Soviet-Polish war map. Briefly about the Soviet-Polish war

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Causes of the conflict

The Polish state, formed in November 1918, from the very beginning began to pursue an aggressive policy towards its eastern neighbor - Russia. On November 16, the Head of the Polish State, Józef Pilsudski, notified all countries except the RSFSR about the creation of an independent Polish state. But, despite ignoring Soviet Russia, nevertheless, in December 1918, the Soviet government announced its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with Poland. She rejected this offer. Moreover, on January 2, 1919, the Poles shot the mission of the Russian Red Cross, which caused a deterioration in relations between the two states. Poland was proclaimed an independent state within the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772 (the year of the first partition of Poland - M.P.). This implied a radical revision of its borders, including those with Russia. The border between Poland and Russia was the subject of discussion at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Poland's eastern border was defined by ethnic boundaries between Poles, on the one hand, and Ukrainians and Belarusians, on the other. It was established at the suggestion of British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon and was called the “Curzon Line”. January 28, 1920 NKID in Once again turned to Poland with a peace proposal based on recognition of its independence and sovereignty. At the same time, serious territorial concessions were made to Poland. The border was supposed to run from 50 to 80 km east of the “Curzon Line”, that is, Soviet Russia was ready to cede significant territories. Lenin noted on this occasion: “When we offered Poland a peace in January (1920 - M.P.), which was extremely beneficial for her, but very unfavorable for us, diplomats from all countries understood this in their own way: “the Bolsheviks are conceding an inordinate amount , - that means they are excessively weak” (Lenin V.I. T.41, p. 281). In mid-February 1920, Pilsudski announced that he was ready to begin negotiations with Russia if it recognized the borders of Poland within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of 1772.

This approach was unacceptable for Russia. The Polish ruling elite put forward the national slogan of creating a “Greater Poland” “from sea to sea” - from the Baltic to the Black. This nationalist project could only be realized at the expense of Russia. Pilsudski raised the question of revising the border between Poland and Soviet Russia, that is, it was about the rejection of the historical territories of Russia and their annexation to Poland. On the Polish side, as preconditions for negotiations, they demanded that the Soviet side withdraw Soviet troops from all territories that were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth before the first partition of Poland. They were supposed to be occupied by Polish troops. On March 6, the Soviet government offered peace to Poland for the third time since the beginning of 1920. On March 27, 1920, Polish Foreign Minister S. Patek announced his readiness to begin peace negotiations. The place of negotiations was the city of Borisov, which was located in the area of ​​​​combat operations and was occupied by Polish troops. The Polish side proposed to declare a truce only in the Borisov area, which allowed it to conduct military operations on the territory of Ukraine.

The Soviet side proposed to declare a general truce during the negotiations and choose any place for negotiations far from the front line. Poland did not accept these proposals. The last time a Soviet peace proposal to Poland was sent on February 2, 1920, on April 7, a refusal was received to conduct any negotiations with the Soviets. All attempts by the Soviet government to establish peaceful relations and resolve controversial issues negotiations ended in failure.

As noted by L.D. Trotsky, we “wanted with all our might to avoid this war.” Thus, among the main reasons for the Soviet-Polish War of 1920, one should name Poland’s desire to seize Russian territory, as well as the Entente policy, which encouraged Poland’s attack on Soviet Russia in order to overthrow the power of the Bolsheviks.

Beginning and course of the war

France, England, and the USA helped Poland create a strong army.

In particular, the United States provided her with $50 million in 1920. France and England provided assistance with advisers and instructors. Ferdinand Foch in January 1920 set the task of the French mission in Warsaw: “in as soon as possible prepare the strongest army possible." In France, under the command of General Haller, a Polish army was created, consisting of two corps. In 1919 she was transferred to Poland. These states provided Poland with enormous military and economic assistance. In the spring of 1920, they supplied it with 1,494 guns, 2,800 machine guns, 385.5 thousand rifles, 42 thousand revolvers, about 700 aircraft, 200 armored vehicles, 800 trucks, 576 million cartridges, 10 million shells, 4.5 thousand carts, 3 million equipment components, 4 million pairs of shoes, communications equipment and medicines.

With the help of the above countries, by the spring of 1920, Poland managed to create a strong and well-equipped army of about 740 thousand people. By April 1920, the Polish armed forces were at Eastern Front consisted of six armies, the combat strength of which was determined at 148.4 thousand soldiers and. They were armed with 4,157 machine guns, 302 mortars, 894 artillery pieces, 49 armored vehicles and 51 aircraft. On the Soviet side, they were opposed by two fronts: Western (commander V.M. Gittis, member of the Revolutionary Military Council I.S. Unshlikht), deployed on the territory of Belarus, and Southwestern (commander A.I. Egorov, member of the Revolutionary Military Council R.I. Berzin ), located on the territory of Ukraine. Both fronts had two armies. In general, on the Soviet-Polish front, Polish troops were slightly superior to Soviet troops. However, in Ukraine, where the Polish command planned to deliver the main blow, he managed to create a superiority in fighters by 3.3 times, machine guns by 1.6 times, and guns and mortars by 2.5 times. The plan of the Polish command, approved by the Entente, provided for the defeat of the 12th and 14th at the first stage of military operations. Soviet armies, they began to retreat. However, it was not possible to defeat them, as the Polish command expected.

The Polish army was supported by Polish nationalists. On April 21, 1920, a secret “political convention” was signed between Pilsudski and Petliura, one of the leaders of the Central Ukrainian Rada. The Petliurites ceded 100 thousand square meters to Poland for recognition of their “government”. km. Ukrainian territory with a population of 5 million people. In Ukraine there was no strong resistance to Pilsudski. And this despite the fact that the Poles took out industrial equipment and robbed the population; punitive detachments burned villages and shot men and women. In the city of Rivne, the Poles shot more than 3 thousand civilians. Because the population refused to give food to the occupiers, the villages of Ivantsy, Kucha, Yablukovka, Sobachi, Kirillovka and others were completely burned down. The residents of these villages were shot with machine guns. In the town of Tetiyevo, 4 thousand people were massacred during the Jewish pogrom. The troops of the 12th Army left Kyiv on May 6, where Polish troops entered. A few days later, Polish General E. Ryndz-Smigly hosted a parade of allied troops on Khreshchatyk. Polish troops also occupied a significant part of the territory of Belarus with the city of Minsk.

By mid-May 1920, almost all of Right Bank Ukraine was under the control of Polish troops. By this time, the front in Ukraine had stabilized. The Soviet 12th and 14th armies suffered heavy losses, but were not defeated. Strategic goals, that is, the defeat of the troops of the South Western Front, Pilsudski failed to realize it. As he himself admitted on May 15, “we punched the air - we covered a long distance, but did not destroy the enemy’s manpower.” The launch of a broad Polish offensive in Ukraine and the capture of Kyiv led to significant changes in the strategy of Soviet Russia. The Polish front became the main one for Moscow, and the war with Poland became the “central task.” On May 23, the theses of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) “The Polish Front and Our Tasks” were published, in which the country was called upon to fight against lordly Poland. On April 30, that is, a week before this document, the appeal of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars “To all workers, peasants and honest citizens of Russia” was published.

It revealed the aggressive nature of the war, and again confirmed the independence and sovereignty of Poland. Mass mobilization was underway in the country. By November 1920, 500 thousand people were mobilized. Komsomol and party mobilizations were also carried out: 25 thousand communists and 12 thousand Komsomol members were mobilized. By the end of 1920, the size of the Red Army reached 5.5 million people. The Soviet-Polish War and the seizure of Russia's historical territories during it led to a certain national unity in a country divided by the civil war. Former officers and generals tsarist army, who had previously not sympathized with the Bolsheviks, now declared their support. Famous generals of the Russian Army A.A. Brusilov, A.M. Zayonchkovsky and A.A. On May 30, 1920, Polivanov addressed “all former officers, wherever they are” with an appeal to take the side of the Red Army. Many have come to the conclusion that the Red Army is now turning from a Bolshevik army into a national, state army, that the Bolsheviks defend the interests of Russia. Following this appeal, on June 2, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree “On the release from responsibility of all White Guards who will help in the war with Poland and Wrangel.”

Red Army counteroffensive

After the capture of Kyiv, according to Trotsky, “the country shook itself.” Thanks to mobilization measures, the preconditions were created for the Red Army's counteroffensive. On April 28, 1920, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) discussed a counteroffensive plan. The main blow was planned in Belarus, north of Polesie. The troops of the Western Front received significant reinforcements. From March 10 to June 1, 1920, the front received more than 40 thousand reinforcements. The number of horses increased from 25 thousand to 35. On April 29, M.N. became commander of the Western Front. Tukhachevsky, who replaced Gittis. At the same time (May 26), Stalin was appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front, and F.E. was appointed head of the front's rear services. Dzerzhinsky. The offensive of the Western Front began on the morning of May 14 (15th Army - commander A.I. Kork) in the Vitebsk region. Here it was possible to create a superiority of forces over the Poles, both in manpower and in weapons. The defense of the first Polish division was broken. Already on the first day of the offensive, Soviet troops advanced 6-20 km. The 43rd Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division under the command of V.I. distinguished itself. Chuikova. The troops of the Western Front advanced westward to 100-130 km.

However, the enemy, having brought up reserves, managed to push our troops back 60-100 km. But this was done in no small part due to the transfer of troops from Ukraine, where the Poles had weakened their positions. The May offensive of Soviet troops in Belarus forced them to expend a significant part of their reserves. This made it easier for the troops of the southwestern front to go on the offensive. In May 1920, the Southwestern Front received reinforcements in the amount of 41 thousand people. WITH northern Caucasus The first Cavalry Army was transferred to the Southwestern Front. Its commander was S.M. Budyonny; members of the RVS - K.E. Voroshilov and E.A. Shchadenko. The cavalry made a 1000-kilometer march on horseback. During the campaign, she defeated many rebel and anti-Soviet detachments operating in the rear of the troops of the Southwestern Front. On May 25, the cavalry concentrated in the Uman region (18 thousand sabers). It significantly strengthened the offensive capabilities of the Southwestern Front. May 12-15 at the front headquarters in Kharkov with the participation of Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev developed a front counteroffensive plan. On the eve of the offensive, the balance of forces looked as follows: Polish troops consisted of 78 thousand bayonets and sabers; The Southwestern Front had 46 thousand bayonets and sabers. But he seriously outnumbered the enemy in cavalry. At the beginning of June, the first cavalry army went on the offensive. On June 7, the 4th Cavalry Division captured Zhitomir, freeing 7 thousand Red Army soldiers from captivity, who immediately entered service. It was here that Pilsudski's headquarters was almost captured. On June 8, they took the city of Berdichev. The Polish front in Ukraine was split into two parts. On June 12, Kyiv was liberated, and on June 30, Rivne.

During the liberation of these cities, the 25th Chapaev Division and Kotovsky's cavalry brigade especially distinguished themselves. The Soviet offensive in Belarus developed successfully. At dawn on July 4, the troops of the Western Front went on the offensive. Already on the first day of the offensive, the right wing of the front advanced 15-20 km. However, it was not possible to encircle and completely destroy the Polish 1st Army opposing it. The 16th Army advanced on Minsk, and on July 11 it was liberated, on July 19 Baranovichi was liberated. To save Poland from complete defeat, British Foreign Secretary Curzon on July 11, 1920 addressed the Soviet government with a Note that proposed conditions for ending the war and concluding a truce. This note in our country was called the “Curzon ultimatum.” It contained the following proposals: the Polish army retreats to the line outlined in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference (“Curzon Line”). Soviet troops stop 50 km away. east of this line; the final decision on the border between Poland and Russia was to take place at an international conference in London; if the Soviet offensive continues, the Entente will support Poland. In addition, it was proposed to conclude a truce with Wrangel. Under those conditions, this meant the annexation of Crimea from Russia. Moscow was given 7 days to respond and it was reported that Poland agreed to these conditions. The Soviet government discussed Curzon's note on July 13-16. There was no unity on this issue. G.V. Chicherin, L.B. Kamenev, L.D. Trotsky believed that the terms of the truce were favorable for the Soviet side, so we could agree to negotiations and, taking into account our conditions, conclude a truce with Poland. Considering how events developed in the future, this approach was very promising for Russia. However, the point of view prevailed, according to which it was believed that Poland was weak and swipe will lead to its final defeat, and after it the collapse of the entire Versailles system, which does not take into account Soviet interests. This position was based on an erroneous assessment of the successes of the Red Army and the idea that Poland was on the verge of defeat. IN

As a result, on July 16, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), Curzon’s note was rejected and a decision was made on a further offensive against Poland. Just 2.5 months later, in September 1920, at the IX All-Russian Conference of the RCP(b), Lenin was forced to admit the fallacy of such a decision. Meanwhile, against the backdrop of the victories of the Red Army in Ukraine and Belarus, the conviction about the possibility of turning this war into a revolutionary war grew. The leadership of Soviet Russia planned that the entry of the Red Army into the territory of Poland and the defeat of Pilsudski here could be the beginning of the transformation of lordly bourgeois Poland into a Soviet Republic, headed by Polish workers and peasants. On July 30, the Polish Revolutionary Committee (Polrevkom) was created in Bialystok, which included Bolsheviks of Polish origin Julian Marchlewski (Chairman), Felix Dzerzhinsky, Felix Kohn, Edward Pruchniak and Józef Unschlicht. 1 million rubles were allocated for its activities. The task of the Polrevkom was to prepare a revolution in Poland. At the end of July - beginning of August 1920, the Red Army entered the territory of ethnic Poland.

Disaster of the Red Army on the Vistula

On August 10, 1920, the commander of the Western Front, M.N. Tukhachevsky signed a directive to cross the Vistula and capture Warsaw. It said: “Fighters of the workers’ revolution. Keep your eyes on the West. The problems of the world revolution are being solved in the West. Through the corpse of white Poland lies the path to world fire. On bayonets we will bring happiness and peace to working humanity. To the west! To decisive battles, to resounding victories!” The front troops numbered more than 100 thousand bayonets and sabers, somewhat inferior to the enemy in numbers. In the Warsaw and Novogeorgievsk directions, it was possible to create a superiority of forces over the Poles, of whom there were about 69 thousand bayonets and sabers, and the Soviet troops (4, 15, 3 and 16 armies) - 95.1 thousand. However, in the Ivangorod direction, where Pilsudski was preparing a counterattack , the number of troops was: 38 thousand bayonets and sabers for the Poles and 6.1 thousand for the Red Army soldiers. The main forces of the Polish troops were withdrawn beyond the Vistula for regrouping. They have received a fresh addition. The Soviet units that reached the Vistula, on the contrary, were extremely tired and small in number. During the battles, they suffered heavy losses, the rear units fell behind by 200 - 400 km, and therefore the supply of ammunition and food was disrupted. The troops did not receive reinforcements.

Some divisions had no more than 500 fighters. Many regiments became companies. In addition, between the two Soviet fronts, the Southwestern, whose main forces fought for the city of Lvov, and the Western, which was supposed to cross the Vistula and take Warsaw, a gap of 200 - 250 km formed, which did not allow them to quickly interact with each other. . In addition, the 1st Cavalry Army, transferred from the Southwestern Front to the Western Front, was far from the main battle area at the time of the decisive battles for Warsaw and did not provide the necessary assistance. The Bolsheviks' hopes for support from Polish workers and poor peasants were also not realized. If the Bolsheviks said that the Red Army was coming to Poland to liberate workers and peasants from exploitation, then Pilsudski said that the Russians were coming to enslave again, they were again trying to eliminate Polish statehood. He managed to give the war at the stage when the Red Army found itself on Polish territory a national liberation character and unite the Poles. Polish workers and peasants did not support the Red Army. At the IX All-Russian Conference of the RCP(b) (October 1920), a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 15th Army of the Western Front, D. Poluyan, said: “In the Polish army, the national idea solders the bourgeois, the peasant, and the worker, and this can be observed everywhere.” The entry of the Red Army into Poland frightened the West, the Entente countries, as they believed that in the event socialist revolution and the beginning of Sovietization in this country will begin chain reaction and other European countries will be influenced by Soviet Russia, and this will lead to the destruction of the Versailles system.

Therefore, the West has seriously increased its assistance to Poland. In such conditions, on August 13, 1920, the Battle of the Vistula began. On the same day, after stubborn fighting, they managed to capture the city of Radzimin, located 23 km from Warsaw, and the next day - two forts of the Modlin fortress. But this was the last success of the Soviet troops. The situation for the Soviet troops was further aggravated by the fact that on August 12, the Armed Forces of Southern Russia began an offensive under the command of Baron Wrangel, who pulled back part of the Red Army forces intended for the Polish front. On August 16, Polish troops launched a counteroffensive and launched a strong flank attack between the Western (Warsaw) and Southwestern (Lvov) fronts. The enemy quickly broke through the weak front of the Mozyr group of forces of the Western Front and created a threat of encirclement of the Warsaw group of Soviet armies.

Therefore, front commander Tukhachevsky gave the order for the troops to retreat to the east, although a considerable part was surrounded. On August 18, Pilsudski, as the Head of the Polish State, addressed the population with an ominous appeal not to allow any Red Army soldier who remained surrounded to leave Polish soil. As a result of the defeat near Warsaw, the troops of the Western Front suffered heavy losses. According to some estimates, during the Battle of Warsaw, 25 thousand Red Army soldiers died, more than 60 thousand were captured, 45 thousand were interned by the Germans. Several thousand people went missing. The front also lost a large amount of artillery, small arms and property. Polish losses are estimated at 4.5 thousand killed, 10 thousand missing and 22 thousand wounded. On August 25, 1920, retreating Soviet troops found themselves in the area of ​​the Russian-Polish border of the 18th century. It is necessary, however, to pay attention to the fact that at that time few in the West believed that Pilsudski could win. The Entente countries did not have confidence in him. This is evidenced by the fact that at a meeting between Lloyd George and the French Prime Minister Milner, Warsaw was actually recommended to remove Pilsudski from the post of Commander-in-Chief. The Polish government offered this post to the French General Weygand, who refused, believing that specific conditions this war must be commanded by a local military commander. Pilsudski's authority as a military leader was also low among the Polish military. It is no coincidence, therefore, that many said that Poland could be saved either by Action or by a Miracle. And Churchill would call the Polish victory near Warsaw “the Miracle on the Vistula, only with some changes, it was a repetition of the miracle on the Marne.” But the victory was won, and in the future she began to be associated with Jozef Pilsudski. During the battle on the Vistula, a Soviet-Polish peace conference opened in Minsk on August 17. The Soviet delegation consisted of representatives of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR. The interests of Belarus were represented by the Russian delegation. During the conference, hostilities between Poland and Russia did not stop. To undermine the negotiating position of the Soviet delegation, Polish troops increased their offensive, capturing new territories. On October 15-16, 1920, they occupied Minsk, and in the southwestern direction they were stopped by September 20 at the border of the rivers Ubort, Sluch, Litvin, Murafa, that is, significantly east of the “Curzon line”. Negotiations from Minsk were moved to Riga. They started on October 5th. Poland did not stop military operations this time either, seizing new territories and pushing the border more and more towards Russia. The armistice was signed on October 12, 1920 and came into effect at midnight on October 18.

The final peace treaty between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, on the one hand, and the Polish Republic on the other, was signed on March 18, 1921 in Riga. According to the agreement, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were ceded to Poland. The state border ran significantly east of the Curzon Line. The captured territory was 200 thousand square meters. km., more than 13 million people lived on it. The financial and economic terms of the agreement were also difficult for Russia. Russia released Poland from liability for debts Russian Empire; Russia and Ukraine agreed to pay Poland 30 million rubles in gold as the Polish share of the gold reserves of the former Russian Empire and as recognition of Poland's separation from Russia. Poland was also given 555 steam locomotives, 695 passenger cars, 16,959 freight cars, and railway property along with stations. All this was estimated at 18 million 245 thousand rubles in gold in 1913 prices. Diplomatic relations were established between the parties. The state of war between states ceased from the moment the treaty entered into force. Despite the fact that the bloodshed was over, the signed agreement did not lay the foundation for future good neighborly relations between Russia and Poland; on the contrary, it became the cause of a serious conflict between the two neighbors. The Belarusian and Ukrainian lands were divided “to the quick.” Eastern Galicia, against the will of the Ukrainian population, was transferred to Poland.

The great drama of this war was the fate of Red Army prisoners of war in Polish captivity. It should be noted that there is no reliable data on the total number of Red Army soldiers who were in captivity and the number of dead. Polish and Russian historians provide different data. Polish historians Z. Karpus, D. Lepińska-Nalęcz, T. Nałęcz note that at the time of the cessation of hostilities, there were about 110 thousand captured Red Army soldiers on the territory of Poland, of which 65,797 prisoners of war were sent to Russia after the end of the war. According to also Polish data total died in the camps various reasons amounted to 16-17 thousand people. According to Russian historian G.M. Matveev, 157 thousand Red Army soldiers were in Polish captivity, of whom 75,699 returned to their homeland. The fate of the remaining more than 80 thousand prisoners turned out differently. According to his calculations, from hunger, disease, etc. From 25 to 28 thousand people could have died in captivity, that is, approximately 18 percent of the Red Army soldiers actually captured. I.V. Mikhutina provides data on 130 thousand Red Army prisoners of war, of whom 60 thousand died in captivity in less than two years. M.I. Meltyukhov names the number of prisoners of war in 1919-1920. 146 thousand people, of which 60 thousand died in captivity, and 75,699 returned to their homeland. Thus, in Russian historiography there is no generally accepted data on the number of Soviet prisoners of war who were in Polish captivity, as well as on the number of those who died in captivity. Polish captivity turned out to be a real nightmare for the Red Army soldiers. Inhumane conditions of detention brought them to the brink of survival. The prisoners had extremely poor food, in fact there was no health care. The delegation of the American Christian Youth Union, which visited Poland in October 1920, testified in its report that Soviet prisoners were kept in premises unsuitable for habitation, with windows without glass and through gaps in the walls, without furniture and sleeping equipment, placed on the floor, without mattresses and blankets.

The report also emphasized that the prisoners' clothes and shoes were also taken away; many had no clothes at all. As for Polish prisoners of war in Soviet captivity, their situation was completely different. No one pursued a policy of extermination towards them. Moreover, they were considered victims of the Polish lords and capitalists, and in Soviet captivity they were looked upon as “class brothers.” In 1919-1920 41-42 thousand people were captured, of which 34,839 were released to Poland. Approximately 3 thousand people expressed a desire to remain in Soviet Russia. Thus, the total loss was approximately 3-4 thousand, of which about 2 thousand were recorded according to documents as having died in captivity.

Polynov M.F. USSR/Russia in local wars and
armed conflicts of the XX-XXI centuries. Tutorial. – St. Petersburg,
2017. – Info-Da Publishing House. – 162 s.

After the surrender of Germany, the Soviet government canceled the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and launched an armed operation called Vistula. Soviet troops were supposed to bring revolution to Europe and ensure the victory of communism. In fact, the military operation was directed, first of all, against the independence of the Belarusian People's Republic and the Lithuanian Republic.
In December 1918, Soviet troops occupied Minsk, and in January 1919 - Vilna and Kovno. On February 27, 1919, the creation of the Lithuanian-Belarusian Socialist Republic Soviets. The seizure of Belarusian-Lithuanian lands by the Red Army was prevented by the Polish people, and in general by the entire Catholic population of Western Belarus and the Vilna region, organizing self-defense committees.

The Polish government, seeking to delay the march of Soviet troops to the east, managed to reach an agreement on February 5, 1919 with German army(leaving the occupied territories in accordance with the decisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919) on the passage of units of the Polish army through the territories occupied by the Germans. February 9 -14, 1919 Polish troops took positions on the line: Kobrin, Pruzhany, along the Zelva and Neman rivers. A few days later, the Red Army reached the positions occupied by the Poles, and a Polish-Soviet front was formed on the territory of Lithuania and Belarus.
At the beginning of March 1919, the Poles launched an offensive. A group of troops of General S. Sheptytsky occupied Slomin and created fortifications on the northern bank of the Neman, a group of General A. Listovsky occupied Pinsk and crossed the Yaselda River and the Oginsky Canal.
As a result of another blow, in April 1919, the Poles captured Novogrudok, Baranovichi, Lido and Vilna (after 1939 the city was called Vilnius), this last city took the 1st Division of the Legions of General E. Rydza-Szmiglego, numbering 2.5 thousand people, and the cavalry group of Lieutenant Colonel V. Belina-Prazhmovsky, numbering 800 people. Between the beginning of May and the first half of July, the front line stabilized.

Belarusian-Lithuanian Front

Units of the Polish army created the Belarusian-Lithuanian Front under the command of General S. Shcheptytsky. After the Belovezhskaya negotiations (June-August 1919) ended in failure, the Polish side, launching an offensive, occupied Minsk (August 8, 1919), crossed the Berezina and occupied Bobruisk (August 29, 1919).
The Polish-Bolshevik war in Ukraine began in July 1919, after the end of the Polish-Ukrainian battles and the occupation of Eastern Galicia by the Polish army along the Zbruch River.
In September, the Polish side entered into an agreement with S. Petliura, the head of the Ukrainian People's Republic, on a joint fight against the Red Army. J. Pilsudski broke the alliance with General A.I. Denikin (who was striving to restore Russia within the borders that existed before World War I and refused to recognize the independence of the Polish state), so as not to support the offensive of the White Guards unfriendly to Poland.
The Polish side began, lasting from October to December 1919, peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks in Moscow and Mikashevichi in Polesie. Thanks to the suspension of the offensive of the Polish army, the Red Army was able to free up part of its forces, which allowed it to defeat A.I. Denikin and S. Petliura. By the end of 1919, the territories to the west of the line were under Polish control: the Zbruch River, Ploskirov, the Sluch River, Zvyakhel, the Ubort River, Bobruisk, the Berezina River, Borisov, Lepel, Polotsk, Dvinsk (modern Daugavpils).

Operation of E. Rydza-Szmiglogo in Lithuania

In January 1920, at the request of the Lithuanian government, E. Rydz-Szmigly, at the head of the 1st and 3rd Divisions of the Legions, set out for Dvinsk and, supported by significantly weaker Lithuanian forces, took the city and handed it over to Lithuania. Taking advantage of the break in hostilities in winter period Both sides began preparing for the offensive. The Red Army gathered forces in Belarus, the Polish - in Eastern Galicia.
The Soviet government, for tactical reasons, tried to continue peace negotiations (note by G.V. Chicherin and L. Skulsky dated December 22, 1919), while simultaneously developing offensive plans. The Polish government responded to the note on March 27, 1920, proposing Borisov, located on the front line, as the place of negotiations. The proposal could not be accepted by the Soviet side, given the offensive being prepared in Belarus. In March, the Polish army occupied strategic points important for the Russians: Mozyr and Kalenkovichi, which delayed the transfer of troops to the Western Front.

Ukrainian and Belarusian offensive

After the conclusion of a political treaty and military convention with the Ukrainian government of S. Petliura (April 21 and 24, 1920), on April 25 the offensive of the Polish army in Ukraine began. Polish units under the command of E. Rydza-Szmigloy, with the support of Ukrainian units, occupied Kyiv on May 7, 1920, and on May 9 occupied the heights on the Dnieper. On May 14, the Soviet command launched an offensive on the Dvina and Berezina, which, however, was stopped.
On May 26, Soviet troops launched an offensive in Ukraine (General A.I. Egorov), on June 5 the cavalry army of S.M. Budyonny broke through the Polish defenses near Samogrodok and threatened to encircle Polish units in Kyiv. On June 10, the Polish army abandoned the city and retreated to the east with heavy fighting.
The pursuing Red Army approached Lvov and Zamosc.
The Russian offensive, launched on July 4 in Belarus, also ended successfully. By the end of July, Soviet troops occupied Vilna, Lida, Grodno and Bialystok. In the first half of August, the Red Army under the command of M.N. Tukhachevsky reached the Vistula and created a threat to Warsaw. In this situation, the government of L. Skulsky resigned.

The new Prime Minister S. Grabski transferred on July 1 all power to the National Defense Council, which included: the Head of State, the head (marshal) of the Sejm, the prime minister, three ministers, three representatives of the army and ten ambassadors. The preliminary negotiations started by Western diplomats at the request of the government of S. Grabsky did not find a response from the government of Soviet Russia. The government of S. Grabski also resigned, and W. Witos became the prime minister of the new cabinet. On July 28, the Russians created a replacement for the Polish government in Bialystok - the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland.

Miracle over the Vistula

The turning point of the war was the Battle of Warsaw, which took place on August 13-25, 1920.
The burden of defending the capital lay on the army of the Northern Front of General J. Haller. After the attacks of units of the Soviet Western Front under the command of M.N. Tukhachevsky were repulsed on August 14-15, a successful attack on positions 15 and 3 took place on August 16-21 Russian army over Vkra, carried out by the 5th Army of General V. Sikorsky.
On August 16, a maneuver group consisting of five infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade, under the command of J. Pilsudski, struck near Wiepsz. The maneuver group broke through the Russian front near Kotsk, occupied Podlasie and reached the rear of M.N. Tukhachevsky’s troops. Soviet units attacked from the south and west were forced to cross the Prussian border, and some troops retreated to the east. In September, M.N. Tukhachevsky tried to organize a defense on the Neman line, where he took the battle, but was defeated.
The Red Army also suffered defeat in southern Poland. After the battles near Komarov Khrubeshov, in which Budyonny’s cavalry army was defeated, the retreat of the Soviet troops followed. At the beginning of October, the Polish army reached the line: Tarnopol, Dubno, Minsk, Drissa. On October 12, 1920, a decree on laying down arms was signed, on October 18, hostilities were stopped, and on March 18, 1921, the Riga Peace Treaty was signed, ending the war and establishing the eastern border of Poland.

Massacre of the USSR - premeditated murder Andrey Mikhailovich Burovsky

Soviet-Polish War 1918–1920

As soon as a restored Poland emerged, Polish communists and anarchists immediately launched their uprisings. The first wanted to create their own state; others - to destroy the state as such. Both of them relied on Soviet Russia and expected help from it. It would seem that Polish nationalists had something to do in indigenous Poland itself. But not yet having had time to strengthen their own state, they rushed to restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - that is, their empire of the 17th–18th centuries.

The war with Poland in the east was waged by the forces of Russian armies: and the Armed Forces of the South of Russia A.I. Denikin, and the Red Army.

You can describe this war for a long time, the exploits and crimes committed during it, tell how the front line rolled to the west and east many times... There was a moment when the Red Army stood almost on the Vistula, in the indigenous Polish lands, and was rapidly moving towards Warsaw. There was a moment when the Poles were in Kyiv, and Pilsudski was quite seriously planning a cavalry raid on Moscow.

For a long time, from April to December 9, 1919, Soviet-Polish negotiations on borders dragged on. They came to nothing.

But now this is not the main thing... For our topic, it must be emphasized that the Polish army attacked the positions of the Red Army every time the Red Army crushed Denikin and rolled south. And when Denikin beat the Reds and his army moved north, the Poles loomed menacingly over the rear of the White Army. Until the end of his days, A.I. Denikin was sure that the fateful campaign against Moscow in the fall of 1919 was thwarted precisely by the operations of the Poles: at the decisive moment they agreed with the Reds to conduct joint actions.

During Denikin's offensive, the Poles stopped the war with the Reds. Denikin negotiates with him: let Pilsudski continue operations against the 12th Army, at least sluggishly. At least for deterrence.

Pilsudski is negotiating with Denikin - obviously. And secretly he conducted negotiations with Lenin of a completely different kind. Through the head of the “Red Cross mission” Marchlewski, a personal friend of Pilsudski and his comrade-in-arms from the times of terrorism. Pilsudski's headquarters contacted Marchlewski and ordered an oral note to be conveyed to the government of the Soviet Republic. It said: “Assistance to Denikin in his struggle does not correspond to Polish state interests.” And he pointed out: the Polish army’s attack on Mozyr could be decisive in Denikin’s war with the Bolsheviks. But Poland did not deliver this blow. Let the Bolsheviks believe him... The communists assured Pilsudski that “the secret will be kept inviolably.” And it was stored until 1925. Only after Markhlewski’s death did the Soviet press let it slip: they spoke in many words about the merits of the deceased, including negotiations with Pilsudski.

The 12th Army was wedged between the positions of the Poles and the Whites - a very unstable, operationally losing position. The Poles stopped, and the 12th Army actively acted against the Whites in the Kiev direction. The Reds transferred 43 thousand bayonets from Volyn to Yelets to break the white front.

Only after the Whites abandoned Kyiv and the volunteers retreated to the south did General Listovsky begin to occupy the cities abandoned by the Whites. And in the north, the Polish army resumed its operations.

It turns out: the main goal of the Poles was to maintain as long and as cruel a time of unrest in Russia as possible... in order to snatch as many western regions as possible from the weakened country, including Ukrainian ones. This is really worth remembering.

Only after the Treaty of Riga in 1921 was the Polish-Soviet border finally established... Within Poland were the lands of the so-called Western Ukraine - that is, Volyn and Galicia. A state arose, which was officially called the “Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.”