Generals of the Russian Imperial Army. Tsarist army officers who fought in the Red Army

Judas of the Russian land and their fate: imperial generals who voluntarily transferred to serve in the Red Army September 29th, 2014

In total, 164 generals VOLUNTARILY entered the service of the Reds. 35 of them were shot, 25 were sentenced to different terms imprisonment (not counting those who were in prison and then were shot, they are included in the list of those executed), the fate of 35 people is unknown, 14 people went over to the side of the whites or fled abroad, 2 were executed by whites, 31 people died before the beginningala great terror. 15 people did not come under repression at all (they did not receive a prison term, they were not sent into exile).

“In the USSR, those tsarist generals were highly respected who chose the side of the Reds and went to serve the Bolsheviks!” Anyone will tell you that soviet man in the Internet. But, as you know, Soviet reality has nothing to do with real reality. In...this text, everyone can get acquainted with the real fate of the generals who went over to the side of the Bolsheviks. All generals listed on the list VOLUNTARILY joined the Red Army. How did the Soviet country repay them for their help at a critical moment? This is an original study conducted with full analysis 164 general biographies especially for "Sputnik and Pogrom". So...

Voishin-Murdas-Zhilinsky - was arrested in 1919, part of his property was confiscated. Then released. Died in 1926.
Alexey Brusilov - cavalry inspector. Died 1926
Nikolai Voronov - in 1919 he went over to the whites.
Nikolai Danilov - taught at the General Staff Academy. Died 1934
Dmitry Dolgov - fled to Belgium in 1920 (according to other sources - in 1922).
Andrei Zayonchkovsky - taught at the military academy, died in 1926.
Dmitry Shuvaev - taught military science, later received a personal pension. Shot in 1937 at the age of 83
Nikolai Mikhnevich - taught military science, died in 1927.
Alexander Kuzmin-Karavaev - fled to Yugoslavia in the early 20s.
Konstantin Velichko - taught, died in 1927.
Vladislav Klembovsky - after failures in Soviet-Polish war was accused of aiding the Poles and thrown into prison. In protest he went on a hunger strike and died of starvation in 1921.
Konstantin Baiov - defected to the Whites in 1919, then emigrated to Estonia.
Vasily Vitkovsky - taught geodesy. Died in 1924.
Alexander Baltiysky - taught at the Frunze Military Academy. Shot in 1939 on charges of participation in a fascist military conspiracy.
Evgeny Iskritsky - taught, in 1931 he was sentenced to 10 years in the camps, released two years later. In 1937 he was again sentenced to 10 years, in 1947 he was released and sent to settle in Kazakhstan, where he died in 1949.
Alexander Dobryshin - died during the siege of Leningrad in 1942.
Vladimir Egoriev - taught military science. Died in 1948.
Alexey Gutor - taught at the military academy. In the early 20s he was arrested by security officers, but was released. Shot in 1938.
Dmitry Nadezhny - arrested in 1931 in the "Spring" case. Sentenced to 5 years in the camps, commuted to three years of exile. He taught at the Military Medical Academy and died in 1945.
Georgy Korolkov - arrested in the "Spring" case, died in 1936.
Philip Dobryshin - died in 1920.
Alexander Novikov - retired since 1922. Arrested in the "Spring" case, in 1931 sentenced to 10 years. According to some sources, he died in 1932.
Vasily Novitsky - taught. Died in 1929.
Fyodor Ogorodnikov - taught at the Frunze Academy, was arrested in 1931 on a cadet case, but did not receive a prison sentence. Died in 1939.
Dmitry Parsky - died of typhus in 1921.
Fedor Podgursky - in staff positions. Died in 1929.
Nikolai Potapov is a childhood friend of the top manager of the RSDLP, Comrade Kedrov. He worked for the Bolsheviks during the Provisional Government. Participated in Operation Trust. Died in 1946.
Nikolai Sivers - died of typhus in 1919.
Semyon Sukhomlin - inspector, died in 1928.
Andrei Snesarev - headed the Academy of the General Staff, then rector of the Institute of Oriental Studies; in 1930, for leading the counter-revolutionary organization "Russian National Union", he was sentenced to death, commuted to 10 years. He was imprisoned in Solovki, released in 1934 as seriously ill, and died in 1937.
Alexander von Taube - one of the first to go over to the side of the Bolsheviks, was involved in the creation of the Red Army, was captured by the Whites, sentenced to death, died of typhus in 1919.
Alexander Freiman - in 1919, the Cheka was suspected of participating in the military organization "National Center". Further fate is unknown.
January Tsikhovich - fled to Poland in 1921.
Sergei Sheideman - died in prison in 1922.
Witold-Czeslaw Koreivo - taught, in 1935 he and his family were expelled from Leningrad. Died in 1938.
Vsevolod Chernavin - in staff positions. Shot in 1938.
Nikolai Blavdzevich - taught at the institute, arrested in the "Spring" case. He was sent into exile in Kazakhstan for 5 years, his further fate is unknown.
Nikolai Drozdov - taught. Died in 1953.
Alexander Sundblad - taught. In 1937, he was arrested for counter-revolutionary agitation of a defeatist nature and executed.
Alexander Nikolaev was one of the first to go over to the Bolsheviks. In 1919 he was captured by the whites and hanged.
Anton Stankevich - in 1919 he was captured by the Kornilovites and was hanged by the verdict of a military court.
David Kozlovsky - taught at the artillery academy. Died in 1949.
Fyodor Golenkin - taught, died in 1936.
Leonid Alexandrov - taught. Died in 1933.
Yakov Alekseev - served in the military topographic department of the Red Army headquarters. Convicted in 1930. Further fate is unknown.
Andrey Auzan - taught at the military academy, dismissed in 1923. He went to Latvia, in 1944 to Germany, then to Britain, died in 1953.
Vladimir Afanasyev - taught, in 1930 he was arrested and released. In 1931 he was arrested in the “Spring” case, received 3 years, died in 1953.
Vladimir Baranovsky is the chief military director of Moscow universities. In 1931, being seriously ill, he was arrested in the “Spring” case, sentenced to death with a commuted term of 10 years, and died in a camp a few months later.
Ivan Barmin - taught, executed in 1938.
Alexander Belyaev - worked in Vsevobuch, in 1937 he was arrested for anti-Soviet agitation and executed.
Nikolai Belyaev - taught military science. Arrested in 1930 in the "Spring" case. He received 5 years in the camps, his further fate is unknown.
Mikhail Bonch-Bruevich is the brother of top manager of the RSDLP Bonch-Bruevich. The first general to defect to the Bolsheviks (before that, he was one of the first to defect to the side of the Provisional Government). He was arrested in the Vesna case, but was quickly released without charges. In 1944 he received lieutenant general. Died in 1956.
Vladimir Buimistrov - retired since 1922. In 1931 he was arrested in the “Spring” case, sent into exile for three years, his further fate is unknown.
Sergei Volkov - taught, executed in 1938.
Vladimir Gatovsky - taught at the military academy, arrested in the "Spring" case, received 3 years, died in 1935.
Evgeniy-Alexander Hegstrem - left for Finland in 1921. Died in 1926.
Valentin Diaghilev - taught, in 1927 sentenced to death, commuted to 10 years. I sat on Solovki. In 1929, together with a group of prisoners, he was shot on charges of plotting an uprising in the camp and escaping abroad.
Nikolai Elizarov - taught, in 1937 he was shot on charges of participation in a counter-revolutionary officer organization and agitation of a fascist nature.
Mikhail Zagyu - taught at the Military Chemical Academy, was arrested in 1921 and 1926, but was released. Died in 1951.
Pyotr Izmestyev - taught, worked in the archive, was arrested by the Cheka, but was released, died in 1925.
Felix Iozefovich - led the Moscow military district. Shot by the Bolsheviks in 1921.
Dmitry Kadomsky - in various staff positions. Died in 1935.
Mikhail Kamensky - taught, in 1935 he and his family were expelled from Leningrad. In 1937 he was shot.
Sergei Kamensky - taught, was arrested in 1924, 1927, 1929, served 4 years, and in 1941 exiled to Kazakhstan. Died in 1951.
Nikolai Korsun - taught at the Frunze Academy, died in 1954.
Fyodor Kostyaev - taught, died in 1925.
Gabriel Ladyzhensky - taught. Presumably died in 1945.
Dmitry Lebedev - taught at the military academy. Left for Estonia in 1922.
Pavel Lebedev - joined the Reds, became chief of staff of the Red Army, then assistant commander of the Ukrainian military district. He was one of the top 5 main red military leaders. Died in 1933.
Nikolai Liventsev - fled to the whites in 1919.
Sergei Lukirsky - taught strategy at the military academy, in 1931 he was arrested in the "Spring" case, received five years, was released a year later, rose to the rank of division commander, was shot in 1938 on charges of participating in a counter-revolutionary officer-monarchist terrorist organization.
Nikolai Maksimovsky - went to France in 1920.
Evgeniy Martynov - taught, in 1931 sentenced to 5 years, next year released, shot in 1937 on charges of counter-revolutionary agitation.
Nikolai Makhrov - commanded a division, rose to the rank of brigade commander, died in 1935.
Dmitry Melnikov - in 1919 he went over to the side of the whites and emigrated with Wrangel's army.
Joseph Menitsky - taught at a technical school, died in 1934.
Viktor Mikhailov - taught, in 1936 he was sent to a special settlement in Kazakhstan for three years. Died in 1937.
Viktor Mikheev is a military instructor at a Moscow university. The exact fate is unknown; according to some sources, he was shot in 1938.
Evgeny de Montfort - worked as a military commander at a university, in 1931 he was sentenced to 5 years in the “Spring” case, in 1934 he was released, worked in the Ministry of Food Industry, died in 1956.
Alexander Mochulsky - shot in 1921.
Vladimir Muratov - taught at the Communist University. Died in 1934.
Alexander Mukhanov - in 1921 sentenced to 5 years as a “participant in the insurgent movement.” Before the war he was arrested again and died in prison in 1941.
Nikolai Myslitsky - taught at the military academy, after 1930 traces are lost.
Alexander Neznamov - taught at the Military Academy, died in 1928.
Ivan Nikulin - taught, in 1931 received a 3-year suspended sentence in the "Spring" case. Further fate is unknown.
Fedor Novitsky - in Civil War- assistant front commander, then teacher. Died in 1944.
Nikolai Oboleshev - was arrested three times during the Civil War on suspicion of having connections with whites. Probably shot in 1920.
Sergei Odintsov - commanded the army during the Civil War. According to some sources, he died of natural causes in 1920, according to others, he was shot.
Vladimir Olderogge - commanded the front in the Civil. Arrested in the "Spring" case and executed in 1931.
Alexander Pevnev - taught, died in 1936.
Vladimir Peters-Kamnev - taught, executed in 1938.
Grigory Plyushchevsky-Plyushchik - taught, executed in 1938.
Nikoal Pnevsky - worked as a supply worker, died in 1928.
Nikolai Popov taught, in 1935 he was arrested and exiled to Kazakhstan. Further fate is unknown.
Lev Radus-Zenkovich - left for Lithuania in 1920.
Nikolai Rattel - in staff positions, then in the national economy. Shot in 1939.
Konstantin Rylsky - executed in 1921.
Sergei Savchenko - division commander, then major general. Died in 1963.
Lev Savchenko-Matsenko - executed in 1920.
Alexander Samoilo - taught, rose to the rank of lieutenant general, joined the party, died in 1963.
Nikolai Sapozhnikov - in civilian life in staff positions, then taught. In 1931 he received 5 years in the Vesna case. In 1937 he was shot.
Dmitry Satterup - worked in the military archive. Shot in 1940.
Alexander Svechin - taught at the military academy. In 1931 he received 5 years in the Vesna case. Released the following year. In 1938 he was shot.
Sergei Segerkranz - taught, in 1931 he received 5 years in the "Spring" case, in 1938 he was again arrested and sentenced to 10 years, in 1940 he was released, after that the traces are lost.
Vladimir Sedachev - in staff positions, died in 1928.
Ivan Seliverstvov - studied geology. Arrested in 1931. Further fate is unknown.
Nikolai Semenov - taught at the military academy. Shot in 1938.
Dmitry Sergievsky - died in 1920.
Vladimir Serebryannikov - in staff positions. In 1930 he was arrested for wrecking railways and received 10 years. In 1937 he was shot.
Vsevolod Sokovnin - died in 1922.
Mikhail Sokovnin - taught, died in 1943.
Pavel Staev - worked in publishing houses, edited military publications. Died in 1953.
Andrei Suvorov - taught, exiled to Kazakhstan in the "Spring" case, executed in 1938.
Nikolai Suleiman - taught at the military academy, died in prison in 1942.
Vladimir Sushkov - taught, died in 1927.
Pavel Sutin - commanded the front during the Civil War, then taught at the military academy, was shot in 1938.
Sergei von Taube - taught, executed in 1931.
Yuri Tikhmenev - taught mathematics at school. Died in 1943.
Mikhail Fastykovsky - fled to Poland in 1922, returned in 1924, was recruited by the OGPU, and executed in 1938.
Georgy Khvoshchinsky - in staff positions. Shot himself in 1928.
Nikolai Henrikson - in staff positions, then a personal pensioner, died in 1941.
Mikhail Tsygalsky - taught, died in 1928.
Vladimir Cheremisinov - went over to the whites and emigrated.
Alexey Cherepennikov - taught, executed in 1937.
Dmitry Shelekhov - taught, shot in 1931 along with 11 other officers in the case of the Semenovsky Guards Regiment, the so-called. "Semyonovskoe case."
Anatoly Shemansky - died in 1942.
Konstantin Shemyakin - died in 1927.
Karl Ezering - left for Latvia in 1921.
Pavel Yagodkin - taught, in 1931 received 10 years, further fate is unknown.

Belkovich, Disterlo, Kozlovsky, Leo, Lyubomirov, Korulsky, Nesterovsky, Svyatsky, Khamin, Cherkasov, Ivanov, Anisimov, Grishinsky, Evreinov, Zaichenko, Kabalov, Kadoshnikov, Klimovich, Kolschmidt, Kosyakov, Kruger, Maydel, Martynov, Mikheev, Novakov, Peterson, Popov, Remezov, Solnyshkin, Tomilin, Ushakov, Fedotov, Chausov, Yakimovich, Yakovlev - fate unknown.

The Soviet government knew how to be grateful; it did not touch slightly less than half of the tsarist generals (we do not consider those whose fate is unknown and who escaped) who voluntarily swore allegiance to it. Hence the conclusion: if during the coming Russian Revolution the Bolsheviks emerge again, and you are a senior officer, do not go over to their side under any circumstances. They will then kill you, imprison you, or force you to flee abroad. Don't repeat other people's mistakes!

Evgeniy Politdrug

In what proportions were the officers of the Russian Imperial Army divided between the Whites and the Reds in the Civil. The quintessence of the research is given in V. Kozhinov’s book “Russia. Century XX" (bylym: an author with a pronounced monarchical orientation, in some sense an anti-Soviet):

“V.V., who knew how to collect information. Shulgin wrote - and, as is now clear, rightly so - back in 1929: " Almost half of the General Staff officers remained with the Bolsheviks. Nobody knows how many ordinary officers there were, but it was a lot.", M.V. Nazarov refers to an article by emigrant General A.K. Baiova (by the way, his brother Lieutenant General K.K. Baiov served in the Red Army!), published in 1932 in the Parisian newspaper “Chasovoy”, and a treatise by the excellent military historian A.G. Kavtaradze, published in 1988 in Moscow. But M.B. Nazarov takes on faith precisely A.K.’s figure. Baiov, who was not able to count the number of officers in the Red Army. Meanwhile A.G. Kavtaradze, using documents, established the number of generals and officers of the General Staff who served in the Red Army (the vast majority of them appear in his book even by name), and it turned out that not 20, but 33 percent of their total number ended up in the Red Army.

If we talk about the officer corps in general, as a whole, then, according to the calculations of A.G., they served in the Red Army. Kavtaradze, 70,000-75,000 people, that is, approximately 30 percent of its total composition (a smaller share than among the General Staff, which had its own significant reason). However, this figure - 30 percent - is essentially misleading. For, as A.G. proves. Kavtaradze, another 30 percent of the officers in 1917 found themselves outside of any army service at all (op. cit., p. 117). This means that not 30, but about 43 percent of the officers available by 1918 served in the Red Army, while 57 percent (approximately 100,000 people) served in the White Army.

But what is especially striking is the fact that "the most valuable and trained part of the officer corps of the Russian army - the corps of officers of the General Staff"(p. 181) 639 people (including 252 generals) ended up in the Red Army, which was 46 percent - that is, in fact, about half - continued serve after October 1917 as General Staff officers; in the White Army there were approximately 750 of them (op. cit., pp. 196-197). So, almost half of the best part, the elite of the Russian officer corps, served in the Red Army!

Until recently, these figures were unknown to anyone: this historical fact neither the whites nor the reds wanted to recognize (since this revealed one of the true, but not honorable, reasons for their victory over the whites); however, this is still an indisputable fact. By the way, it was quite impressively recreated fiction; Let us recall at least the image of Colonel of the General Staff Roshchin in “Walking through Torment” by A.N. Tolstoy. But this image, completely characteristic of the era, was perceived by most readers as a kind of exception, as a deviation from the “norm.” Of course, one can try to argue that generals and officers joined the Red Army under duress, or out of hunger, or for the subsequent transfer to the Whites (however, many more officers transferred from the White Army to the Red Army than vice versa). But when we're talking about for choices made by tens of thousands of people, such explanations do not seem credible. The situation is, without a doubt, much more complicated.

By the way, a calculation was recently published according to which (I quote) "total career officers who participated in the civil war in the ranks of the regular Red Army were more than 2 times higher than the number of career officers who took part in hostilities on the side of the whites"("Questions of History", 1993, No. 6, p. 189). But this is obviously an exaggeration. "Enough"; and the fact that the number of officers in the White Army was not much greater than their number in the Red Army.
* * *
To understand the way of thinking of a patriot who found himself in a white camp, read the memoirs of General Y.A. Slashcheva. And, of course, the work by A.N. mentioned by V. Kozhinov. Tolstoy "Walking through torment."
* *
Blym for reference: V.V. Shulgin is a monarchist,

“We are just careless Landsknechts,” answered one of the Red military experts, former General A. A. Svechin, during interrogations.

Who will win: “we” or “they”? Who will have to gnaw on moldy crackers and wander around dosshouses in a foreign land or hang around in a noose in their homeland? Finally, what's next?

In 1919, at the height of the civil war, these questions tormented the vast majority of the population under the long-lived Russian Empire.

But if nothing serious threatened the civilians and soldier masses of the warring parties, then their commanders, former generals and officers, best case scenario a pretty future in hard labor smiled.

The choice made in 1918 under the threat of a German invasion in favor of the Red Army during the civil war could well have resulted in repression by the whites for military experts.

The morale of many former generals and officers was not the best. Here is what publicist F. Stepun wrote about his impressions of conversations with military experts:

“They listened and objected in an objective-strategic style, but some strange, fiery-mysterious questions ran through everyone’s eyes and behind them, in which everything echoed and winked - fierce hatred of the Bolsheviks with acute envy of the successes of the advancing volunteers.

The desire for victory for one’s own group of officers who remained in Russia over Denikin’s officers with obvious disgust at the thought that the victory of one’s own group would also be a victory for something other than one’s own Red Army; fear of the outcome - with firm faith: nothing will happen, no matter what you say, their own people are coming.”

There were relatively few military experts who, out of conviction, went over to the Bolsheviks. There were few such old military leaders, but young general staff officers, captains and colonels, tsarist army who received positions in the Red Army that they could not even dream of in earlier times, became loyal supporters of Soviet power.

The time of birth of the “ideological” Bolshevik military experts should be considered June-July 1919, when the Red Army was defeated on the Southern Front of the Civil War, and the real threat its capture by the Whites.

Because of this, in June-July 1919 there were mass arrests of military experts holding various responsible positions.

A number of betrayals were added to the bouquet of troubles for the Bolsheviks: the defection to the Whites on June 19 of the commander of the 9th Army, former Colonel N.D. Vsevolodov, and the flight across the front line on August 10 of the chief of staff of the 8th Army, former Colonel A.S. Nechvolodov.

It is worth noting that the 8th Army was generally terribly unlucky with its chiefs of staff: back in October 1918, V.V. Vdoviev-Kabardintsev fled from this position to the whites, and in March 1919, V.A. Zheltyshev.

One more with a strong blow There was already an escape from the headquarters of the Southern Front of the former general and professor of the Military Academy V. E. Borisov.

In the summer of 1919, the Soviet government was concerned about two problems: where to find reliable military experts and who to blame for failures on the fronts of the civil war.

The Bolsheviks completed both tasks successfully. The castling of the command staff of the Red Army gave brilliant results for the Bolsheviks - they finally received those military experts who served them without any reservations.

Former commander became Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army Eastern Front General and General Staff Sergei Sergeevich Kamenev. The fronts of the civil war were headed by: Southern - former Lieutenant General V.N. Egoryev, Eastern - former Major General V.A. Olderogge, former Lieutenant General D.N. Nadezhny remained the commander of the Western Front.

The former officers and generals named here, who became front commanders, did not change Soviet power. However, two of them, namely V. A. Olderogge and D. N. Nadezhny, were arrested in the “Spring” case, and S. S. Kamenev was posthumously declared an enemy of the people in 1937.

Among young officers, the percentage of Bolshevik adherents was slightly higher. Here is what former Colonel A.D. Taranovsky said about this during interrogations in the case - “Spring”:

“I believe that the old teaching staff, perhaps, would not have minded remaining in place when Denikin entered and hoped to rehabilitate themselves before him.

As for the young staff of the General Staff, there would, without a doubt, be a division, and most of, in case of abandonment of Moscow, would have left with the retreating units of the Red Army, defending on the Volga line, and, perhaps, further to the East, because their peers in Denikin’s army had long since been groomed as generals and their service there would have been difficult.”

Many former staff and chief officers were flattered by the positions offered by the Bolsheviks. Especially when they were assigned to be commanders or chiefs of staff of armies.

And here the military experts gave their best full blast, trying... no, not to bring victory to the Bolsheviks, but to prove to those “old bastards” sitting on the other front line that they, the young ones, are capable of something.

This is what the already mentioned Sergei Dmitrievich Kharlamov said during interrogations: “Transferred to the front (the headquarters of the 15th Army, reorganized from the 15th Latarmia), I immediately lived in the interests of the army.

Comrade Berzin (chief of the 4th directorate of the Red Army headquarters), Comrade K.K. Danishevsky and a number of other workers of the 15th Army can testify about my work in the 15th Army and my political person.

Receiving the responsible position of commander of the 7th Army, a position that I would not have even dreamed of in the old tsarist times, finally makes me not only just a loyal citizen, but also encourages me to strive for the fastest possible further achievement of victories over the enemy.

The failure of the defense of Narva and the breakthrough of the front by the troops of General. Yudenich (my leader Ludenquist turned out to be a scoundrel, a traitor and worked not for me, but for Yudenich) greatly discourages me.

I ask the visiting Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, Trotsky, to give me the honor of fighting the enemy with at least a battalion or regiment. I receive the Kolpino group, beat Yudenich’s troops near Pavlovsk, Detskoye Selo, and Gatchina. Unexpectedly I receive the Order of the Red Banner.

In 1920 I transferred to the South Western Front and am appointed chief of staff of the Ukrainian Labor Army. Passionate about the work of socialist construction and restoration of the Soviet National economy I’m starting to become infected with the enthusiasm of the workers, without boasting, I can say that I work here conscientiously.” (GASBU, FP, d. 67093, t. 172, case of S. D. Kharlamov, p. 15-ob-17.)

Thus, in the summer of 1919, military experts appeared in the Red Army, ready to go with the Bolsheviks to the end.

By the spring of 1920, the number of military experts in the Red Army had decreased significantly due to natural losses, repression by the Bolsheviks and defectors.

By September 1, 1919, 35,502 former officers were drafted into the Red Army (Directives of the Red Army Front Command. - M., 1978, - T. 4. - P. 274).

But the Red Army no longer had trained command personnel at its disposal. Therefore, in the spring of 1920, former white officers from the armies that capitulated in Siberia, near Odessa and the Caucasus began to be accepted into the army en masse.

As numerous authors testify, by the beginning of 1921, 14,390 such people were accepted (Efimov N.A. Command staff of the Red Army 1928. - T. 2. - P. 95). However, former white officers were accepted into the ranks of the Red Army only until August 1920.

Hundreds of former officers, including white ones, began to join the Red Army. Most of them were sent to the Western Front to fight the Poles. On the Southern Front, against Wrangel, mostly old, proven military experts remained.

Of the formerly prominent white generals who entered the service of the Bolsheviks in 1920: former commander of the Kuban Army N.A. Morozov, chief of staff of the Ural Army V.I. Motorny, corps commander in the Siberian Army I.G. Grudzinsky and many others .

And in total, during the Polish campaign, 59 former white General Staff officers came to the Red Army, of which 21 were generals. (List of persons with higher general education in the Red Army by March 1, 1923. - M., 1923). All of them were immediately sent to responsible staff positions.

Initially fighting The Southwestern Front fought both against the armies of Wrangel and against the troops of Petliura and the Poles. The front commander was a former lieutenant colonel of the tsarist army, a future marshal Soviet Union Alexander Ilyich Egorov.

The position of his chief of staff was held by former General Staff Colonel Nikolai Nikolaevich Petin. Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin himself was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the front.

Egorov and Petin were experienced and talented military leaders. Both of them various reasons they had no intention of breaking with the Reds; A.I. Egorov, it seems, was an ordinary “servant.”

In 1905-1909, as a junior officer and then a company commander, he participated in the suppression of revolutionary uprisings in the Caucasus. Moreover, he personally commanded the executions of demonstrations.

During the First World War, while in position, Alexander Ilyich wrote a talented essay on the history of his native regiment, and on its pages he was filled with loyal feelings.

Finally, in 1917, Egorov, elected to the Council of Soldiers' Deputies, repeatedly changed his political position, and before joining the Bolshevik Party, he managed to be a Left Socialist Revolutionary.

Whether Colonel of the General Staff Nikolai Nikolaevich Petin had reasons to dislike the old system is unknown. But from his combat biography it is clear that during the First World War he was a very good staff worker, and went through all stages of staff service from the chief of staff of a division to the staff officer of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

By the end of the war on the Russian front, the rank of colonel was clearly not enough for him, especially since most of Nikolai Nikolaevich’s classmates at the Nikolaev Military Academy were already generals by that time.

However, Petin’s position can be judged from one interesting archival document. At the beginning of July 1920, Wrangel’s chief of staff and Petin’s former colleague, General P. S. Makhrov, secretly conveyed to Nikolai Nikolaevich a request to assist the Whites in their fight against the Bolsheviks.

And this is what Petin replied: “... I take it as a personal insult to you that you suggest that I can serve in a high responsible position in the Red Army not out of conscience, but for some other reasons. Believe me, if I hadn’t had received his sight, he would have been either in prison or in a concentration camp.

From the very moment when you and General Stogov left Berdichev before the entry of the Germans and Austrians called by the Ukrainian Rada there, I decided that nothing could tear me away from the people, and I went with the remaining employees to what was terrible for us at that time, but together with our dear Soviet Russia.

Fundamental political differences between the workers' and peasants' government, which took the helm after October revolution, and representatives of the bourgeois intelligentsia lost their importance when the country was threatened by external enemies. When it comes to survival, and a ring of fronts is closing around the country, prudence dictates its own rules, and the place of ideological interests is taken by the desire to save the Fatherland, making concessions and compromises with internal opponents.

The civil confrontation significantly weakened the forces of the newly formed Red Army (Workers' and Peasants' Red Army). It was not possible to strengthen its command staff with young specialists from among the working people, because their training required time that simply did not exist. The need to immediately create a sufficiently strong regular army that would be able to repel not only the imperialist interventionists, but also the troops of the White Guards, led to the fact that the Soviet leadership considered it appropriate to use the accumulated military and theoretical experience of specialists who, before the events of 1917, were in the service of The Tsar's army.

Having justified the need to use significant cultural heritage capitalism, Lenin addressed the country's governing bodies. He emphasized the need to treat special attention to attract scientifically educated specialists not only in the military, but also in other fields, regardless of their origin and who and whom they served before the advent of Soviet Power. It was certainly easy to set a goal, but how to achieve it? Most of the former nobles remained either hostile to Soviet power or took a wait-and-see attitude towards it. Confident that the revolution would bring with it only devastation and the fall of culture, they expected inevitable death Russian intelligentsia. It was difficult for them to comprehend that, by meeting them halfway, the Soviet government was striving to transfer the most valuable achievements capitalist way of life.

The coercion factor could hardly then give positive results. In addition, it was necessary to work not only to change the attitude of the intelligentsia towards the new government, but also to influence the negative attitude of the working masses towards former representatives of the bourgeoisie. Another problem was that some of the leading party workers did not at all share Lenin’s opinion on the need to cooperate with the side of the opposite worldview, even in conditions of total control over their activities. And of course, such interaction with people simply imbued with an ideology so alien to the Bolsheviks, quite often turned into sabotage. However, without using the knowledge and experience that the intelligentsia Tsarist Russia got in the best educational institutions Europe and while working in high official positions even before the revolution, it was impossible to raise the country and win victory over external enemies.

In the end, many former officers and generals realized that Soviet power was the only force representing national interests Russia and capable of protecting the country from external enemies in a given period of time. All patriotic professional military men, who feel their connection with the people, considered it their duty to support the “reds” in the struggle for the independence of their homeland. The position of the new government on not encroaching on the political convictions of military specialists, which was even legally enshrined at the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets (dated July 10, 1918), was also of great importance. Unfortunately, we must not forget about other former nobles and officers who are ready to surrender our country to external enemies for desecration. They wanted in every possible way to get rid of the communists and their destructive ideas, not wanting to understand the consequences of such “devilish” deals.

The first steps towards cooperation were good example for other military men who still doubt the correctness of such a decision. The generals who had already sided with the Bolsheviks called on the remaining officers of the Tsarist Army to come out to defend the country in the ranks of the Red Army. The remarkable words of their address have been preserved, clearly showing the moral position of these people: “At this important historical moment, we, senior comrades in arms, appeal to your feelings of devotion and love for the Fatherland, we ask you to forget all grievances and voluntarily join the Red Army. Wherever you are assigned, serve not out of fear, but out of conscience, so that, without sparing your life, with your honest service you can defend our dear Russia, preventing its plunder.”

There is no hiding the fact that in order to attract specialists pre-revolutionary Russia Sometimes not entirely humane methods and means were used. Some historians are inclined to call the post-revolutionary period the “path to Golgotha” for the Russian intelligentsia, because repressive methods of forcing them to work for the Soviet regime were widespread. However higher authorities the authorities did not welcome such an attitude towards experts of noble origin, as evidenced by the order of the Presidium of the Cheka adopted on December 17, 1918. This document contains strict instructions to exercise special caution when holding bourgeois-noble specialists accountable for certain actions and to allow their arrest only if there are proven facts of anti-Soviet activity. The country could not afford to thoughtlessly throw away valuable personnel; difficult times dictated new rules. Also, contrary to numerous allegations about the forced involvement of military experts from Imperial Russia in the Red Army, it is worth noting that the negative transformations that took place in the army even before the revolution significantly changed the mood among the officers. This only contributed to the fact that with the advent of Soviet power, many senior army ranks considered it their duty, and not out of fear, to support the Bolsheviks in the battle for the Fatherland.

The result of the measures taken was that out of one hundred and fifty thousand professional military men who served in the officer corps of pre-revolutionary Russia, seventy-five thousand people fought in the Red Army against thirty-five thousand old officers in the service of the White Guards. Their contribution to the victory in the Civil War is undeniable; fifty-three percent of the command staff of the Red Army were officers and generals of the Imperial Army.

Since the situation required immediate and correct action, already in November 1917, none other than a hereditary nobleman, Lieutenant General of the former Imperial Army M.D. was appointed chief of staff and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the army. Bonch-Bruevich, nicknamed " Soviet general" It was he who had the opportunity to lead the Red Army in February 1918, created from separate units of the Red Guard and the remnants of the former Imperial Army. This was the most difficult thing for Soviet Republic a period that lasted from November 1917 to August 1918.

Mikhail Dmitrievich Bonch-Bruevich was born in Moscow on February 24, 1870. His father was a land surveyor, a descendant of an old noble family. At twenty-one, Bonch-Bruevich graduated from the Konstantinovsky Land Survey Institute as a surveyor, and a year later from the Moscow Infantry Junker School. Until 1898, he studied at the Academy of the General Staff, where he remained until 1907 to teach tactics. He was a participant in the First World War. His brother, Vladimir Dmitrievich, was a Bolshevik since 1895, and was involved in the affairs of the Council of People's Commissars. Perhaps that is why, after the October Revolution, Bonch-Bruevich was the first of the generals to side with the new government and accept the position of chief of staff. His assistant was the former major general nobleman S.G. Lukirsky. Mikhail Dmitrievich died in 1956 in Moscow.

From the end of 1918, the newly established position of Commander-in-Chief of the country's Armed Forces was occupied by His Eminence S.S. Kamenev (but not the Kamenev who was later shot along with Zinoviev). Having headed an infantry division after the revolution, this most experienced career officer rose through the ranks at lightning speed.

Sergei Sergeevich Kamenev was born into the family of a military engineer from Kyiv. He graduated from the Kiev Cadet Corps, the Alexander Military School and the St. Petersburg Academy of the General Staff. He was highly respected by the soldiers. During the First World War, Kamenev held various staff positions. At the beginning of the revolution, Kamenev read a collection of Lenin and Zinoviev called “Against the Current,” which, in his words, “opened up new horizons for him and made a stunning impression.” In the winter of 1918, he voluntary consent joined the Red Army and led the operations to destroy Denikin, Wrangel and Kolchak. Kamenev also helped suppress resistance in Bukhara, Fergana, Karelia, and the Tambov province (Antonov's uprising). From 1919 to 1924 he served as Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army. He created a plan for the defeat of Poland, which was never implemented due to the opposition of the leadership of the Southwestern Front (represented by Egorov and Stalin). After the end of the war, he held major positions in the Red Army, was one of the founders of Osoaviakhim, and conducted research in the Arctic. In particular, Kamenev organized assistance to the Chelyuskin, lost in ice, and the Italian Nobile expedition.

The direct subordinate of Sergei Sergeevich Kamenev and his first assistant was a hereditary nobleman, head of the Field Headquarters of the Red Army P.P. Lebedev, who held the rank of major general in the Imperial Army. Having replaced Bonch-Bruevich in this post, Lebedev skillfully led the Field Headquarters throughout the war (from 1919 to 1921), actively participating in the preparation and conduct of major operations.

Pavel Pavlovich Lebedev was born in Cheboksary on April 21, 1872. Coming from a family of impoverished nobles, he received his education at public expense. He graduated with honors from the Cadet Corps, the Alexander Military School, and the Academy of the General Staff. With the rank of staff captain, Lebedev was assigned to the General Staff, where, thanks to his extraordinary abilities, he quickly made a brilliant career. Participated in the First World War. He refused to go over to the side of the whites and after a personal invitation from V.I. Lenin joined the Bolshevik army. Considered one of the main developers of operations to destroy N.N.’s troops. Yudenich, A.I. Denikina, A.V. Kolchak. Lebedev was distinguished by amazing endurance, worked seven days a week, and returned home only at four o’clock in the morning. After the end of the Civil War, he remained to work in leadership positions in the Red Army. Lebedev was awarded the highest awards of the Soviet Republic. He died on July 2, 1933 in Kharkov.

Another hereditary nobleman A.A. Samoilo was a direct colleague of Lebedev, holding the post of chief of the All-Russian General Staff. Having risen to the rank of major general in the Imperial Army, Alexander Alexandrovich, after the revolutionary changes of October, went over to the side of the Bolsheviks, and for his significant services he was awarded numerous orders and medals, including two Orders of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner and the Order Patriotic War I degree.

Alexander Alexandrovich Samoilo was born on October 23, 1869 in the city of Moscow. His father was a military doctor from the family of hetmans of the Zaporozhye Army. In 1898, Alexander Alexandrovich graduated from the General Staff Academy. During the war he served in General Staff in the operations department. On the side of the “Reds”, he took part in negotiations with Germany (in Brest-Litovsk), with Finland (in April 1920), with Turkey (in March 1921). He is the prototype of the main character of the novel “I Have the Honor,” written by Valentin Pikul. He died in 1963 at the age of ninety-four.

An outsider may develop misrepresentation that Lenin and Trotsky, when deciding on candidates for senior command posts, certainly sought to appoint representatives of the Imperial Corps of Generals to them. But the truth is that only those who were awarded such high military ranks had the necessary skills and abilities. It was they who helped the new government instantly navigate the most difficult situation and defend the freedom of the Fatherland. The harsh conditions of wartime quickly placed people in their rightful places, pushing forward real professionals and “pushing aside” those who only seemed so, being in fact ordinary “revolutionary babble”.

Based on a detailed card index of officers of the Russian army compiled for October 1917, as well as further verification of the received data with later ones, the most true information about the number of military ranks of the Imperial Army who served on the side of the new government was determined. Statistics show that during the Civil War, 746 former lieutenant colonels, 980 colonels, and 775 generals served in the army of workers and peasants. And the Red Fleet was generally an aristocratic military unit, since the General Staff of the Russian Navy after the October events was practically in in full force went over to the side of the Bolsheviks and selflessly fought on the side of Soviet power throughout the civil war. The commanders of the flotilla during the war were former rear admirals of the Imperial Navy and hereditary nobles: V.M. Altvater, E.A. Behrens and A.V. Nemitz. They also completely voluntarily supported the new government.

Vasily Mikhailovich Altfater was born in Warsaw into the family of a general on December 4, 1883 and received an excellent education. He took part in the defense of Port Arthur during Russo-Japanese War. He showed himself to be a courageous man when rescuing the crew of the battleship Petropavlovsk. During World War I he worked in the Naval Administration. Having gone over to the Bolshevik side in 1917, Vasily Mikhailovich became the first commander of the RKKF. This is what he wrote in his statement: “Until now, I served only because I considered it necessary to be useful to Russia. I didn't know you and didn't trust you. Even now I don’t understand much, but I am convinced that you love Russia more than many of us. That's why I came to you." V.M. Altvater died from heart attack April 20, 1919 and was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery.

Separately, we can note the white officers and generals who emigrated to China and returned to Russia from China in the 20s and 30s. For example, in 1933, together with his brother, Major General A.T. Sukin, colonel of the General Staff of the old army, Nikolai Timofeevich Sukin, went to the USSR, a lieutenant general in the white armies, a participant in the Siberian Ice Campaign, in the summer of 1920 he temporarily held the post of chief of staff of the commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Russian Eastern outskirts, in the USSR he worked as a teacher of military disciplines. Some of them began working for the USSR while still in China, such as a colonel of the old army, in the Kolchak army, Major General Tonkikh I.V. - in 1920, in the armed forces of the Russian Eastern outskirts, he served as chief of staff of the marching ataman, in 1925 he lived in Beijing. In 1927, he was an employee of the military attache of the plenipotentiary mission of the USSR in China; on 04/06/1927 he was arrested by the Chinese authorities during a raid on the premises of the plenipotentiary mission in Beijing, and probably after that he returned to the USSR. Also, while still in China, another high-ranking officer of the White Army, also a participant in the Siberian Ice Campaign, Alexey Nikolaevich Shelavin, began to collaborate with the Red Army. It’s funny, but this is how Kazanin, who came to Blucher’s headquarters in China as a translator, describes his meeting with him: “In the reception room there was a long table set for breakfast. A fit, graying military man sat at the table and ate with appetite from a full plate. oatmeal. In such stuffiness, eating hot porridge seemed to me a heroic feat. And he, not content with this, took three soft-boiled eggs from the bowl and threw them onto the porridge. He poured canned milk over it all and sprinkled it thickly with sugar. I was so hypnotized by the enviable appetite of the old military man (I soon learned that it was the Tsarist General Shalavin, who had transferred to Soviet service), that I saw Blucher only when he was already standing completely in front of me.” Kazanin did not mention in his memoirs that Shelavin was not just a tsarist, but a white general; in general, in the tsarist army he was only a colonel of the General Staff. A participant in the Russian-Japanese and World Wars, in Kolchak’s army he held the positions of chief of staff of the Omsk Military District and the 1st Consolidated Siberian (later 4th Siberian) Corps, participated in the Siberian Ice trek, served in the Armed Forces of the Russian Eastern Outskirts and the Amur Provisional Government, then emigrated to China. Already in China he began to cooperate with the Soviet military intelligence(under the pseudonym Rudnev), in 1925–1926 - military adviser to the Henan group, teacher at the Whampoa military school; 1926-1927 - at the headquarters of the Guangzhou group, helped Blucher evacuate from China and himself also returned to the USSR in 1927.

One can name many more famous names of officers and generals of the old army, who selflessly fought on the side of the Red Army and commanded entire fronts that ultimately defeated the White Guard hordes. Among them, the former Lieutenant General Baron Alexander Alexandrovich von Taube, who became the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army in Siberia, stood out. The brave military leader was captured by Kolchak in the summer of 1918 and died on death row. And a year later, the hereditary nobleman and Major General Vladimir Aleksandrovich Olderogge, commanding the entire Eastern Front of the Bolsheviks, completely destroyed the White Guards in the Urals and completely eliminated the Kolchakism. At the same time, the Southern Front of the Reds, led by experienced lieutenant generals of the old Army Vladimir Nikolaevich Egoryev and Vladimir Ivanovich Selivachev, stopped Denikin’s army, holding out until reinforcements arrived from the East. And this list can go on and on. Despite the presence of “home-grown” Red military leaders, among whom there are many legendary names: Budyonny, Frunze, Chapaev, Kotovsky, Parkhomenko and Shchors, in all main directions at the decisive moments of the confrontation, those same “hated” representatives of the former bourgeoisie were at the helm. It was their talent in managing armies, coupled with knowledge and experience, that led the troops to victory.

Laws Soviet propaganda weren't allowed for a long time objectively highlight the role of certain layers of military personnel of the Red Army, belittling their importance and creating a certain halo of silence around their names. Meanwhile, they honestly played their role during a difficult period for the country, helped win the Civil War and went into the shadows, leaving only military reports and operational documents about themselves. However, they, like thousands of other people, shed their blood for the Fatherland and are worthy of respect and memory.

As an objection to the assertions that Stalin and his comrades later deliberately destroyed representatives of the noble intelligentsia through their repressive measures, we can only say that all the war heroes mentioned in the article above, like many other military specialists, quietly lived to old age with the exception of those who died in battle. And many representatives of the junior officers managed to make a successful military career and even become Marshals of the USSR. Among them are such famous military leaders as former second lieutenant L.A. Govorov, staff captains F.I. Tolbukhin and A.M. Vasilevsky, as well as Colonel B.M. Shaposhnikov.

Of course, one should not deny that, in Lenin’s words, “excesses” and ill-considered actions were observed on the ground, there were undeserved arrests and overly harsh sentences, but talking about prepared mass repressions aimed at destroying the noble military corps is completely unfounded. It is much more instructive to remember how the rest, the “white” officers, with whom it is now fashionable to sympathize and sing their praises, fled to French and Turkish cities at the first threat. Saving their own skins, they gave everything they had to the direct enemies of Russia, who at the same time were fighting with their compatriots. And these are those who swore allegiance to the Motherland and promised to defend the Fatherland until their last breath. While the Russian people fought for their independence, such “officers”, not worthy to bear such a high rank, sat in Western taverns and brothels, wasting money that they took out of the country when they escaped. They have long discredited themselves in

The fundamental political differences between the workers' and peasants' government, which took the helm after the October Revolution, and representatives of the bourgeois intelligentsia lost their importance when the threat from external enemies loomed over the country. When it comes to survival, and a ring of fronts is closing around the country, prudence dictates its own rules, and the place of ideological interests is taken by the desire to save the Fatherland, making concessions and compromises with internal opponents.

Having justified the need to use the significant cultural heritage of capitalism, Lenin turned to the country's governing bodies. He emphasized the need to pay special attention to attracting scientifically educated specialists not only in the military, but also in other fields, regardless of their origin and who they served before the advent of Soviet Power. It was certainly easy to set a goal, but how to achieve it? Most of the former nobles remained either hostile to Soviet power or took a wait-and-see attitude towards it. Confident that the revolution would bring only devastation and the fall of culture, they expected the inevitable death of the Russian intelligentsia. It was difficult for them to comprehend that, by meeting them halfway, the Soviet government was striving to transfer the most valuable achievements of the capitalist way of life to a renewed Russia.

The coercion factor would hardly have been able to produce positive results then. In addition, it was necessary to work not only to change the attitude of the intelligentsia towards the new government, but also to influence the negative attitude of the working masses towards former representatives of the bourgeoisie. Another problem was that some of the leading party workers did not at all share Lenin’s opinion on the need to cooperate with the side of the opposite worldview, even in conditions of total control over their activities. And of course, such interaction with people simply imbued with an ideology so alien to the Bolsheviks, quite often turned into sabotage. However, without using the knowledge and experience that the intelligentsia of Tsarist Russia received in the best educational institutions of Europe and while working in high official positions even before the revolution, it was impossible to raise the country and defeat external enemies.

In the end, many former officers and generals realized that Soviet power was the only force representing the national interests of Russia and capable of protecting the country from external enemies in a given period of time. All patriotic professional military men, who feel their connection with the people, considered it their duty to support the “reds” in the struggle for the independence of their homeland. The position of the new government on not encroaching on the political convictions of military specialists, which was even legally enshrined at the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets (dated July 10, 1918), was also of great importance. Unfortunately, we must not forget about other former nobles and officers who are ready to surrender our country to external enemies for desecration. They wanted in every possible way to get rid of the communists and their destructive ideas, not wanting to understand the consequences of such “devilish” deals.

The first steps towards cooperation became a good example for other military personnel who still doubted the correctness of such a decision. The generals who had already sided with the Bolsheviks called on the remaining officers of the Tsarist Army to come out to defend the country in the ranks of the Red Army. The remarkable words of their address have been preserved, clearly showing the moral position of these people: “At this important historical moment, we, senior comrades in arms, appeal to your feelings of devotion and love for the Fatherland, we ask you to forget all grievances and voluntarily join the Red Army. Wherever you are assigned, serve not out of fear, but out of conscience, so that, without sparing your life, with your honest service you can defend our dear Russia, preventing its plunder.”

There is no hiding the fact that to attract specialists from pre-revolutionary Russia, sometimes not entirely humane methods and means were used. Some historians are inclined to call the post-revolutionary period the “path to Golgotha” for the Russian intelligentsia, because repressive methods of forcing them to work for the Soviet regime were widespread. However, the highest authorities did not welcome such an attitude towards experts of noble origin, as evidenced by the order of the Presidium of the Cheka adopted on December 17, 1918. This document contains strict instructions to exercise special caution when holding bourgeois-noble specialists accountable for certain actions and to allow their arrest only if there are proven facts of anti-Soviet activity. The country could not afford to thoughtlessly throw away valuable personnel; difficult times dictated new rules. Also, contrary to numerous allegations about the forced involvement of military experts from Imperial Russia in the Red Army, it is worth noting that the negative transformations that took place in the army even before the revolution significantly changed the mood among the officers. This only contributed to the fact that with the advent of Soviet power, many senior army ranks considered it their duty, and not out of fear, to support the Bolsheviks in the battle for the Fatherland.

Since the situation required immediate and correct action, already in November 1917, none other than a hereditary nobleman, Lieutenant General of the former Imperial Army M.D. was appointed chief of staff and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the army. Bonch-Bruevich, nicknamed "Soviet general". It was he who had the opportunity to lead the Red Army in February 1918, created from separate units of the Red Guard and the remnants of the former Imperial Army. This was the most difficult period for the Soviet Republic, lasting from November 1917 to August 1918.

Sergei Sergeevich Kamenev was born into the family of a military engineer from Kyiv. He graduated from the Kiev Cadet Corps, the Alexander Military School and the St. Petersburg Academy of the General Staff. He was highly respected by the soldiers. During the First World War, Kamenev held various staff positions. At the beginning of the revolution, Kamenev read a collection of Lenin and Zinoviev called “Against the Current,” which, in his words, “opened up new horizons for him and made a stunning impression.” In the winter of 1918, he voluntarily joined the ranks of the Red Army and led the operations to destroy Denikin, Wrangel and Kolchak. Kamenev also helped suppress resistance in Bukhara, Fergana, Karelia, and the Tambov province (Antonov's uprising). From 1919 to 1924 he served as Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army. He created a plan for the defeat of Poland, which was never implemented due to the opposition of the leadership of the Southwestern Front (represented by Egorov and Stalin). After the end of the war, he held major positions in the Red Army, was one of the founders of Osoaviakhim, and conducted research in the Arctic. In particular, Kamenev organized assistance to the Chelyuskin, lost in ice, and the Italian Nobile expedition.

Alexander Alexandrovich Samoilo was born on October 23, 1869 in the city of Moscow. His father was a military doctor from the family of hetmans of the Zaporozhye Army. In 1898, Alexander Alexandrovich graduated from the General Staff Academy. During the war he served on the General Staff in the operations department. On the side of the “Reds”, he took part in negotiations with Germany (in Brest-Litovsk), with Finland (in April 1920), with Turkey (in March 1921). He is the prototype of the main character of the novel “I Have the Honor,” written by Valentin Pikul. He died in 1963 at the age of ninety-four.

An outsider may have the false impression that Lenin and Trotsky, when deciding on candidates for the highest command posts, certainly sought to appoint representatives of the Imperial Corps of Generals to them. But the truth is that only those who were awarded such high military ranks had the necessary skills and abilities. It was they who helped the new government instantly navigate the most difficult situation and defend the freedom of the Fatherland. The harsh conditions of wartime quickly placed people in their rightful places, pushing forward real professionals and “pushing aside” those who only seemed so, being in fact ordinary “revolutionary babble”.

Based on a detailed card index of officers of the Russian army compiled for October 1917, as well as further verification of the received data with later ones, the most true information about the number of military ranks of the Imperial Army who served on the side of the new government was determined. Statistics show that during the Civil War, 746 former lieutenant colonels, 980 colonels, and 775 generals served in the army of workers and peasants. And the Red Fleet was generally an aristocratic military unit, since after the October events the General Staff of the Russian Navy almost in its entirety went over to the side of the Bolsheviks and selflessly fought on the side of Soviet power throughout the civil war. The commanders of the flotilla during the war were former rear admirals of the Imperial Navy and hereditary nobles: V.M. Altvater, E.A. Behrens and A.V. Nemitz. They also completely voluntarily supported the new government.

Vasily Mikhailovich Altfater was born in Warsaw into the family of a general on December 4, 1883 and received an excellent education. He took part in the defense of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War. He showed himself to be a courageous man when rescuing the crew of the battleship Petropavlovsk. During World War I he worked in the Naval Administration. Having gone over to the Bolshevik side in 1917, Vasily Mikhailovich became the first commander of the RKKF. This is what he wrote in his statement: “Until now, I served only because I considered it necessary to be useful to Russia. I didn't know you and didn't trust you. Even now I don’t understand much, but I am convinced that you love Russia more than many of us. That's why I came to you." V.M. Altvater died of a heart attack on April 20, 1919 and was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery.

Separately, we can note the white officers and generals who emigrated to China and returned to Russia from China in the 20s and 30s. For example, in 1933, together with his brother, Major General A.T. Sukin, colonel of the General Staff of the old army, Nikolai Timofeevich Sukin, went to the USSR, a lieutenant general in the white armies, a participant in the Siberian Ice Campaign, in the summer of 1920 he temporarily held the post of chief of staff of the commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Russian Eastern outskirts, in the USSR he worked as a teacher of military disciplines. Some of them began working for the USSR while still in China, such as a colonel of the old army, in the Kolchak army, Major General Tonkikh I.V. - in 1920, in the armed forces of the Russian Eastern outskirts, he served as chief of staff of the marching ataman, in 1925 he lived in Beijing. In 1927, he was an employee of the military attache of the plenipotentiary mission of the USSR in China; on 04/06/1927 he was arrested by the Chinese authorities during a raid on the premises of the plenipotentiary mission in Beijing, and probably after that he returned to the USSR. Also, while still in China, another high-ranking officer of the White Army, also a participant in the Siberian Ice Campaign, Alexey Nikolaevich Shelavin, began to collaborate with the Red Army. It’s funny, but this is how Kazanin, who came to Blucher’s headquarters in China as a translator, describes his meeting with him: “In the reception room there was a long table set for breakfast. A fit, graying military man sat at the table and ate oatmeal from a full plate with appetite. In such stuffiness, eating hot porridge seemed to me a heroic feat. And he, not content with this, took three soft-boiled eggs from the bowl and threw them onto the porridge. He poured canned milk over it all and sprinkled it thickly with sugar. I was so hypnotized by the enviable appetite of the old military man (I soon learned that it was the Tsarist General Shalavin, who had transferred to Soviet service), that I saw Blucher only when he was already standing completely in front of me.” Kazanin did not mention in his memoirs that Shelavin was not just a tsarist, but a white general; in general, in the tsarist army he was only a colonel of the General Staff. A participant in the Russian-Japanese and World Wars, in Kolchak’s army he held the positions of chief of staff of the Omsk Military District and the 1st Combined Siberian (later 4th Siberian) Corps, participated in the Siberian Ice Campaign, served in the Armed Forces of the Russian Eastern Outskirts and the Amur Provisional government, then emigrated to China. Already in China, he began to collaborate with Soviet military intelligence (under the pseudonym Rudnev), in 1925–1926 - military adviser to the Henan group, teacher at the Whampoa military school; 1926-1927 - at the headquarters of the Guangzhou group, helped Blucher evacuate from China and himself also returned to the USSR in 1927.

The laws of Soviet propaganda did not allow for a long time to objectively highlight the role of certain layers of military personnel of the Red Army, belittling their importance and creating a certain halo of silence around their names. Meanwhile, they honestly played their role during a difficult period for the country, helped win the Civil War and went into the shadows, leaving only military reports and operational documents about themselves. However, they, like thousands of other people, shed their blood for the Fatherland and are worthy of respect and memory.