The collapse of the USSR: the formation of a new Russian statehood. Formation and development of the new Russian statehood

After the breakup USSR the liquidation of the previous structures of power and management began. Some former union institutions and departments were transferred to the disposal of Russian management structures. The Moscow Kremlin became the residence of the country's president.

April 21, 1992 was changed official name Russian state. The RSFSR was renamed the Russian Federation - Russia (with both names being equivalent).

With the collapse of the USSR, the nature of the relationship between the President, on the one hand, and the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies, on the other, did not change. The lack of a clear delineation of powers between them caused an acute confrontation between the two branches of government - legislative and executive. The relationship between them became especially aggravated during the development of the constitutional project of the Russian state. Anti-presidential sentiments have intensified among parliamentarians. Many members of the parliamentary corps advocated returning the country to its previous path. political development and for the restoration of the USSR. In December 1992, B. N. Yeltsin, in an address to the people, announced the transformation of parliament into a “reactionary force.”

The opposition sentiments of parliamentarians found support among a significant part of the population. Many Russians were dissatisfied with the continuation of the course towards the development of a market economy, the ongoing economic crisis and the lack of social guarantees. In December 1992, under pressure from the legislative branch, the government of E. T. Gaidar resigned. V. S. Chernomyrdin, who was previously in the leadership of the Cabinet of Ministers, became the new Prime Minister economic work. But this did not relieve tension in society and in the relationship between President B.N. Yeltsin and parliament.

In April 1993, on the initiative of the Congress of People's Deputies, a referendum was held on confidence in the president, on early elections of the president and people's deputies. Of the 69 million people who took part in the elections, over half supported the president and his socio-economic policies (58.7% and 53%, respectively). 67.6% of voters voted for early elections of deputies. The results of the referendum, which meant a victory for the presidential forces, deepened the political crisis.

The confrontation between the branches of power intensified in the fall of 1993. By this time, the president and his advisers had prepared a draft of a new Constitution of the Russian Federation. However, parliamentarians, trying to limit the omnipotence of the president, delayed its adoption. On September 21, 1993, B. N. Yeltsin announced the dissolution of representative bodies of power - the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation and the Congress of People's Deputies. Elections for a new parliament were scheduled for December 12. Some deputies refused to recognize the legality of the president’s actions and announced his removal from power. A new president was sworn in - A.V. Rutskoy, who until that moment held the post of Vice President of the Russian Federation.

In response to the unconstitutional presidential act, opposition forces organized demonstrations in Moscow and erected barricades in a number of places (October 2-3). An unsuccessful attempt was made to storm the city hall and the Ostankino television center. The desire to change the course of social economic reforms united several tens of thousands of people. A state of emergency was declared in the capital, and troops were sent into the city. During the events, several hundred of its participants died or were injured.

With the establishment of the president's autocracy, the dismantling of the Soviet system that had existed until then began. In October 1993, several decrees were adopted on the reform of representative bodies of government and local self-government. In accordance with them, the activities of Soviets at all levels were terminated. Their responsibilities were transferred to the hands of local administration and elected councils.

Russian Constitution of 1993 On December 12, 1993, the Constitution of the Russian Federation was adopted by popular vote. Russia was declared a democratic federal legal state with a republican form of government. The head of state was the president, elected by popular vote. The Russian Federation included 21 republics and 6 territories, 1 autonomous region and 10 autonomous districts, 2 federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg) and 49 regions. The principles for constructing the highest bodies of state power and administration were determined. The bicameral structure of the Federal Assembly, the permanent legislative body of the Russian Federation, was legislated (Diagram 3). The independence of the bodies of the three branches of government - legislative, executive and judicial - was emphasized.

The Constitution delimited the powers between the authorities of the Russian Federation and its subjects.

The most important national issues were included in the competence of the highest authorities of Russia: the adoption of laws and control over their implementation, management of federal state property, the financial system, the basics of pricing policy, the federal budget. They were responsible for resolving issues of foreign policy and international relations, declaring war and concluding peace, and managing foreign economic relations. The federal civil service was also subordinate to the federal government. Issues of environmental management, protection of historical and cultural monuments, education, and science were jointly administered by the authorities of the Federation and its constituent entities.

Political multi-party system, the right to freedom of labor and the right to private property were legislated. The Constitution created the conditions for achieving political stability in society.

Interethnic relations

After the collapse of the USSR, relations between the federal authorities and individual constituent entities of the Russian Federation were not easy.

One of the hotbeds of interethnic conflicts was in the North Caucasus. Only with the help Russian army managed to stop the armed clashes that arose due to territorial disputes between the Ingush and Ossetians. In 1992, Checheno-Ingushetia was divided into two independent republics.

On March 31, 1992, a Federative Treaty was signed between the autonomous republics of Russia. It provided for the division of powers between federal and republican authorities. The agreement recorded the refusal of the federal government to seek dictatorship. The document became the basis for the state unity of the country, the development of subsequent relationships between the center and the national-state formations of the Russian Federation. Tatarstan joined the treaty in 1994, stipulating special conditions that do not contradict the fact that it remains a full-fledged subject of the Federation. Specific relations developed with the leadership of the Republic of Ichkeria (Chechnya), which not only did not sign the Federative Treaty, but persistently sought to secede from Russia.

The adoption of the 1993 Constitution was an important step in strengthening the unity of the Russian state. At the same time, tensions remained in relations with individual constituent entities of the Federation. The development of the separatist movement in Chechnya led to a split in the leadership of the republic and armed conflicts between the separatists and the official authorities. In December 1994, the Russian Armed Forces were introduced into the territory of Chechnya. This marked the beginning of the Chechen war, which ended only at the end of 1996. The Peace Agreement signed in November 1996 between the Russian and Chechen leadership provided for the withdrawal of federal armed forces from Chechnya and the holding of presidential elections in the republic. The agreement and the cessation of hostilities did not eliminate the separatist aspirations of the Chechen leadership. The situation in the republic remained extremely tense and explosive.

Political parties in the State Duma. In December 1993, elections were held to a new government body - the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, consisting of two chambers: the Federation Council and the State Duma. On the eve of the elections, several political blocs and coalitions emerged. The blocs “Russia's Choice” and “Yavlinsky, Boldyrev, Lukin” (“Yabloko”), the Russian Movement of Democratic Reforms, and the election association “Fatherland” have become widely known. Most associations and parties advocated for a variety of forms of ownership, strengthening social protection of the population, and for the unity and integrity of Russia. However, on issues of nation-state building, their positions fundamentally diverged. The Yabloko bloc defended the idea of ​​a constitutional federation, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation - the restoration of the union state on a new basis, the Liberal Democratic Party - the revival of the Russian state within the pre-1977 framework.

As a result of elections held on a multi-party basis, representatives of 8 parties entered parliament. Nai larger number Russia's Choice, LDPR, Agrarian Party and Communist Party of the Russian Federation received seats.

The first chairman of the Federation Council was V.F. Shumeiko, former director of one of the country's large industrial enterprises. The State Duma was headed by I.P. Rybkin. From the first days of the work of the State Duma, several party factions arose within its composition. The most numerous among them was the “Choice of Russia” faction, headed by E. T. Gaidar.

Issues of economic and national policy, social security and international relations occupied a central place in the work of the State Duma of the first convocation. During 1993-1995 Deputies adopted over 320 laws, the vast majority of which were signed by the president. These include laws on the government and the constitutional system, on new forms of property, on peasant and farm enterprises, on joint-stock companies, and on free economic zones.

For the 1995 State Duma elections. public associations and the parties came with clear demands in the economic and political fields. The central place in the election platform of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation - G. A. Zyuganov) was occupied by the demands for restoring the Soviet system in Russia through peaceful means, ending the process of denationalization and nationalization of the means of production. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation advocated the termination of foreign policy treaties that “infringed” on the interests of the country.

The all-Russian socio-political movement “Russia is Our Home”, formed on the eve of the elections, united representatives of the executive structures of government, economic and business strata. Participants in the movement saw the main economic task in the formation of a mixed economic system on the principles inherent in a market economy. The role of the state was to create favorable conditions for the development of small and medium-sized businesses and business activity of the population.

450 deputies were elected to the State Duma of the second convocation. The overwhelming majority of them were employees of legislative and executive authorities, many of them were members of the previous deputy corps. 36% total number seats in the Duma were won by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, 12% - “Our Home is Russia”, 11% - LDPR, 10% - G. A. Yavlinsky's bloc (Yabloko), 17% - independent and 14% - other electoral associations.

The composition of the State Duma predetermined the acute nature of the inter-party struggle on all domestic political issues considered in it. The main struggle unfolded between supporters of the chosen path of economic and political reform and the opposition, in whose ranks were the factions of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party and the bloc of G. A. Yavlinsky. In fierce confrontation, decisions were discussed and decisions were made on issues related to the regulation of new socio-economic relations. A significant portion of the deputies were rejected by the government policy in Chechnya and foreign policy actions aimed at rapprochement with NATO. The position of the parliamentarians was supported by some sections of the Russian population.

The forces opposing the government tried to present a united front in the presidential elections in the summer of 1996. 11 people ran for the presidency, including B. N. Yeltsin, G. A. Zyuganov, V. V. Zhirinovsky, M. S. Gorbachev, G. A. Yavlinsky. As a result of two rounds of elections, B. N. Yeltsin again became the President of Russia. 55% of the total number of voters voted for him. G. A. Zyuganov, the main competitor of B. N. Yeltsin, received 40.7% of the votes. The results of the presidential elections showed that the overwhelming majority of citizens supported the president’s course towards creating a market economy and a democratic state.

The political system of Russia in the 1990s. has undergone qualitative changes. In the evolution of the state system of the Russian Federation, two stages can be distinguished: 1992-1993. - the period of maintaining the Soviet type of legislative (representative) power and its struggle with presidential-governmental structures and the period opened by the 1993 Constitution, which consolidated the political dominance of presidential power, the approval of a new mechanism for the separation of powers.

The political system of Russia in 1992-1993. was formed on the basis of coexistence and then confrontation between the two branches of government. Councils at all levels were retained. This period ended with a failed attempt to forcefully remove B. N. Yeltsin from power in October 1993 and the adoption of the new Constitution of the Russian Federation in a national referendum on October 12, 1993. At the same time, elections to the new parliament took place.

According to the new Constitution, Russia was declared a democratic federal legal state with a republican form of government. The federal structure of the country was consolidated, based on state integrity, delimitation of the jurisdiction and powers of government bodies of the center and the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, equality and self-determination of peoples. Russia includes 89 equal subjects: 21 republics, 6 territories, 49 regions, 1 autonomous region, 10 autonomous districts and 2 federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg).

State power in the Russian Federation began to be built on the basis of its division into legislative, executive and judicial. State power is exercised by the President, the bicameral Federal Assembly (the upper one is the Federation Council and the lower one is the State Duma), the Government and the courts of the Russian Federation.

A new phenomenon was the legal consolidation of the status of the Constitutional Court. In the constituent entities of Russia, state power is exercised by presidents, governors and local representative bodies. The Constitution recognized the ideological and political diversity of public life, enshrined a multi-party system, human and civil rights and freedoms, including the right to private property.

Since the end of 1993, the formation of new authorities began, provided for by the Constitution and other regulations. Elections to the State Duma were held according to a mixed majority-proportional system. The elections contributed to the emergence of a multi-party system in Russia. A major step in the political process was the 1996 national presidential election, in which B. N. Yeltsin again won. The next elections to the State Duma in 1999 took place in the context of the established multi-party system and the professionalization of parliamentary activities. The victory in these elections was won by the pro-government bloc “Unity”, formed mainly from supporters of the policies of the new Chairman of the Government V.V. Putin.

After the adoption of the 1993 Constitution, state legislation was updated. In almost all areas of law, new codes were adopted, which were fundamentally different from the codes of the Soviet era. Among them: Civil Code 1994-2001, Criminal Code 1996, Family Code 1995, Labor Code 2001, etc.

On December 31, 1999, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin announced his voluntary early resignation from his post. According to the Constitution, V.V. Putin became the acting president of the Russian Federation. At the elections held on March 26, 2000, in the first round, he was elected President of Russia.

After the collapse of the USSR, the liquidation of the previous structures of power and management began. Some former union institutions and departments were transferred to the disposal of Russian management structures. The Moscow Kremlin became the residence of the country's president.

On April 21, 1992, the official name of the Russian state was changed. The RSFSR was renamed the Russian Federation - Russia (with both names being equivalent).

With the collapse of the USSR, the nature of the relationship between the President, on the one hand, and the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies, on the other, did not change. The lack of a clear delineation of powers between them caused an acute confrontation between the two branches of government - legislative and executive. The relationship between them became especially aggravated during the development of the constitutional project of the Russian state. Anti-presidential sentiments have intensified among parliamentarians. Many members of the deputy corps advocated returning the country to the path of previous political development and for the restoration of the USSR. In December 1992 B.N. Yeltsin, in his address to the people, announced the transformation of parliament into a “reactionary force.”

The opposition sentiments of parliamentarians found support among a significant part of the population. Many Russians were dissatisfied with the continuation of the course towards the development of a market economy, the ongoing economic crisis and the lack of social guarantees. In December 1992, under pressure from the legislative branch, the government of E.T. resigned. Gaidar. V.S. became the new Prime Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers. Chernomyrdin, who was previously in a managerial economic position. But this did not relieve tension in society and in the relationship between President B.N. Yeltsin and parliament.

In April 1993, on the initiative of the Congress of People's Deputies, a referendum was held on confidence in the president, on early elections of the president and people's deputies. Of the 69 million people who took part in the elections, over half supported the president and his socio-economic policies (58.7% and 53%, respectively). 67.6% of voters voted for early elections of deputies. The results of the referendum, which meant a victory for the presidential forces, deepened the political crisis.

The confrontation between the branches of power intensified in the fall of 1993. By this time, the president and his advisers had prepared a draft of a new Constitution of the Russian Federation. However, parliamentarians, trying to limit the omnipotence of the president, delayed its adoption. September 21, 1993 B.N. Yeltsin announced the dissolution of representative government bodies - the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation and the Congress of People's Deputies. Elections for a new parliament were scheduled for December 12. Some deputies refused to recognize the legality of the president’s actions and announced his removal from power. The new president, A.V., was sworn in. Rutskoi, who until that moment held the post of Vice President of the Russian Federation.

In response to the unconstitutional presidential act, opposition forces organized demonstrations in Moscow and erected barricades in a number of places (October 2-3). An unsuccessful attempt was made to storm the city hall and the Ostankino television center. The desire to change the course of socio-economic reforms united several tens of thousands of people. A state of emergency was declared in the capital, and troops were sent into the city. During the events, several of its participants died or were injured.

With the establishment of the president's autocracy, the dismantling of the Soviet system that had existed until then began. In October 1993, decrees were adopted on the reform of representative bodies of government and local self-government. In accordance with them, the activities of Soviets at all levels were terminated. Their responsibilities were transferred to the hands of local administration and elected councils.

Choosing a political course. As at the beginning of the 20th century, the new Russian statehood was born in an atmosphere of chaos and anarchy. The content and sequence of political and economic reforms were dictated by the crisis state of the socialist system, and not by the subjective choice of certain political leaders.

By the end of 1991, a very difficult socio-economic situation was developing in the country. Over the year, national income decreases by more than 11%, industrial production falls, and the production of oil and coal and food products decreases. Almost all types of consumer goods become scarce. By the beginning of November 1991, the country's foreign exchange reserves were completely exhausted, and Vnesheconombank stopped all payments abroad, with the exception of payments to service the external debt, which by this time reached $76 billion. The threat of real famine looms over the country.

Due to constantly deteriorating living conditions, euphoria in society is quickly giving way to general disappointment. The newfound freedom from Marxist dogma brought a sense of relief to the country's population, but at the same time there was confusion about an uncertain future and a feeling of loss of social and moral guidelines. “Perestroika” shook the foundations of the Soviet system, but practically did not create the political and economic foundations of the capitalist system.

In the fall of 1991, state bodies of the USSR actually ceased to function as authorities. An attempt to create a new union state apparatus in the form of the Inter-Republican Economic Committee (IEC) ends in failure. The former Soviet republics refuse to fulfill economic obligations to the Union. Some of them decisively choose the path of radical socio-economic reforms. Others try by all means and means to avoid them or delay them as much as possible.

At the same time, the union bureaucracy was stealing federal property into urgently created “concerns” and “associations.” The process of spontaneous privatization is sweeping the regions of the country.

The situation in the country was complicated by the inaction of democratic forces that did not have a clear, well-developed program for systemic transformation. The disappearance of the enemy in the person of the CPSU caused split and apathy in their ranks.

The growing chaos and social tension required the Russian leadership to urgently recognize the new reality, form national state institutions, determine the goals and objectives of the foreign and domestic policies of the Russian Federation, resolve the most pressing socio-economic issues, and finally launch competitive market mechanisms. Coincidence in time of tasks that were solved in other countries in different time, incredibly complicated the activities of the government of B. N. Yeltsin. The creation of the foundations of a new socio-economic system took place in an environment of acute shortage of prerequisites for it. For historical reasons, Soviet people had only extremely negative ideas about capitalism and the market, and therefore did not feel the desire to participate in their creation.

For these reasons, the question of the purpose of transformation Russian society could not be immediately publicly staged in the fall and winter of 1991 either by the authorities or the media. President B. N. Yeltsin did not in any of his program speeches in 1991-1992. did not talk about capitalism as the ultimate goal of the beginning structural reforms. Thus, the question of where Russia should go in order not to lose its state and international positions was actually left unanswered. Because of this, the internal political situation in the country in the fall of 1991 remained uncertain, Russian society lived with vague expectations of change.

For the same reasons, the real chance of reorganizing the old state machine on a democratic basis, that is, through re-elections of Soviets at all levels, was not realized. After the collapse of the USSR, B. N. Yeltsin clearly did not want to “rock the boat.” Moreover, this prospect did not suit either the Russian partycrats or the Russian democrats at that time. Elections to the Soviets were postponed, and the old nomenklatura continued to operate in the Soviets and in economic structures. Between the new Russian leadership and the former party and economic elite, a completely definite agreement, not sealed by any formal agreements, arose, the essence of which was the refusal to dismantle the Soviet system and reform it only to a limited extent. The union of the political elite, new and old, became the basis of the post-August transitional Russian statehood. As a result, everything - from the army to the KGB, from the prosecutor's office to social security departments - was preserved. The changes affected only the CPSU apparatus (it was dissolved, and the buildings of the CPSU Central Committee were sealed). The president decisively rejected lustration (putting on trial for the past), which the most radical democrats insisted on. Having intuitively solved the problem of consensus (between the ruling and opposing political forces, avoiding a “witch hunt”), the new Russian leadership was able to begin reforms. However, the traditional split in values ​​in Russian society has significantly complicated the solution of this problem, constantly provoking the undermining of the achieved civil consent.

The crisis and collapse of the Soviet system coincided with the financial and budgetary crisis, so in the fall of 1991, the political leadership of Russia, along with the main task - the transition to a market and the formation of a developed system of private property relations - was faced with the no less pressing issue of stopping inflation and ensuring stable economic growth. The inaction of the Russian government in the first period after the August events had a negative impact on the development of the socio-economic situation. Uncertainty of economic prospects, discussions about the upcoming monetary reform and increase retail prices pushed the Russian population to buy goods and create a stock of essential items. As a result, the few goods still remaining from Gorbachev's times disappeared from the stores. The introduction of the principle of distributing goods among the population using cards and coupons and organizing sales at enterprises could not improve the situation. “Hungry queues” are becoming a major factor in politics, contributing to increased confrontation between political forces. The hardships caused by the collapse of the USSR seriously hampered the legitimacy of reformist authorities and policies. In turn, the emerging democratic institutions, transmitting and intensifying the social tension caused by the reforms, largely complicate their development. In this situation, the communists, who created several parties, began to gradually return to active political life. As a result, already at initial stage Post-communist transformation, the support of the political regime sharply narrowed. The situation was also complicated by the growing threat of the collapse of Russia itself, which was created at one time on the same principles as the Union.

Preserving the integrity of the Russian state. The fate of Russian statehood in 1991-1993. was largely determined by the confrontation between republican regional authorities and federal authorities. The reasons that led to the collapse of the USSR affected the growth of centrifugal, separatist tendencies within Russia. They were based on the desire of the regions to independently manage the fruits of their labor. Failures in reforming society pushed the autonomies to seek a way out of the crisis by solving their own national problems through isolation from other ethnic groups. In conditions of an aggravation of the economic crisis, the severance of economic ties, and the impoverishment of the majority of the population, the republican economic elite, skillfully appealing to the real facts of national discrimination, demanded preferential rights to territory and resources for the titular nationalities. The threat of the collapse of Russia grew throughout 1992. By the summer of this year, dozens of subjects of the Federation - Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia (Sakha), Udmurtia, Novosibirsk and Tyumen region delayed or even stopped paying taxes to the federal budget.

Some subjects of the Federation proposed transforming it into a confederation, others advocated real federalism, that is, a clear division of responsibilities and powers of the center and localities, taking into account the natural, climatic and socio-political differences of the regions. Still others, fearing the economic ineffectiveness of a federation built on ethnic rather than territorial-economic principles, as well as the development of “asymmetry” into a confederation, demanded the liquidation of existing republics, territories and regions and the creation in their place of provinces strictly subordinate to the center.

Claims of the republics and others national entities in Russia, for a special status, and even more so for leaving it, they were threatened with the complete collapse of the country and civil strife. Under these conditions, the government of the Russian Federation pursued an inconsistent national-state policy. The illegal armed groups of D. Dudayev, who dispersed the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomy in September 1991 and demonstratively announced the separation of Chechnya from Russia, were not disarmed, which subsequently turned into a serious crisis in this region. Subsidizing from the federal budget continued for the republics that were heading towards secession from Russia. It was only at the end of October 1992, after the start of the clash between the Ossetians and the Ingush, that the Russian President for the first time did not rule out the possibility of using force to protect the territorial integrity of the country and state interests.

The first serious step towards preserving the unity of Russia was the Federative Treaty, work on which began back in 1990. Even during the discussion of the draft treaty, it became obvious that the idea of ​​national statehood had taken deep roots during the years of Soviet power and it was impossible to return to territorial entities. Therefore, both a return to the pre-revolutionary provincial structure on a territorial basis and a federation were rejected nation states With priority rights on the territory of the titular nations and minimal powers of the federal center. Signed on March 31, 1992 by the majority of the subjects of the Federation, with the exception of Tatarstan and Chechnya, the Federative Agreement outlined in general terms the powers of general federal bodies and bodies of the subjects of the Federation. Thus, internal political tension in the country sharply decreased, and the war of laws partially ceased.

Confrontation between two authorities. The legislative design of the new Russian statehood in the first years of reforms was seriously complicated by the confrontation within the government itself, between its two branches - legislative and executive, but essentially - two systems of power - one from the past, the other in the future - democratic. Their conflict in the absence of normal constitutional legitimacy of power (the slightly updated old Basic Law of the RSFSR continued to operate in the country) and the coexistence in the state body of two incompatible principles (presidential power and the Soviet system) was inevitable. Many amendments to the current Constitution and other legislative acts were adopted in the intensifying struggle of these two political forces. The failures of the first stage of liberal reforms strengthen the bloc of the old nomenklatura and contribute to the consolidation of all opposition forces around the legislative power. The goal of the opposition is to completely seize power through the weakening of presidential structures and tight control over the government. It was this goal that was reflected in the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” at numerous rallies of Labor Moscow, the National Salvation Front and other pro-communist organizations. In turn, hardliners surrounded insisted on the dissolution of the Supreme Council and the liquidation of the Congress of People's Deputies. Thus, the “August agreement” was called into question. Taking advantage of its legal uncertainty, various political forces began to “take away” state power piece by piece. Actual dual power, or rather anarchy, provoked the opposition to further redistribute power in its favor. The struggle over the foundations of the constitutional system of Russia continued with varying success until the spring of 1993. The Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, headed by R.I. Khasbulatov, increasingly intervened in the affairs of the executive branch, demanding the resignation of the president. In April 1993, at the insistence of B.N. Yeltsin, a referendum on confidence in the president was held. 58% of those who took part in the voting voted for trust. Nevertheless, the struggle to remove Yeltsin from power continued after the referendum. The constitutional crisis was not overcome. The question of the form of government - presidential or parliamentary republic - became particularly acute. Every day the constitutional crisis took on an increasingly dangerous and destructive character for the country.

The irreconcilable opposition made extensive use of numerous rallies and protest marches to achieve its goals. On May 1, 1993, demonstrators in Moscow on Leninsky Prospekt gave a real battle to the police forces. The intense struggle between the legislative and executive powers continued throughout the summer.

October events of 1993 By the autumn of 1993, Russia found itself in a state of deep political crisis. Its growth is the result of Russia's lack of real experience and stable traditions of democracy and parliamentarism. In the conditions of the beginning of the revolutionary process, several power centers simultaneously appeared in the country, due to which both R. Khasbulatov and B. Yeltsin had grounds to claim leadership in state affairs. Beginning in the spring of 1992, the majority of the deputy corps was aimed at gradually limiting the power and powers of the president and changing the course of reforms.

Under these conditions, B. N. Yeltsin, a staunch supporter of building a rule of law state (which is fully confirmed by the consistent fulfillment of his obligations), took a forced step. To end the protracted political dual power, on September 21, 1993, he issued decree No. 1400 “On step-by-step constitutional reform,” in which he announced the dissolution of the Congress and the Supreme Council and the holding of a referendum on the new Constitution and elections to the bicameral Federal Assembly (State Duma and Council of the Federation). By the same date, it was supposed to complete the work on preparing a new Constitution.

The Presidential Decree formally contradicted a number of articles of the current Constitution, but left the opposition a real opportunity to go to elections and democratically resolve the issue of power.

The opposition rejected the legitimate scenario and launched a decisive attack on the president. On the night of September 23, 1993, the extraordinary Tenth Congress of People's Deputies, at which there was no quorum, adopted a resolution declaring B. N. Yeltsin’s actions a “coup d’etat” and removed him from office. The congress elected Vice-President A.V. Rutsky as acting president. After this, the confrontation between the parties turns into a power struggle. Having received powers, A. Rutskoy creates armed formations, in “ The White house» weapons and ammunition are being brought in (later the military discovered 1,132 weapons - hundreds of machine guns, machine guns, grenade launchers, sniper rifles, - 312 kg of TNT).

On October 1-2, there was still a possibility of a peaceful development of events. Chairman of the Constitutional Court V.D. Zorkin proposed the so-called zero option, the essence of which was to cancel all decisions of the president and the Supreme Council after September 21 and call for simultaneous re-elections of the president and parliament. But the opposition organized mass riots on October 3, 1993 in the center of Moscow on Smolenskaya Square. By 10 o'clock in the evening, armed militants who arrived at the Ostankino television center attempted to storm it.

In this situation, Yeltsin, taking full responsibility, gave the order to send a tank division to Moscow and blockade the White House. As a result of its subsequent assault, there were casualties on both sides, including neither deputies nor leaders of the rebellion. The rebels were arrested.

The events of October 1993 were received ambiguously by various layers of Russian society. And there are still no unambiguous assessments of them in historiography (among the five points of accusation of the left opposition, which initiated the process of removing B.N. Yeltsin from power in May 1998 through impeachment, i.e., through removal from office, there was also unlawful dissolution of 1993 of the opposition Supreme Council).

Regardless of legal and other assessments of the actions of the parties, “Black October” finally destroyed the system of Soviets and Soviet power.

Revival of Russian parliamentarism. In accordance with the presidential decision, on December 12, 1993, elections to the Federation Council and the State Duma were held. Simultaneously with the elections, a referendum was held on the draft of the new Constitution.

Elections on a multi-party basis were held in Russia for the first time after an almost eighty-year break. A real pre-election struggle for votes has unfolded between political parties and blocs. Initially, 35 parties and movements applied to participate in the elections, but only 13 of them managed to register their lists with the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, the rest were unable to collect the required 100 thousand voter signatures.

The elections were held in an atmosphere of tension in society caused by the collapse of the USSR and the October putsch. Voters showed their disappointment with the progress of radical reforms. As a result, none of the political parties that supported the president’s course received more than 15% of the votes from the total number of voters, which is why the State Duma initially turned out to be in opposition to the president. At the same time, by the very struggle for seats in parliament, and then by occupying important posts in it, deputies, including opponents of B.N. Yeltsin, recognized the legitimacy of the “usurper president” and “his Constitution.” Such legitimation generally ensured stability of the constitutional system of Russia for the coming years.

In total, in the elections on December 12, 444 deputies were elected to the State Duma, including 225 in federal and 219 in single-mandate electoral districts. Elections were not held in Tatarstan and Chechnya. Of the 13 electoral associations, only 8 received seats in parliament. Taking into account deputies elected from party lists and on an individual basis, greatest number The “Choice of Russia” party received 76 seats in the State Duma, LDPR - 63, Agrarians - 55, Communist Party of the Russian Federation - 45.

New Constitution of Russia. On December 12, along with the State Duma elections, a referendum on the Constitution also took place. A little more than 50% of those who took part in the voting voted for the draft of the country’s new basic law. The adoption of the Constitution was the most important step in the democratic renewal of Russia.

The Russian Constitution of 1993 is the first democratic Constitution in the entire history of the country. It put an end to the ideologization of state power and the entire system of the Soviet totalitarian regime. For the first time in the history of the Russian state, the Constitution established the fundamental principle of modern parliamentarism - the principle of separation of powers. Also for the first time, in accordance with generally accepted world practice, the legislative body was called parliament; its powers were separated from the powers of other government bodies, which allowed it to focus on legislative activity.

By the time the new Constitution was adopted in Russia, new social groups and the party, the formation of the political and economic structures of the new society has not finished. For these reasons, the new Russian Constitution bore the features of a transition period and certain compromises. The most obvious of these is the noticeable imbalance of power between the president and parliament. According to the new basic law, the president has extremely broad powers. It is difficult to impeach him (remove him from office), although such a procedure is laid down (Article 93) in the new Constitution.

A person, his rights and freedoms (and not a collective, a class, a party, as it was before) are called the highest value in the Basic Law. Freedom of speech and freedom of the media were proclaimed, and censorship was prohibited. True, and this is one of the significant shortcomings, rights and freedoms have been pushed out of the main place.

Despite all its shortcomings, for the first time in the history of Russia, a document was adopted in which the level of guaranteed human rights and freedoms, the mechanism for their protection corresponded to generally recognized principles and norms international law. Everyone is guaranteed freedom of thought and speech, freedom of the media, and censorship is prohibited.

The new Basic Law, despite the weakness of real counterbalances to the decisions taken by the president, created a very real legal basis for the construction of a democratic federal rule of law state. As a result, already in 1994 Russia had a fully functional bicameral parliament.

Formation of the Federal Assembly. The new Russian Constitution changed the nature of state power, the form of government and the principles of legislative activity. A new, post-Soviet, post-communist stage in the development of Russian statehood has begun.

Unlike the former Supreme Council, the State Duma was initially created as an exclusively professional parliamentary body, where all elected deputies must work on a permanent basis. The jurisdiction of the lower chamber, according to the Constitution, includes the adoption of legislative acts, approval of the state budget and control over its implementation, control over the observance of human rights, and participation in the formation of the Government of the Russian Federation.

The Federation Council (as the upper house of parliament), according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, represented and defended the interests of 89 constituent entities of the Federation. Therefore, its main function is to review federal laws adopted by the lower house. The composition of the deputy corps of the State Duma of the first convocation mainly reflected the real balance of forces and moods in Russian society. None of the factions in the State Duma had a decisive advantage. At best, the communist and nationalist factions could count on the support of 180-230 deputies when voting, the “buffer factions” - 110-130, and the democratic ones - 100-120. In the lower house, eight factions and one deputy group “New Regional Policy” were created and officially registered. Their composition and political orientations changed several times during the work of the State Duma.

The process of formation of the Federal Assembly was difficult, since its first steps were carried out under strong impact bloody outcome of the confrontation between the President and the Supreme Council.

The most consistent anti-presidential position in the State Duma was occupied by the faction of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), led by its chairman G. A. Zyuganov (the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, recreated in February 1993, demanded a change in government policy and the restoration of socialism). Having a solid representation in the Duma (45 people), the Communist faction initiated a discussion of the most confrontational issues - about the Commission to investigate the events of October 3-4, about the denunciation of the Belovezhskaya Accords, about the beginning of the presidential impeachment procedure. Nevertheless, the communist opposition was never able to secure a Duma majority on the most important issues. Due to the imperfection of constitutional norms and the transitional nature of the parliament itself, compromise solutions were most often passed during voting. For these reasons, the 1993 parliament did not achieve much legislative success. The State Duma was able to adopt a new Civil Code Russian Federation, federal laws on the elections of the President, deputies of the State Duma, on general principles the structure of state power, local self-government, and the basic guarantees of the electoral rights of Russian citizens.

The State Duma, in accordance with its constitutional law, on February 23, 1994, declared an amnesty for persons under investigation or in custody in connection with the events of August 19-21, 1991, May 1, 1993, September 21 - October 4, 1993. This step, which was primarily political, turned the Duma into an independent center of power. However, the war in Chechnya clearly showed the inability of parliament to control the use of military force by the executive branch.

Nevertheless, the Russian parliament of the first convocation fulfilled its main function: it legitimized the new political and state system.

Chechen crisis. The new Russian Constitution enshrined the main features of the country's federal structure: its state integrity, the division of powers between authorities in the center and locally, the equality of the subjects of the Federation, as well as the signs of equality and self-determination of the peoples of the Russian Federation. According to the Constitution, the federal center has supreme power throughout the entire territory of the state. But as expected, the Constitution did not resolve all issues of the country's federal structure. The equality of the subjects of the Federation was fixed only formally (the Federation still had an “asymmetrical” character). Different regions had different competencies and bore different degrees of responsibility to the state and citizens.

Legislative bodies of republics, territories and regions differ significantly in their legal status, competence, and even in name. As a result, the formation of the national-state structure of Russia largely proceeded spontaneously, under the influence of continuous “bargaining” between the center and the regions on issues of authority and distribution of income.

The weakness of the federal government forced it to sign special bilateral agreements with the subjects of the Federation, as a rule, with the ethnic republics that were richest in their resources.

Thus, in February 1994, an agreement was signed with Tatarstan, which provided the republic with rights and advantages that other subjects of the Federation did not have. Tatarstan has taken over such traditional federal functions as protecting human and civil rights and freedoms, granting or depriving Tatar citizenship, establishing relations with foreign states, and others. However, this agreement made it possible to return Tatarstan to the constitutional space of Russia. Later, similar agreements were signed with other Russian republics. At the same time, Bashkortostan stipulated for itself in the agreement certain rights regarding the budget and taxes.

Bilateral agreement signed Russian government and the Republic of Yakutia (Sakha), allowed it not only to collect federal taxes itself, but also to spend them on federal programs. In 1994-1995 20 bilateral agreements were signed with ethnic republics. They allowed local authorities to gain time and satisfy the demands of nationalist forces, and the federal center to avoid forceful pressure in solving national problems.

At the end of 1994, the Russian leadership made an attempt to cut the “Chechen knot”. For three years since the national radicals led by D. Dudayev came to power in the republic, Moscow expected that the regime established by the general would become obsolete, but this did not happen. Over these years, Chechnya has turned into a dangerous source of separatism in the North Caucasus. D. Dudayev’s calls for the creation of a “common Caucasian home of peoples” outside Russia created real danger re-division of the post-Soviet space threatened the integrity of the Russian Federation. Chechen separatism threatened to undermine the barely emerging agreement between the center and the regions.

The federal authorities repeatedly tried to establish a dialogue with the regime of D. Dudayev, but the issue rested on the political status of Chechnya. The Chechen authorities stubbornly refused to consider the republic a subject of the Russian Federation. In response, the Russian government applied economic pressure, gradually reducing the supply of Volga and Siberian oil to the Grozny oil refinery, limiting the possibilities of financial fraud with Chechen advice notes.

This tactic has borne some fruit. By the end of 1993, the Dudayev regime was experiencing a serious crisis. The “Independent Republic of Ichkeria” was on the verge of a social explosion. The landslide decline in production, reduction in oil revenues, power outages for the republic's non-payment of debt, and constant armed clashes sharply reduced the number of supporters of D. Dudayev and the sovereignty of Chechnya.

However, the fragmentation and heterogeneity of the opposition forces allowed Dudayev to easily disperse the parliament, the Constitutional Court, and the Grozny city assembly in May-June 1993, when they demanded to limit his power and conduct an investigation into oil fraud.

In the spring of 1994, the Nadterechny district became the all-Chechen center of resistance to D. Dudayev, where the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic was created, headed by U. Avturkhanov. The denouement came on November 26, when the tank assault on Grozny, ineptly organized by the opposition and, possibly, the Russian special services, ended in complete failure.

After this, the “war party” gains the upper hand in the Russian leadership. On November 30, 1994, President B.N. Yeltsin issued a decree “On measures to restore constitutional legality and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” according to which a special group of troops was created to solve this problem. The troops were given only a few days to prepare for military operations. On December 10, 1994, troops of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Affairs entered the territory of Chechnya. From the very beginning, the fighting was unsuccessful for the federal troops. The assault on Grozny New Year's Eve, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Russian military personnel, became a military disaster. The failures of the Russian troops' military operations were explained by the fact that the military was given tasks that could not be accomplished by military means. In addition, the development and logistics of the operation were extremely unsatisfactory. Of the military equipment that entered service with the federal troops in Chechnya, more than 20% was completely faulty, and another 40% was partially faulty. As a result, in the first day of hostilities, federal troops, according to official data alone, lost 72 units of military equipment. What came as a surprise to Russian politicians and military officers was that Dudayev had a well-trained army. By the beginning of the events, the Chechen armed forces had 13 thousand people, not counting mercenaries and volunteers from other countries. In Chechnya, after the withdrawal of Russian troops from it in the fall of 1991, a lot of weapons and ammunition were accumulated. But most importantly, by skillfully playing on national feelings and portraying Russia as the enemy of the Chechen people, Dudayev managed to win over the population of Chechnya, who previously occupied a neutral position, to his side. From a bankrupt politician he turned into a national hero. Most of the population of Chechnya perceived the entry of federal troops as an invasion of an enemy army seeking to take away their freedom and independence.

As a result, the operation to restore the rule of law, preserve the integrity of Russia, and disarm the bandits turned into a protracted, bloody war for Russian society, affecting all aspects of life, and above all the economy.

New tasks of Russian foreign policy. The process of adapting Russian foreign policy to new realities in the world turned out to be long and painful. The transitional state of Russian society, the struggle for power, and the severe economic crisis have seriously complicated the development of the concept of national security and a new foreign economic doctrine.

For the above reason, in 1991-1993. The foreign policy of democratic Russia was in many ways a continuation of the “perestroika diplomacy” of M. S. Gorbachev. It was characterized by a desire to integrate into the Western community and world economic structures. The concept of a strategic alliance between Russia and the United States, proclaimed by Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev, which was later transformed into the idea of ​​a strategic partnership, assumed Russia’s loyalty to Western values ​​in exchange for Western assistance in implementing liberal reforms.

During the first two years of liberal reforms in the country, Russian diplomacy, despite mistakes and a limited arsenal of means, managed to solve many problems caused by the collapse of the USSR and the determination of a new international status of the Russian Federation. Russia took the seat held by the USSR in the UN Security Council.

On January 3, 1993, the presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States signed the extremely important Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-2), providing for the mutual reduction of the nuclear potential of the two countries by 2003 to the level of 3,500 nuclear warheads. This agreement caused a mixed reaction in Russian society, since at the beginning of the 90s. the stockpiles of nuclear warheads in the USSR amounted to more than 33 thousand, and in the USA - more than 23 thousand, and, therefore, Russia had to destroy a larger number of them.

In October 1993, as a result of the signing of the Tokyo Declaration, an important step was taken towards normalizing relations between our country and Japan.

At the same time, the Russian foreign policy During these years there was clearly a lack of strategic depth and initiative. Despite the democratic rhetoric, it still reflected the logic of the Cold War. Kozyrev's diplomacy as a whole brought insignificant results.

Certain miscalculations made in 1991-1992. in Russian-American relations, in politics in the Balkans and especially in relations with neighboring countries forced B. N. Yeltsin already in 1993 to significantly adjust Russia’s foreign policy course.

In the concept of foreign policy, approved in April 1993 by the President, the main attention was paid to the tasks of developing relations with countries of the near abroad and Eastern Europe, and only then followed the West and other regions of the world.

Thanks to this, bodies coordinating and directing the activities of the CIS, such as the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government, began to meet regularly. Cooperation between security and financial structures developed.

However, these real steps towards rapprochement within the CIS clearly revealed the differences in the interests of individual countries of the Commonwealth and their different readiness for further participation in the integration process.

The differences in their economic potential and economic structure significantly complicated the coordination of national and state interests of the CIS member states.

For these reasons, the formation and strengthening of the Commonwealth turned out to be more difficult than it seemed at first. In 1994-1997 processes of demarcation and national self-determination clearly outpaced integration and rapprochement. The republics that became independent built their power and economic structures, finances, and armed forces at an accelerated pace. Attempts to implement real integration, as a rule, did not go beyond numerous statements by leaders and the signing of regular multilateral agreements.

Under these conditions, a multi-speed integration strategy is being developed in the CIS. In 1995, the formation of a customs union began between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which made it possible to ensure freer movement of goods and capital of these states. In March 1996, the Quartet countries signed the Treaty on Deepening Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields. In parallel, the formation of the “two” (the Union of Russia and Belarus), the “single economic space” of the Central Asian countries - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and subsequently the “GUAM” - the unification of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova - was underway in order to develop the Euro-Asian Trans-Caucasian transport corridor. The fragmentation of the Commonwealth into small blocs, as practice has shown, only strengthened centrifugal tendencies and contributed to the orientation of some blocs towards foreign partners.

Since 1994, Russia's foreign policy has gradually changed its character, becoming more and more powerful. Anti-Western sentiments are noticeably increasing in the country, mainly arising as a spontaneous reaction to specific actions of the United States and its allies. At the beginning of 1996, the change of guidelines in foreign policy was reinforced by personnel changes: A. Kozyrev was replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs by E. Primakov, who had previously been the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service. Having become minister, E. Primakov declared the priority of his activities to be the near abroad, bilateral and multilateral relations with the CIS countries. The real result was achieved only in 1997, when agreements were signed with Belarus and Ukraine. The agreement with Ukraine became possible thanks to a compromise reached on two fundamental issues: the status of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and the division of the fleet itself.

During B. N. Yeltsin’s visit to Ukraine in the spring of 1997, the fleet was finally divided, as was its infrastructure.

By the mid-90s. The issue of NATO expansion to the East has become central to Russian diplomacy. In 1990-1991 the leaders of NATO states assured M. Gorbachev that after the unification of Germany and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO would not extend its influence to the East. Western leaders have not kept their promises.

The priority of the new American strategy is to preserve the systems of military-political alliances created by the United States during the Cold War. At the end of 1994, the United States decides on the need to admit former Soviet allies in the war zone to NATO, despite Russia's strong objections.

As a result of persistent negotiations, on May 27, 1997, the fundamental Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and NATO was signed in Paris. NATO and Russia no longer view each other as adversaries. Russia received from NATO a formal promise not to permanently station armed forces on the territory of its new members.

In general, the compromise on the issue of NATO expansion improved the situation in Europe and the world. However, NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia erased most of the achievements on the path of rapprochement between Russia and NATO, including agreements on the development of confidence-building measures.

New Eastern policy. As a result of deliberate efforts to intensify Russian eastern policy in 1991-1997. Relations with most countries in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) have reached new levels. Traditionally large-scale ties with India have consistently developed, and active cooperation with Vietnam and Mongolia has resumed.

In April 1996, in Beijing, B.N. Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin formulated a course for the development of an equal, trusting partnership. In the new historical conditions, relations between two neighboring states should be built not on ideological proximity, but on mutual benefit and a balance of interests.

A year later, in April 1997, during the state visit of the President of the People's Republic of China to Moscow, a joint Russian-Chinese Declaration on a multipolar world and the establishment of a new international order was signed. This document is important evidence of the coincidence of the conceptual approaches of the parties and the most important trend in the development of modern international relations. In this document, the parties supported the growing trend towards multipolarity in the world.

The main topic of the Beijing summit in April 1997 was economic issues. Fierce competition in the Chinese market forces Russia to quickly resolve issues of overcoming the economic crisis and create competitive products, since China in market conditions prefers higher quality products from leading Western countries to traditional Russian machinery and equipment.

In 1993-1997 The Russian-Japanese dialogue has noticeably intensified. For many decades, the development of economic and cultural ties between the two neighboring countries was hampered by the notorious “territorial issue.” Stalin, having refused to sign a peace treaty with Japan in 1951, missed the opportunity to once and for all resolve the dispute over the ownership of the Southern Kuril Islands in his favor.

The possibility of a breakthrough in relations between Tokyo and Moscow appeared only in 1993 after B. N. Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosakawa signed the Tokyo Declaration, which intended to solve the problem of the “northern territories” on the basis of legality and justice, without dividing into winners and defeated.

After the G7 meeting in Denver, the new Prime Minister of Japan, Hashimoto, proposed to reconsider his country’s foreign policy priorities in the context of the end of the Cold War and, in particular, to radically improve relations with Russia. One of important reasons softening the position of the Japanese side in relations with Russia - the unstable situation in East Asia, the strengthening of China’s position and, consequently, the need to maintain a balance in the region.

Parliamentary elections of 1995. In the fall of 1994, a new election campaign for elections to the State Duma, whose constitutional powers expired in 1995, started in the country.

The political crisis gave a powerful impetus to the establishment of a real multi-party system in Russia. For parties that were elected to the State Duma (Choice of Russia, LDPR, DPR, Communist Party of the Russian Federation, APR, PRESS), parliamentary activity becomes the main one. In the first half of 1994, about 50 political parties and 100 socio-political associations were registered in Russia.

A characteristic feature of this time was the regrouping of the main party and political forces: the search for allies and a unifying idea, the formation of election blocs and coalitions. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, trying to unite the entire left-wing electorate, is updating its political image, combining three different principles in its ideological platform: Marxism, Russian national doctrine and the concept of sustainable development.

By the summer of 1994, E. Gaidar created a right-wing liberal party, called the “Democratic Choice of Russia”. However, with its formation the split in the democratic movement was not overcome. Another right-wing party, Yabloko, led by G. Ya. Yavlinsky, criticized the monetarist “bias” in the activities of the government, E. Gaidar and V. Chernomyrdin, and demanded expansion of the powers of the legislative branch.

Unlike the 1993 elections, which were held in extreme political and legal conditions that developed after the cessation of the activities of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, the 1995 elections took place in a relatively calm environment. In the fall of 1994, the active formation of pre-election blocs and coalitions of various political trends and orientations began, which reached its apogee by December 1995. Along with the political parties that participated in the 1993 elections, new political associations entered the arena: the “Our Home - Russia” (V. Chernomyrdin, S. Belyaev), “Ivan Rybkin Bloc”, “Congress of Russian Communities”, “Power”, etc. In total, 43 electoral associations and blocs were registered with the Central Election Commission by the beginning of the elections. Such fragmentation, which testified to the immaturity of Russian democracy, led to the fact that most of them failed to overcome the five percent barrier to obtain seats in the State Duma.

According to the voting results, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation received 158 mandates in the State Duma of the second convocation. The success of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in the elections was associated with the deterioration economic situation the majority of the population and the absence of noticeable changes for the better, increasing nostalgic sentiments among people, and the desire to restore lost social guarantees. In turn, the defeat of radical reformists is the result of fragmentation and inability to unite. On the whole, the relative balance was not disturbed, and the new Russian parliament remained moderately opposed to the executive power.

11.1. Legal foundations of the new Russian statehood

The collapse of the USSR confronted the Russian Federation, as well as other republics of the former Union, with the problem of ensuring independent state existence and the task of establishing a new Russian statehood.

In this regard, the country's leadership, socio-political parties and movements interested in a democratic and strong Russia were faced with the urgent task of finding a civilized system of its state structure in the conditions of modern transformations. It was necessary to make a transition to a socially oriented market economy and democratic methods of leadership, to create the legal foundations of Russian statehood, to build a state that reliably and effectively serves its people, establishes and guarantees order, and protects society from anarchy and tyranny; protects against any external threats; guarantees a complex of social benefits, first of all, to those who themselves are not able to realize the opportunities provided by the state.

The political development of Russia in the first years after the collapse of the USSR was associated with the constitutional design of Russian statehood. First of all, presidential structures began to be created - the Security Council and the Presidential Council, and the institution of presidential representatives was introduced in the regions, who exercised powers bypassing local councils.

Legal basis of Russian statehood at the end of 1991 - beginning of 1992. was quite controversial. It was based on laws inherited from the USSR and the laws of the RSFSR as an integral part of the Union. Such inconsistency in Russia's constitutional framework was objectively determined by its evolutionary transition to new principles for building the state, society and the relationships between them.

In one state organism two incompatible principles coexisted and opposed each other. New - presidential power, federalism, the principle of separation and mutual limitation of powers, responsibility to society. And the old thing is the strict hierarchy of the Soviet system with its monopoly on all power functions and collective responsibility (i.e. irresponsibility) for decisions made.

The legislative formalization of the new Russian statehood initially proceeded gradually, through the adoption of individual amendments to the current Constitution of the RSFSR of 1978, laws, declarations, and decrees of the President of the Russian Federation. An important achievement in this regard was the Declaration on the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens adopted in 1990 - a fundamental document for further work on legislation ensuring human rights.

In connection with the reform of socio-economic relations, the desire to create a socially oriented market economy, legislative acts were adopted regulating new property relations, land relations, business activities, privatization, the banking sector, guaranteeing freedom of the media. Important steps in the legal formation of the new Russian statehood were the beginning of judicial reform, significant milestones of which were the establishment of the Constitutional Court, arbitration courts and jury trials, a serious update of criminal and criminal procedural legislation, guaranteeing the reality of the presumption of innocence.

However, the adopted legislative acts did not provide clear and comprehensive regulation, did not always provide mechanisms for their implementation, guarantees and responsibility of government structures to society.

Many amendments to the Constitution of the RSFSR and other legislative acts were adopted in intense struggle two political forces - reformers and counter-reformers, who during 1992-1993. increasingly polarized. At the same time, everything became increasingly aggravated, especially in federal level, the confrontation between the executive branch and the Soviets. The tactics of constant balancing, searching for compromises with political opponents held back the creation of a new Russian statehood, and at times led to a retreat from the course of reforms and to the prolongation of the painful effects of the transition period.

In order to peacefully resolve contradictions, the President and the Government of Russia sought solutions with the help of the Constitutional Agreement, the April 1993 referendum on confidence in the President and people's support for the course of reforms, and a constitutional meeting. Although the majority of participants in the April referendum spoke out in support of B.N. Yeltsin, the confrontation of political forces in the country, especially in Moscow and a number of other cities, grew, sometimes resulting in mass demonstrations, accompanied by clashes with the police and casualties among the participants.

January 21, 1993 President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin issued decree No. 1400 “On phased constitutional reform in Russia.” In it, he announced the dissolution of the Supreme Council, the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia and the holding of elections to the bicameral Federal Assembly, as well as elections of the President of Russia in June 1994.

There are two opposing views on the events of early October 1993. Opponents of President B.N. Yeltsin believe that the President committed a crime: he dispersed the legally elected Supreme Council, used armed army units in the fight against it and other opposition forces, and authorized the murder of hundreds of citizens Russia. The President’s supporters believe that he dealt with the anti-democratic, pro-communist opposition that had taken the path of rebellion.

“Black October” finally destroyed the system of Soviets and Soviet power in Russia - following the Supreme Council, the Councils of People's Deputies of lower levels in most subjects of the federation were liquidated. These events became an important catalyst for accelerating the formation of a new system of power and the creation of a new Constitution.

In accordance with the decision of the President of the Russian Federation, on December 12, 1993, elections were held to the State Duma - the lower house of the bicameral Federal Assembly. Simultaneously with the elections, a referendum was held on the draft of the new Constitution of Russia, the preparation of which began in the summer of 1993 by a specially created Constitutional Conference.

Elections in December 1993 and adoption of a new Constitution of the Russian Federation laid the legal foundations of the new Russian statehood, were their constitutional design and the most important stage in the democratic renewal of Russia.

For the construction of a new Russian statehood, a new system of public administration, it is importantmatter Federative Treaty, signed on March 31, 1992, Agreement on Social Accord in the spring of 1994, signing of agreements on the delimitation of powers and areas of jurisdiction between the federal center and the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, adoption and implementation of civil, family, labor, criminal procedure codes , as well as many other federal laws and regulations adopted in subsequent years.

11.2. Stages of formation of the modern Russian state

Researchers identify various stages in the formation of the modern Russian state. Thus, O. Smolin identifies four main periods in the socio-political process, as a result of which the formation of a new Russian statehood took place: reformist (April 1985 - August 1991); revolutionary (August 1991 - August 1996); post-revolutionary (August 1996 - December 1999); the period of stabilization and reform of the post-revolutionary political regime (January 2000).

V. Sogrin divides the modern period of Russian history into three completed stages: 1985-1986, 1987-1991, 1991-1999. - and one unfinished (began with V. Putin coming to power).

As a starting point for the periodization of the formation of the modern Russian state, we can highlight June 12, 1990, when the First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty. True, it was just a declaration that had no legal consequences, but its adoption meant the potential opportunity, in the event of certain circumstances, to create one’s own statehood. That's why First step can be seen as the creation of legal, political and economic foundations for the formation of an independent Russian state. It was marked by the introduction of the post of president and the election of B.N. Yeltsin to this post. The first stage ends with disintegration Soviet Union and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (06/12/1990 - December 1991).

Second phase(1992-1993) is usually defined as anti-statist. The first wave reformers (E. Gaidar, A. Chubais, A. Shokhin, etc.) sought to oust the state, primarily from the economic sphere. Its functions here, according to their plan, were to be performed by a self-developing market. At this stage, the institutions for planned regulation of the economy were eliminated, and its denationalization began. Privatization of state property, liberalization of prices, creation of market economy institutions (exchanges, commercial banks, etc.) should have led to the formation of economic entities independent from the state and caused the corresponding social change: the formation of a class of large private owners and a middle class, constituting the basis of a civil society capable of subjugating the state. IN social sphere the state reserved support for education, medicine, pension provision, assistance to the unemployed. The state had to ensure the advancement of reforms, creating a legal space for them, ensuring law and order and stability of society, support from the world community, and sufficient defense capability of the country. In the political sphere, it was marked by the confrontation between the Supreme Council and the President, the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies and the cessation of Soviet power.

At the third stage (1994-1998) the illusory nature of the reformers’ intentions to limit government intervention in the economic sphere was revealed. The experience of reforms showed that the state did not leave the economy; only the nature and methods of its influence on economic processes changed. Moreover, some experts note that these changes had extremely negative consequences for both the state and society.

State institutions, having abandoned the functions of directive management and direct control over the activities of economic entities, actively influenced, first of all, the process of privatization of state property. This became the basis for the merging of the state bureaucracy with the emerging class of private owners, accompanied by a fantastic surge of corruption and the emergence of nomenklatura-oligarchic clans that sought to subordinate the state to their interests.

The hope of the reformers that the “self-developing” market would become an effective regulator of economic relations in the country did not come true. On the contrary, during this period the tendency towards a socio-economic crisis in the country intensified. The state, having lost a significant part of its property, unable to collect taxes in the amount necessary to perform its most important functions, found itself in a situation of acute crisis.

This crisis manifested itself in the inability of the state to consolidate a society in whichsocial polarization, confrontation between the authorities and the opposition, which at times acquired extremely acute forms, sharply intensified; in the failure to fulfill the most important social functions, as evidenced by the crisis in the healthcare, education, science, culture, and pension systems; in the ineffective activities of law enforcement agencies, who were unable to stop the tide of growing crime caused by the redistribution of property; in the degradation of the Russian Armed Forces, losing their combat effectiveness; in permanent government crises; in the decline of the foreign policy prestige and influence of the Russian state; in the uncertainty of the prospects for economic cooperation between Russia and developed countries, which especially intensified after the default.

By the fall of 1998, the defects of the chosen model of interaction between state and society, which took shape in the process of modern Russian reforms, were revealed. The opinion about the improvement of the state and the strengthening of its role was shared by the main political forces of the country in a wide spectrum: from the “right” center to national-patriotic forces.

Fourth stage(September 1998 - December 1999) was marked by a change of government, headed by E. Primakov, who announced the need to adjust the course of reforms.

The main goal of this adjustment is to increase the role of the state in reforming Russian society and, above all, its economy. This was necessary to increase the effectiveness of reforms in the interests of the whole society, and not the nomenklatura-oligarchic clans. This did not mean a return to the methods of strict state regulation characteristic of the Soviet era. Methods were needed to ensure an optimal balance between the mechanisms of self-development of society and government regulation, which is inevitable for complexly organized socio-economic systems. The ideologists of radical liberal reforms made a significant mistake in assessing the trends that determine the logic of development of modern states. This logic was assessed by them in terms of “decrease - increase” of the role of the state, while in reality the state did not reduce or strengthen its role in society, it changed the methods and means of its influence on society, remaining the main factor ensuring sustainable, stable development of complex socio-economic systems.

Fifth stage(2000s) began with V. Putin coming to power and is characterized by a strengthening of the vertical of power, an increase in the role of the state in the socio-economic sphere, a change in priorities in regional politics, and an attempt to create an effective judicial system. Without abandoning liberal reforms in the economic sphere, the state is pursuing an active social policy by redistributing resources in favor of the losing sections of society (state employees, pensioners, youth). Political changes are largely authoritarian in nature, but do not cause sharp protests from the main part of society. The President has set a course for creating a strong state through effective economic policy while implementing the principle of the rule of law. In his presidential messages, the head of state focuses on the relationship between a strong state and the protection of civil, political and economic freedoms. Strengthening the state is associated with achieving efficiency in all spheres of society.

11.3. The concept of the rule of law

Constitutional state means a type of state whose power is based on law, is limited by it and is realized through it. The main elements that form the basis of the rule of law are human freedom, associated with the most complete provision of his rights, and the limitation of state power by law.

In a rule-of-law state, conditions are created for a person for his legal freedom, a unique mechanism of legal incentives, which is based on the principle “everything that is not prohibited by law is permitted.” This principle is the opposite of the principle of a totalitarian state: “everything that is not permitted by law is prohibited.” The fundamental difference between these principles lies in the initial freedom or, conversely, lack of freedom of a person. If the first principle presupposes a partial restriction of the rights of a free individual, then the second principle proceeds from the possibility of granting partial rights and freedoms to a person completely dependent on the state.

Man, as an autonomous subject, is free to dispose of his own strengths, abilities, property, and conscience. Law, being a form and measure of freedom, should push the boundaries of an individual’s capabilities as much as possible.

Generalized legal aspects of personality are embodied in the formula « human rights» , which are fundamental, since they are designed to provide the primary prerequisites for a decent human existence and underlie specific and diverse subjective individual rights. Human rights are a source of constant reproduction of his initiative, entrepreneurship, and an instrument for the self-development of civil society. In the modern period, human rights problems reach the international, interstate level, which confirms the legitimacy of their priority over state problems and indicates their national character.

Human rights and the rule of law are undoubtedly characterized by general patterns of emergence and functioning, since they can only exist and operate in one “bundle”. Both phenomena are based on law, although its role for them is different, despite the existing points of contact. This indicates that the connecting link between a person and the state should be law, and the relationship between them should be truly legal.

The essence of the rule of law is the limitation of the law of the state. Law here acts as the antipode of arbitrariness and as a barrier on its path. Since state power (mainly executive power) tends to degenerate into various abuses, it requires a reliable legal framework that limits and restrains such negatives, erecting a barrier to its unjustified and illegal excess and violation of human rights.

Legal restrictions are necessary to ensure that the shortcomings of a powerful person do not turn into the vices of state power. That is why we can say that the law does not limit the actual control effects of government agencies on the individual, but only unjustified and unlawful infringements of the interests of citizens. In fact, the law, by limiting power, protects it from self-destruction, therefore, in a democracy, the rule of law is established.

Consequently, “the rule of law is an organization of political power that creates conditions for the most complete provision of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, as well as for the most consistent binding of state power through law in order to prevent abuses.”

11.4. Implementation of the principles of the rule of law in modern Russia

From the definition of the rule of law, two main ones can be distinguished: principle of the rule of law : the most complete provision of human and civil rights and freedoms (substantive side); as well as the most consistent connection with the help of law of political power, the formation of legal restrictions for state structures (formal legal side).

The first principle is constitutionally enshrined in Article 2 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which states that “a person, his rights and freedoms are the highest value.” The main purpose of the rule of law is to guarantee every citizen the opportunity for comprehensive personal development. At the same time, the rights of a person and a citizen are primary, natural, while the possibility of exercising the functions of state power is secondary, derivative.

Democracy, like the rule of law, does not seem possible without human freedom, the implementation of which is served by political institutions, provided that they are not only legal, but also legitimate.Freedom flourishes only if society manages to create institutions that ensure its stability and continued existence. According to Ralf Dahrendorf, “institutions are the framework within which we make our choices, such as economic prosperity. Institutions guarantee us respect for our rights, and therefore social justice. If we want as many people as possible to have the best chances in life, we must achieve this through institutions, while continually refining and improving those structures.”

The second principle is implemented using the following methods and means.

1. Within the framework of the rule of law, a special place belongs to constitutionalism , which is a stabilizing factor, ensures the predictability of the policy being implemented. The starting point of constitutionality is the recognition of the priority of the principle of law rather than the factor of force. The law becomes the main instrument regulating various aspects of public life, defining the boundaries of power. The rule of law is a necessary condition for the normal functioning of every person and the entire society. The regime of legality, the triumph of law in inextricable unity with the priority of man, is the most important thing in understanding the nature of the rule of law.

In a rule-of-law state, a law adopted by the supreme authority in strict compliance with all constitutional procedures cannot be repealed, amended or suspended by acts of the executive branch. The law is adopted either by the people or by deputies, who are representatives of the people and respectively express public interests, in contrast to instructions and orders adopted by ministries and departments in their narrow sectoral or corporate interests. Therefore, when departmental orders diverge from the law in Russia, the latter acts as having the highest legal force.

2. Limitation of state power through the implementation of human rights and freedoms and citizen , i.e. actual implementation of the first principle. Human rights form the basis of a system of “checks and balances”, a legal limitation for the state, thereby preventing the latter from unnecessary regulatory intrusion into private life.

Since the state will never limit itself, limiting its power is possible only through another power, which the state cannot ignore. Such power is represented by the rights of man and citizen, which are a kind of manifestation of the power of the individual, the will of civil society. Only awareness of the need for proactive behavior of citizens can become a guarantee of the priority of human and civil rights as the highest value over the rights of the state.

3. The rule of law is based on principle of separation of powers , which in modern interpretation has three accents: social, political and legal. From a social point of view, the division of powers is determined by the division of socially necessary labor for the implementation of power functions, its specialization and professionalization. The political meaning of the separation of powers lies in the demonopolization of power, its dispersal across various areas and rational organization. The legal aspect of the separation of powers is realized through the constitutional consolidation of the most important provisions of the idea itself, the constitutional delimitation of branches of power.

System of "checks and balances" , installed in Russian Constitution, laws, is a set of legal restrictions in relation to specific government authorities: legislative, executive, judicial.

Thus, in relation to the legislative branch, a rather strict legal procedure of the legislative process is used, which regulates its main stages, the procedure for implementation: legislative initiative, discussion of the bill, adoptionlaw and its publication. In the system of counterbalances, an important role is played by the president, who has the right to apply a suspensive veto in case of hasty decisions of the legislator, and to call early elections if necessary. The activities of the Constitutional Court can also be considered as law-restraining, since it has the right to block all anti-constitutional acts. The legislator in his actions is limited by the time frame, the very principles of law, the constitution, and other legal and democratic norms and institutions.

In relation to the executive branch, restrictions on departmental rule-making and delegated legislation are used. This also includes certain terms of presidential power established by law, a vote of no confidence in the government, impeachment, a ban on responsible employees of executive bodies being elected to legislative structures or engaging in commercial activities. An important means Government control is the adoption of the budget and parliamentary control over its implementation.

The democratic nature of the judiciary is realized through public control, a characteristic feature of which is public proceedings. The objective-critical view of the public is effective form democratic control. The court is obliged to proceed not from the principle of expediency, but from the strict priority of the law. Characteristic of a democratic court following rules, generally accepted in the practice of legal proceedings: presumption of innocence, irreversibility of the law, doubts - in favor of the accused, voluntary admission of guilt requires evidence, one witness is not a witness, you cannot be a judge in your own home. An important prerequisite for the triumph of the rule of law is the right of citizens to judicial protection. Every citizen has the right to count on the help of the court in protecting his rights, honor and dignity. Unlawful actions of the authorities can be appealed in court.

4. Can also help limit government power federalism . The federation complements the horizontal division of power with a vertical one and thereby becomes a means of limiting state power, a system of checks and balances. With truly functioning federal relations, various government structures and branches of government will control each other and reduce the likelihood of abuse and arbitrariness against individuals. At the same time, in conditions of separatism, a falsely understood idea of ​​​​sovereignization, and within the framework of unstable federal relations, federalism can easily turn into a “double danger” for individual freedom, when both the center and the subjects of the federation attack the rights of man and citizen.

5. Mutual responsibility of the state and the individual - another way to limit political power. In a state governed by the rule of law, the individual and the ruling entity must act as equal partners who have entered into a kind of agreement on cooperation and responsibility.

This is a unique way of limiting political power, which expresses the moral and legal principles in the relationship between the state as the bearer of political power and the citizen as a participant in its implementation. While establishing in legislative form the freedom of society and the individual, the state itself is not free from restrictions in its own decisions and actions. Through the law, it must undertake obligations to ensure fairness and equality in its relations with the citizen, public organizations, other states. “Recognition, observance and protection of human and citizen rights and freedoms is the duty of the state,” is enshrined in Art. 2 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Referendums, reports of deputies to voters, etc. can be forms of public control over the fulfillment of obligations of government agencies.

The responsibility of the individual to the state is based on the same legal principles. The individual agrees to certain restrictions and undertakes to obey the general regulations of the state. The use of state coercion must be of a legal nature, not violate the measure of personal freedom, and correspond to the gravity of the offense committed.

Thus, relations between the state and the individual must be carried out on the basis of mutual responsibility.

It is possible to identify other principles that, to one degree or another, follow from the above and create a background for them. This - high level legal consciousness and legal culture, the presence of civil society and its control over the implementation of laws by all subjects of law and some others. At their core, all principles of the rule of law are restrictions that strengthen the position of legal and legitimate power.

The essence of the rule of law is the destruction of the state's monopoly on power with a simultaneous change in the ratio of freedom of the state and society in favor of the latter and the individual. A genuine rule-of-law state creates conditions for citizens to perceive themselves as active participants in the political process, strengthening the positive and reducing the negative properties of the state.

11.5. The practice of establishing the rule of law in modern Russia

In Part 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation stipulates that “The Russian Federation - Russia is a democratic legal federal state with a republican form of government.” Despite the fact that this article directly states that the rule of law already exists inFor Russia, this is still only a goal to which it is necessary to strive.

The process of becoming legal statehood takes a long historical time. It takes place together with the formation of civil society and requires targeted efforts. The rule of law is not introduced by a one-time act and cannot be the result of pure legislation. The whole process must be organically experienced by society if it is ripe for this.

In Russia, the majority of the population, understanding the need for certain general rules, are ready to comply with the laws, but only if representatives of the authorities comply with the laws. However, Russian practice in recent years indicates gross violations of Russian legislation by officials of various ranks, manifested in the appearance of “werewolves in uniform”, corruption scandals affecting all state authorities and local governments.

The formation of legal statehood in Russia will be facilitated by the solution of socio-economic problems: reducing the gap between rich and poor segments of the population, minimizing unemployment, fulfilling social programs, national projects, eliminating the social basis for the growth of crime and violations of the rule of law, as well as the implementation of a set of measures of state and legal order: solving problems of federalism and national relations, reducing the level of bureaucratization, increasing professionalism, democratizing relations with citizens.

In a rule-of-law state, power is viewed as a force in the service of law, the main function of which is the implementation of laws and, accordingly, the public interests expressed in them. In today's Russia, there is still no system of laws as a really effective force. “Decree law” often prevails, which ultimately dooms people to helplessness and humiliation and common man, both a businessman and a politician. The judicial system has not yet become a guarantor of justice, as evidenced by the assessment of its activities given by the President of Russia in his annual message to the Federal Assembly in 2005: “if part of Russian society continues to perceive the judicial system as corrupt, it will simply be impossible to talk about effective justice "

In a legal society, the individual and the state are considered equal partners, but in modern Russia, mutual responsibility is only just declared. The “unnecessary” behavior of our state creates a chain reaction. Russian citizens are beginning to take the same approach to fulfilling their duties: they refuse civil responsibility, participate in elections and referendums, and avoid military service, from paying taxes, from paying for an apartment and for travel on public transport, etc.

In order to regain the trust of the people, the government must prove its worth and make fundamental changes. Such steps could include a significant reduction in the cumbersome state apparatus and placing real responsibility on officials for their implementation. functional responsibilities, expanding the scope of transparency in the activities of state authorities, taking into account the experience of establishing a rule of law state in other countries, etc.

Achieving the goals of the rule of law is possible only if citizens understand the need to defend their interests and influence political power, exercise control over its activities. Important factors for democratic participation are political conditions that promote the realization of rights and freedoms; legal, material and economic foundations that shape a person’s desire for a decent life; accessibility of the media, providing political communication between society and government.

The famous economist Evgeny Yasin spoke quite convincingly in this context: “either we learn to live in democracy, that is, we become active and responsible citizens, demanding of government authorities, we become a society capable of exercising control over it, or the path to the world of prosperous people is denied to us.” nations."

Basic concepts: mutual responsibility of the state and the individual, citizen, constitutionalism, human rights, rule of law, legal basis of Russian statehood, legal consciousness, principles of the rule of law, separation of powers, system of “checks and balances”, federalism, Federal Treaty, stages of formation of the modern Russian state.

Questions for self-control:

1.What was the inconsistency of the legal basis of Russian statehood in the early 1990s?

2.What was the essence of the confrontation between the executive branch and the Supreme Council in 1992-1993?

3.Name the main stages in the formation of the modern Russian state.

4.Why the 1992-1993 stage? called anti-statist?

5.What fundamental changes in state building occurred at the stage of 1998-1999? and whose name are they associated with?

6. Describe the current stage in the formation of the Russian state, which began in 2000.

7.What are the main elements that form the basis of the rule of law?

8.What is the fundamental difference between the principles “everything that is not prohibited by law is permitted” and “everything that is not prohibited by law is prohibited”?

9. Why are legal restrictions necessary for the state?

10. Define the rule of law.

11.List the basic principles of the rule of law.

12.Which document states that “man, his rights and freedoms are the highest value”?

13. How is the binding of political power through the law carried out in Russian political practice?

14.What checks and balances exist in relation to the legislative, executive and judicial powers in the Russian Federation?

15.What is the mutual responsibility of the state and the individual and how is it implemented in Russia?

16. Why does the Russian Constitution say that Russia is a legal state?

17.What is the peculiarity of statist legal consciousness?

18.What steps need to be taken to form a rule of law state in Russia?

Literature:

Dahrendorf R.After 1989: Morality, revolution and civil society. Reflections on the revolution in Europe. M., 1998.