchange reserves, but 30% of revenues were spent on servicing internal and external debt. High social tension remained, caused by hidden unemployment and non-payment of wages, pensions and social benefits. From 30 to 40 million people fell below the poverty line (according to various estimates), strikes, hunger strikes, and blocking of railways.

The costs of reforms can be explained as follows:

Poor starting conditions for reforms, the economy was on the verge of collapse, with the collapse of the USSR, economic ties fell apart, the previous management mechanism collapsed and it was necessary to create a new one. A depreciated ruble, lack of gold and foreign exchange reserves, debts of the USSR, lack of food reserves in the country, high social tension, disproportion in industry with a bias towards the military-industrial complex and the mining and heavy industries.

Political instability, struggle between the legislative and executive powers, and then between financial and industrial groups.

Mistakes of the theorists and implementers of reforms in choosing a strategy and in assessing the situation and the consequences of decisions made (“they wanted the best, but it turned out as always”). For example, calculations for an influx of investment and an increase in production after the stabilization of the ruble exchange rate and victory over inflation did not come true.

It cannot be said that this course did not give society any positive impulses. Perhaps the most significant shift was the overcoming of the difficult psychological barrier of transition to the market, the emergence of entrepreneurs and the emergence of market mechanisms.

2.3 1996 crisis

In 1996, for the first time in the last three years, we felt what it was like to see prices rise by 10-100% per week, buying food in reserve, queues in stores, depreciation of bank deposits, bankruptcy of the banks themselves. The unfamiliar word “default” has become quite understandable and familiar. There was talk about the nationalization of banking institutions, large firms, almost about dictatorship.

But most analysts say something else: on August 17, an abscess that had been brewing for a very long time just opened, and information that had been known to selected figures in politics and economics for quite some time became public.

So, 1996. “Black Tuesday” was safely forgotten. The dollar is taken into the corridor, and the currency is quietly sold on every corner at a price of about 6 rubles per one conventional unit. The campaign for the State Duma elections has just ended, and preparations for the presidential elections are in full swing. The standard of living is gradually improving, salaries are paid on time, trade is booming. But at the same time, production volumes at domestic enterprises continue to fall, which is not surprising - due to the low value of the dollar, imports are quite accessible to the masses, and it cannot be said that they are almost always more beautiful and better quality than our goods. Business debt also continues to rise, and no one seems to be worried about it. And loans continue to come from abroad, because frightened foreigners do not want to see the “Russian Ivan” with a red star on his forehead and a nuclear missile behind his back hungry - it’s better to feed him so that God forbid he doesn’t want to fight. With these loans, the sources of repayment of which no one seems to even think about, the state maintains the appearance of stability and even some recovery.

The first bell should have rung for everyone back in the fall of 1996. Boris Yeltsin announced with difficulty that he was very seriously ill; complex operation. The opposition is happily preparing for early elections. And there is complete calm on the stock exchanges. The ruble is not depreciating, the value of enterprise shares remains stable. But in the West, where the economy is much more stable than ours, serious fluctuations in stock prices occur even when it turns out that the US President is also a man during working hours. The Dow Johnson Index immediately falls, and everyone is talking about a crisis. In our country, the news of the President’s illness does not affect the economy at all. Strange? Certainly! But why didn’t any of the economists ask the question - why is all this happening? Why is our economy so resilient? Now we can answer this question: but because it was FULLY regulated, but not by administrative, but by pseudo-economic methods, when colossal funds received from foreign loans were spent to support the stock price and the national currency.

In 1997, the President seemed to be recovering. Young reformers come to the government and begin to reform Russia in all serious ways. Either we transfer officials to Volgas, assembled from imported components, and are more expensive than Mercedes, then we collect pop stars and persuade them to pay taxes, then we carry out denomination, because growth has begun in Russia, and old money with such growth didn't fit.

And it’s true - growth begins. It manifests itself in a very strange way - for some reason the value of shares of a number of Russian enterprises is increasing, mainly, of course, in the extractive industries. Again, no one has any questions - why, say, Gazprom shares are rising in price so much when oil prices continue to fall on the world market? But oil is, perhaps, the only commodity whose trade brought real profits to Russia (there is no point in talking about the arms trade, because, as it turned out quite recently, the treasury from this business suffered only losses, and all the profits went to anyone, but not state), and the decrease in budget revenues from the sale of “black gold” clearly had to make a serious hole in it. But the government continues to say that difficult times are over and we are entering an era of prosperity in Russia. But for some reason, delays in salaries and pensions are resuming with renewed vigor. And the population, which only recently “chose with their hearts,” begins to grumble again. Industrial activities have not started working, they prefer not to pay workers salaries, but no one is going to go bankrupt. It turns out a strange picture: nothing is working, but the citizens of the country live, on the whole, quite well, and there has been growth.

Perhaps the last broad gesture by the government during the “new stagnation” era was the campaign to repay pension debts at the end of 1997. It looked quite convincing: they found reserves and were able to give everything away at once. Officially. In practice, not everything and not everyone. As it turned out, money to pay off debts was simply PRINTED, and the issue of fiat money only significantly increased pressure on the stability of the ruble, but did not solve macroeconomic problems.

So, let's summarize the period of relative stability of 1996 - 1997. The term “virtual economy” suits this time like no other. Indeed, the Russian economy turned into a kind of artificial reality that had little in common with the true state of affairs. It cannot be said that the creation of such an economy had only negative aspects. After all, jobs were preserved, albeit at minimum wages. As a result, we had social stability, which would have been difficult to achieve in the event of mass bankruptcies, mass and free sale of enterprises into private hands, etc. But, unfortunately, the peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist economic models within one society is impossible, which led to the imbalance that caused the current global crisis. The state, collecting huge loans all over the world, spent them on maintaining the remnants of the old, expecting that they would give new, viable shoots. Alas, the miracle did not happen, and today we have to start everything almost all over again, but much more difficult conditions. Yaretsky Yu. L. Russian civilization: past and present. - Moscow, 2008. p.18

The events of 1998 can be perceived as the last attempts to keep the economic situation on track. Despite the fact that the stock price of Russian enterprises began to fall catastrophically, the ruble continued to be kept at the same, unrealistic, but so desirable level - about 6 rubles per dollar. A change of government, negotiations to obtain new loans, the writing of a new beautiful program, which, after being demonstrated to Western creditors, clearly no one was going to implement - we know what this led to. And the President’s statement the day before the announcement of the devaluation of the ruble, that devaluation was impossible in principle, finally deprived him of the trust of even those who continued to harbor some illusions about his competence.

The rise in the dollar exchange rate, which led to a sharp rise in the price of goods, both imported and domestically produced. Complete distrust of Russia as a partner in the global arena. Real prospects for the country's bankruptcy. Serious crisis banking system and the collapse of the most seemingly unshakable monsters, like Inkombank and others. And most importantly, it is impossible to try to correct the situation using the PREVIOUS methods. After all, in the West they were very afraid that if Russia was left completely without means of subsistence, then it would pull the whole world economy. But that did not happen. Yes, there are some unpleasant nuances from our troubles, but in general, nothing major or irreparable has happened. And now it won’t be possible to get loans by scaring the West with spells like “Better give, otherwise it will be bad for everyone!” We have never fit into the world economy, and all our troubles concern only ourselves.

On December 31, 1999, Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin relieves himself of his duties as head of state and, as he himself says, leaves a worthy replacement. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin is a new figure in the government. The country recognized him literally half a year ago, but the masses believe him, which seems to me unreasonably. Are there any guarantees that the new one will be better than the old one? Putin wins the wrong elections only because the country has long known about all the disadvantages of other candidates besides him.

3. Socio-economic development of Russia at the present stage

Our country entered the beginning of the 21st century with a difficult economic legacy, which was aggravated by acute social and political contradictions and a decline in the country’s prestige on the world stage. In this situation, the new leadership had to choose the optimal path of socio-economic and political development. Many experts note that the evolutionary, initially quite conservative path chosen by President V.V. Putin, in fact, there was no alternative: in the current conditions, Russia could progressively move forward only within a very narrow corridor, and any deviation from this path would lead to social upheaval and destructive consequences for society. The consistent implementation of this evolutionary course made it possible to solve two major problems in a few years: first, to bring Russia out of the depths of the socio-economic crisis; secondly, to ensure political stability.

The following facts indicate the real successes of socio-economic development over the past seven years:

The decline in production has been overcome and its steady growth is observed.

Over the past five years, Russia's GDP growth has averaged 7% per year (2003 - 7.3%, 2004 -7.1%; 2005 - 6.4%; 2006 - 6.6%; forecast 2007 .- 7.6%). This is a high figure, typical for countries with dynamically developing economies (China, India). Such growth rates significantly exceed those of the United States or Western Europe.

Federal budget expenditures on solving problems that are significant for society have increased 5 times.

Russia has firmly taken its place in the top ten largest national economies in the world. In the 90s, this position was under threat, being inferior in terms of GDP by 5 times to China and 10 times to the USA, Russia had every chance of losing it.

Russia has almost completely paid off its foreign debts.

There has been an increase in investment in the economy. In 2007, in the economy as a whole it was about 20%, and in certain industries, for example, the production of vehicles, it reached 40-60%. A significant part of investments in recent years has begun to be directed to the non-resource sector of the economy: mechanical engineering, processing industry, and services.

Since 2001, household incomes have increased faster than the cost of living. From 2000 to 2007, real incomes of the population doubled.

The basis for successful economic development was a doctrine that combines the ideas of a market economy and effective government regulation. It was associated with structural changes. Several large companies with large capitals were created that could serve as “locomotives” Russian economy and were competitive within the global world economy (examples include Rosneft or Gazprom). The state initiated mergers in a number of other industries - in the defense and automotive industries. At the same time, this made it possible to strengthen the state presence in strategic sectors. At the same time, from the first years of V.V. Putin began to take measures to combat some oligarchs who sought to exert unacceptable pressure on the implementation of state policy.

Characterizing the state of the Russian economy at the beginning of the 21st century, one cannot help but note its inherent contradictory features. On the one hand, we can talk about a number of features that bring Russia closer to underdeveloped countries:

Economic production and exports in Russia are predominantly of a raw materials nature. The economic successes of recent years have been achieved by our country largely due to the favorable situation in world oil and gas prices. Unique fuel and energy resources make it one of the key players in the geopolitical arena. However, the focus on raw material exports makes the country's development strictly dependent on jumps in world energy prices. The development of the raw materials sector is not enough for Russia to rank with the G8 countries, rapidly developing China and India, which represent the forefront of the modern economy. This requires economic diversification.

Indicators of quality and life expectancy in Russia are not yet comparable with the level of highly developed countries. In terms of GDP per capita ($885), Russia in 2005 ranked approximately 40th in the world, following countries such as South Africa and Chile in this ranking, and slightly ahead of Mexico.

One of the most pressing problems in Russia is the sharp stratification of society in terms of income level and quality of life. To characterize such stratification in economics, the so-called “Ginny index” is used. It is the ratio of the total income of the richest 10% of people in a country to the total income of the poorest 10% of citizens. In Russia, these indicators differ by 14 times (and in Moscow - by 41 times). For developed countries, a discrepancy of 4-6 times is common. Such deep social stratification is rather characteristic of some countries in Latin America and Africa. For developed countries, the usual difference in income is only 4-6 times. The prototype of the middle stratum in Russia does not exceed 20-25% of the population, and the gap in the incomes of the rich elite and the bulk of society, despite the general increase in real incomes of the population, does not show a tendency to decrease.

Russia entered the beginning of the 21st century as a country with a criminalized economy and a high level of corruption.

On the other hand, the Russian economy has a number of features characteristic of highly developed countries:

There are high-tech industries that in the past worked primarily for defense.

A highly qualified workforce has been preserved.

The level of science, special and general education is relatively high.

A number of high technologies and advanced developments that are competitive and in demand on the world market are being created in Russia.

Thus, our country, despite the significant losses of the 1990s, has significant potential for implementing an innovative path of development.

Thanks to the results achieved since 2000, the possibilities for maneuver, the “corridor” in which Russia can really develop, have today expanded noticeably. There is an opportunity to build strategic plans that are not bound by the strict need to use all resources to urgently solve the most pressing and pressing problems. This kind of strategic plan is contained in the annual Address of the President to the Federal Assembly, which he delivered on April 26, 2007. It has absorbed in concentrated form key points, which were expressed in previous Messages and supplemented them with a number of new provisions. It contains a sober assessment of the current situation in Russia with all its pros and cons. On the other hand, the key ideas of the Message have actually turned into directives that are actively being implemented in practice.

The socio-economic development strategy of the current Russian leadership is aimed, first of all, at ensuring the country's competitiveness and strengthening its position on the world stage. The Development Bank was created to finance projects directly related to increasing competitiveness.

The changing nature of the economic tasks facing the state led to a change in the functions of the Stabilization Fund. Its main source of income is oil and gas revenues. In accordance with the new approach, they will now be divided into three parts:

Part 1 - reserve fund. It is designed to reduce the risks of the Russian economy in the event of a sharp drop in world energy prices, and is also intended to maintain macroeconomic stability and combat inflation.

The second part of oil and gas revenues is sent to the federal budget to implement, first of all, large social programs.

The third part is those oil and gas revenues that go to the National Welfare Fund. The funds from this fund should be used to broadly improve the quality of life of people and to develop the economy, ultimately creating conditions for improving the well-being of current and future generations. In particular, we are talking about co-financing voluntary pension savings and covering the deficit of the pension system, creating conditions for more efficient use of natural resources, eliminating infrastructure restrictions in the economy, and modernizing and developing high-tech industries.

The creation of an innovative economy is considered today as the most important goal for improving the economy. In modern post-industrial society, it is this path that determines the main vector of movement of advanced countries. The transition to an innovative development model must be quite dynamic - otherwise Russia will remain outside the threshold of that group of countries that have today reached the indicators of a post-industrial society or are very close to it. At the same time, general economic growth should not have a painful impact on the social status of the population or its individual groups. On the contrary, the most important task is to use the results of economic development to ensure a new, higher quality of life for people.

Similar documents

The collapse of the USSR, economic and political consequences. Adoption of a new constitution of the Russian Federation. Declared goals. Elections to the State Duma in 1993, 1995, 1999. Presidential elections in 1996, 2000 Russian foreign policy in the new geopolitical situation

The formation of Russian statehood after the collapse of the USSR. The Constitution of the Russian Federation and its meaning. Development of the state-political regime of modern Russia. Analysis of the main problems hindering the formation of an effective Russian state.

abstract, added 11/14/2010

Belovezhskaya Agreement between the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus B.N. Yeltsin, L.M. Kravchuk and S.S. Shushkevich December 8, 1991 The main consequences of the collapse of the USSR for Russia and for the former Soviet republics. New geopolitical quality of Russia.

abstract, added 03/25/2014

Characteristics of the political development of the Russian Federation in the 90s. XX century: stages of formation of the new Russian statehood, formation of the state apparatus, development and adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993. System of government bodies.

course work, added 03/23/2010

Chernigov and Smolensk principalities. Features of the social movement in Russia in the 19th century. Socio-economic development of the country in the 20s. XX century Sources of the victory of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. New political thinking M.S. Gorbachev.

test, added 04/22/2009

Democratic foundations and stages of their formation in the history of Russian statehood. Democratic transit in Russia 80-90. XX century and its features. Analysis of the developmental, participatory and pluralistic form of democracy in modern Russia.

thesis, added 10/01/2014

Development of civil society institutions in Russia. Studying the prerequisites for the formation of civil associations at the stage of “perestroika” and “new” Russia. Stimulating the dialogue of political power between society and the state according to its own rules.

course work, added 11/24/2010

The socio-economic and political situation in the USSR in the late 70s - early 80s. XX century Increasing stagnation in the economy and the preconditions for the socio-economic crisis. Implementation of the perestroika policy in 1985-1991. and its consequences.

thesis, added 09/18/2008

The basis of NATO’s modern anti-crisis strategy, its transformation after the collapse of the USSR. Transformation of a number of provisions of the New Strategic Concept, effective methods of “crisis management”. Features of NATO policy towards Russia, its significance.

abstract, added 09/27/2009

Life in the USSR: geographical location and features, regions of the USSR and life in them. National-state structure. Federal structure. The reasons that pushed the USSR to collapse. Countries of the former Soviet Union after the collapse.

1. Formation of Russian statehood

The state is the main institution of the political system, an organization that performs the functions of normative and regulatory management of society. The main feature of the state is public power, which is based on coercive mechanisms, using legal sanctions, and is implemented through the activities of civil servants.

Another sign of a state is sovereignty, which means that the state has the highest power within its borders. Only the state has the right to issue laws of a generally binding nature. The functions of the state can be divided into internal and external.

Internal functions include: consolidation of society; ensuring public safety; adoption and implementation of laws; maintaining public order; development of a national-state idea; formation of normative and value attitudes; regulation of economic, social and political relations; creating the necessary conditions for the development of culture.

TO external functions include: protection of state interests in the international arena; maintaining the country's defense capability at the required level; participation in the decision global problems; development of mutually beneficial economic and political cooperation.

The formation and development of Russian statehood goes back many centuries. This process began in the Old Russian state and continues to this day. Throughout its history, Russia has gone through five main periods of state development: the Old Russian State, the Moscow State, the Russian Empire, the Soviet State and the Russian Federation.

The Old Russian state with its center in Kyiv arose in the middle of the 9th century and existed until the middle of the 15th century. This period was marked by the establishment of the basic principles of statehood in Rus', the merging of its northern and southern centers, the increase in the military-political and international influence of the state, and the onset of the stage of its fragmentation and loss of centralized control, which was natural for early feudal monarchies. Prince Vladimir Svyatoslavovich, named the Red Sun, was destined to become the spiritual father and founder of the Old Russian state. Under him, in 988, Rus' adopted Orthodoxy as the state religion. After this, literacy began to spread in the country, painting and literature began to develop. However, by the end of the 12th century, a number of independent states were being formed in Rus'. Due to their fragmentation in the first third of the 13th century, enemies constantly began to attack Russian lands. As a result, in the 14th century, Ancient Rus' as a state community ceased to exist. The Moscow state existed from the mid-15th to the end of the 17th century. During this era, the final liberation of Russian lands from the vassal dependence of the Golden Horde took place, the process of “gathering lands” around Moscow was completed, and the basic state-political, socio-economic and cultural principles of the Russian autocracy were formalized. A striking manifestation of the increase in the authority of the Moscow sovereign was the solemn crowning of Ivan IV to the throne in 1547. This event was followed by the most important reforms of government bodies, the judicial system, the army, and the church. The emergence of the Russian autocracy in the 16th century was accompanied by its successes in the field of centralization of the state and the intensification of foreign policy. The growth of the international authority of the Moscow state was also facilitated by a significant expansion of its territory due to successful campaigns of conquest and the colonization of new lands in the east. All this led to the formation of the Great Russian nation.

During the 17th century, the main institutions of Russian absolutism were formed in the country, which created the preconditions for the transformation of the Muscovite kingdom into the Russian Empire.

The state of the Russian Empire covers the era from the end of the 17th to the beginning of the 20th century. During this time, the formation, flourishing and collapse of the Russian autocratic monarchy took place.

The Soviet state existed from February 1917 until the end of 1991 and is associated with the formation of the foundations of Soviet statehood during the era of the revolutionary transformation of Imperial Russia into the Russian Republic. This stage of development of our state absorbed the crisis of central state power and the decomposition of the ethnopolitical unity of the country, the loss by the Provisional Government of the democratic perspective of state development and the further radicalization of the revolutionary movement in the country, in the wake of which the Bolsheviks led by V.I. came to power as a result of the revolution. Ulyanov. During the Civil War, Bolshevism, which became the ideological core of the new system, formed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which restored the political and territorial unity of most of the former Russian Empire.

The era of the Russian Federation began in December 1991. Since then, fundamental changes have occurred in the country. The new Constitution of the Russian Federation was adopted in 1993, which made it possible to form a democratic political system. Multi-party system has become a reality. Russians elected the President of the Russian Federation, deputies of the State Duma, governors, mayors, and local governments. Russia's achievements in foreign policy have become the most noticeable and conscious. The state was actually terminated cold war , the threat of a global military conflict between the socialist East and the capitalist West has been removed. The ideologization of foreign policy stopped, and with it the support of anti-American regimes in third world , and inspiring regional conflicts. But military-political concessions were often made unilaterally and were not accompanied by real integration of the Soviet Union into world communities. The USSR was gradually losing its position as a world power, and this foreshadowed serious foreign policy problems for the new Russia. Namely, foreign policy was divided into two directions: relations with independent states, former union republics - near abroad , and relations with states that were previously external for the USSR - far abroad.

The defense capability suffered significantly; there were practically no borders with the former republics. The Russian fleet lost its bases in the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea fleet had to be divided with Ukraine. The former republics nationalized the most powerful military groups on their territories. It was necessary to withdraw troops from Germany, Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic states. The unified air defense system collapsed. The former influence on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was lost. Former partners in CMEA and the Warsaw Pact linked their plans for the future with the European Union and NATO.

Formally, the Russian Federation was sovereign, although part of the CIS, but the country had no borders, no army, no customs, no concept of citizenship, no economic management system. In relations with its CIS partners, Russia has moved away from two extreme positions - imperial attempts to forcefully restore the union state and self-elimination from the problems of the former Union. It was thanks to this that a serious conflict within the CIS was avoided. All former republics of the USSR, having become members of the UN, several moved away from Russia. However, this did not last long; each of these countries had many problems that they were unable to solve. Armed conflicts arose and escalated in Tajikistan, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Moldova.

But with the beginning of economic reforms in Russia, the Commonwealth experienced its first serious crisis in 1992. Russian oil exports fell by half (while to other countries increased by a third). The CIS countries have begun to leave the ruble zone. The failure of the Emergency Committee and the collapse of perestroika meant not only the end of socialist economic reform, but also the victory of supporters of liberal reforms. The Russian leadership chose the liberal path, proclaiming in October 1991 the transition to market relations and then to a liberal political model.

The new - 21st century in the formation and development of Russian statehood began with the fact that on March 26, 2000, in the first round of the presidential elections, the acting President of the Government of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, having received almost 53% of the votes, won a landslide victory.

The most important direction in the activities of the new President of the Russian Federation was the implementation of large-scale administrative reform, since the existing structure of power required its improvement. In this regard, on May 13, 2000, in order to ensure the implementation by the head of state of his constitutional powers, increase the efficiency of the activities of federal government bodies and improve the system of control over the implementation of their decisions, the President of the Russian Federation signed a Decree on the formation of seven federal districts- structural units of the new political division of Russia.

The reform of the Government of the Russian Federation that took place in the spring of 2004 and changes in its structure, which continued until the end of 2007, led to a reduction in the number of ministries and the creation of the so-called three-level system of executive power (ministry, service, agency). Now the Government of the Russian Federation consists of the Prime Minister, two First Deputies, three Deputy Prime Ministers, federal ministries, federal services and federal agencies. Moreover, in the structure of federal executive bodies there are federal ministries, services and agencies, the activities of which are managed personally by the President of the Russian Federation (diagram).

Changes in the structure of executive authorities of the Russian Federation were made in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Federal Constitutional Law “On the Government of the Russian Federation” in order to improve the structure of federal executive authorities. An important role in the development of Russian statehood is played by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, consisting of the Federation Council and the State Duma, which work on a permanent basis. According to established tradition, the Federation Council is called the upper house of parliament, and the State Duma is called the lower, although in terms of their position they are equal, and each performs its own functions, defined by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Both chambers make laws for the whole society, National economy Russia, for all economic structures, main spheres and industries, without exception, for all social groups and every citizen. The main goal of both chambers and parliament as a whole is to ensure the well-being and prosperity of the peoples of Russia, the integrity and independence of the state, and the protection of human rights and freedoms.

state russia political military reform

2. Russian society in the first years of reforms

At the end of December 2011 - beginning of 2012, it will be twenty years since the Russian Federation, immediately after the collapse of the USSR, began to carry out radical reforms that primarily affected the economy, but also affected all other spheres of society. It is quite difficult to name the exact start date of these reforms. We can recall four events that marked their beginning:

the suppression of the “putsch” of the State Emergency Committee at the end of August 1991, which led to the actual collapse of the Union, the paralysis of the union authorities and the transfer of almost all responsibility to the “sovereign” leadership of the Russian Federation;
The Fifth Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, held in late October - early December 1991, approved plans for radical reform of the country and gave the President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin emergency powers to implement these plans;
the formation of a “reform government” with an economic bloc headed by E. Gaidar in mid-November 1991;
price liberalization in early January 1992, marking the transition to a market economy.

With the beginning of the reforms, society began to gradually withdraw from influence on the decision-making process, and attempts by representative authorities to somehow adjust the course of reforms began to be perceived more and more hostile, which already in 1992 significantly narrowed the social base of the reforms, and in 1993 led to the well-known events " Black October." Popular representation in the form of a system of councils at all levels also became “superfluous” for the “government of reforms,” and it set a course for curtailing their activities. The new layer of businessmen who took the helm of the processes of property redistribution was formed not from below, not from among the most effective representatives of small and medium-sized businesses, but was actually “appointed” from above, by government bodies, which for a long time predetermined the oligarchic nature of Russian capitalism. Society, having lost its levers of influence on the authorities, gradually became more and more passive and inert, citizens focused on solving their personal problems. And the government, deprived of effective control from below, became increasingly mired in corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and irresponsibility. All these problems, generated by the decisions taken in the early 90s, still persist, and in many ways continue to get worse.

The “era” that changed at the turn of the century, the rise to power of people with different experiences and different political views, as can be seen today, led to only minor changes in the socio-political system of the country: the most obvious negative consequences of the reforms were partially eliminated. At the same time, the main contradictions - ineffective public administration, corruption, excessive growth of social differentiation, broken laws, backward social sphere - all this continues to remain serious problems that cannot yet be solved. In a number of issues there has been a rollback - the sprouts have practically disappeared political democracy, who made their way in the 90s, businesses, especially small and medium-sized ones, are experiencing enormous problems, the vertical mobility of citizens has been reduced, which indicates elements of socio-political stagnation. Today, the country is in many ways facing another political fork in the road, which could determine its fate for many years to come.

At the beginning of January 1992, the government of E. Gaidar released retail prices for consumer goods. Thus began a radical social reorganization of Russia, the transition from a planned distribution economy to a free market, from a totalitarian to a democratic state structure. The economic results of the reforms are reflected in numerous works by both Russian and foreign economists. Their conclusions boil down to the transformation of Russia that has occurred over the years into a raw materials appendage now not only of the West, but also of the East. If in 1989 goods with high added value accounted for 38.7% of our exports, then in 2010 - 4.7%. If in 1991 our aircraft made up about 40% of the world civil aviation fleet, then at the beginning of 2010 it was less than 2%.

The technological lag of our country from advanced countries began to emerge in the late Soviet period. The reforms were designed to reduce the backlog and modernize the economy. But no modernization took place. On the contrary, the reforms led to the deindustrialization of the country. In the 1990s, the Russian government essentially declared war on science, resulting in huge losses for the intellectual elite. Russian reformers tried to get rid of it as quickly as possible. Most of its representatives were thrown to the margins of social life. In the clothing markets of large and small Russian cities in the 1990s, one could see graduates of Soviet universities known abroad, their teachers, engineering and technical personnel of leading industrial enterprises and other highly educated professionals. Of course, not everyone went abroad, most changed their profession, went where they could earn something to support their families.

Over the years of reforms, Russian society has fragmented, many forms of solidarity have been lost, and social stratification has reached unprecedented proportions. Studies by demographers show that economic reforms have also cost our country dearly: more than two-thirds of all reasons for the depopulation of Russians are associated with a sharp deterioration in the health of the nation, a decrease in the quality of medical care, as well as with such mass phenomena that arose in the 1990s as social depression, apathy and aggression of the population, child homelessness and homelessness. In the mid-1990s, many diseases that had been eradicated during the Soviet era returned to the country, and, above all, infectious ones, such as tuberculosis, since the system created during the Soviet era actually ceased to function efficient system its prevention, diagnosis and treatment. If in 1990 the birth rate in Russia was 1989 thousand people. , then in 2000 - 1267 thousand people, mortality per 1 thousand people in 1990 was 11.2, in 2000 it became 15.5. The country has maintained a system of free medical care, but due to economic difficulties, its financing has noticeably deteriorated. A significant number of patients began to use the services of the rapidly expanding private healthcare sector.

During the reforms that legalized the principle of private property (including the means of production, including land), the social structure of Russia has undergone serious changes. The attitude towards property began to play a big role here. In modern Russian society, three new social strata have emerged: large, medium and small private owners. The latter include almost the majority of the country's population. These are the owners of free privatized city apartments, holders of small blocks of shares in industrial enterprises, owners of country houses and village houses, and after the adoption of the Land Code - of land plots. But there remained a layer of poor people.

Two other important factors in the social stratification of society were sources of income and their size. Based on sources of income, the country's population was divided into those who lived off their property and private enterprise; hired workers of different qualifications and nature of work, employed in the public and private sectors of the economy, in the cultural sector, etc.; citizens who received state pensions for old age and health reasons. Statistics most clearly record social stratification based on per capita income. Social scientists distinguish the following strata: rich (enough funds to organize their own large business that brings huge profits) - 7%; wealthy (enough funds for a high standard of living and increasing existing capital) - 7%; wealthy (funds allow them to purchase housing, renew durable goods, provide prestigious education to children, and have quality rest) - 15.8%; low-income (there are enough funds only for everyday expenses and, in case of emergency, for minimal expenses for treatment and health promotion) - 50%; poor (having minimal means only for basic maintenance of life without any prospects for its improvement) - 20.2%.

Once again, as in pre-revolutionary times, a large part of the Russian population found itself in an uncomfortable state of marginality (previously prosperous skilled workers who found themselves among the socially helpless, entrepreneurs with an unstable financial situation, forced migrants from conflict zones in Russia and former republics THE USSR).

All of the listed aspects of the Russian reformation of the 1990s as a whole were quite objectively assessed by both the academic community and the general public. The obviousness of the results of the reformation, reflected in real indicators, does not create the basis for any significant differences in estimates.

3. The Russian Federation in the plans of international organizations: military-political competition and economic cooperation. NATO plans for Russia

Russia is one of the key participants in international relations. As one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council<#"justify">On May 28, 2002, at the Pratica di Maare airbase near Rome (Italy), the heads of state and government of NATO member countries and the Russian Federation signed the Rome Declaration “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality,” officially establishing the NATO-Russia Council. The new structure replaced the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, established in 1997 in accordance with the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. The new body is intended to take relations between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to a qualitatively higher level, providing a more effective mechanism than before for consultations, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decisions and joint actions between Russia and NATO member states on a wide range of issues security in the Euro-Atlantic region."

Along with the forums at which important decisions of a long-term, strategic plan are made (such as summits in Rome or Prague), a number of smaller-scale events have recently taken place, the nature of which, however, made it possible to analyze in more detail certain aspects of relations between Russia and NATO. Such events include scientific and scientific-practical conferences, including those held through the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Thus, on February 4, 2002 in Rome and December 9, 2002 in Moscow, under the chairmanship of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Secretary General of NATO, joint conferences of the Russia-NATO Council were held on the topic “The role of the military in the fight against terrorism.”

The results of the conferences indicate a high level of mutual understanding between their participants. The Russian military and NATO representatives have jointly developed a whole package of specific proposals aimed at developing cooperation between us in the field of combating terrorism.

When assessing positive or negative trends in our relations, one cannot ignore the issue of further expansion of the bloc and the related problem of its further transformation. Russia expressed its attitude to the ongoing process, which can be described as “calmly negative.”

It is obvious that NATO’s expansion to the east is being carried out within the framework of a military-political course towards globalizing the functions of the alliance and consolidating its role as a leading military-political force not only in Europe, but throughout the world. Already the first stage of NATO expansion, as a result of which Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were admitted to the alliance, meant a breakdown in the world order that had emerged after the end of World War II.

The very logic of NATO expansion is difficult to perceive as anything other than a desire to further weaken Russia’s position and role in international affairs. The advance of the bloc's military structures to Russian borders is an obvious and unjustified relapse of the Cold War, no matter what arguments it is justified. The latest expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to include new members has had a negative impact on Russia’s geopolitical and geostrategic position, and this forces us to think about measures to counter these truly “new” threats.

NATO's expansion to the east and the increase in the military power of the alliance objectively lead to the formation of new dividing lines in Europe and the deformation of the European security system. To avoid such a situation, Russia at one time proposed the option of a so-called “deferred solution”, in which the accession of the Baltic countries could be postponed and synchronized in time with a real, qualitative and irreversible improvement in relations between NATO and Russia.

However, the leadership of the alliance and the heads of candidate states ignored the concerns Russian side. Now we can state that the “tension lines” have become closer to us, and their negative impact on the system of international relations will certainly manifest itself in the future.

With all the evidence of a positive change in the nature of our relations, we must not forget that the system of military confrontation that developed during the Cold War has not yet been completely dismantled, since until now most of the military power of the NATO bloc, previously directed against the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, is now by right of succession is oriented against Russia. The same can be said about the military strength of the Russian Federation, which is still intended primarily for military containment of the NATO bloc.

We certainly have the potential for interaction in new geopolitical conditions; objectively there is a set necessary elements for such interaction. Positive changes in the international situation have made it possible to minimize the likelihood of a large-scale war breaking out between the main subjects of international relations, while at the same time there remains a real threat of exacerbation of existing or the emergence of new military conflicts of varying scale and intensity that could negatively affect both international security and our relationship. Perhaps it would be right if the members of the Russia-NATO Council, based on the accumulated experience of practical interaction, persistently work to expand the “field of coinciding interests” and increase specific areas of cooperation. At the same time, the positive evolution of Russian-NATO relations depends not so much on a quantitative increase in activities in certain areas of interaction, but on a qualitative change in the very content of these relations.

Used Books

1.History of Russia XX - early XXI century. Grade 11. A.A. Levandovsky, Yu.A. Shchetinov, S.V. Mironenko, 4th edition, Moscow “Enlightenment” 2010.

2.Internet resource: Intelros magazine club "Continent » No. 147, 2011 Reforms of the 1990s: socio-political results.

Internet resource Wikipedia: Russia and NATO

Internet resource Wikipedia: Russian Foreign Policy

Internet resource: Collection of scientific articles. Edited by Colonel General Yu.N. Baluevsky, Moscow - 2004

Internet resource: Analytical report “Twenty years of reforms through the eyes of Russians.” Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow, 2011.

Tutoring

Need help studying a topic?

Our specialists will advise or provide tutoring services on topics that interest you.
Submit your application indicating the topic right now to find out about the possibility of obtaining a consultation.

Introduction

Termination in December 1991 the existence of the USSR as a single union state, a subject of international law and geopolitical reality, the fall of the union center acutely raised the problem of ensuring independent state existence and the formation of a new Russian statehood.

In the conditions of the collapse of the administrative-command system and the comprehensive crisis of government and society, it was necessary to build a new state and bring the control mechanisms out of paralysis. Centrifugal processes, which continued largely due to inertia, and the desire of a number of constituent entities of the Russian Federation for “sovereignization” called into question the very existence of the Russian state as a single whole.

In this regard, the country's leadership, socio-political parties and movements interested in a democratic and strong Russia were faced with the urgent task of finding a civilized system of its government in the conditions of modern transformations - the transition to a socially oriented market economy and democratic methods of leadership, creating a legal basis Russian statehood.

This Herculean task building a state that is not the exclusive property of one political force and therefore does not dictate to society how to live. It only serves it reliably and effectively: it establishes and guarantees order in it, protecting it from anarchy and arbitrariness; protects against any external threats; guarantees a complex of social benefits, first of all, to those who themselves are not able to realize the opportunities provided by the state.

The relevance of this work is to analyze the formation of the modern public administration system, to understand why the modern state structure of Russia has developed in this way, what are the problems and ways of its further improvement.

Formation and development of the new Russian statehood

The main stages of the formation of the socio-political system of the Russian Federation in 1990-1993.

The RSFSR was the largest union republic of the USSR and occupied over 3/4 of the country's territory, more than half of its population lived in it. Like other union republics, the RSFSR had its own Constitution, its own bodies of state power and administration - the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, ministries and departments. At the same time, the statehood of the RSFSR was largely nominal. Unlike other republics, its state structures did not complement the pyramid of power and were often an extra link that could easily be dispensed with, therefore, many bodies that existed in other union republics were not created in the RSFSR.

The RSFSR was directly affected by the political processes of late perestroika and decentralization of public administration. In the spring of 1990 In the RSFSR, new bodies of state power were formed - the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR and the permanent Supreme Council of the RSFSR. June 12, 1990 At the First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR was adopted.

March 17, 1991 At the republican referendum, the majority of Russians were in favor of introducing the post of president into the RSFSR. June 12, 1991 the first presidential elections, which brought victory to B.N. Yeltsin. After the failed coup attempt in August 1991. the real levers of state power ended up in the hands of the republics, including the RSFSR. Institutions, enterprises and organizations transferred from all-Union to republican subordination.

In December 1991, after the final collapse of the USSR, the RSFSR became an independent state and was recognized by the world community as the legal successor of the USSR. In April 1992 The official name of the republic was changed. The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic was renamed the Russian Federation - Russia. The names "Russian Federation" (RF) and "Russia" were recognized as equivalent.

New Russia inherited a difficult legacy in the field of territorial structure. The government of the country was strictly centralized; every little detail of a region or city had to be decided in Moscow. The interests of the regions were completely subordinated to national goals, and if contradictions arose between them, the interests of the regions were neglected without hesitation. Meanwhile, as the country developed and grew, it became too complex in its territorial structure.

After the fall of the totalitarian state, centrifugal forces burst forth. They led to the collapse of the USSR, and then became a threat to the integrity of Russia. Autonomous republics and administrative-national entities began to declare themselves independent entities. The weakening of the influence of the center on the regions, the loss of controllability of the economy from a single center, and the strengthening of the republican-regional elites were facilitated by the measures implemented in 1991-1992. principles of public administration, according to which federal authorities and management are responsible only for economic problems, only coordinate economic activity, should not, in the conditions of a “self-regulating market,” be involved in state economic management and planning. The search for an optimal model of the national-state structure of the Russian Federation was difficult. It was conducted in heated discussions and disputes with the separatist-minded political elites of the autonomous entities. March 31, 1992 In the Kremlin, the majority of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation signed the Federal Treaty. It consisted of three separate agreements:

Agreement on the delimitation of jurisdiction and powers between the federal government bodies of the Russian Federation and the government bodies of the sovereign republics within the Russian Federation;

Agreement on the delimitation of jurisdiction and powers between federal government bodies of the Russian Federation and government bodies of territories, regions, cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg of the Russian Federation;

Agreement on the delimitation of jurisdiction and powers between the federal government bodies of the Russian Federation and the government bodies of the autonomous region, autonomous districts within the Russian Federation. With the conclusion of the Federal Treaty, the collapse of Russia was avoided.

Thus, the signing of the Federal Treaty was a serious step towards preserving the unity of Russia.

State apparatus of the Russian Federation 1991 - 1993

Period since December 1991 to December 1993 turned out to be one of the most dramatic in the history of the formation of the new Russian statehood. State structures that appeared during the era of the USSR slowly and complexly transformed into the authorities of a sovereign state.

The Congress of People's Deputies was considered the highest authority in the Russian Federation. His competence included determining domestic and foreign policy, adopting and amending the Constitution, and resolving a number of other important state issues. The Supreme Council of the Russian Federation was elected at the Congress. The Supreme Council of the Russian Federation was a permanent legislative, executive, administrative and control body. The highest official, the head of executive power, was the President of the Russian Federation. He was elected in tandem with the vice president for a five-year term. The Constitution established certain requirements for candidates for both of these positions: they must be under 35 years of age and not older than 65. The same person could not hold the office of president for more than two consecutive terms. The President was vested with significant powers in the sphere of executive power and directed the activities of the government.

The Constitutional Court, which exercised judicial power in the form of constitutional proceedings, became the new body of state power of the Russian Federation.

With the collapse of the USSR, executive and administrative power underwent changes. All-Union and Union-Republican ministries and state committees were abolished. All central government bodies of the Russian Federation began to report only to the President or the Government of the Russian Federation. In local government, a departure began from the principle of unity and sovereignty of the Soviets. He expressed that the local government, while remaining accountable to the Council, ceased to be its executive body.

Thus, the coexistence of old and new governance structures, the varying degrees of their adaptation to new conditions, the complexity of the political and economic situation in the country, the beginning of the redistribution of state property, disagreements on the adoption of a new Constitution became the cause of the crisis of 1993, which resulted in an armed confrontation between supporters of the Congress people's deputies and the Supreme Council and supporters of the president and government.

Choosing a political course. As at the beginning of the 20th century, the new Russian statehood was born in an atmosphere of chaos and anarchy. The content and sequence of political and economic reforms were dictated by the crisis state of the socialist system, and not by the subjective choice of certain political leaders.

By the end of 1991, a very difficult socio-economic situation was developing in the country. Over the year, national income decreases by more than 11%, industrial production falls, and the production of oil and coal and food products decreases. Almost all types of consumer goods become scarce. By the beginning of November 1991, the country's foreign exchange reserves were completely exhausted, and Vnesheconombank stopped all payments abroad, with the exception of payments to service the external debt, which by this time reached $76 billion. The threat of real famine looms over the country.

Due to constantly deteriorating living conditions, euphoria in society is quickly giving way to general disappointment. The newfound freedom from Marxist dogma brought a sense of relief to the country's population, but at the same time there was confusion about an uncertain future and a feeling of loss of social and moral guidelines. “Perestroika” shook the foundations of the Soviet system, but practically did not create the political and economic foundations of the capitalist system.

In the fall of 1991, state bodies of the USSR actually ceased to function as authorities. An attempt to create a new union state apparatus in the form of the Inter-Republican Economic Committee (IEC) ends in failure. The former Soviet republics refuse to fulfill economic obligations to the Union. Some of them decisively choose the path of radical socio-economic reforms. Others try by all means and means to avoid them or delay them as much as possible.

At the same time, the union bureaucracy was stealing federal property into urgently created “concerns” and “associations.” The process of spontaneous privatization is sweeping the regions of the country.

The situation in the country was complicated by the inaction of democratic forces that did not have a clear, well-developed program for systemic transformation. The disappearance of the enemy in the person of the CPSU caused split and apathy in their ranks.

Growing chaos and social tension required the Russian leadership to urgently recognize the new reality and form national state institutions, determine the goals and objectives of the foreign and domestic policy of the Russian Federation, solve the most pressing social problems economic issues finally launch competitive market mechanisms. The coincidence in time of tasks that were solved in other countries at different times incredibly complicated the activities of the government of B. N. Yeltsin. The creation of the foundations of a new socio-economic system took place in an environment of acute shortage of prerequisites for it. For historical reasons, Soviet people had only extremely negative ideas about capitalism and the market, and therefore did not feel the desire to participate in their creation.

For these reasons, the question of the goal of transforming Russian society could not be immediately publicly raised in the fall-winter of 1991, either by the authorities or the media. President B. N. Yeltsin did not in any of his program speeches in 1991–1992. did not talk about capitalism as the ultimate goal of the beginning structural reforms. Thus, the question of where Russia should go in order not to lose its state and international positions was actually left unanswered. Because of this, the internal political situation in the country in the fall of 1991 remained uncertain, Russian society lived with vague expectations of change.

For the same reasons, the real chance of reorganizing the old state machine on a democratic basis, that is, through re-elections of Soviets at all levels, was not realized. After the collapse of the USSR, B. N. Yeltsin clearly did not want to “rock the boat.” Moreover, this prospect did not suit either the Russian partycrats or the Russian democrats at that time. Elections to the Soviets were postponed, and the old nomenklatura continued to operate in the Soviets and in economic structures. Between the new Russian leadership and the former party and economic elite, a completely definite agreement, not sealed by any formal agreements, arose, the essence of which was the refusal to dismantle the Soviet system and reform it only to a limited extent. Union political elite, new and old, became the basis of the post-August transitional Russian statehood. As a result, everything - from the army to the KGB, from the prosecutor's office to social security departments - was preserved. The changes affected only the CPSU apparatus (it was dissolved, and the buildings of the CPSU Central Committee were sealed). The president decisively rejected lustration (putting on trial for the past), which the most radical democrats insisted on. Having intuitively solved the problem of consensus (between the ruling and opposing political forces, avoiding a “witch hunt”), the new Russian leadership was able to begin reforms. However, the traditional split in values in Russian society has significantly complicated the solution of this problem, constantly provoking the undermining of the achieved civil consent.

The crisis and collapse of the Soviet system coincided with the financial and budgetary crisis, so in the fall of 1991, the political leadership of Russia, along with the main task - the transition to a market and the formation of a developed system of private property relations - was faced with the no less pressing issue of stopping inflation and ensuring stable economic growth. The inaction of the Russian government in the first period after the August events had a negative impact on the development of the socio-economic situation. Uncertainty of economic prospects, discussions about the upcoming monetary reform and increase retail prices pushed the Russian population to buy goods and create a stock of essential items. As a result, the few goods still remaining from Gorbachev's times disappeared from the stores. The introduction of the principle of distributing goods among the population using cards and coupons and organizing sales at enterprises could not improve the situation. “Hungry queues” are becoming a major factor in politics, contributing to increased confrontation between political forces. The hardships caused by the collapse of the USSR seriously hampered the legitimacy of reformist authorities and policies. In turn, the emerging democratic institutions, transmitting and intensifying the social tension caused by the reforms, largely complicate their development. In this situation, the communists, who created several parties, began to gradually return to active political life. As a result, already at the initial stage of the post-communist transformation, the support of the political regime sharply narrowed. The situation was also complicated by the growing threat of the collapse of Russia itself, which was created at one time on the same principles as the Union.

Preserving the integrity of the Russian state. The fate of Russian statehood in 1991–1993. was largely determined by the confrontation between republican regional authorities and federal authorities. The reasons that led to the collapse of the USSR affected the growth of centrifugal, separatist tendencies within Russia. They were based on the desire of the regions to independently manage the fruits of their labor. Failures in reforming society pushed the autonomies to seek a way out of the crisis by solving their own national problems through isolation from other ethnic groups. In conditions of an aggravation of the economic crisis, the severance of economic ties, and the impoverishment of the majority of the population, the republican economic elite, skillfully appealing to the real facts of national discrimination, demanded preferential rights to territory and resources for the titular nationalities. The threat of the collapse of Russia grew throughout 1992. By the summer of this year, dozens of subjects of the Federation - Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia (Sakha), Udmurtia, Novosibirsk and Tyumen regions delayed or even stopped paying taxes to the federal budget.

Some subjects of the Federation proposed transforming it into a confederation, others advocated real federalism, that is, a clear division of responsibilities and powers of the center and localities, taking into account the natural, climatic and socio-political differences of the regions. Still others, fearing the economic ineffectiveness of a federation built on ethnic rather than territorial-economic principles, as well as the development of “asymmetry” into a confederation, demanded the liquidation of existing republics, territories and regions and the creation in their place of provinces strictly subordinate to the center.

The claims of the republics and other national entities in Russia to a special status, and even more so to secede from it, threatened the complete collapse of the country and civil strife. Under these conditions, the government of the Russian Federation pursued an inconsistent national-state policy. The illegal armed groups of D. Dudayev, who dispersed the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomy in September 1991 and demonstratively announced the separation of Chechnya from Russia, were not disarmed, which subsequently turned into a serious crisis in this region. Subsidizing from the federal budget continued for the republics that were heading towards secession from Russia. It was only at the end of October 1992, after the start of the clash between the Ossetians and the Ingush, that the Russian President for the first time did not rule out the possibility of using force to protect the territorial integrity of the country and state interests.

The first serious step towards preserving the unity of Russia was the Federative Treaty, work on which began back in 1990. Even during the discussion of the draft treaty, it became obvious that the idea of national statehood had taken deep roots during the years of Soviet power and it was impossible to return to territorial entities. Therefore, both a return to the pre-revolutionary provincial structure on a territorial basis and a federation were rejected nation states with preferential rights to the territory of titular nations and minimal powers of the federal center. Signed on March 31, 1992 by the majority of the subjects of the Federation, with the exception of Tatarstan and Chechnya, the Federative Agreement outlined in general terms the powers of general federal bodies and bodies of the subjects of the Federation. Thus, internal political tension in the country sharply decreased, and the war of laws partially ceased.

Confrontation between two authorities. The legislative design of the new Russian statehood in the first years of reforms was seriously complicated by the confrontation within the government itself, between its two branches - legislative and executive, but essentially - two systems of power - one from the past, the other in the future - democratic. Their conflict in the absence of normal constitutional legitimacy of power (the slightly updated old Basic Law of the RSFSR continued to operate in the country) and the coexistence in the state body of two incompatible principles (presidential power and the Soviet system) was inevitable. Many amendments to the current Constitution and other legislative acts were adopted in the intensifying struggle of these two political forces. The failures of the first stage of liberal reforms strengthen the bloc of the old nomenklatura and contribute to the consolidation of all opposition forces around the legislative power. The goal of the opposition is to completely seize power through the weakening of presidential structures and tight control over the government. It was this goal that was reflected in the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” at numerous rallies of Labor Moscow, the National Salvation Front and other pro-communist organizations. In turn, hardliners surrounded insisted on the dissolution of the Supreme Council and the liquidation of the Congress of People's Deputies. Thus, the “August agreement” was called into question. Taking advantage of its legal uncertainty, various political forces began to “take away” state power piece by piece. Actual dual power, or rather anarchy, provoked the opposition to further redistribute power in its favor. The struggle over the foundations of the constitutional system of Russia continued with varying success until the spring of 1993. The Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, headed by R.I. Khasbulatov, increasingly intervened in the affairs of the executive branch, demanding the resignation of the president. In April 1993, at the insistence of B.N. Yeltsin, a referendum on confidence in the president was held. 58% of those who took part in the voting voted for trust. Nevertheless, the struggle to remove Yeltsin from power continued after the referendum. The constitutional crisis was not overcome. The question of the form of government - presidential or parliamentary republic - became particularly acute. Every day the constitutional crisis took on an increasingly dangerous and destructive character for the country.

The irreconcilable opposition made extensive use of numerous rallies and protest marches to achieve its goals. On May 1, 1993, demonstrators in Moscow on Leninsky Prospekt gave a real battle to the police forces. The intense struggle between the legislative and executive powers continued throughout the summer.

October events of 1993 By the fall of 1993, Russia found itself in a state of deep political crisis. Its growth is the result of Russia’s lack of real experience and stable traditions of democracy and parliamentarism. In the conditions of the beginning of the revolutionary process, several power centers simultaneously appeared in the country, due to which both R. Khasbulatov and B. Yeltsin had grounds to claim leadership in state affairs. Beginning in the spring of 1992, the majority of the deputy corps was aimed at gradually limiting the power and powers of the president and changing the course of reforms.

Under these conditions, B. N. Yeltsin, a staunch supporter of building a rule of law state (which is fully confirmed by the consistent fulfillment of his obligations), took a forced step. To end the protracted political dual power, on September 21, 1993, he issued decree No. 1400 “On step-by-step constitutional reform,” in which he announced the dissolution of the Congress and the Supreme Council and the holding of a referendum on the new Constitution and elections to the bicameral Federal Assembly (State Duma and Council of the Federation). By the same date, it was supposed to complete the work on preparing a new Constitution.

The Presidential Decree formally contradicted a number of articles of the current Constitution, but left the opposition a real opportunity to go to elections and democratically resolve the issue of power.

The opposition rejected the legitimate scenario and launched a decisive attack on the president. On the night of September 23, 1993, the extraordinary Tenth Congress of People's Deputies, at which there was no quorum, adopted a resolution declaring B. N. Yeltsin’s actions a “coup d’etat” and removed him from office. The congress elected Vice-President A.V. Rutsky as acting president. After this, the confrontation between the parties turns into a power struggle. Having received powers, A. Rutskoy creates armed formations, in “ The White house» weapons and ammunition are being brought in (later the military discovered 1,132 weapons - hundreds of machine guns, machine guns, grenade launchers, sniper rifles - 312 kg of TNT).

On October 1–2, there was still a possibility of a peaceful development of events. Chairman of the Constitutional Court V.D. Zorkin proposed the so-called zero option, the essence of which was to cancel all decisions of the president and the Supreme Council after September 21 and call for simultaneous re-elections of the president and parliament. But the opposition organized mass riots on October 3, 1993 in the center of Moscow on Smolenskaya Square. By 10 o'clock in the evening, armed militants who arrived at the Ostankino television center attempted to storm it.

In this situation, Yeltsin, taking full responsibility, gave the order to send a tank division to Moscow and blockade the White House. As a result of its subsequent assault, there were casualties on both sides, including neither deputies nor leaders of the rebellion. The rebels were arrested.

The events of October 1993 were received ambiguously by various layers of Russian society. And there are still no unambiguous assessments of them in historiography (among the five points of accusation of the left opposition, which initiated the process of removing B.N. Yeltsin from power in May 1998 through impeachment, i.e., through removal from office, there was also unlawful dissolution of 1993 of the opposition Supreme Council).

Regardless of legal and other assessments of the actions of the parties, “Black October” finally destroyed the system of Soviets and Soviet power.

Revival of Russian parliamentarism. In accordance with the presidential decision, on December 12, 1993, elections to the Federation Council and the State Duma were held. Simultaneously with the elections, a referendum was held on the draft of the new Constitution.

Elections on a multi-party basis were held in Russia for the first time after an almost eighty-year break. A real pre-election struggle for votes has unfolded between political parties and blocs. Initially, 35 parties and movements applied to participate in the elections, but only 13 of them managed to register their lists with the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, the rest were unable to collect the required 100 thousand voter signatures.

The elections were held in an atmosphere of tension in society caused by the collapse of the USSR and the October putsch. Voters showed their disappointment with the progress of radical reforms. As a result, none of the political parties that supported the president’s course received more than 15% of the votes from the total number of voters, which is why the State Duma initially turned out to be in opposition to the president. At the same time, by the very struggle for seats in parliament, and then by occupying important posts in it, deputies, including opponents of B.N. Yeltsin, recognized the legitimacy of the “usurper president” and “his Constitution.” Such legitimation generally ensured stability of the constitutional system of Russia for the coming years.

In total, in the elections on December 12, 444 deputies were elected to the State Duma, including 225 in federal and 219 in single-mandate electoral districts. Elections were not held in Tatarstan and Chechnya. Of the 13 electoral associations, only 8 received seats in parliament. Taking into account deputies elected on party lists and on an individual basis, the largest number of seats in the State Duma was received by the “Choice of Russia” party - 76, LDPR - 63, Agrarians - 55, Communist Party of the Russian Federation - 45.

New Constitution of Russia. On December 12, along with the State Duma elections, a referendum on the Constitution also took place. A little more than 50% of those who took part in the voting voted for the draft of the country’s new basic law. The adoption of the Constitution was a major step in the democratic renewal of Russia.

The Russian Constitution of 1993 is the first democratic Constitution in the entire history of the country. It put an end to the ideologization of state power and the entire system of the Soviet totalitarian regime. For the first time in the history of the Russian state, the Constitution established the fundamental principle of modern parliamentarism - the principle of separation of powers. Also for the first time, in accordance with generally accepted world practice, the legislative body was called parliament; its powers were separated from the powers of other government bodies, which allowed it to focus on legislative activity.

By the time the new Constitution was adopted in Russia, new social groups and parties had not taken shape, and the formation of the political and economic structures of the new society had not completed. For these reasons, the new Russian Constitution bore the features of a transition period and certain compromises. The most obvious of them is the noticeable imbalance of power between the president and parliament. According to the new basic law, the president has extremely broad powers. It is difficult to impeach him (remove him from office), although such a procedure is laid down (Article 93) in the new Constitution.

A person, his rights and freedoms (and not a collective, a class, a party, as it was before) are called the highest value in the Basic Law. Freedom of speech and freedom of the media were proclaimed, and censorship was prohibited. True, and this is one of the significant shortcomings, rights and freedoms have been pushed out of the main place.

Despite all its shortcomings, for the first time in the history of Russia, a document was adopted in which the level of guaranteed human rights and freedoms and the mechanism for their protection corresponded to the generally recognized principles and norms of international law. Everyone is guaranteed freedom of thought and speech, freedom of the media, and censorship is prohibited.

The new Basic Law, despite the weakness of real counterbalances to the decisions taken by the president, created a very real legal basis for the construction of a democratic federal rule of law state. As a result, already in 1994 Russia had a fully functional bicameral parliament.

Formation of the Federal Assembly. The new Russian Constitution changed the nature of state power, the form of government and the principles of legislative activity. A new, post-Soviet, post-communist stage in the development of Russian statehood has begun.

Unlike the former Supreme Council, the State Duma was initially created as an exclusively professional parliamentary body, where all elected deputies must work on a permanent basis. The jurisdiction of the lower chamber, according to the Constitution, includes the adoption of legislative acts, approval of the state budget and control over its implementation, control over the observance of human rights, and participation in the formation of the Government of the Russian Federation.

The Federation Council (as the upper house of parliament), according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, represented and defended the interests of 89 subjects of the Federation. Therefore, its main function is to review federal laws adopted by the lower house. The composition of the deputy corps of the State Duma of the first convocation mainly reflected the real balance of forces and moods in Russian society. None of the factions in the State Duma had a decisive advantage. At best, the communist and nationalist factions could count on the support of 180–230 deputies when voting, the “buffer factions” – 110–130, and the democratic ones – 100–120. In the lower house, eight factions and one deputy group “New Regional Policy” were created and officially registered. Their composition and political orientations changed several times during the work of the State Duma.

The process of formation of the Federal Assembly was difficult, since its first steps were carried out under the strong influence of the bloody outcome of the confrontation between the president and the Supreme Council.

The most consistent anti-presidential position in the State Duma was occupied by the faction of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), led by its chairman G. A. Zyuganov (the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, recreated in February 1993, demanded a change in government policy and the restoration of socialism). Having a solid representation in the Duma (45 people), the Communist faction initiated a discussion of the most confrontational issues - about the Commission to investigate the events of October 3-4, about the denunciation of the Belovezhskaya Accords, about the beginning of the presidential impeachment procedure. Nevertheless, the communist opposition was never able to secure a Duma majority according to the most important issues. Due to the imperfection of constitutional norms and the transitional nature of the parliament itself, compromise solutions were most often passed during voting. For these reasons, the 1993 parliament did not achieve much legislative success. The State Duma was able to adopt the new Civil Code of the Russian Federation, federal laws about the elections of the president, deputies of the State Duma, about the general principles of the structure of state power, about local self-government, about the basic guarantees of the electoral rights of Russian citizens.

The State Duma, in accordance with its constitutional law, on February 23, 1994, declared an amnesty for persons under investigation or in custody in connection with the events of August 19–21, 1991, May 1, 1993, September 21–October 4, 1993. This step, which was primarily political, turned the Duma into an independent center of power. However, the war in Chechnya clearly showed the inability of parliament to control the use of military force by the executive branch.

Nevertheless, the Russian parliament of the first convocation fulfilled its main function: it legitimized the new political and state system.

Chechen crisis. The new Russian Constitution enshrined the main features of the country's federal structure: its state integrity, the division of powers between authorities in the center and locally, the equality of the subjects of the Federation, as well as the signs of equality and self-determination of the peoples of the Russian Federation. According to the Constitution, the federal center has supreme power throughout the entire territory of the state. But as expected, the Constitution did not resolve all issues of the country's federal structure. The equality of the subjects of the Federation was fixed only formally (the Federation still had an “asymmetrical” character). Different regions had different competencies and bore different degrees of responsibility to the state and citizens.

Legislative bodies of republics, territories and regions differ significantly in their legal status, competence, and even in name. As a result, the formation of the national-state structure of Russia largely proceeded spontaneously, under the influence of continuous “bargaining” between the center and the regions on issues of authority and distribution of income.

The weakness of the federal government forced it to sign special bilateral agreements with the subjects of the Federation, as a rule, with the ethnic republics that were richest in their resources.

Thus, in February 1994, an agreement was signed with Tatarstan, which provided the republic with rights and advantages that other subjects of the Federation did not have. Tatarstan has taken over such traditional federal functions as protecting human and civil rights and freedoms, granting or depriving Tatar citizenship, establishing relations with foreign states, and others. However, this agreement made it possible to return Tatarstan to the constitutional space of Russia. Later, similar agreements were signed with other Russian republics. At the same time, Bashkortostan stipulated for itself in the agreement certain rights regarding the budget and taxes.

A bilateral agreement signed by the Russian government and the Republic of Yakutia (Sakha) allowed it not only to collect federal taxes itself, but also to spend them on federal programs. In 1994–1995 20 bilateral agreements were signed with ethnic republics. They allowed local authorities to gain time and satisfy the demands of nationalist forces, and the federal center to avoid forceful pressure in solving national problems.

At the end of 1994, the Russian leadership made an attempt to cut the “Chechen knot”. For three years since the national radicals led by D. Dudayev came to power in the republic, Moscow expected that the regime established by the general would become obsolete, but this did not happen. Over these years, Chechnya has turned into a dangerous source of separatism in the North Caucasus. D. Dudayev’s calls for the creation of a “common Caucasian home of peoples” outside Russia created a real danger of a repeated redistribution of the post-Soviet space and threatened the integrity of the Russian Federation. Chechen separatism threatened to undermine the barely emerging agreement between the center and the regions.

The federal authorities repeatedly tried to establish a dialogue with the regime of D. Dudayev, but the issue rested on the political status of Chechnya. The Chechen authorities stubbornly refused to consider the republic a subject of the Russian Federation. In response, the Russian government applied economic pressure, gradually reducing the supply of Volga and Siberian oil to the Grozny oil refinery, limiting the possibilities of financial fraud with Chechen advice notes.

This tactic has borne some fruit. By the end of 1993, the Dudayev regime was experiencing a serious crisis. The “Independent Republic of Ichkeria” was on the verge of a social explosion. The landslide decline in production, reduction in oil revenues, power outages for the republic's non-payment of debt, and constant armed clashes sharply reduced the number of supporters of D. Dudayev and the sovereignty of Chechnya.

However, the fragmentation and heterogeneity of the opposition forces allowed Dudayev to easily disperse the parliament, the Constitutional Court, and the Grozny city assembly in May-June 1993, when they demanded to limit his power and conduct an investigation into oil fraud.

In the spring of 1994, the Nadterechny district became the all-Chechen center of resistance to D. Dudayev, where the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic was created, headed by U. Avturkhanov. The denouement came on November 26, when the tank assault on Grozny, ineptly organized by the opposition and, possibly, the Russian special services, ended in complete failure.

After this, the “war party” gains the upper hand in the Russian leadership. On November 30, 1994, President B.N. Yeltsin issued a decree “On measures to restore constitutional legality and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” according to which a special group of troops was created to solve this problem. The troops were given only a few days to prepare for military operations. On December 10, 1994, troops of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Affairs entered the territory of Chechnya. From the very beginning, the fighting was unsuccessful for the federal troops. The assault on Grozny New Year's Eve, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Russian military personnel, became a military disaster. The failures of the Russian troops' military operations were explained by the fact that the military was given tasks that could not be accomplished by military means. In addition, the development and logistics of the operation were extremely unsatisfactory. Of the military equipment that entered service with the federal troops in Chechnya, more than 20% was completely faulty, and another 40% was partially faulty. As a result, in the first day of hostilities, federal troops, according to official data alone, lost 72 units of military equipment. What came as a surprise to Russian politicians and military officers was that Dudayev had a well-trained army. By the beginning of the events, the Chechen armed forces had 13 thousand people, not counting mercenaries and volunteers from other countries. In Chechnya, after the withdrawal of Russian troops from it in the fall of 1991, a lot of weapons and ammunition were accumulated. But most importantly, by skillfully playing on national feelings and portraying Russia as the enemy of the Chechen people, Dudayev managed to win over the population of Chechnya, who previously occupied a neutral position, to his side. From a bankrupt politician he turned into a national hero. Most of the population of Chechnya perceived the entry of federal troops as an invasion of an enemy army seeking to take away their freedom and independence.

As a result, the operation to restore the rule of law, preserve the integrity of Russia, and disarm the bandits turned into a protracted, bloody war for Russian society, affecting all aspects of life, and above all the economy.

New tasks of Russian foreign policy. The process of adapting Russian foreign policy to new realities in the world turned out to be long and painful. The transitional state of Russian society, the struggle for power, and the severe economic crisis have seriously complicated the development of the concept of national security and a new foreign economic doctrine.

For the above reason, in 1991–1993. The foreign policy of democratic Russia was in many ways a continuation of the “perestroika diplomacy” of M. S. Gorbachev. It was characterized by a desire to integrate into the Western community and world economic structures. The concept of a strategic alliance between Russia and the United States, proclaimed by Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev, which was later transformed into the idea of a strategic partnership, assumed Russia’s loyalty to Western values in exchange for Western assistance in implementing liberal reforms.

During the first two years of liberal reforms in the country, Russian diplomacy, despite mistakes and a limited arsenal of means, managed to solve many problems caused by the collapse of the USSR and the determination of a new international status of the Russian Federation. Russia took the seat held by the USSR in the UN Security Council.

On January 3, 1993, the presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States signed the extremely important Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-2), providing for the mutual reduction of the nuclear potential of the two countries by 2003 to the level of 3,500 nuclear warheads. This agreement caused a mixed reaction in Russian society, since at the beginning of the 90s. the stockpiles of nuclear warheads in the USSR amounted to more than 33 thousand, and in the USA - more than 23 thousand, and, therefore, Russia had to destroy a larger number of them.

In October 1993, as a result of the signing of the Tokyo Declaration, an important step was taken towards normalizing relations between our country and Japan.

At the same time, Russian foreign policy in these years clearly lacked strategic depth and initiative. Despite the democratic rhetoric, it still reflected the logic of the Cold War. Kozyrev's diplomacy as a whole brought insignificant results.

Certain miscalculations made in 1991–1992. in Russian-American relations, in politics in the Balkans and especially in relations with neighboring countries forced B. N. Yeltsin already in 1993 to significantly adjust Russia’s foreign policy course.

In the concept of foreign policy, approved in April 1993 by the President, the main attention was paid to the tasks of developing relations with countries of the near abroad and Eastern Europe, and only then followed the West and other regions of the world.

Thanks to this, bodies coordinating and directing the activities of the CIS, such as the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government, began to meet regularly. Cooperation between security and financial structures developed.

However, these real steps towards rapprochement within the CIS clearly revealed the differences in the interests of individual countries of the Commonwealth and their different readiness for further participation in the integration process.

The differences in their economic potential and economic structure significantly complicated the coordination of national-state interests of the CIS member states.

For these reasons, the formation and strengthening of the Commonwealth turned out to be more difficult than it seemed at first. In 1994–1997 processes of demarcation and national self-determination clearly outpaced integration and rapprochement. The republics that became independent built their power and economic structures, finances, and armed forces at an accelerated pace. Attempts to implement real integration, as a rule, did not go beyond numerous statements by leaders and the signing of regular multilateral agreements.

Under these conditions, a multi-speed integration strategy is being developed in the CIS. In 1995, the formation of a customs union began between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which made it possible to ensure freer movement of goods and capital of these states. In March 1996, the Quartet countries signed the Treaty on Deepening Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields. In parallel, the formation of the “two” (the Union of Russia and Belarus), the “single economic space” of the Central Asian countries - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and subsequently the “GUAM” - the unification of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova - for the purpose of developing Euro-Asian Trans-Caucasian transport corridor. The fragmentation of the Commonwealth into small blocs, as practice has shown, only strengthened centrifugal tendencies and contributed to the orientation of some blocs towards foreign partners.

Since 1994, Russia's foreign policy has gradually changed its character, becoming more and more powerful. Anti-Western sentiments are noticeably increasing in the country, mainly arising as a spontaneous reaction to concrete actions USA and its allies. At the beginning of 1996, the change of guidelines in foreign policy was reinforced by personnel changes: A. Kozyrev was replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs by E. Primakov, who had previously been the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service. Having become minister, E. Primakov declared the priority of his activities to be the near abroad, bilateral and multilateral relations with the CIS countries. The real result was achieved only in 1997, when agreements were signed with Belarus and Ukraine. The agreement with Ukraine became possible thanks to a compromise reached on two fundamental issues: the status of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and the division of the fleet itself.

During B. N. Yeltsin’s visit to Ukraine in the spring of 1997, the fleet was finally divided, as was its infrastructure.

By the mid-90s. The issue of NATO expansion to the East has become central to Russian diplomacy. In 1990–1991 the leaders of NATO states assured M. Gorbachev that after the unification of Germany and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO would not extend its influence to the East. Western leaders have not kept their promises.

The priority of the new American strategy is to preserve the systems of military-political alliances created by the United States during the Cold War. At the end of 1994, the United States decides on the need to admit former Soviet allies in the war zone to NATO, despite Russia's strong objections.

As a result of persistent negotiations, on May 27, 1997, the fundamental Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and NATO was signed in Paris. NATO and Russia no longer view each other as adversaries. Russia received from NATO a formal promise not to permanently station armed forces on the territory of its new members.

In general, the compromise on the issue of NATO expansion improved the situation in Europe and the world. However, NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia erased most of the achievements on the path of rapprochement between Russia and NATO, including agreements on the development of confidence-building measures.

New Eastern policy. As a result of deliberate efforts to intensify Russian eastern policy in 1991–1997. Relations with most countries in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) have reached new levels. Traditionally large-scale ties with India have consistently developed, and active cooperation with Vietnam and Mongolia has resumed.

In April 1996, in Beijing, B.N. Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin formulated a course for the development of an equal, trusting partnership. In the new historical conditions, relations between two neighboring states should be built not on ideological proximity, but on mutual benefit and a balance of interests.

A year later, in April 1997, during the state visit of the President of the People's Republic of China to Moscow, a joint Russian-Chinese Declaration on a multipolar world and the establishment of a new international order was signed. This document is important evidence of the coincidence of the conceptual approaches of the parties and the most important trend in the development of modern international relations. In this document, the parties supported the growing trend towards multipolarity in the world.

The main topic of the Beijing summit in April 1997 was economic issues. Fierce competition in the Chinese market forces Russia to quickly resolve issues of overcoming the economic crisis and create competitive products, since China in market conditions prefers higher quality products from leading Western countries to traditional Russian machinery and equipment.

In 1993–1997 The Russian-Japanese dialogue has noticeably intensified. For many decades, the development of economic and cultural ties between the two neighboring countries was hampered by the notorious “territorial issue.” Stalin, having refused to sign a peace treaty with Japan in 1951, missed the opportunity to once and for all resolve the dispute over the ownership of the Southern Kuril Islands in his favor.

The possibility of a breakthrough in relations between Tokyo and Moscow appeared only in 1993 after B. N. Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosakawa signed the Tokyo Declaration, which intended to solve the problem of the “northern territories” on the basis of legality and justice, without dividing into winners and defeated.

After the G7 meeting in Denver, the new Prime Minister of Japan, Hashimoto, proposed to reconsider his country’s foreign policy priorities in the context of the end of the Cold War and, in particular, to radically improve relations with Russia. One of the important reasons for the softening of the position of the Japanese side in relations with Russia is the unstable situation in East Asia, the strengthening of China’s position and, therefore, the need to maintain balance in the region.

Parliamentary elections 1995 In the fall of 1994, a new election campaign for elections to the State Duma, whose constitutional powers expired in 1995, started in the country.

The political crisis gave a powerful impetus to the establishment of a real multi-party system in Russia. For parties that were elected to the State Duma (Choice of Russia, LDPR, DPR, Communist Party of the Russian Federation, APR, PRESS), parliamentary activity becomes the main one. In the first half of 1994, about 50 political parties and 100 socio-political associations were registered in Russia.

Characteristic feature At this time, there was a regrouping of the main party and political forces: the search for allies and a unifying idea, the formation of election blocs and coalitions. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, trying to unite the entire left-wing electorate, is updating its political image, combining three different principles in its ideological platform: Marxism, Russian national doctrine and the concept of sustainable development.

By the summer of 1994, E. Gaidar created a right-wing liberal party, called the “Democratic Choice of Russia.” However, with its formation the split in the democratic movement was not overcome. Another right-wing party, Yabloko, led by G. Ya. Yavlinsky, criticized the monetarist “bias” in the activities of the government, E. Gaidar and V. Chernomyrdin and demanded expansion of the powers of the legislative branch.

Unlike the 1993 elections, which were held in extreme political and legal conditions that developed after the cessation of the activities of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, the 1995 elections took place in a relatively calm environment. In the fall of 1994, the active formation of pre-election blocs and coalitions of various political trends and orientations began, which reached its apogee by December 1995. Along with the political parties that participated in the 1993 elections, new political associations entered the arena: the “Our Home - Russia” (V. Chernomyrdin, S. Belyaev), “Ivan Rybkin Bloc”, “Congress of Russian Communities”, “Power”, etc. In total, 43 electoral associations and blocs were registered with the Central Election Commission by the beginning of the elections. Such fragmentation, which testified to the immaturity of Russian democracy, led to the fact that most of them failed to overcome the five percent barrier to obtain seats in the State Duma.

According to the voting results, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation received State Duma second convocation 158 mandates. The success of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in the elections was associated with the deterioration of the economic situation of the bulk of the population and the absence of noticeable changes for the better, the strengthening of nostalgic sentiments among people, and the desire to restore lost social guarantees. In turn, the defeat of radical reformists is the result of fragmentation and inability to unite. On the whole, the relative balance was not disturbed, and the new Russian parliament remained moderately opposed to the executive power.

End of work -

This topic belongs to the section:

Recent history of Russia

The modern history of Russia.. in a Shestakov the modern history of Russia..

If you need additional material on this topic, or you did not find what you were looking for, we recommend using the search in our database of works:

What will we do with the received material:

If this material was useful to you, you can save it to your page on social networks: