The Battle of Kursk, you can’t retreat, everyone died. "I've never seen so much blood

75 years ago, on August 23, 1943, the largest battle of the Second World War and one of the most grandiose tank battles in history - the Battle of Kursk, which lasted about 50 days. In total, about 3 million soldiers and officers, almost 8 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and at least 4,500 aircraft took part in it. In a conversation with DW, German historians assess this battle.

Operation Citadel

In the summer of 1943, the “Third Reich” managed to unite such large forces on the Eastern Front for the last time. This was done in order to strike at the advancing Soviet troops and cut off the Red Army forces concentrated on the Kursk Bulge - a ledge on the front line that was formed as a result of the winter campaign of 1942-1943 - and then destroy them. However, Operation Citadel (as it was called in the plans of the Wehrmacht command) failed. The Germans lost the Battle of Kursk.

“The main result of the Battle of Kursk is that after the defeat in it, the Germans no longer had the opportunity to launch large offensive operations. This was the last large-scale offensive of the Wehrmacht on the German-Soviet front during the Second World War, after which Nazi Germany finally lost the initiative on Eastern Front,” emphasizes Jens Wehner, curator of the Bundeswehr Military History Museum in Dresden.

As Munich historian Roman Töppel explains, “this is why many Wehrmacht generals who advocated the Battle of Kursk later began to claim that the idea to start this battle belonged exclusively to Hitler. However, this is not so. It was Hitler who "At first, against the Battle of Kursk. The idea of ​​carrying out Operation Citadel was put forward by the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, Colonel General Rudolf Schmidt. And then Hitler was convinced of its necessity."

All responsibility- on Hitler?

Roman Töppel has been studying the history of the Battle of Kursk for many years. He even wrote a book about it called "Kursk 1943. Die größte Schlacht des zweiten Weltkrieges" ("Kursk - 1943. The largest battle of the Second World War"). It was published in 2017 and has already been translated into Spanish, English, French languages, and should appear in Russian this fall. Archival materials and war diaries were used as sources. Roman Töppel is one of the few historians who gained access to the archive of the German Field Marshal, participant in the First and Second World Wars, Erich von Manstein, who was considered the most gifted strategist of the Wehrmacht. The archive is kept by Manstein's son.

While working on his book, Töppel did not set himself the goal of describing in detail the course of the battle on the Kursk Bulge. Instead, he tried to dispel the numerous misconceptions regarding the Battle of Kursk that still exist today. Thus, some historians and memoirists argue that the Operation Citadel undertaken by the Germans, which was the prologue to the battle of Kursk, could have ended successfully if Hitler had started it earlier. But he wanted to wait for the delivery of new tanks and therefore postponed it to July.

“In a number of military memoirs one has to read that if the Germans had started this operation in May 1943, it would have been successful. But this is completely untrue: it was impossible to start it in May, because weather on the Eastern Front this was not allowed: it rained continuously,” recalls Roman Töppel.

Hitler really had high hopes for new tank models. “The Germans brought a lot of new equipment to Kursk, for example, about 130 heavy Tiger tanks. Panther tanks were also used for the first time in the battle on the Kursk Bulge. They were used there in the amount of about 200 vehicles. More than 1,300 aircraft took part in the battles Luftwaffe," Jens Wehner lists. It should, however, be noted that these and other figures cited by historians and memoirists sometimes differ markedly depending on the sources.

Battle of Prokhorovka: who won?

Be that as it may, success was initially on the side of the Wehrmacht - during the tank battle of Prokhorovka that took place on July 12, 1943, which became the most famous part of Operation Citadel. According to military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser, 186 German and 672 Soviet tanks took part in this battle. And although the German troops failed to take the Prokhorovka station, the losses of the Red Army were very sensitive: it lost 235 tanks, and the Germans lost less than a dozen.

“In the Battle of Prokhorovka, Soviet troops suffered a crushing defeat. However, their command presented the result of the battle as a victory and reported this to Moscow. In light of the final victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk, this later looked quite plausible,” says historian Matthias Uhl ).

But how could the Red Army, whose forces significantly exceeded those of the enemy (almost twice as many tanks and 130 thousand soldiers and officers against 70 thousand Germans), lose this battle? According to Karl-Heinz Friser, at the Battle of Prokhorovka, Soviet generals made many mistakes because they were rushed by Stalin. We paid human lives. Thus, the 29th Tank Corps, sent on the offensive without sufficient preliminary reconnaissance, was met by fire from German tanks hidden in a shelter. And it was almost completely destroyed.

Legend from a warlordErich von Manstein

There are allegations that the Germans lost the Battle of Kursk due to Hitler's premature order to stop the offensive in the northern sector and transfer separate tank units from Kursk to Sicily, where British and American troops landed. Roman Töppel and Jens Wehner deny this.

As Töppel explained, “this myth originally appeared in the memoirs of Erich von Manstein. However, this is just a legend. The offensive of the 9th German Army in the northern sector of the Kursk Bulge was repulsed on July 10. In addition, Hitler gave the order to stop the offensive north of Kursk not because of the Allied landing in Sicily, but because of the offensive that began on July 12 Soviet troops near Orel."

The generals, who blamed the defeat in the Battle of Kursk solely on the “Fuhrer,” also argued that as a result of the failure of Operation Citadel, the Germans would not have suffered such heavy losses if in the summer of 1943 on the Eastern Front they had not gone on the offensive, but remained in defensive positions.

Context

“In fact, this is not so. Let’s start with the fact that Operation Citadel did not cost the Germans such huge losses. In any case, they did not exceed the losses incurred during defensive battles. And secondly, in 1943 the German side simply did not have the opportunity to remain on the defensive and preserve strength, since the Red Army would still have gone on the offensive, and heavy fighting, which would have led to no less losses, could not have been avoided,” explains Roman Töppel.

Revaluation inRussia, underrated in the West

In Soviet and Russian historiography, the Battle of Kursk is considered the final turning point of World War II and the third most important battle after the defense of Moscow and the Battle of Stalingrad. However, German historians refute this attitude.

“The Battle of Kursk was the largest and one of the bloodiest battles of the Second World War, but by no means decisive. After all, at the latest already in 1942, after the failure of Operation Barbarossa and two unsuccessful German offensive operations on the Eastern Front, as well as With the entry of the United States into the war, after the battle at Midway Atoll, as a result of which the initiative in the Pacific theater of operations passed to the Americans, it became clear that Germany could not win this war,” states Roman Töppel.

But in the West, the Battle of Kursk is underestimated. According to Jens Wehner, they know more about the Battle of Stalingrad and the Allied landings in Normandy, as well as about the military confrontation between Anglo-American and Italian-German troops in North Africa. However, those who are truly interested in the history of World War II are well aware of the Battle of Kursk, since it is of great military and historical significance.

Be that as it may, it is too early to put an end to the work on studying the Battle of Kursk, says Matthias Uhl. “To get a true understanding of the realities of this battle, scientists still need to work a lot in Soviet and German archives, study a lot of documents and materials. Now, for example, historians are analyzing German wartime documents, which after the Second World War settled in the archives for a long time Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and then Russia. Currently, these papers are being digitized, and soon they will be available on the Internet," a German historian told DW.

See also:
"Dark Worlds" near Berlin

• History of Berlin dungeons

  This is what Berlin looked like after the defeat of the Third Reich. There were fierce battles here, but long before that, entire streets and neighborhoods had been destroyed by bombing. Berlin was subjected to them more often than other German cities. The number of victims of air raids among its residents was, according to various estimates, from 20 to 50 thousand people. For the country as a whole - 600 thousand.



History of Berlin dungeons

The National Socialists began preparing for war in the skies over Germany immediately after seizing power, for which already in 1933, at the direction of Hermann Goering, the Imperial Air Defense Union (Reichsluftschutzbund) was created. Throughout the country they began to build bomb shelters, deepen and refurbish basements, create teams to extinguish incendiary bombs and control blackouts, publish posters...



History of Berlin dungeons

In Berlin, in one of these civilian bomb shelters, there is now a museum dedicated not only to wartime bunkers, but also to city dungeons in general - from the beginning of the 19th century to the present day. It is located at the Gesundbrunnen metro station, and was created almost 20 years ago by the Berlin Dungeons society (Berliner Unterwelten).



History of Berlin dungeons

The society itself consists of about 500 people. Thanks to their efforts in different parts cities you can now get to previously inaccessible places. Forgotten and abandoned sites and structures have become tourist attractions and are preserved for history. In 2006, this organization was awarded Germany's most important award in the field of monument protection - the Silver Hemisphere (Silberne Halbkugel).



History of Berlin dungeons

The excursion "Dark Worlds" (Dunkle Welten), which we will go on today, takes place in a bunker intended for passengers of the Berlin transport company B.V.G. It was designed for 1,300 people, but at the end of the war it sometimes accommodated three times that number. Groups linger for ten minutes in one of the rooms, taking a place on these benches.



History of Berlin dungeons

When there were a lot of people, the ventilation couldn't cope. Condensation formed on the walls, flowing onto the concrete floor into special recesses... At the beginning of the war, the raids lasted 10-15 minutes, at the end they often lasted more than an hour. Inscriptions from those times have been preserved on the walls.



History of Berlin dungeons

A four-story bomb shelter at Gesundbrunnen station was built in the subway's office premises, which were originally intended for a canteen, employee rest, and storage of tools, equipment and other materials. The branch line was launched in 1930, but these premises remained empty until the spring of 1941, since there was not enough money to equip them after the start of the global economic crisis.



History of Berlin dungeons

In this place, the metro and commuter rail lines intersected and now intersect. When raids on the then capital of the “Third Reich” began to become more frequent, they decided to equip a shelter for passengers here. This room housed the women's restroom. The fastenings from the partitions are still visible on the walls. Toilets were waterless, filled with peat or crushed bark.



History of Berlin dungeons

In the rooms of the former air-raid shelter there are displayed exhibits found in Berlin at construction sites, during excavations, brochures, documents donated by individuals or organizations, this Faustpatron... Among them there is also a card index on metal plates, found in an abandoned bunker in the Tempelhof area and containing, among other things, information about forced workers of one of the Berlin companies.



History of Berlin dungeons

Members of the Berlin Dungeons discovered the file cabinet. They studied the information and were able to find more than 20 people who, based on these confirmations, received compensation for forced labor in the “Third Reich.” Note that address-archiving machines developed by the German company Adrema at the beginning of the last century were used in Germany until the 1970s. The photo shows incendiary bombs.



History of Berlin dungeons

These exhibits were found in the underground shelter of drivers from Adolf Hitler's personal fleet. At the end of the war, their bunker was filled up, so a lot of things were preserved in it, including the Nazi graffiti that they left on the walls. In 1992, archaeologists took photographs of the drawings, and also removed from there many different things and objects that occupy several display cases in the exhibition.



History of Berlin dungeons

Leaving the bunker, we will linger near this apparatus, demonstrating the operation of pneumatic mail. The first line in Berlin was launched in 1865. In 1940, the length of the underground pipeline system was 400 kilometers. Operation of the city system was stopped only in the 1970s, but such internal mail - fast and reliable - is still used by some trading houses and companies.

74 years ago on the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht began an offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge. However, it did not turn out to be unexpected - the Red Army had been preparing for defense for several months. Military historian, retired colonel Karl-Heinz Friser, who worked for many years in the military-historical department of the Bundeswehr, is considered the best expert on events on the Eastern Front. He studied in detail both German and Russian documents.

Die Welt: The Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 is considered "the largest battle of all time." Is this statement true?

Karl-Heinz Friser: Yes, superlative in this case it is quite appropriate. In the Battle of Kursk in August 1943, four million soldiers, 69 thousand guns, 13 thousand tanks and 12 thousand aircraft took part on both sides.

– Usually the attacking side has numerical superiority. However, near Kursk the situation was different. The Wehrmacht had three times fewer forces than Stalin's army. Why did Hitler decide to attack?

– In the summer of 1943, Germany managed to unite all its forces on the Eastern Front for the last time, because at that time the troops anti-Hitler coalition started their operation in Italy. In addition, the German command feared that the Soviet offensive in the summer of 1943, which was to begin with the Battle of Kursk, would grow like an avalanche. Therefore, a decision was made to launch a preemptive strike while this avalanche had not yet moved.

“Hitler decided a few weeks before the start of this offensive that it would be interrupted if the Allies attacked Italy. Was this a strategically correct or incorrect decision?

– Hitler was very ambivalent about this offensive. The High Command of the Ground Forces was in favor, the High Command of the Wehrmacht was against. In the end, at Kursk it was about tactical and operational goals, and in Italy about strategic goals, namely the prevention of a war on several fronts. Therefore, Hitler decided on a compromise: the offensive was to begin, but be stopped immediately if the situation in Italy became critical.

– The most famous part of Operation Citadel was the tank battle near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943. Did two “steel avalanches” really collide then?

– Some people claim that 850 Soviet and 800 German tanks took part in the battle. Prokhorovka, where 400 Wehrmacht tanks were allegedly destroyed, is considered the “graveyard of German tank forces.” However, in reality, 186 German and 672 Soviet tanks took part in this battle. The Red Army lost 235 tanks, and the German troops lost only three!

- How could this be?

The Soviet generals did everything wrong that could be done, because Stalin, making mistakes in his calculations, was very pressed for the timing of the operation. Thus, the “kamikaze attack” carried out by the 29th Tank Corps ended in an undetected trap set earlier by Soviet troops, behind which there were German tanks. The Russians lost 172 of 219 tanks. 118 of them were completely destroyed. That evening, German soldiers towed their damaged tanks for repairs and blew up all the damaged Russian tanks.

– Did the Battle of Prokhorovka end in victory for the Soviet or German forces?

– It all depends on which side you look at the situation from. From a tactical point of view, the German troops won, but for the Soviets this battle turned into hell. From an operational point of view, this was a success for the Russians because the German offensive was stopped for the time being. But in fact, the Red Army initially planned to destroy two enemy tank corps. Therefore, strategically, this was also a failure of the Russians, since near Prokhorovka it was planned to deploy the Fifth Guards Tank Army, which was subsequently supposed to play main role in the summer offensive.

– After the landing of British and American troops in Sicily, Hitler recalled the Second SS Panzer Corps from the front, although it was impossible to quickly transfer it to Sicily. From the point of view of combat, this was completely pointless, because the redeployment of tanks to southern Italy would take several weeks. Why did Hitler still do this?

– It was not a military, but a political decision. Hitler feared the collapse of his Italian allies.

– Was the Battle of Kursk really the turning point of World War II?

- Why not?

– Neither Kursk nor Stalingrad became turning points. Everything was decided in the winter of 1941 in the battle of Moscow, which ended in the collapse of the blitzkrieg. In a protracted war, the Third Reich, which was experiencing, in particular, a shortage of fuel, had no chance against the Soviet Union, which also received support from the United States and Great Britain. Even if Germany had won the Battle of Kursk, it would not have been able to prevent its own defeat in the entire war.

– With your research, you have already dispelled several myths about the Battle of Kursk that prevailed in the former Soviet Union. Why were there so many legends about this battle?

– In Soviet historiography of the Battle of Kursk, “ greatest battle of all times,” initially played a surprisingly minor role. Because the mistakes made by the Soviet command during it were simply shameful, and the losses were terrifying. For this reason, the truth was subsequently replaced by myths.

– How do your Russian colleagues assess the Battle of Kursk today? Do legends about this still dominate in Russia? And has anything changed in the perception of this issue in the Putin era compared to the Yeltsin era?

- IN last years Several critical publications appeared. The author of one of them, Valery Zamulin, confirmed the huge losses of Soviet forces near Prokhorovka. Another author, Boris Sokolov, pointed out that official casualty figures were greatly underestimated. Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded, however, that Russian historians create positive image Red Army. Since then, these colleagues, as sources in Moscow told me, have been forced to “split into two” between “truth and honor.”

© Sven Felix Kellerhoff for Die Welt (Germany)

Paul Karel" Eastern front". In two books. M.: Isographus, EKSMO, 2003.

BACK IN THE YEARS of the Great Patriotic War, as our front-line soldiers later admitted, each of them (of course, not out loud, but to himself) recognized the Germans as an evil, cunning, skillful and persistent enemy. Even then, Soviet soldiers were asking questions: “Who are they, the Germans? For what are they fighting so desperately and bravely?”

It is perhaps still difficult to find a comprehensive, detailed answer, especially in one source. The full picture is formed on the basis of many memoirs, historical studies, literary works and films. These include the book by Paul Karel. It was published in 1963 in Germany, was immediately translated into all European languages, and in the first ten years went through 8 editions only in German (400 thousand copies in total). However, in the USSR this work was immediately placed in special storage, making it accessible only to a narrow circle of scientists. And so it was released in Russia, although, frankly speaking, not with a massive circulation of five thousand (the price - 430 rubles - is also not the most affordable).

Of course, the discerning Russian reader will find many shortcomings in Karel’s book - in particular, 40 years ago, many archival materials were closed to the author. However, one cannot help but admit that we have before us a surprisingly harmonious combination of a scientific monograph and personal memories of direct participants in the events of 1941-1944. on the Eastern Front (and Karel cites the stories of several hundred former Wehrmacht soldiers - from a colonel general, army commander to an ordinary infantryman, from the chief of the general staff to a simple signalman), resulting in a vivid, impressive picture of the struggle of German and Soviet troops. Undoubtedly, with all the existing flaws, this work will show us the Great Patriotic War from the other side - through the eyes of German soldiers and officers. And this is its main value.

It is, of course, impossible to even briefly acquaint the readers of HBO with all the main parts of the book. But on the days of the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk, we will try to convey the self-awareness of the enemy who was then attacking both the northern and southern faces of the famous arc.

SOUTH FACE: "PRELUDE" 4 JULY

The main events of the initial stage of the Battle of Kursk on the southern flank of the “fiery arc” have already been described twice on the pages of “NVO” (## 16 and 20, 2003). But Paul Karel's book allows us to highlight some little-known facts and details of the bloody drama that unfolded here. For example, the vast majority of Russians do not know that the July 5 offensive was preceded by fierce fighting: Hoth's 4th Panzer Army sought to capture the ridge of hills in front of the German positions, which actually hid the system of deep Soviet defense.

And this is what happened on July 4, 1943 in the sector of the 3rd battalion of Captain Leick of the Grenadier Regiment of the SS Motorized Division "Gross Germany".

“14.50. An hour ago, the soldiers had lunch. A thunderstorm with a torrential downpour had just died down. At that moment, squadrons of Ju-87 dive bombers roared over the German trenches towards the Soviet positions. They were covered by fighters. The Stukas banked and dived steeply with a howl. More than 2,500 bombs fell on a strip of land 3 km long and 500 m wide.

At 15.00, when the bombed Junkers flew away, the German guns began to speak. A flurry of explosions arose again where the trenches of Soviet riflemen and observation posts of Soviet artillery were located. A little later, Leik’s piercing cry was heard: “Forward!”

The captain was the first to jump out of the trench and run across the open area. Everyone knew that this space, in which there was absolutely no place to hide, was well under fire from the Russians. That is why Leik himself rushed forward from the command post to lead the battalion. He was followed by the commander of the 15th company, Lieutenant Metzner. Under the cover of artillery fire, platoons of SS men fled along the passages into minefields, on their heels were assault guns, behind the assault guns were guns on self-propelled carriages. Along with the artillerymen were groups of sappers, ready to remove any obstacle.

The attack, undoubtedly, was perfectly prepared and at first developed like clockwork. Soon, however, Soviet soldiers from the surviving strongholds opened fire on the attackers with all types of weapons. Soviet artillery also intervened. Volley after volley covered the German battle formations. But the 3rd battalion was still lucky: it managed to take advantage of the confusion of the Russians in its sector and capture the ridge of the hill west of the village of Butovo. But then progress stalled. Leik's companies retook approximately seven hundred meters. Then the SS men came under heavy mortar fire. Captain Leik was killed, Lieutenant Metzner was seriously wounded, and a third of the personnel of the 15th company were out of action. Fewer and fewer people rose for the next throw. Many other company and platoon commanders fell. The new battalion commander, Captain Bolk, had his leg torn off by a mine.

By nightfall the Germans managed to recapture the dominant heights. However, this “prelude” before the offensive of July 5 seemed to determine the entire nature of the subsequent battles - intense, dynamic, with heavy losses for both sides.

In the chapters of Karel’s book devoted to the events on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, one significant point attracts attention, which explains why the Germans achieved quite noticeable success here on July 5-12. Along with other factors, the German Hs-129 and Stuka attack aircraft, equipped with 37-mm cannons, played a significant role in this. “They,” writes Karel, “were used as a kind of flying anti-tank artillery: they dived from the sky onto tanks like hawks into a poultry yard. Tank counterattacks were thus choked due to the sudden intervention of these machines. Hetman’s Soviet tank formation suffered the most. Twelve of his T-34s were knocked out of action in a very short time by just one of these flying anti-tank aircraft..."

Further in Karel’s book, with reference to the report of a Soviet artillery observer, it is said: “... An attacking aircraft dives from about 800 meters onto an unsuspecting tank column. Approximately fifteen meters from the latter it emerges from its dive. A gun shot, a flash, a roar, and "Through a column of smoke from a damaged T-34, the German pilot soars up. A moment later he dives again. Always from behind... invariably choosing the most vulnerable place - the engine compartment, each hit in which causes an immediate explosion."

THE MODEL IS COMING

July 5, 1943, 1 hour 10 minutes. Quite unexpectedly, Soviet artillery and mortar fire fell on the formations and units of the 9th German Army under the command of Walter Model that were preparing to attack. A sudden, terrible suspicion, writes Paul Karel, arose in the minds of the German staff officers: the Russians were ahead of them and would now go on the attack themselves. The shelling continued for more than an hour, “causing serious damage,” but the enemy never appeared. "The German commanders breathed a sigh of relief."

Exactly according to plan, at 3.30, the German artillery itself began fire preparation. "Nothing like this has ever happened on the Eastern Front."

Chief Corporal of the 3rd Battalion of the 478th Grenadier Regiment of the 258th Infantry Division Karl Rudenberg, holder of the Knight's Cross (note that this Reich award for the entire Second world war only 7,300 people were awarded), was the first to reach Soviet positions with his machine gun. After hand-to-hand combat, Rudenberg's platoon captured the fortifications of the first defensive line. Medical non-commissioned officer Pingel hurried here. “There were dead and wounded everywhere,” says Karel. “The trenches were deep. At the third turn, he pulled back. Karl Rudenberg was crouched against the wall of the trench... At his feet lay a Russian, whose arms, chest and head were torn to shreds. All right Karl’s side is an open wound... Suddenly Karl pointed his head at the Russian... and said: “He jumped with a grenade right at me.” There was admiration in Karl’s voice..."

10 minutes later, Chief Corporal Rudenberg died.

Towards evening, according to Karel, the 1st battalion of the 478th Grenadier Regiment, with powerful fire support, including the new Shmel and Hornet guns mounted on armored chassis, covered the remaining 500 m and now lay in front of the first line of defense of the Soviet 280th Rifle Division. The assault troops managed to break into the Soviet trenches. But all attempts to break into the deep defensive system ended in nothing in the face of furious Russian resistance.

The 479th Grenadier Regiment was in the same difficult situation. The entire 258th Infantry Division, which, as the right-flank strike group of the 46th Tank Corps, was supposed to quickly overcome Soviet barriers along the Trosna-Kursk road, froze after a bloody attack...

On the left wing of General Zorn's 46th Panzer Corps, the 7th and 31st Infantry and 20th Panzer Divisions advanced through fields of rye and thick clover. The Bavarians from the 7th Division were soon stopped by intense fire from the defenders. In the rye, where the soldiers hoped to hide, they were blown up by mines. Things weren’t going smoothly for the 31st Infantry either: the engineer battalion that moved forward, under the cover of fire from “Tigers” with frontal 102-mm armor, firing salvo after salvo from their powerful long-barreled 88-mm cannons, cleared wide passages in the minefields . But...

Karel writes: "... and in these conditions the task of the sappers remained hellish. The Russians fired at them from heavy mortars installed in deep trenches, not vulnerable to low-trajectory tank guns. It was an unequal duel. And it was the sappers who paid the bills. Commander 2 1st company and two platoon commanders died in the first few minutes..."

Only two hours later the passages were ready, and the Tigers moved forward. The assault troops of the 17th Grenadier Regiment ran behind the tanks and next to them. Despite the mines and heavy fire, the grenadiers reached the first trench and... It was empty: at the beginning of the German artillery barrage, the Soviet units retreated back, leaving only observers and grenade launchers.

The assault guns and half a dozen Ferdinands of Major Steiner's 653rd Division, says Paul Karel, operated on the front of the 292nd Infantry Division. Here the Germans were immediately able to advance 5 km deep into the Soviet defense, to Aleksandrovka. “The Russian firing positions were crushed. The assault troops joined the battle formations of the 6th Infantry Division, which captured Butyrki.” However...

The Soviet riflemen did not panic. They allowed enemy armored vehicles through their trenches and then engaged German infantrymen in battle. German tanks and assault guns had to return to help their infantry. Then they went forward again and... came back again.

Karel: “By evening, the infantry was left without strength, and the tanks and assault guns were left without fuel.” And yet, German battalions and regiments reported to higher headquarters: “We are advancing! With difficulty, at great cost. But we are advancing!”

UNFORGETTABLE DAYS

The next day, Model sent three tank divisions to the area where there seemed to be success. They clashed in a fierce battle with Soviet armored formations. “Between Ponyri and Soborivka,” says Karel, “on a front section of fourteen kilometers, a tank battle began, unprecedented in scale in the history of military operations. It lasted four days.

At the climax of the battle, between 1,000 and 1,200 tanks and assault guns were involved on each side. Numerous air force units and 3,000 guns of all calibers complemented this terrible duel. The reward was a hill near Olkhovatka with its key position - a height of 274".

The 505th Tiger Division, under the command of Major Sovant, was at the forefront of the German attack. The tankers, without exaggeration, encountered a forest of Soviet anti-tank guns, a whole labyrinth of anti-tank traps. The German infantrymen were met by a wall of fire. The first wave of attackers choked. The second wave rolled several hundred meters and also stopped. About nine dozen T-IVs of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd tank regiment of the 2nd tank regiment of Major von Boxberg went in the third wave, but their rush was stopped. The 9th Panzer Division also failed to achieve more.

“The infantrymen of the 20th Panzer Division,” we read in Karel’s book, “fought fiercely under the scorching sun on July 8 near the village of Samodurovka. Within an hour, all the officers of the 5th company of the 112th motorized infantry regiment were killed and wounded. Nevertheless, the infantry crawled across the fields, capturing trenches and running into new ones. The battalions melted away. The companies became platoons.

Lieutenant Hensch gathered the few surviving people: “Forward, soldiers, one more trench!”... They succeeded. Only the lieutenant lay dead twenty steps from the target, and around him half the company was killed and wounded.”

The 33rd German motorized infantry regiment fought for three days for a bridgehead near the village of Teploye. Positions changed hands. Captain Disiner, the last surviving officer, gathered the remnants of the 2nd Battalion and again led them into the attack. He took a height long disputed by the Russians. And again he was forced to retreat. The neighboring 6th Infantry Division captured only the slope of the fiercely defended height 274 at Olkhovatka.

Karel: “In the left sector of the breakthrough, the main point of the battle was the village of Ponyri. “We will never forget this village,” even now say the soldiers of the 292nd Pomeranian division who fought at Ponyri.”

* * *

No, neither new planes, nor new tanks, nor the courage and combat skill of soldiers, officers, and generals helped the Wehrmacht: the last major German offensive on the Eastern Front ended in failure, the offensive power of the Germans was broken irreversibly.

What does Paul Karel see as the reasons for the defeat?

“The Soviet army withstood the disasters of 1941-1942; it overcame the crisis, seized the initiative and now dictated the course of events... most importantly, the quality of strategic and tactical leadership, especially of mobile formations, has noticeably improved. This was evidenced not only by flexibility in controlling the battle , but also the speed with which reserves were transferred to threatened areas..." The Red Army was also "inspired by a new fighting spirit. The call to fight for the Fatherland was more convincing for Russian soldiers than the old hackneyed slogan to defend the world revolution."

It was not the Battle of Stalingrad, but the Battle of Kursk, Karel is convinced, that became “in all respects a fateful battle that determined the outcome of the war in the East.”

The Battle of Kursk in July 1943 buried German tanks and hopes

After the Stalingrad victory greatly helped the Red Army to believe in itself, the Germans were able to at least partially restore their tarnished reputation thanks to the recapture of Kharkov. Nevertheless, they did not give up hopes of a radical change in the eastern campaign. Total mobilization and increased production of weapons allowed them to largely compensate for the heavy losses they suffered. The Germans also relied on new medium tanks "Panther", heavy tanks "Tiger", self-propelled artillery "Ferdinand", new, well-armed and fast Focke-Wulf aircraft (Fw 190A), modernized Heinkel bombers (He 111) and single-seat Henschel attack aircraft (Hs 129). In the Battle of Kursk, which began on the Fourth of July 1943, the Germans were about to regain their advantage.

According to data on monthly losses, from the beginning of the Barbarossa plan to the end of March 1943, the armed forces of the Third Reich lost 2,237,656 people killed, wounded and missing on the eastern front (total losses reached 2,504,128 people), while, According to the headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces, the enemy lost 11 million dead, captured and wounded, no longer fit for service.

According to official Russian data from 1993, during the same period the Red Army and Navy suffered 2,325,909 killed, 387,171 died from wounds, 414,692 died in hospitals and died in emergencies, for a total of 3,127,772 people. Another 3,994,831 were missing or captured, and 5,913,480 were wounded, shell-shocked or burned. That is, the Germans assumed that Russian forces would dry up sooner or later.

Solution: Kursk Bulge

According to the German command, the Kursk arc, protruding far to the west, concealed a favorable opportunity to encircle and then defeat the armies of the Central and Voronezh Fronts that took up defensive positions there. This task was to be carried out by troops on the joining flanks of Army Groups “Center” and “South”.

Context

July 5: Hell on the Kursk Bulge

Bet on "Tiger" and "Panther"

Many mistakes on the way to the Kursk Bulge

But the Soviet command was not asleep either. His intelligence reported in advance German plans. After careful consideration, the decision was made to take a well-prepared defense, and after the enemy’s strike forces were exhausted, to launch a counter-offensive. In the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge they concentrated enormous forces, significantly superior to enemy forces: 1,910,361 soldiers, 31,415 guns and mortars, 5,128 tanks and self-propelled artillery, and 3,549 aircraft against 776,907 soldiers, 7,417 guns and mortars, 2,459 tanks and self-propelled artillery, and 1,830 enemy aircraft.

However, the Germans managed to achieve temporary superiority in the direction of the main attack. Each of the Soviet armies closest to the front line built three lines of defense. In June 1943, 300 thousand people took part in the creation of fortifications on the Kursk Bulge. Never before during the entire Great Patriotic War had such a large and extensive trench network been built. In addition to powerful anti-tank defense, a strong air defense of the fronts and railways was also created. After listing all these advantages, the question arises: why then were the losses, primarily of personnel and armored vehicles, that the Red Army suffered in the Battle of Kursk so large both at the defensive and offensive stages? The answer lies in the technical superiority of the German armed forces, the extremely high qualifications of tank crews and pilots, to whom even Russian specialists today pay tribute, in the perfectly coordinated actions of repair units that managed to instantly return damaged tanks and self-propelled artillery units back into service, as well as in a number of other factors.

Three strategic operations in one battle

As part of the Battle of Kursk, one of the largest in World War II, three large-scale strategic operations were carried out. Firstly, this is the Kursk defensive operation - the first stage of this grandiose clash, in which the troops of the Central and Voronezh Front, at the cost of colossal losses (in people and equipment), stopped the advance of the German shock units. Secondly, the Oryol offensive operation (“Kutuzov”), which was carried out from July 12 to August 18, 1943. During this operation, the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts and part of the forces of the Western Front liberated a vast territory and inflicted a crushing defeat on Army Group Center. The final operation was the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation (“Rumyantsev”), which was carried out from August 3 to August 23, and during which the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts liberated the Kharkov industrial region and defeated a powerful enemy group, thereby creating favorable conditions for liberation left bank Ukraine. On August 5, celebratory artillery salvoes thundered in Moscow for the first time in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Colossal losses

During the 50-day Battle of Kursk, both sides suffered huge losses. According to official data, Soviet Union lost 863,303 soldiers, 5,244 guns and mortars, 6,064 tanks and self-propelled artillery, and 1,626 aircraft, while Germany lost 203,000 soldiers, 720 tanks and self-propelled artillery, and 681 aircraft. It is not worth mentioning that according to Soviet data German losses were significantly higher: 30 divisions, including seven tank divisions, from 400 thousand to half a million dead, missing and wounded, three thousand guns and mortars, one and a half thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 3,700 aircraft.

However, the Germans also exaggerated their successes. During the first four days of the Battle of Kursk, Luftwaffe pilots reported the destruction of 923 Soviet aircraft, although actual losses reached only 566 aircraft. Some Western authors suggest that Soviet losses in this gigantic battle amounted to as many as 1,677,000 dead, captured, wounded and sick, as well as 3,300 aircraft against 360 thousand dead and wounded German soldiers (ratio 4.66 to one).

Fierce fighting on the eastern front had big influence on the number and combat effectiveness of Soviet and German armored vehicles in 1943. If by June 30, the Soviet command had at its disposal 12,576 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, of which 10,060 (80.1%) were combat-ready, and the German command had 3,434, of which 3,060 (89.1%) were combat-ready. then by December 31 the number of Soviet tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, despite the developed defense industry, which in 1943 produced 19,892 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, sharply decreased to 5,643, of which only 2,413 (42.8%) were combat-ready. By this date, the Germans had 3,356 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, of which 1,818 (54.2%) were combat-ready.

Prokhorovka: myths and reality

IN Soviet times The tank battle of Prokhorovka, which took place on July 12, 1943, was called the largest in the history of World War II, and this misconception still exists. But in fact, on that day, in two directions (southwest and west of Prokhorovka station), 662 Soviet tanks and 30 self-propelled artillery units directly collided with 420 German tanks, that is, a total of not 1200 - 1500 tanks and self-propelled guns -artillery installations (800 Soviet versus 700 German, as Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov claimed). According to V. Zamulin, the four tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant General Rotmistrov have 340 tanks, of which 193 are irreparable, and 19 self-propelled artillery units (14 are irretrievable). That is, a total of 207 armored vehicles (according to another Russian source, 511 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, that is, the ratio was 2.5 to one in favor of the Germans). The 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 3rd Wehrmacht Panzer Corps lost 193 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, of which 20 were beyond repair. According to German historians, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser lost 153 - 163 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, of which five (!) could not be restored, and 55 were sent for overhaul. True, this is hard to believe.

However, during the border battle of Brody-Berestechko-Dubno on June 26 - 28, 1941, the Soviet command carried out a counterattack with the forces of the 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps, numbering five thousand tanks against the advancing German 1st Panzer Group and some formations of the 6th Army, which had a thousand tanks. Soviet troops then suffered a crushing defeat and lost 2,648 tanks. Then for another two years the Germans took foreign correspondents there and proudly showed them a huge cemetery of Soviet armored vehicles. This catastrophe, larger in scale than Prokhorovka, is still bashfully kept silent about. As the classic said: “Victory has many parents, and only defeat is always an orphan.”

The defeat at Kursk buried all the Germans' hopes that they would be able to seize the strategic initiative and make a radical change in the war in the east in favor of the Third Reich. For their exploits in the Battle of Kursk, 180 people received the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

All comments

• 04:36 07.07.2018 | 1

  goroshek-82

  By this date, the Germans had 3,356 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, of which 1,818 (54.2%) were combat-ready.
  -------------------
  and how many of these 54.2% are the work of the Skoda factories?

• 05:18 07.07.2018 | -1

  Graz

  goroshek-82, well, by 1943 there probably wasn’t much left of the Czech tanks in the Wehrmacht; by this time the Czechs were left with the production of light anti-tank self-propelled guns, although at the beginning of the war it seems that maybe up to 50% of the tanks were captured by the Germans and of these captured (and made by the Czechs during the occupation) were precisely Czech

• 05:26 07.07.2018 | 0

  goroshek-82

  Graz, after all, will be closer to the Czech Republic for factory repairs than to Bavaria.

• 09:41 07.07.2018 | 0

  leoirk

  Graz, the Czechs produced StuG throughout the war. This AT was extremely dangerous for Soviet tanks.

• 05:10 07.07.2018 | 4

  Alex81

  The author refers to incomprehensible “Russian official sources”, but at the same time:
  - 5128 Soviet tanks took part in the battle. Of these, 6064 were lost. I'm not kidding. Figures from the article.
  Well, everything else is exactly the same.

  The author went on to say that on December 31, 1943, the Soviets had 2,413 combat-ready tanks, while the Fritz had 1,818 (our advantage was only 30%). At the same time, near Kursk, the Fritz advanced with 2459 tanks against our 5128 (with our superiority by 100%). As I understand from the author, in 1945 the Krauts still took Moscow.

  In short, again, not research, but God knows what, without an attempt to at least comprehend my nonsense.

• 05:42 07.07.2018 | 5

  Veblen

  Alex81, "...on December 31, 1943, among the Soviets...".
  And you are quite original in naming those thanks to whom you live in this beautiful white world. Perhaps you should still rethink something in your, so to speak, worldview...?

• 06:03 07.07.2018 | 0

  Alex81

  Veblen, there is no need to rethink anything. I was born in that country, and we were Soviets. And they are Krauts and Americans (and not “Pindos” at all).

• 06:52 07.07.2018 | 3

  heard quadruple

  Alex81, "I was born in that country, and we were scoops."
  The way you were and the way you remain (lyrics from the song)

• 07:02 07.07.2018 | 3

  Veblen

  Alex81, at 06:03 07/07/2018. “I was born in that country...”
  So now it’s a small matter: you just need to learn to respect those people who once broke Hitler’s back, other fellow citizens and themselves, at the same time.

• 20:53 07.07.2018 | 0

  Alex81

  Veblen, what do you see as offensive in the word “scoop”?
  Well, for example, here is the definition from Lurka:

  SCOOP
  1. Socio-economic - a system of bureaucratic management, when no one cares about anything except their specific profit. Simply put, a scoop is a cut according to Soviet laws.
  2. Personal - a representative of the Soviet inhabitants, cattle from the Soviet people.

  According to paragraph 1. Do you think that the USSR had an incorrect economic system? Did everyone care about the lamp? :) Who then “broke Hitler’s back”? Who built the best education system in the world? How did you achieve everything that was achieved?

  According to paragraph 2. Do you consider Soviet inhabitants (this is the same as the Russian people, in principle) to be cattle? We are now talking about the most educated people in the world, just in case.
  It doesn't occur to me.

  Well, how can a word that describes the Soviet system and Soviet inhabitants (one of which I was one) be considered somehow indecent?

  Gain self-respect and look at your past with pride. Then you will not be offended either for the “Soviet” or for the “vatniks”.

• 10:02 07.07.2018 | 2

  leoirk

  Alex81, The Red Army was armed with the T-34, T-70, English Mk.IV Churchill, and SU-122 and SU-76 self-propelled guns.

  And this is all against the Tigers, Panthers and Ferdinands.
  At Prokhorovka, almost half of the Soviet tanks were light T-70s with a 45 mm gun.

  Well, about the “scoops” - an extremely incorrect statement...

• 16:33 07.07.2018 | 0

  Alex81

  Lerik, yes, you haven’t matured enough to be a scoop yet.) You still don’t know how to read and analyze text.)

  Read the Pole. Yes, the Fritz’s tanks on the Kursk Bulge were heavier than ours (both in terms of armor and caliber). So if you read this Czech carefully, you would see that, in his opinion, the Krauts defeated us by the end of 1943. We had nothing to fight back with. There are no tanks left.

  I gave you Czech crooked numbers (with a claim to “officiality”) in my first post. Think.

• 10:50 07.07.2018 | 1

  Olkhon

  Alex81, In short, again, not a study, but God knows what, without an attempt to at least comprehend my nonsense.

  Not research, but reliving the past and trying to distort history! Few people think about numbers - they read them stupidly and put them aside in their heads. Sooner or later, “the whole world” will know that the USSR ATTACKED Europe, and Hitler defended himself and defended it as best he could

• 14:01 07.07.2018 | 1

  kdmitrii1966

  Alex81, but I grew up “in that country”, like many others, and I consider such a definition as humiliating, dismissive.. If we accept it modern essence, then we have never been like that, just like those whom you called that - as a result of whose actions the Soviet army advanced beyond Kharkov and further.. "Veblen" is absolutely right in his remark!

• 16:42 07.07.2018 | 0

  Alex81

  kdmitrii1966, as a result of the actions of the people whom I called “scoops,” the Soviet army actually reached Berlin, and did not “advance beyond Kharkov and further.” The country built the first nuclear power plant, launched a man into space and did a lot more.

  What kind of “modern” essence someone puts into the word “scoops” is of little interest to me. You have complexes, you deal with them.

  Maybe it still offends you when they call you a “vatnik”? :)

• 17:09 07.07.2018 | 2

  kdmitrii1966

  Alex81, the fact that the Soviet army advanced beyond Kharkov follows from the text of the article - that’s why I wrote it that way, and as for the term “scoop”, it’s useless to explain something in relation to you, “not good fodder for a horse” - as they say inappropriate discussions about space flights and nuclear power plants change little! Here we should think about it, and not argue..

• 17:13 07.07.2018 | 1

  leoirk

  Alex81, >> you haven’t matured enough to be a scoop yet.
  A very pathetic attempt to hit me.
  I don’t need to read any Czechs or Poles.

  Valery Zamulin - The Secret Battle of Kursk. Unknown documents testify.
  The Battle of Kursk has been written in great detail.

• 05:18 07.07.2018 | 2

  Kola

  Look how the Czechs were worried about their masters

• 05:29 07.07.2018 | 1

  fvi

  All numbers are very approximate. and there is no point in commenting on them. but the fact is that our losses were unfortunately much greater than the fascist ones. It was probably only with Operation Bagration that the German losses equaled ours or became even greater.

• 06:05 07.07.2018 | 0

  Alex81

  fvi, if these “official” figures are accepted, then from Operation Bagration the Fritz losses should exceed ours by 4-5 times. ... Maybe it's true. ... But I would not discuss this under this piece of misunderstanding that they call a historical article.

• 17:07 07.07.2018 | 0

  dkop

  fvi, here's some strange arithmetic - total losses of personnel based on the results of the war, ours and the Germans are quite comparable, naturally, if the Germans count not only the true Aryans who died right on the battlefield, but also those who died in hospitals and allies and Volksturm and all sorts of Khivi with volunteers (from France, Holland and beyond to Hochland). But as you honor such “researchers,” in each specific battle the German losses were 4-5 times less. So where did they lose the rest? And why did they retreat and lose if the Reich’s human resources were almost an order of magnitude (many times that’s for sure) superior to the rest of the Union? And how much was the economy of Europe united by the Germans quantitatively and qualitatively superior to the remnants of the Union? Why did they always win in losses, but at the same time retreat and retreat?

• 17:38 07.07.2018 | 0

  fvi

  dkop, you are right to add their allies and traitors to the Nazis, but unfortunately the losses of the USSR were much greater than those of Germany. The unexpected attack and the higher level of training and experience of the Wehrmacht and the fact that the war went on on the territory of the USSR for almost all 4 years and millions of prisoners of war and civilians died were also affected.

• 18:06 07.07.2018 | 0

  kdmitrii1966

  fvi, by the time of the attack on the USSR, Germany, taking into account the insignificant losses, essentially conducted enormous military exercises - in Poland and France, where they worked out methods of command and control and interaction of various types of troops, hundreds of thousands of German soldiers and officers gained combat experience.. There was Does the Red Army have a similar experience? No, of course not, hence the results of the Wehrmacht’s victories on the territory of the USSR in ’41-42.. In contrast, during the first two years of the war, in addition to everything else, the Red Army lost a huge number of personnel command personnel at all levels, albeit poorly trained..

• 18:23 07.07.2018 | 1

  dkop

  fvi, I'm talking about personnel losses, i.e. military personnel. Roughly speaking, German losses are estimated at about 9 million, that is, together with the allies and so on. it will be more than 10 million. Soviet losses, according to various estimates, range from 11-13 million military personnel. So purely combat losses are quite comparable and some of the “advantage” of the Germans is fully explained by the extremely difficult year 41 for us. But the fact that the Germans exterminated about 15 million unarmed people - civilians and prisoners of war - is a different matter. These are not battle losses, but rather genocide. In this it is difficult for us to compete with the Europeans.

• 05:31 07.07.2018 | 3

  Veblen

  "According to German historians, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser lost 153 - 163 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, of which five (!) could not be restored... True, this is hard to believe."
  Guderian, too, didn’t believe it and, apparently, that’s why he wrote that after the losses suffered at Kursk, the German tank forces were never able to recover until the end of the war.

• 09:50 07.07.2018 | 0

  leoirk

  Veblen, Prokhorovka was a massacre for Soviet tanks. The permanent losses of the Germans were minimal. But the Germans evacuated their damaged tanks to Kharkov. Where they were later successfully captured by the advancing Soviet troops. So Guderian wrote correctly...

• 10:42 07.07.2018 | 0

  Veblen

  leoirk,"So Guderian wrote correctly...".
  I think that in this matter he can be completely trusted.

• 02:51 08.07.2018 | 0

  Chud Vychegda

  leoirk, Prokhorovka was the result of a failure, as a result of which a counter battle was accepted and during the approaching stage we suffered huge losses. But as soon as the tanks mixed up and close combat began, the menagerie began to be massacred. The turret traverse speed and mobility of our tanks were higher, which gave them considerable advantages. The battlefield remained with the Germans. They evacuated their equipment and blew up ours. This is where the difference in losses came from.
  Well, we cannot live without hand-to-hand combat, whether in the infantry or on tanks. In the sky, they even rammed planes “hand-to-hand.” And tanks rammed tanks. And the dismounted crews fought hand-to-hand.

• 15:24 07.07.2018 | 0

  kdmitrii1966

  Veblen, one of our Veteran Tankmen recalled that before the Battle of Kursk they were taken 300 kilometers away to receive tanks... A huge field, there are a couple of hundred cars - all brand new, green, painted T34... Come to the creek, choose any one, with a cast, with a welded turret - try whichever one you like.., but there weren’t enough trained crews and tankers at all.. This was one of the reasons for such losses Soviet army on the Kursk Bulge! The Germans, despite everything, trained their tankers more thoroughly...

• 16:57 07.07.2018 | 0

  Alex81

  kdmitrii1966, unfortunately, there is little research on this topic. Either like this Czech one (I have a whole English book on my shelf about the tactics of using Panthers on the Kursk Bulge, written by a Czech like this), or ours are shambolic.

  Rotmistrov’s counterattack (“near Prokhorovka”), apparently, was indeed disastrous. But there were only part of the tanks there. Our tanks, which in the first days of the battle operated from fortified positions and from ambushes, were much more effective. Neither the Krauts nor the Czechs admit this, but this can be determined from indirect sources.
  We must remember that our 76 caliber was really weak, and against panthers too. But position decides. According to statistics, whichever tanks were defending were the ones that got frags.

  “Irreversible losses” when analyzing tank battles are the first sign of defamation. In fact, this parameter only reflects who has left the battlefield. If it’s behind you, you’ll pull out your tanks and repair them.

• 06:28 07.07.2018 | 1

  Foxbat

  The Czech is completely confused by the numbers.. His beautiful country also had a hand in that massacre..
  I remembered an old joke: "
  _ Vovochka, what did you do during the war?
  -And I brought shells to the soldiers!
  - What did they tell you?
  -Danke, danke! Voldemar!

• 15:03 07.07.2018 | 0

  arctic

  Foxbat, I still remember:
  - Didu, is it true that you shot down German planes?
  - Is it true. Well, they knocked them down.... They didn’t fully fill them, so they fell.

• 06:51 07.07.2018 | 4

  Zhukomukh

  Based on the results of three lost matches in Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, the German team went home...
  The following year, the Soviet team went to visit the Germans.
  According to the results of the return away matches in Budapest, Vienna and Berlin, the German national team capitulated, the sponsor was poisoned, the coaches went to prison.
  The protracted Second World Cup has finally ended.

• 07:59 07.07.2018 | 1

  gkpractik

  Why doesn’t my brother write that every second cartridge of a German soldier and every third shell was lovingly produced for them without strikes or sabotage by our Czech brothers?
  Hetzer self-propelled guns burned our tankers alive from ambushes - a low bow to the Czechs for well-made vehicles from the Reich leadership. Self-propelled guns were aimed at them from above by FW189 "Rama" spotters - excellent work of the Slavic brothers.
  At night, fascist bombers loaded their bomb carriers with landmines made by the Czechs and brought them down on our peaceful cities and villages, on women, old people and children...
  Nation "Judas". Even the Poles are somehow decent and more worthy than this Carpathian dirt...

• 10:18 07.07.2018 | 4

  Veblen

  1. "...during the border battle of Brody-Berestechko-Dubno on June 26 - 28, 1941, the Soviet command carried out a counterattack with the forces of the 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps, numbering five thousand tanks against the advancing German 1st Panzer Group and some formations of the 6th Army, which had a thousand tanks. The Soviet troops then suffered a crushing defeat and lost 2648 tanks..."
  The author of the article forgot to say that at that time the Nazis had treacherously seized the operational initiative and almost complete air supremacy in the absence of any dense air defense system among the Soviet troops. Let's add here the advantage in quality and experience in managing large masses of armored vehicles, as well as the advantage of the Nazis in combat experience, etc. After this, it turns out that the combat equivalent of those five thousand Soviet tanks, no matter how strange it may seem, could correspond to 600 tanks or less. Hence the result.
  2. “About this catastrophe, surpassing Prokhorovka in scale...”.
  A disaster - yes. Surpassing Prokhorovka in scale - no! Simply because with this disaster, Soviet tank troops began the path to victory and world championship, and not to complete destruction, as happened after Prokhorovka among the Nazis.
  These are the conclusions that a study of the fundamentals of game theory and some pages of WWII leads to.

• 17:18 07.07.2018 | 0

  leoirk

  Veblen, A. Ulanov and D. Shein “Order in tank forces? Where did Stalin's tanks go? It helps a lot to understand the defeats of 1941..

• 20:27 07.07.2018 | 0

  Veblen

  leoirk, leoirk, I think that it is no secret to anyone that the only thing worse than the summer campaign of 1941 was Gorbachev’s “perestroika”.
  But if defeats cannot be avoided, then it is better to start the war with them than to end the war with them.

• 00:19 08.07.2018 | 0

  leoirk

  Veblen, Kamrad. Read it. The industry of the USSR could produce a bunch of tanks. But the quality was just crap. There was simply no technology. The godless Pindos helped us a lot with lend-lease.

• 02:18 08.07.2018 | 0

  Veblen

  leoirk, “The industry of the USSR could have made a bunch of tanks. But the quality was simply fucked up.”...?
  1. "...78th OGvTTP (consisting of 20 IS-2 tanks), advancing on Debrecen in Hungary, from October 6 to October 31, destroyed 6 Tigers, 30 Panthers, 10 T-IV tanks, 1 self-propelled guns" Ferdinand", 24 self-propelled guns of various calibers, 109 guns, 38 armored personnel carriers... 2 ammunition depots and 12 aircraft at the airfield... Irreversible losses of the regiment during this period: two IS-2s burned out from faustpatrons, another 16 tanks received varying degrees damage.
  ...attacking the town of Cañar, which was defended by 10 Panthers, the tankers of the regiment destroyed half of them. The next day, having lost three of their vehicles, they burned seven more Panther tanks.
  During the attack (...) of the village of Hajdu Bagosh, two IS-2s had to fight with five T-V tanks"Panther".
  During the tank duel, our IS-2s managed to destroy three T-Vs, one IS-2 was hit by a Faustpatron (not a Panther!). The next day, October 19, after capturing Hajdu Bagos, the regiment's tanks burst into the city of Debrecen, where two more Panthers were destroyed by direct fire.
  2. The 24th Tank Corps of General Badanov, having fought about 240 kilometers in five days (and this in the bitter cold of the winter of 1942!), destroyed a supply base, a garrison and a large airfield behind enemy lines, which ensured the supply of food and ammunition to the encircled area. the Paulus group (at the same time destroying 86 German aircraft on the ground); cut the railway to Stalingrad and on December 24, 1942 captured the railway station and the village of Tatsinskaya, Rostov region. The enemy, having transferred two tank and two infantry divisions to Tatsinskaya, tried to encircle and destroy the corps. After a 4-day battle, the corps emerged from the encirclement (exit from the encirclement was ensured not only by the forces of the corps, but also by an attack from outside the ring). By order of the USSR NKO No. 412 of December 26, 1942, the 24th Tank Corps for military merits was transformed into the 2nd Guards Tank Corps with the honorary name Tatsinsky.
  Well, how do you like the quality of Soviet tanks...? And let's not confuse such two types of quality as quality in the narrow and broad sense of this concept.
  As for lend-lease assistance to the USSR, the West and the God-hating Pindos, who deliberately infected blacks with syphilis, contributed “several” more to the “economic miracle” of the 3rd Reich. Moreover, the artificial gasoline produced using American technology, which was used by fascist tanks and trucks, was especially high-quality (I suspect the same about airplanes, but I’m not sure).
  By the way, the “famous” Sherman received the honorary name “Rolsen Lighter” from American soldiers!

• 02:29 08.07.2018 | -1

  leoirk

  Veblen, Kamrad. Don't confuse 1941 with 1945.
  I repeat. The godless Pindos have helped our industry a lot.
  Here's an example for you.

  The largest manufacturer of "thirty-fours", Nizhny Tagil plant No. 183, could not switch to the production of T-34–85, since there was nothing to process the turret ring gear with a diameter of 1600 mm. The rotary machine available at the plant made it possible to process parts with a diameter of up to 1500 mm. Of the NKTP enterprises, such machines were available only at the Ural Mash Plant and Plant No. 112. But since the Ural Mash Plant was loaded with the IS tank production program, there was no hope for it in terms of production of the T-34–85. Therefore, new rotary machines were ordered from the UK (Loudon) and the USA (Lodge). As a result, the first T-34–85 tank left the workshop of plant No. 183 only on March 15, 1944. These are the facts; as they say, you can’t argue with them. If Plant No. 183 had not received imported rotary machines, new tanks would not have come out of its gates. So it turns out that, in all honesty, it is necessary to add 10,253 T-34–85 tanks produced by Nizhny Tagil “Vagonka” before the end of the war to Lend-Lease supplies of armored vehicles.

  Not bad. Minus 10 thousand T-34-85. The best tanks WWII.

• 07:27 08.07.2018 | 0

  Veblen

  leoirk,
  1. "Veblen, Comrade. Don't confuse 1941 with 1945."
  If you carefully read the comment to which you are responding, you will understand that in its paragraph 1 we are talking about 1944 (“advancing on Debrecen in Hungary, from October 6 to October 31” could not have happened in 1945, although you , of course, you have the right to a different opinion, which I willingly admit, after all, I’m Comrade, after all, and not some kind of satrap!).
  2. “I repeat. The godless Pindos have helped our industry a lot.”
  As Comrade Stalin would say, I am glad, comrades, that you and I have no disagreements on the issue of the quality of Soviet tanks.
  3. “Therefore, new rotary machines were ordered from the UK (Loudon company) and the USA (Lodge)... “These are the facts, as they say, you can’t argue with them.”
  Why argue when there is a biography of Mr. Truemn online? I quote further.
  “Truman’s famous saying was made a few days after Hitler’s Germany attacked the Soviet Union:
  “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia is winning, then we should help Germany, and let them kill as many as possible, although I do not want to see Hitler as the winner under any circumstances.”
  By the way, both England and the USA were interested in the supplies in question, because England had to save its own skin, and the United States eventually had to land in Europe in order to establish its hegemony on its, of course, long-suffering land tormented by the monster Hitler.
  And here are a couple more quotes regarding creative heritage Hjalmar Schacht, who in the early 1930s managed to work as the main German representative of the American financial corporation J.P. Morgan, and then became Hitler's main financier.
  “The fact that the United States would not be lost and confused during the war that broke out in Europe was clear even before the first shots were fired. And indeed, it was not for the same reason that American businessmen and government agencies bought the German economy “wholesale and retail” for a long time, in order to sacrifice profits because of some kind of hostilities..."
  "Already during Nuremberg trials former President of the Reichsbank Hjalmar Schacht, in a conversation with an American lawyer, said: “If you want to indict the industrialists who helped rearm Germany, then you must indict yourself. You will have to indict the Americans. The Opel car plant, for example, did nothing produced, in addition to military products. This plant was owned by your General Motors.
  Etc. But the gasoline for the Luftwaffe was supplied by the American Standard Oil.
  4. “So it turns out that, in all honesty, it is necessary to add 10,253 T-34–85 tanks produced by Nizhny Tagil “Vagonka” before the end of the war to the Lend-Lease supplies of armored vehicles.”
  To be honest, taking into account in the simplest expert way all factors of production and the interest of the USA and Great Britain, there are about 1600 cars, but no more!

• 
  3rd Mechanized Corps of the Baltic Special Military District: KB tanks - 79, T-34 tanks - 50, according to the report card there are 17,948 armor-piercing 76-mm shells, there is zero.

  The USSR of the 30s was technologically much inferior to Germany, England and the USA.
  And in the conditions of the most difficult war he could not catch up. There are no miracles.
  Quality has increased due to mass supplies of machines and equipment.
  And also through technology transfer. Without this, the 78th OGvTTP from your example would never have reached Debrecen. I would have lost all my tanks along the way - as happened with the mech. housings arr. 1941..

• 08:20 09.07.2018 | 0

  Veblen

  leoirk,
  1. "The USSR of the 30s was technologically much inferior to Germany, England and the USA."
  I agree with this right away, because it is an obvious fact. But, in order not to go deeper into the jungle, I’ll ask a simple question.
  The Second World War would have taken place, as we know it, if the USA, England and France, who through a concerted effort kicked the USSR out of European politics, had demanded that Hitler comply with the Versailles restrictions on Germany's armament: 7 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions without tanks , aviation and automatic weapons?
  Or here’s another thing: who “pumped up” the German economy from a state of devastation in the early 20s to a level that allowed it to compete for primacy in Europe with the economy of England and a gross domestic product of a third of America’s in the early 30s.
  For a hint, see, for example, at 07:27 07/08/2018 the following, said by Hjalmar Schacht: “The fact that the United States would not be lost and confused during the war that broke out in Europe was clear even before the first shots were fired. And indeed, not for the same American businessmen and government agencies have been buying up the German economy “wholesale and retail” for a long time in order to sacrifice profits because of some kind of hostilities..."
  And yet, for everything (!) that was supplied to us by the USA, England and Germany (with the exception of trophies), the USSR paid. Well, I already wrote about the interest of the USA and England in “helping” the USSR in the same 07:27 07/08/2018: The USA was “quietly” striving for world domination (from about 1890!), to which we can add a very compelling the need to get out of the crisis of 1929-1942, and England had to save its skin: the old woman played the game (in “Hitlerovich”) with Hitler to the point that he reached the English Channel.
  So there is no need to make benefactors out of those who at first financed Hitler, not unprofitably for themselves, and set him against the USSR, and then, when he got out of geopolitical control, began to help the USSR just as profitably, but to a much smaller extent. How do you like this kind of business in the economics and geopolitics of those whom you previously designated as “ungodly Pindos”?
  By the way, during the discussion with you, I finally got around to finding out that without American gasoline, as many as 2 types (!) Hitler would have had nothing to fuel his tanks, cars, or planes with.
  Here, approximately this way, min hertz!

• 09:21 09.07.2018 | 0

  Veblen

  leoirk, Kamrad. "Just connect one thing to the other. In 1941, the quality of tanks was no good."
  How did they win the battle of Moscow at the beginning of 1942 and carry out the unprecedented Tatsin raid at the end of 1942?
  Why, before the attack on Moscow, Guderian called a group of designers to the Eastern Front and, hardly, demanded that the T-34 be copied? Why did the collision with this car come as a shock to the Nazis?
  Why did only about a third of the tanks remain in the Wehrmacht tank groups before the 1st attack on Moscow?
  How did Katukov clean up Guderian’s face near Tula?
  How did Zinovy ​​Kolobanov’s KV company knock out and burn approximately 40 fascist tanks during the day of battle?
  And all this took place before the supply of equipment from the USA and England could have an impact! The latter, by the way, will be confirmed by anyone who worked in production.
  So leave the myths and legends of Aberdeen Proving Ground for a more naive audience, Comrade.

• 05:45 09.07.2018 | 0

  leoirk

  Veblen, 2. about Truemn and so on.
  Well, the bourgeoisie had no reason to love the communists.

  Nevertheless, these words can be answered with a quote from Churchill.

  We will provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can. We will appeal to all our friends and allies in all parts of the world to adhere to the same course and pursue it as steadfastly and steadily to the end as we will do.

  We offered the government of Soviet Russia any technical or economic assistance that we are able to provide and which will be useful to it.

  Well, about the trade of Pindos companies with Hitler.
  Well, the USSR also traded with Germany. And even the war in Spain did not interfere with this. And it wouldn’t hurt to remember about the friendship and border treaty between the USSR and Germany from 1939..

• 10:49 09.07.2018 | 0

  Veblen

  leoirk,
  1. “Well, there was no reason for the bourgeoisie to love the communists.”
  Articles about how J.P. Morgan gave loans to I. G. Farben - the manufacturer of Zyklon B, quote or will you find it yourself?
  No, I’ll still quote: “I. G. Farben made a very large contribution to the Nazi movement: by 1939 it provided 90% of the influx foreign currency and 85% of all military and industrial products necessary to prepare Germany for world war." And there were also Ford, and General Motors, etc.
  2."...The USSR also traded with Germany. And even the war in Spain did not interfere with this."
  Before Hitler came to power, it was indeed trade; after Hitler came to power, the USSR was squeezed out of the German oil market (who occupied it, you probably know or guess) and the banal forced “appeasement” of the demoniac began. And for a comparison of volumes, see the previous paragraph, and there is a lot of interesting information on the Internet. About England's participation in this matter, for example.
  2. “And it wouldn’t hurt to remember about the treaty of friendship and border between the USSR and Germany from 1939...”.
  Let's remember, Comrade, why not? Let us just note that we already recalled the anti-Versailles tricks of Hitler, the USA, England and France in

The situation of the German troops at the time of 1943 was difficult in terms of weapons and the number of tank divisions. On May 10, Guderian was summoned to another meeting with Hitler on the production of the Panther tank. After which he asked Hitler to give him the floor. Hitler gave his consent and Guderian began to convincingly dissuade an attack on the Eastern Front. He explained that the German troops were currently having difficulties and first needed to overcome them, and only then implement such major operations. Guderian asked: “Why do you want to launch an offensive in the east this year?” Here Keitel intervened in the conversation: “We must launch an offensive for political reasons.” I objected: “Do you think people know where Kursk is? The world is completely indifferent whether Kursk is in our hands or not. I repeat my question: “Why do you even want to launch an offensive in the east this year?” Hitler replied to this literally the following: “You are absolutely right. When I think about this attack, my stomach begins to ache." I replied: "You have the right reaction to the situation. Give up this idea." Hitler did not answer anything. The conversation was over.

After this meeting, Guderian again dealt with issues of tank production, the formation of tank divisions, met with the commanders-in-chief of tank battalions, and visited factories that produced tanks for Germany. And on one of these trips, get acquainted with negative sides Panther tanks, so that they could then report to Hitler. Guderian discovered a lot of faults with the Panthers, and the people operating these tanks were little familiar with their operation and sometimes had virtually no front-line experience. Guderian, having reached the Fuhrer, immediately reported on all the nuances, but, unfortunately, Hitler did not change his plan to carry out the ill-fated offensive called “Citadel”.

Guderian recalls that Hitler began his offensive in the east. In the south, ten tank divisions, seven infantry and one motorized division were advancing from Belgorod. During the offensive, all German ground forces were used. Hitler said that it could not fail. Guderian was surprised at how Hitler finally decided to carry out this operation.

Guderian writes that the offensive began on July 5, 1943. It was organized according to a scheme that had long been calculated by the Russians. Hitler, in turn, decided to abandon the offensive through Sevsk and Kharkov. He supported Zeitzler's plan, which was to capture the Russian troops advanced in an arc and thereby recapture the Eastern Front.

Guderian visited both German offensive fronts in order to identify problems in technology and tactics, and also talk with tank crews. Guderian had warned Hitler about the ineffectiveness of the Panther tanks, and now he was convinced in practice that they were not sufficiently prepared for combat operations. Also, the Tiger tanks were not suitable for combat; it turned out that they did not even have the required amount of ammunition. Also, Guderian, talking about the shortcomings of the German army’s weapons, mentioned that the Germans did not have machine guns “... and therefore, when they broke into the enemy’s defensive positions, they literally had to shoot sparrows from cannons.” Guderian was upset that his fears were confirmed and angry at Hitler for not listening to him. The Germans were unable to destroy even infantry firing points, and thus the infantry could not advance forward. Guderian recalls that German tanks approached Russian artillery positions without infantry. Huge sacrifices, exceptional bravery of the German soldiers, but, unfortunately, the infantry was never able to participate in hostilities. In the south, meanwhile, the situation was unfolding more prosperously, but the troops stationed there could not fully block the Russian arc. The Russians launched a counterattack on Orel on July 15, but had to abandon it on August 4. Belgorod fell after Orel.

Guderian writes that in the Orel area, where until that day the Germans had repelled all attacks by Russian troops, he wanted to concentrate his 2nd Tank Army. And it was precisely because of this area that Guderian had a conflict with Field Marshal von Kluge, after which Guderian was removed from office.

Operation Citadel was a failure. This dealt a crushing blow to the German army. Guderian notes that the tank and armored forces were out of action for a long time due to heavy losses and lack of people. Their restoration to continue operations on the Eastern Front was called into question. The Russians were euphoric with their success, and the Eastern Front saw much more blood after that. "The initiative has passed to the enemy."

Again, Guderian's warnings were rejected and only after a while, Hitler told him: “You were right! You told me about this 9 months ago. Unfortunately, I did not listen to you.”