Agrarian reform of 1906 briefly. Stolypin's agrarian reform

INTRODUCTION

The work examines the reasons for the implementation, main stages, and results of the Stolypin agrarian reform, which was carried out by the tsarist government in the period from 1906 to 1914. The problem is considered against the backdrop of the political and economic situation that has developed in Russia, on the eve of the ongoing reforms.

The beginning of the 20th century was a time of fundamental changes in politics and economics. A crisis situation was brewing in the country, revolutionary uprisings arose, the revolution of 1905-1907 took place. Russia needed to get back on its feet in order to continue to develop as a strong state, in order to gain influence and respect among highly developed countries such as England, France, which At that time they were capitalist powers, with a well-functioning administrative apparatus, a stable economy, and good rates of development of industry, production and economy.

Russia had two paths of development: revolutionary and peaceful, i.e. through reform political system and economics. There were no development trends observed in agriculture, but it was agriculture that was considered as a source of capital accumulation for the development of industry. After the abolition of serfdom, the peasants did not improve their situation or living status. Landlord lawlessness continued. A crisis situation was brewing. More and more peasant uprisings arose. To prevent unrest, the government had to immediately take measures to regulate the peasant masses, establish production, and restore agriculture. A reform was needed that could settle all the grievances; a person was needed who would take responsibility for carrying out such a reform. He became Prime Minister Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin. He offered his way out of the current situation. His reform was approved and accepted by the government.

The main stages and ways of carrying out the Stolypin agrarian reform are discussed in detail and outlined in this work. Using the available material, we are convinced that this reform was the most acceptable way out of the current situation and gave time to think about further ways of developing Russia.

1. PETER ARKADIEVICH STOLYPIN ABOUT REFORM

“We are called upon to free the people from beggary, from ignorance, from lack of rights,” said Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin. He saw the path to these goals primarily in strengthening statehood.

The core of his policy, the work of his whole life, was land reform.

This reform was supposed to create a class of small owners in Russia - a new “strong pillar of order”, a pillar of the state. Then Russia would “not be afraid of all revolutions.” Stolypin concluded his speech on land reform on May 10, 1907 with the famous words: “They (opponents of statehood) need great upheavals, we need Great Russia!”

“Nature has invested in man some innate instincts... and one of the strongest feelings of this order is the sense of ownership.” - Pyotr Arkadyevich wrote in a letter to L.N. Tolstoy in 1907. - “You cannot love someone else’s property on an equal basis with your own, and you cannot cultivate and improve land that is in temporary use, on an equal basis with your own land. The artificial emasculation of our peasant in this regard, the destruction of his innate sense of property leads to many bad things and, most importantly, to poverty. And poverty, for me, is the worst of slavery...”

P.A. Stolypin emphasized that he sees no point in “driving the more developed element of landowners off the land.” On the contrary, we need to turn the peasants into real owners.

What kind of social system would arise in Russia after this reform?

Stolypin's supporters both then and later imagined him differently. Nationalist Vasily Shulgin, for example, believed that he would be close to the Italian fascist system. The Octobrists thought it would be more of a Western liberal society. Pyotr Arkadyevich himself said in 1909 in an interview: “Give the state 20 years of internal and external peace, and you will not recognize of today's Russia».

Internal peace meant the suppression of the revolution, external peace meant the absence of wars. “As long as I am in power,” said Stolypin, “I will do everything humanly possible to prevent Russia from going to war. We cannot compare ourselves with an external enemy until the worst internal enemies of the greatness of Russia - the social revolutionaries - are destroyed.” Stolypin prevented war after Hungary captured Bosnia in 1908. Having convinced the tsar not to mobilize, he noted with satisfaction: “Today I managed to save Russia from destruction.”

But Stolypin failed to complete the planned reform.

The Black Hundreds and influential court circles were extremely hostile towards him. They believed that he was destroying the traditional way of life in Russia. After the suppression of the revolution, Stolypin began to lose the support of the tsar

2. PREREQUISITES OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Before the revolution of 1905-1907, two different forms of land ownership coexisted in the Russian village: on the one hand, the private property of landowners, on the other, the communal property of peasants. At the same time, the nobility and peasants developed two opposing views of the land, two stable worldviews.

Landowners believed that land was property just like any other. They saw no sin in buying and selling it.

The peasants thought differently. They firmly believed that the land was “nobody’s”, God’s, and the right to use it was given only by labor. The rural community responded to this age-old idea. All the land in it was divided between families “according to the number of eaters.” If the size of a family decreased, its land allotment also decreased.

Until 1905, the state supported the community. It was much easier to collect various duties from it than from many individual peasant farms. S. Witte remarked on this matter: “It is easier to shepherd a herd than to shepherd each member of the herd individually.” The community was considered the most reliable support of autocracy in the village, one of the “pillars” on which the state system rested.

But the tension between the community and private property gradually increased, the population increased, and the peasants' plots became smaller and smaller. This burning shortage of land was called land shortage. Involuntarily, the peasants' gaze turned to the noble estates, where there was a lot of land. In addition, the peasants considered this property to be initially unfair and illegal. “We must take away the landowner’s land and add it to the communal land!” - they repeated with conviction.

In 1905, these contradictions resulted in a real “war for the land.”

The peasants “as a whole,” that is, as a whole community, went to destroy the noble estates. The authorities suppressed the unrest by sending military expeditions to places of unrest, carrying out mass floggings and arrests. From the “original foundation of autocracy,” the community suddenly turned into a “hotbed of rebellion.” The former peaceful neighborhood between the community and the landowners came to an end.

3. STOLYPINSKY AGRARIAN REFORM. ITS BASIC IDEA

During the peasant unrest of 1905, it became clear that it was impossible to maintain the previous situation in the village. Communal and private ownership of land could not coexist side by side for much longer.

At the end of 1905, the authorities seriously considered the possibility of meeting the peasant demands. General Dmitry Trepav said then: “I am a landowner myself and will be very happy to give half of my land for free, being convinced that only under this condition will I retain the second half.” But at the beginning of 1906 there was a change in sentiment. Having recovered from the shock, the government chose the opposite path.

An idea arose: what if we did not give in to the community, but, on the contrary, declared a merciless war on it. The point was that private property would go on a decisive offensive against communal property. Especially quickly, within a few months, this idea won the support of the nobility. Many landowners who had previously ardently supported the community now turned out to be its irreconcilable opponents. “The community is a beast, we must fight this beast,” the famous nobleman, monarchist N. Markov categorically stated. The main spokesman for sentiments directed against the community was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Pyotr Stolypin. He called for “giving the peasant the freedom to work, get rich, and free him from the bondage of the outdated communal system.” This was the point main idea land reform, which was called Stolypin.

It was assumed that wealthy peasants would turn from community members into “small landowners.” Thus, the community will be blown up from the inside, destroyed. The struggle between the community and private property will end with the victory of the latter. A new layer of strong owners is emerging in the country - “a strong pillar of order.”

Stolypin’s concept proposed a path for the development of a mixed, multi-structured economy, where government forms farms had to compete with collective and private ones. The components of his programs are the transition to farms, the use of cooperation, the development of land reclamation, the introduction of three-stage agricultural education, the organization of cheap credit for peasants, the formation of an agricultural party that actually represented the interests of small landowners.

Stolypin puts forward a liberal doctrine of managing the rural community, eliminating striping, developing private property in the countryside and achieving economic growth on this basis. With the progress of the market-oriented peasant economy, in the course of the development of land purchase and sale relations, there should be a natural reduction in the landowner's land fund. The future agrarian system of Russia was presented to the prime minister in the form of a system of small and medium-sized farms, united by local self-governing and small-sized noble estates. On this basis, the integration of two cultures - noble and peasant - was supposed to take place.

Stolypin relies on “strong and strong” peasants. However, it does not require widespread uniformity or unification of forms of land ownership and land use. Where, due to local conditions, the community is economically viable, “it is necessary for the peasant himself to choose the method of using the land that suits him best.”

The beginning of land reform was announced by a government decree of November 9, 1906, adopted as an emergency, bypassing the State Duma. According to this decree, peasants received the right to leave the community with their land. They might as well sell it.

P.A. Stolypin believed that this measure would soon destroy the community. He said that the decree “laid the foundation of a new peasant system.”

In February 1907, the Second State Duma was convened. In it, as in the First Duma, the land issue remained the center of attention. The difference was that now the “noble side” not only defended itself, but also attacked.

The majority of deputies in the Second Duma, even more firmly than in the First Duma, were in favor of transferring part of the noble lands to the peasants. P.A. Stolypin resolutely rejected such projects. Of course, the Second Duma showed no desire to approve the Stolypin decree of November 9. In this regard, there were persistent rumors among the peasants that it was impossible to leave the community - those who left would not get the landowner's land.

The creation of the June Third system, which was personified by the Third State Duma, along with the agrarian reform, was the second step in transforming Russia into a bourgeois monarchy (the first step was the reform of 1861).

The socio-political meaning boils down to the fact that Caesarism was finally crossed out: the “peasant” Duma turned into the “lord’s” Duma. On November 16, 1907, two weeks after the start of the work of the Third Duma, Stolypin addressed it with a government declaration. The first and main task of the government is not reform, but the fight against revolution.

Stolypin declared the second central task of the government to implement the agrarian law on November 9, 1906, which is “the fundamental thought of the current government...”.

Among the reforms, reforms of local self-government, education, worker insurance, etc. were promised.

In the Third State Duma, convened in 1907 under a new electoral law (which limited the representation of the poor), completely different sentiments reigned than in the first two. This Duma was called Stolypinskaya . She not only approved the decree of November 9, but went even further than P.A. himself. Stolypin. (For example, in order to speed up the destruction of the community, the Duma declared all communities where there had been no land redistribution for more than 24 years dissolved).

The discussion of the decree of November 9, 1906 began in the Duma on October 23, 1908, i.e. two years after he entered life. In total, it was discussed for more than six months.

After the decree was adopted by the Duma on November 9, it, with amendments, was submitted for discussion to the State Council and was also adopted, after which, based on the date of its approval by the Tsar, it became known as the law on June 14, 1910. In its content, it was, of course, a liberal bourgeois law, promoting the development of capitalism in the countryside and, therefore, progressive.

The decree introduced extremely important changes in land ownership of peasants. All peasants received the right to leave the community, which in this case allocated land to the exiting individual for his own ownership. At the same time, the decree provided privileges for wealthy peasants in order to encourage them to leave the community. In particular, those who left the community received “in the ownership of individual householders” all the lands “consisting of their permanent use.” This meant that people from the community received surpluses in excess of the per capita norm. Moreover, if there were no redistributions in a given community over the last 24 years, then the householder received the surplus for free, but if there were redistributions, then he paid the community for the surplus at the redemption prices of 1861. Since prices have increased several times over 40 years, this was also beneficial for wealthy immigrants.

Communities in which there were no redistributions from the moment the peasants switched to redemption were recognized as having mechanically transferred to the private property of individual householders. To legally register ownership of their plot, the peasants of such communities only had to submit an application to the land management commission, which drew up documents for the plot that was actually in their possession and became the property of the householder. In addition to this provision, the law differed from the decree in some simplification of the procedure for leaving the community.

In 1906, “Temporary Rules” on the land management of peasants were adopted, which became law after approval by the Duma on May 29, 1911. Land management commissions created on the basis of this law were given the right, during the general land management of communities, to allocate individual householders without the consent of the assembly, at its discretion, if the commission believed that such allocation did not affect the interests of the community. The commissions also had the final say in determining land disputes. Such a right opened the way to the arbitrariness of the commissions.

4. MAIN DIRECTIONS OF STOLYPINSKY AGRARIAN REFORM

Stolypin, being a landowner, leader of the provincial nobility, knew and understood the interests of the landowners; As governor during the revolution, he saw rebel peasants, so for him the agrarian question was not an abstract concept.

The essence of the reforms: putting a solid foundation under the autocracy and moving along the path of industrial, and therefore capitalist development.

The core of the reforms is agricultural policy.

Agrarian reform was Stolypin's main and favorite brainchild.

The reform had several goals: socio-political - to create in the countryside a strong support for the autocracy from strong property owners, splitting them off from the bulk of the peasantry and opposing them to it; strong farms were supposed to become an obstacle to the growth of the revolution in the countryside; socio-economic - to destroy the community, establish private farms in the form of farms and farms, and send the excess labor to the city, where it will be absorbed by the growing industry; economic - to ensure the rise of agriculture and further industrialization of the country in order to eliminate the gap with the advanced powers.

The first step in this direction was taken in 1861. Then the agrarian issue was resolved at the expense of the peasants, who paid the landowners both for land and freedom. Agrarian legislation 1906-1910 was the second step, while the government, in order to strengthen its power and the power of the landowners, again tried to solve the agrarian question at the expense of the peasantry.

The new agricultural policy was carried out on the basis of a decree on November 9, 1906. This decree was the main work of Stolypin's life. It was a symbol of faith, a great and last hope, an obsession, his present and future - great if the reform succeeds; catastrophic if it fails. And Stolypin realized this.

In general, a series of laws of 1906-1912. was bourgeois in nature.

The medieval allotment of land ownership of peasants was abolished, exit from the community, sale of land, free resettlement to cities and outskirts was allowed, redemption payments, corporal punishment, and some legal restrictions were abolished.

Agrarian reform consisted of a set of sequentially carried out and interconnected measures.

From the end of 1906, the state launched a powerful offensive against the community. To transition to new economic relations, a whole system of economic and legal measures to regulate the agricultural economy was developed. The decree of November 9, 1906 proclaimed the predominance of the fact of sole ownership of land over the legal right of use. The peasants could now leave it and receive full ownership of the land. They could now separate what was in actual use from the community, regardless of its will. The land plot became the property not of the family, but of the individual householder.

The peasants were cut off from the communal land - plots of land. Rich peasants moved their estates to the same plots - these were called farmsteads. The authorities considered farmsteads the ideal form of land tenure. On the part of the farmers, who lived separately from each other, there was no need to fear riots and unrest.

Measures were taken to ensure the strength and stability of working peasant farms. Thus, in order to avoid land speculation and concentration of property, the maximum size of individual land ownership was legally limited, and the sale of land to non-peasants was allowed.

After the start of the reform, many poor people rushed out of the community, who immediately sold their land and went to the cities. Wealthy peasants were in no hurry to leave. What was the explanation for this? First of all, leaving the community broke the peasant’s usual way of life and his entire worldview. The peasant resisted the transition to farms and cuts not because of his darkness and ignorance, as the authorities believed, but based on sound everyday considerations. The community protected him from complete ruin and many other vicissitudes of fate. Peasant agriculture was very dependent on the vagaries of the weather. Having several scattered strips of land in different parts of the public allotment: one in the lowlands, another on the hills, etc. (this order was called striped), the peasant provided himself with an average annual harvest: in a dry year, stripes in the lowlands helped out, in a rainy year, in the hills. Having received an allotment of one piece, the peasant found himself at the mercy of the elements. He went bankrupt in the first dry year if the cut was in a high place. The next year was rainy, and it was the turn of the neighbor who found himself in the lowlands to go broke. Only a large cut, located in different terrains, could guarantee an annual average harvest.

After the peasants went out to farms or farms, the previous “insurance” against crop failure disappeared. Now just one dry or too rainy year could bring poverty and hunger. To make such fears disappear among the peasants, those leaving the community began to be cut best lands. Naturally, this caused indignation among other community members. Hostility quickly grew between both. The number of those leaving the community began to gradually decrease.

The formation of farmsteads and cuts was even somewhat slowed down for the sake of another goal - strengthening the allotment land into personal property. Each member of the community could declare his exit from it and secure his own allotment, which the community could henceforth neither reduce nor move.

But the owner could sell his fortified plot even to a stranger to the community. From an agrotechnical point of view, such an innovation could not bring much benefit (the allotment was striped and remained so), but it was capable of greatly disrupting the unity of the peasant world and causing a split in the community. It was assumed that every householder who had lost several souls in his family and was fearfully awaiting the next redistribution would certainly seize the opportunity to keep his entire allotment intact.

In 1907 - 1915 25% of householders declared separation from the community, but 20% actually separated - 2008.4 thousand householders. New forms of land tenure became widespread: farms and cuts. On January 1, 1916, there were already 1,221.5 thousand of them. In addition, the law of June 14, 1910 considered it unnecessary for many peasants who were only formally considered community members to leave the community. The number of such farms amounted to about one third of all communal households.

Despite all the efforts of the government, farmsteads were well established only in the northwestern provinces, including partly Pskov and Smolensk. Even before the start of the Stolypin reform, the peasants of the Kovno province began to settle in farmsteads. The same phenomenon was observed in the Pskov province. The influence of Prussia and the Baltic states was felt in these parts. The local landscape, changeable, cut by rivers and streams, also contributed to the creation of farmsteads.

In the southern and southeastern provinces, the main obstacle to widespread farming was difficulties with water. But here (in the Northern Black Sea region, in the Northern Caucasus and in the steppe Trans-Volga region) the planting of cuts has been quite successful. The lack of strong communal traditions in these places was combined with a high level of development of agrarian capitalism, exceptional soil fertility, its uniformity over very large areas and a low level of agriculture. The peasant, having spent almost no labor and money on improving his stripes, left them without regret and switched to cutting.

In the Central Non-Black Earth region, the peasant, on the contrary, had to invest a lot of effort in cultivating his plot. Without care, this land will not give birth to anything. Fertilization of the soil here began from time immemorial. And from the end of the nineteenth century. Cases of collective transitions of entire villages to multi-field crop rotations with sowing of forage grasses have become more frequent. The transition to “wide stripes” (instead of narrow, confusing ones) has also developed.

The government’s activities would be much more beneficial if in the central black earth provinces, instead of planting farmsteads and cuttings, it assisted in the intensification of peasant agriculture within the community. At first, especially under Prince B.A. Vasilchikov, the chief administrator of land management and agriculture, such assistance was partially provided. But with the arrival of A.V. Krivoshein, who in 1908 took the position of chief manager of land management and agriculture and became Stolypin’s closest associate, the land management department pursued a sharply anti-communal policy. As a result, the scythe found its way to stone: the peasants resisted the planting of farms and cuts, and the government almost openly prevented the introduction of advanced farming systems on communal lands. The only thing in which land managers and local peasants found common interest was the division of joint land ownership of several villages. In Moscow and some other provinces, this type of land management received such great development that it began to relegate work on the allocation of farmsteads and plots to the background.

In the central black earth provinces, the main obstacle to the formation of farmsteads and plots on communal lands was the peasants' lack of land. For example, in the Kursk province, local peasants “wanted the landowner’s land immediately and for free.” It followed from this that before planting farmsteads and cuttings, in these provinces it was necessary to solve the problem of peasant land shortage - including through the inflated landowners' latifundia.

The June 3rd coup d'etat radically changed the situation in the country. The peasants had to give up their dreams of a quick cut-off. The pace of implementation of the decree of November 9, 1906 increased sharply. In 1908, compared with 1907, the number of established householders increased 10 times and exceeded half a million. In 1909, a record figure was reached - 579.4 thousand fortified. But from 1910 the pace of strengthening began to slow down. The artificial measures introduced into law on June 14, 1910 did not straighten the curve. The number of peasants who separated from the community stabilized only after the law “On Land Management” was issued on May 29, 1911. However, once again approaching the highest indicators 1908-1909 It didn't work out that way.

Over these years, in some southern provinces, for example in Bessarabia and Poltava, communal land ownership was almost completely eliminated. In other provinces, for example in Kursk, it lost its primacy. (In these provinces there were many communities with household land ownership before).

But in the northern, northeastern, southeastern, and partly in the central industrial provinces, the reform only slightly affected the mass of the communal peasantry.

The stripwise fortified personal peasant land property was very vaguely similar to the classical Roman “sacred and inviolable private property.” And the point is not only in the legal restrictions imposed on fortified plots (prohibition of selling to persons of the non-peasant class, mortgaging in private banks). The peasants themselves, leaving the community, attached primary importance to securing not specific strips, but their total area. Therefore, it happened that they were not averse to taking part in the general redistribution, if this did not reduce the area of ​​their allotment (for example, when switching to “wide stripes”). To prevent the authorities from interfering and disrupting the matter, such redistributions were sometimes carried out secretly. It happened that the local authorities adopted the same view of the fortified land. The ministerial audit of 1911 discovered numerous cases of share strengthening in the Oryol province.

This means that it was not certain strips that were strengthened, but the share of one or another householder in worldly land ownership. And the government itself eventually took the same point of view, assigning to itself, by law on May 29, 1911, the right to move fortified strips when allocating farmsteads or areas.

Therefore, the massive strengthening of striped lands actually only led to the formation of unallocated communities. By the beginning of the Stolypin reform, about a third of communities in European Russia had not redistributed their land. Sometimes two communities lived side by side - one that was being redistributed and one that was not being redivided. No one noted a big difference in the level of their agriculture. Only in a time without boundaries, the rich were richer and the poor poorer.

In reality, the government, of course, did not want the concentration of land in the hands of a few world-eaters and the ruin of the mass of farmers. Without food in the countryside, the landless poor had to pour into the city. Industry, which was depressed before 1910, could not cope with an influx of labor on such a scale. Masses of homeless and unemployed people threatened new social upheavals. Therefore, the government hastened to make an addition to its decree, prohibiting, within one district, the concentration in the same hands of more than six higher per capita allotments, determined by the reform of 1861. For different provinces, this ranged from 12 to 18 dessiatines. The ceiling set for “strong owners” was very low. The corresponding norm became law on June 14, 1910.

IN real life It was mainly the poor who left the community, as well as city dwellers who remembered that in a long-abandoned village they had a plot of land that could now be sold. Migrants leaving for Siberia also sold land. A huge amount of land for inter-strip fortification went on sale. In 1914, for example, 60% of the area of ​​land fortified that year was sold. The buyer of the land sometimes turned out to be a peasant society, and then it returned to the worldly pot. More often, it was wealthy peasants who bought land, who, by the way, were not always in a hurry to leave the community. Other communal peasants also bought. Fortified and public lands ended up in the hands of the same owner. Without leaving the community, he at the same time had fortified areas. The witness and participant in this whole shake-up could still remember where and what stripes she had. But already in the second generation such confusion should have begun that no court would be able to sort it out. Something similar, however, has already happened once. Allotments purchased ahead of schedule (according to the reform of 1861) at one time greatly disrupted the uniformity of land use in the community. But then they gradually began to get even. Since the Stolypin reform did not resolve the agrarian question and land oppression continued to increase, a new wave of redistribution was inevitable, which was supposed to sweep away much of Stolypin’s legacy. And indeed, land redistribution, which had almost stalled at the height of the reform, began to rise again from 1912.

Stolypin, apparently, himself understood that inter-strip fortification would not create a “strong owner.” It was not for nothing that he called on local authorities “to be convinced that strengthening the areas is only half the battle, even just the beginning of the matter, and that the law of November 9 was not created to strengthen the interstriped area.” On October 15, 1908, by agreement of the Ministers of Internal Affairs, Justice and the Chief Administrator of Land Management and Agriculture, “Temporary Rules on the Allocation of Allotment Land to Certain Places” were issued. “The most perfect type of land structure is a farmstead,” the rules said, “and if it is impossible to form one, a continuous cut for all field land, set aside specifically from the root estate.”

March 1909 The Committee on Land Management Affairs approved the “Temporary Rules on the Land Management of Entire Rural Communities.” Since that time, local land management authorities have increasingly focused on the development of plots of entire villages. The new instructions, issued in 1910, especially emphasized: “The ultimate goal of land management is the development of the entire allotment; therefore, when carrying out work on allotments, one should strive to ensure that these works cover the largest possible area of ​​​​the allotment being arranged...” When assigning work to the queue, the first to go was the development of the entire allotment, then - for group allotments, and only after them - for single. In practice, given the shortage of land surveyors, this meant the cessation of single allotments. Indeed, a strong owner could wait a long time until all the poor people in the neighboring village were driven out to be cut off.

In May 1911, the Law “On Land Management” was issued. It included the main provisions of the instructions of 1909-1910. new law established that the transition to cutting and farm farming no longer requires the preliminary consolidation of allotment lands into personal ownership. Since that time, inter-strip fortification has lost its former significance.

Of the total number of farmsteads and farmsteads created during the reform, 64.3% arose as a result of the expansion of entire villages. It was more convenient for land managers to work this way, the productivity of their work increased, high authorities received round numbers to juggle, but at the same time the number of small farmers and cut-off farmers, who could not be called “strong owners,” multiplied. Many farms were unviable. In the Poltava province, for example, with the full expansion of settlements, on average there were 4.1 dessiatines per owner. The peasants said that on some farms “there is nowhere to put the chicken.”

Only about 30% of farms and cuts on communal lands were formed by allocating individual owners. But these, as a rule, were strong owners. In the same Poltava province, the average size of a single allotment was 10 dessiatines. But most of these allocations were made in the first years of the reform. Then this matter practically disappeared.

Stolypin had mixed feelings about this development. On the one hand, he understood that only the dissection of allotments would isolate peasant farms from each other, and only complete resettlement into farmsteads would finally liquidate the community. It will be difficult for peasants dispersed among farmsteads to rebel.

On the other hand, Stolypin could not help but see that instead of strong, stable farms, the land management department was fabricating a mass of small and obviously weak ones - those who could not stabilize the situation in the countryside and become the support of the regime. However, he was unable to deploy the cumbersome machine of the land management department in such a way that it would act not as it was convenient for it, but as needed for the benefit of the business.

Simultaneously with the publication of new agrarian laws, the government is taking measures to forcibly destroy the community, without relying entirely on the action of economic factors. Immediately after November 9, 1906, the entire state apparatus was set in motion by issuing the most categorical circulars and orders, as well as by repressing those who did not implement them too energetically.

The practice of the reform showed that the mass of the peasantry was opposed to separation from the community - according to at least in most areas. A survey of peasant sentiments by the Free Economic Society showed that in the central provinces peasants had a negative attitude towards separation from the community (89 negative indicators in questionnaires versus 7 positive). Many peasant correspondents wrote that the decree of November 9 was aimed at ruining the masses of peasants so that a few could profit from it.

In the current situation, the only way for the government to carry out reform was through violence against the main mass of the peasantry. The specific methods of violence were very diverse - from intimidation of village gatherings to drawing up fictitious verdicts, from the cancellation of decisions of gatherings by the zemstvo chief to the issuance of decisions by county land management commissions on the allocation of householders, from the use of police force to obtain the “consent” of gatherings to the expulsion of opponents of the allocation.

In order to get the peasants to agree to the division of the entire plot, officials from the land management authorities sometimes resorted to the most unceremonious measures of pressure. One typical case is described in the memoirs of the zemstvo chief V. Polivanov. The author served in the Gryazovets district of the Vologda province. One day, early in the morning during a time of need, an indispensable member of the land management commission came to one of the villages. A meeting was convened, and an indispensable member explained to the “peasants” that they needed to go out to the farms: the society was small, there was enough land and water on three sides. “I looked at the plan and told my clerk: Lopatikha needs to be transferred to farms as soon as possible.” After consulting among themselves, the participants refused. Neither promises to provide a loan, nor threats to arrest the “rebels” and bring in soldiers to billet had any effect. The peasants kept repeating: “We will live as the old people lived, but we don’t agree to farmsteads.” Then the indispensable member went to drink tea, and forbade the peasants to disperse and sit on the ground. After drinking tea, I definitely felt sleepy. He went out to the peasants waiting under the windows late in the evening. “Well, do you agree?” “Everyone agrees!” the gathering answered unanimously. “To the farm, then to the farm, to the aspen, then to the aspen, just so that everyone, that is, together.” V. Polivanov claimed that he managed to reach the governor and restore justice.

However, there is evidence that sometimes peasants' resistance to too much pressure from officials led to bloody clashes.

4.1 ACTIVITIES OF THE PEASANT BANK

In 1906-1907 By decrees of the tsar, some part of the state and appanage lands was transferred to the Peasant Bank for sale to peasants in order to ease land pressure.

Opponents of the Stolypin land reform said that it was being carried out according to the principle: “The rich will get more, the poor will take away.” According to the reform supporters, peasant owners were supposed to increase their plots not only at the expense of the rural poor. The Peasant Land Bank helped them in this, buying up land from landowners and selling it to peasants in small plots. The law of June 5, 1912 allowed the issuance of a loan secured by any allotment land acquired by peasants.

Development various forms credit - mortgage, reclamation, agricultural, land management - contributed to the intensification of market relations in the countryside. But in fact, this land was bought mainly by kulaks, who thus received additional opportunities for expanding the economy, since only wealthy peasants could afford to buy land even through a bank, with payment in installments.

Many nobles, impoverished or worried about peasant unrest, willingly sold their lands. The inspirer of the reform P.A. Stolypin, to set an example, himself sold one of his estates. Thus, the bank acted as an intermediary between land sellers - nobles and its buyers - peasants.

The Bank carried out large-scale purchases of lands with their subsequent resale to peasants on preferential terms, and intermediary operations to increase peasant land use. He increased credit to the peasants and significantly reduced the cost of it, and the Bank paid more interest on its obligations than the peasants paid it. The difference in payment was covered by subsidies from the budget, amounting for the period from 1906 to 1917. 1457.5 billion rubles.

The Bank actively influenced the forms of land ownership: for peasants who acquired land as their sole property, payments were reduced. As a result, if before 1906 the bulk of land buyers were peasant collectives, then by 1913 79.7% of buyers were individual peasants.

The scale of operations of the Peasant Land Bank in 1905-1907. for land purchases has almost tripled. Many landowners were in a hurry to part with their estates. In 1905-1907 the bank bought over 2.7 million dessiatines. land. State and appanage lands were placed at his disposal. Meanwhile, the peasants, counting on the liquidation of landownership in the near future, were not very willing to make purchases. From November 1905 to early May 1907, the bank sold only about 170 thousand dessiatines. He ended up with a lot of land in his hands, the economic management of which he was not equipped to manage, and little money. The government even used pension fund savings to support it.

The activities of the Peasant Bank caused growing irritation among landowners. This was manifested in sharp attacks against him at the Third Congress of Authorized Noble Societies in March-April 1907. The delegates were dissatisfied with the fact that the bank sold land only to peasants (some landowners were not averse to using its services as buyers). They were also concerned that the bank had not yet completely abandoned the sale of land to rural communities (although it tried to sell land mainly to individual peasants in whole plots). The general mood of the noble deputies was expressed by A.D. Kashkarov: “I believe that the Peasant Bank should not be involved in resolving the so-called agrarian question... the agrarian question should be stopped by the power of the authorities.”

At the same time, peasants were very reluctant to leave the community and strengthen their plots. There was a rumor that those who left the community would not receive land from the landowners.

Only after the end of the revolution did agrarian reform move faster. First of all, the government took vigorous action to liquidate the land reserves of the Peasant Bank. On June 13, 1907, this issue was discussed in the Council of Ministers, and it was decided to establish temporary branches of the Bank Council in local areas, transferring to them a number of important powers.

Partly as a result of the measures taken, but also due to changes in the general situation in the country, things improved for the Peasant Bank. Total for 1907-1915 3,909 thousand dessiatines were sold from the bank's fund, divided into approximately 280 thousand farm and cutting plots. Sales increased annually until 1911, but then began to decline.

This was explained, firstly, by the fact that during the implementation of the decree of November 9, 1906, a large amount of cheap allotment “peasant” land was thrown onto the market, and secondly, by the fact that with the end of the revolution, landowners sharply reduced the sale of their lands. It turned out that the suppression of the revolution in the end did not benefit the creation of farms and cuts on bank lands.

The question of how purchases of bank farms and cuts were distributed among various layers of the peasantry has not been sufficiently studied. According to some estimates, the rich elite among buyers was only 5-6%. The rest belonged to the middle peasantry and the poor. Her attempts to gain a foothold in the bank's lands were explained quite simply. Many landowners' lands, leased to the same companies year after year, became, as it were, part of their allotment. Their sale to the Peasant Bank primarily affected land-poor owners. Meanwhile, the bank gave a loan in the amount of up to 90-95% of the cost of the site. The sale of a fortified plot usually made it possible to pay the down payment. Some zemstvos provided assistance in establishing farmsteads. All this pushed the poor to bank lands, and the bank, having losses from maintaining purchased lands on its balance sheet, was not picky in choosing clients.

Having set foot on banking land, the peasant seemed to be restoring for himself those grueling and endless redemption payments, which, under the pressure of the revolution, the government abolished on January 1, 1907. Soon, arrears in bank payments appeared. As before, the authorities were forced to resort to installments and delays. But something also appeared that the peasant had not known before: the auction of the entire farm. From 1908 to 1914 11.4 thousand plots were sold this way. This, apparently, was primarily a measure of intimidation. And the bulk of the poor, presumably, remained on their farms and farmsteads. For her, however, the same life continued (“to get by,” “to hold out,” “to hold out”) that she led in the community.

However, this does not exclude the possibility that quite strong farms. From this point of view, land management on bank lands was more promising than on allotment lands.

4.2 COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT

Loans from the peasant bank could not fully satisfy the peasant's demand for money goods. Therefore, credit cooperation has become widespread and has gone through two stages in its development. At the first stage, administrative forms of regulation of small credit relations prevailed. By creating a qualified cadre of small loan inspectors and by allocating significant credit through state banks for initial loans to credit unions and for subsequent loans, the government stimulated the cooperative movement. At the second stage, rural credit partnerships, accumulating equity, developed independently. As a result, a wide network of small peasant credit institutions, savings and loan banks and credit partnerships was created that served the cash flow of peasant farms. By January 1, 1914, the number of such institutions exceeded 13 thousand.

Credit relations gave a strong impetus to the development of production, consumer and marketing cooperatives. Peasants on a cooperative basis created dairy and butter artels, agricultural societies, consumer shops and even peasant artel dairies.

4.3 RESETTLEMENT OF PEASANTS TO SIBERIA

Stolypin's government also passed a series of new laws on the resettlement of peasants to the outskirts. The possibilities for broad development of resettlement were already laid down in the law of June 6, 1904. This law introduced freedom of resettlement without benefits, and the government was given the right to make decisions on the opening of free preferential resettlement from certain areas of the empire, “eviction from which was recognized as particularly desirable.”

The law on preferential resettlement was first applied in 1905: the government “opened” resettlement from the Poltava and Kharkov provinces, where the peasant movement was especially widespread.

The mass resettlement of peasants to the eastern outskirts of the country was one of the most important areas of reform. This reduced the “land pressure” in the European part of Russia and “let off steam” of discontent.

By decree of March 10, 1906, the right to resettle peasants was granted to everyone without restrictions. The government has allocated considerable funds for the costs of settling displaced persons in new places, in their medical service and public needs, for building roads. In 1906-1913. 2792.8 thousand people moved beyond the Urals.

Over the 11 years of reform, over 3 million people moved to the free lands of Siberia and Central Asia. In 1908, the number of immigrants was the largest during all the years of reform and amounted to 665 thousand people.

However, the scale of this event also led to difficulties in its implementation. The wave of immigrants quickly declined. Not everyone was able to develop new lands. A reverse flow of immigrants moved back to European Russia. The completely ruined poor returned, unable to settle down in their new place. The number of peasants who were unable to adapt to new conditions and were forced to return amounted to 12% of total number migrants. In total, about 550 thousand people returned in this way.

The results of the resettlement campaign were as follows. Firstly, during this period there was a huge leap in economic and social development Siberia. Also, the population of this region increased by 153% during the years of colonization. If before the resettlement to Siberia there was a reduction in sown areas, then in 1906-1913. they were expanded by 80%, while in the European part of Russia by 6.2%. In terms of the pace of development of livestock farming, Siberia also overtook the European part of Russia.

4.4 AGRICULTURAL EVENTS

One of the main obstacles to the economic progress of the village was the low level of farming and the illiteracy of the vast majority of producers who were accustomed to working according to the general custom. During the years of reform, peasants were provided with large-scale agro-economic assistance. Agro-industrial services were specially created for peasants who organized training courses on cattle breeding and dairy production, democratization and implementation progressive forms agricultural production. Much attention was paid to the progress of the system of out-of-school agricultural education. If in 1905 the number of students at agricultural courses was 2 thousand people, then in 1912 - 58 thousand, and at agricultural readings - 31.6 thousand and 1046 thousand people, respectively.

Currently, there is an opinion that Stolypin’s agrarian reforms led to the concentration of the land fund in the hands of a small rich stratum as a result of the landlessness of the bulk of the peasants. Reality shows the opposite - an increase in the share of the “middle strata” in peasant land use. This can be clearly seen from the data given in the table. During the reform period, peasants actively bought land and increased their land fund annually by 2 million dessiatines. Also, peasant land use increased significantly due to the rental of landowners and government lands.

Distribution of the land fund between groups of peasant buyers

Having a male soulPeriodLandlessUp to three dessiatinesOver three dessiatines1885-190310,961,527,61906-191216,368,413,3

5. RESULTS OF STOLYPINSKY AGRARIAN REFORM

agrarian reform land tenure Stolypin

The results of the reform are characterized rapid growth agricultural production, increasing the capacity of the domestic market, increasing exports of agricultural products, and Russia's trade balance was becoming increasingly active. As a result, it was possible not only to bring agriculture out of the crisis, but also to turn it into a dominant feature of Russia’s economic development. The gross income of all agriculture in 1913 amounted to 52.6% of the total gross income. The income of the entire national economy, due to the increase in value created in agriculture, increased in comparable prices from 1900 to 1913 by 33.8%.

Differentiation of types of agricultural production by region led to an increase in the marketability of agriculture. Three quarters of all raw materials processed by the industry came from agriculture. The turnover of agricultural products increased by 46% during the reform period.

Exports of agricultural products increased even more, by 61% compared to 1901-1905, in the pre-war years. Russia was the largest producer and exporter of bread and flax, and a number of livestock products. Thus, in 1910, Russian wheat exports amounted to 36.4% of total world exports.

The above does not mean at all that pre-war Russia should be represented as a “peasant paradise.” The problems of hunger and agricultural overpopulation were not resolved. The country still suffered from technical, economic and cultural backwardness. According to calculations by I.D. Kondratiev in the USA, on average, a farm had a fixed capital of 3,900 rubles, and in European Russia, the fixed capital of an average peasant farm barely reached 900 rubles. The national income per capita of the agricultural population in Russia was approximately 52 rubles per year, and in the United States - 262 rubles.

The rate of growth in labor productivity in agriculture has been comparatively slow. While in Russia in 1913 they received 55 poods of bread per dessiatine, in the USA they received 68, in France - 89, and in Belgium - 168 poods. Economic growth occurred not on the basis of intensification of production, but due to an increase in the intensity of manual peasant labor. But during the period under review, socio-economic conditions were created for the transition to a new stage of agrarian reforms - the transformation of agriculture into a capital-intensive, technologically progressive sector of the economy.

5.1 RESULTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF STOLYPINSKY AGRARIAN REFORM

The community resisted the clash with private land ownership, and after February Revolution 1917 went on a decisive offensive. Now the struggle for land again found a way out in the arson of estates and the murders of landowners, which occurred with even greater ferocity than in 1905. “Then they didn’t finish the job, stopped halfway? - the peasants reasoned. “Well, now we won’t stop and destroy all the landowners at the roots.”

The results of the Stolypin agrarian reform are expressed in the following figures. By January 1, 1916, 2 million householders left the community for the interstitial fortification. They owned 14.1 million dessiatines. land. 469 thousand householders living in non-allocation communities received certificates of identification for 2.8 million dessiatines. 1.3 million householders switched to farm and farm ownership (12.7 million dessiatines). In addition, 280 thousand farms and farms were formed on bank lands - this is a special account. But the other figures given above cannot be mechanically added up, since some householders, having strengthened their plots, then went to farmsteads and cuts, while others went to them immediately, without intersecting fortification. According to rough estimates, a total of about 3 million householders left the community, which is slightly less than a third of the total number in those provinces where the reform was carried out. However, as noted, some of the deportees actually abandoned farming long ago. 22% of land was withdrawn from communal circulation. About half of them went on sale. Some part returned to the communal pot.

Over the 11 years of the Stolypin land reform, 26% of peasants left the community. 85% of peasant lands remained with the community. Ultimately, the authorities failed to either destroy the community or create a stable and sufficiently massive layer of peasant-owners. So you can talk about the general failure of the Stolypin agrarian reform.

At the same time, it is known that after the end of the revolution and before the outbreak of the First World War, the situation in the Russian village improved noticeably. Of course, in addition to the reform, other factors were at work. Firstly, as had already happened, since 1907, redemption payments, which the peasants had been paying for more than 40 years, were abolished. Secondly, the global agricultural crisis ended and grain prices began to rise. From this, one must assume, something also fell to ordinary peasants. Thirdly, during the years of the revolution, landownership decreased, and in connection with this, bonded forms of exploitation decreased. Finally, fourthly, during the entire period there was only one bad harvest year (1911), but there were excellent harvests for two years in a row (1912-1913). As for agrarian reform, such a large-scale event, which required such a significant land shake-up, could not in a positive way affect in the very first years of its implementation. Nevertheless, the events that accompanied it were a good, useful thing.

This concerns the provision of greater personal freedom to peasants, the establishment of farmsteads and plots on bank lands, resettlement to Siberia, and certain types of land management.

5.2 POSITIVE RESULTS OF AGRARIAN REFORM

The positive results of agrarian reform include:

Up to a quarter of the farms were separated from the community, the stratification of the village increased, the rural elite provided up to half of the market grain,

3 million households moved from European Russia,

4 million dessiatines of communal lands were involved in market circulation,

the cost of agricultural implements increased from 59 to 83 rubles. per yard,

consumption of superphosphate fertilizers increased from 8 to 20 million poods,

for 1890-1913 per capita income rural population increased from 22 to 33 rubles. in year,

5.3 NEGATIVE RESULTS OF AGRARIAN REFORM

The negative results of agrarian reform include:

from 70% to 90% of the peasants who left the community somehow retained ties with the community; the bulk of the peasants were the labor farms of community members,

0.5 million migrants returned to Central Russia,

per peasant household there were 2-4 dessiatines, with the norm being 7-8 dessiatines,

the main agricultural implement is the plow (8 million pieces), 58% of farms did not have plows,

mineral fertilizers were used on 2% of the sown area,

in 1911-1912 The country was struck by famine, affecting 30 million people.

6. REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF STOLYPINSKY AGRARIAN REFORM

During the revolution and civil war, communal land ownership won a decisive victory. However, a decade later, at the end of the 20s, a sharp struggle broke out again between the peasant community and the state. The result of this struggle was the destruction of the community.

But a number of external circumstances (the death of Stolypin, the beginning of the war) interrupted the Stolypin reform. If we look at all the reforms that were conceived by Stolypin and announced in the declaration, we will see that most of them failed to come true, and some were just begun, but the death of their creator did not allow them to be completed, because many of the introductions were based on enthusiasm Stolypin, who tried to somehow improve the political or economic structure of Russia.

Stolypin himself believed that it would take 15-20 years for his endeavors to succeed. But also for the period 1906 - 1913. a lot has been done.

The revolution showed a huge socio-economic and political gap between the people and the government. The country needed radical reforms, which were not forthcoming. We can say that during the period of the Stolypin reforms the country was not experiencing a constitutional crisis, but a revolutionary one. Standing still or half-reforms could not solve the situation; on the contrary, they only expanded the springboard for the struggle for fundamental changes. Only the destruction of the tsarist regime and landownership could change the course of events; the measures that Stolypin took during his reforms were half-hearted. The main failure of Stolypin’s reforms is that he wanted to carry out reorganization in a non-democratic way and, despite him, Struve wrote: “It is his agrarian policy that is in blatant contradiction with his other policies. It changes the economic foundation of the country, while all other policies strive to preserve the political “superstructure” as intact as possible and only slightly decorate its façade.” Of course, Stolypin was an outstanding figure and politician, but with the existence of such a system as in Russia, all his projects were “split apart” due to lack of understanding or unwillingness to understand the full importance of his undertakings. It must be said that without those human qualities, such as courage, determination, assertiveness, political flair, cunning, Stolypin would hardly have been able to make any contribution to the development of the country.

What are the reasons for her defeat?

Firstly, Stolypin began his reforms very late (not in 1861, but only in 1906).

Secondly, the transition from a natural type of economy to a market economy under the conditions of an administrative-command system is possible, first of all, on the basis of the active activity of the state. In this case, the financial and credit activities of the state should play a special role. An example of this is the government, which was able, with amazing speed and scope, to reorient the powerful bureaucratic apparatus of the empire to energetic work. At the same time, “local economic profitability was deliberately sacrificed for the sake of the future social effect from the creation and development of new economic forms.” This is how the Ministry of Finance, the Peasant Bank, the Ministry of Agriculture, and other state institutions acted.

Thirdly, where administrative principles of economic management and egalitarian methods of distribution dominated, there will always be strong opposition to change.

Fourthly, the reason for the defeat is the mass revolutionary struggle, which swept away the tsarist monarchy along with its agrarian reform from the historical arena.

Therefore, it is necessary to have social support in the form of proactive and qualified segments of the population.

The collapse of the Stolypin reform did not mean that it had no serious significance. It was a major step along the capitalist path and contributed to a certain extent to the growth in the use of machinery, fertilizers, and an increase in the marketability of agriculture.

CONCLUSION

Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin was a talented politician who conceived several reforms that could make the Russian Empire an advanced state in all respects. One of these ideas was Stolypin’s agrarian reform.

The essence of Stolypin's agrarian reform boiled down to the desire to create a layer of prosperous peasantry in the countryside. Pyotr Arkadyevich believed that by creating such a layer, one could forget about the revolutionary plague for a long time. The wealthy peasantry was supposed to become a reliable support for the Russian state and its power. Stolypin believed that in no case could the needs of the peasantry be met at the expense of the landowners. Stolypin saw the implementation of his idea in the destruction of the peasant community. The peasant community was a structure that had both pros and cons. Often the community fed and saved peasants during lean years. People who were in the community had to provide each other with some help. On the other hand, lazy people and alcoholics lived at the expense of the community, with whom, according to the rules of the community, they had to share the harvest and other products of labor. By destroying the community, Stolypin wanted to make every peasant, first of all, an owner, responsible only for himself and his family. In this situation, everyone would strive to work more, thereby providing themselves with everything they need.

The Stolypin Agrarian Reform began its life in 1906. This year, a decree was adopted that made it easier for all peasants to leave the community. Leaving the peasant community, its former member could demand that it assign the plot of land allotted to him as personal ownership. Moreover, this land was not given to the peasant according to the “strip” principle, as before, but was tied to one place. By 1916, 2.5 million peasants left the community.

During Stolypin's agrarian reform, the activities of the Peasant Bank, established back in 1882, intensified. The bank served as an intermediary between landowners who wanted to sell their lands and peasants who wanted to buy them.

The second direction of the Stolypin agrarian reform was the policy of resettlement of peasants. Through resettlement, Peter Arkadyevich hoped to reduce land hunger in the central provinces and populate the uninhabited lands of Siberia. To some extent, this policy justified itself. The settlers were provided with large plots of land and many benefits, but the process itself was poorly organized. It is worth noting that the first settlers gave a significant increase to the wheat harvest in Russia.

Stolypin's agrarian reform was a great project, the completion of which was prevented by the death of its author.

LIST OF REFERENCES USED

1. Munchaev Sh.M. “History of Russia” Moscow, 2000.

Orlov A.S., Georgiev V.A. “History from ancient times to the present day” Moscow, 2001.

Kuleshov S.V. “History of the Fatherland” Moscow, 1991.

Tyukavkina V.G. “History of the USSR” Moscow, 1989.

Shatsillo K.F. “We need a great Russia” Moscow, 1991.

Avrekh A.Ya. “P.A. Stolypin and the fate of reforms in Russia" Moscow, 1991.

Kozarezov V.V. “About Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin” Moscow, 1991.

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In Russia, the beginning of the 20th century is characterized by a major collapse of the empire and the creation of a state - Soviet Union. Most of the laws and ideas did not become reality; the rest were not destined to last long. One of the reformers at that moment was Pyotr Stolypin.

Pyotr Arkadyevich came from a noble family. Served in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, awarded by the emperor himself for the successful suppression peasant uprising. After the dissolution of the State Duma and the government, the young speaker took over as prime minister. The first step was to request a list of unimplemented bills, according to which new rules for governing the country began to be created. As a result Several economic solutions have emerged, which were called Stolypin's.

Laws of Peter Stolypin

Let us dwell on the history of the origin of the plan for the development of the country's economy - the Stolypin agrarian reform.

Background of land relations

Agriculture at that time brought about 60% of the net product and was the main sector of the state's economy. But lands were divided unfairly between classes:

1. The landowners owned for the most part crop fields.
2. The state had mainly forest areas.
3. The peasant class received land that was almost unsuitable for cultivation and further sowing.

The peasants began to unite, and as a result, new territorial units emerged - rural societies having administrative rights and responsibilities to their members. In the emerging villages there were elders, elders and even a local court, which considered minor offenses and claims of people against each other. All the supreme posts of such communities consisted exclusively of peasants.

Representatives of the upper strata of society living in these villages could become members of the community, but without the right to use land owned by the village administration, and were obliged to obey the rules of the peasant administrations. Consequently, rural officials made the work of the central authorities of the country easier.

Most of the land plots belonged to the communities, which could redistribute plots among peasants in any form, which led to the emergence of new rural farms. The size of the plot and taxes changed depending on the number of workers. Often land was taken from old people and widows who were unable to fully care for it, and given to young families. If peasants changed their permanent place of residence - moved to the city - they did not have the right to sell their plots. When peasants were dismissed from a rural community, the plots automatically became its property, so the land was rented out.

In order to somehow equalize the problem of the “usefulness” of the plots, the board came up with a new way of cultivating the land. For this purpose, all fields belonging to society, cut into peculiar strips. Each farm received several such strips located in different parts of the field. This process of cultivating the land began to noticeably slow down the prosperity of agriculture.

Homestead land ownership

In the western regions of the country, conditions were simpler for the working class: the peasant community was allocated a plot of land with the possibility of passing it on by inheritance. This land was also allowed to be sold, but only to other persons in the working class of society. Village councils owned only streets and roads. Peasant associations had the perfect right to buy land through private transactions, being full owners. Often, acquired plots were divided among community members in proportion to the funds invested, and each took care of their share. It was beneficial - than larger area fields, the lower the price.

Peasant unrest

By 1904, meetings on the agrarian issue did not bring any results, despite the fact that rural communities once again advocated the nationalization of lands belonging to landowners. A year later, the All-Russian Peasant Union was created, which supported the same proposals. But this also did not speed up the solution to the country’s agrarian problems.

The summer of 1905 was marked by a terrible event at that time - the beginning of the revolution. Peasants who did not have forests on communal lands arbitrarily cut down the landowners' reserves, plowed their fields and plundered their estates. Sometimes there were cases of violence against law enforcement officials and arson of buildings.

Stolypin at that time held the post of governor in the Saratov province. But soon he was appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers. Then Pyotr Arkadyevich, without waiting for the Duma meeting, signed the main provision allowing the government to make urgent decisions without the approval of the Duma itself. Immediately after this, the ministry put the agrarian system bill on the agenda. Stolypin and his reform were able to peacefully suppress the revolution and give people hope for the best.

Pyotr Arkadyevich believed that this law is the most important goal for the development of the state. This would give a significant increase in the economic and production table. The project was adopted in 1907. It became easier for peasants to leave the community; they retained the right to their own plot of land. The work of the Peasant Bank, which mediated between the working class and the landowners, also resumed. The issue of resettlement of peasants was raised, who were provided with many benefits and huge land plots, which as a result of Stolypin’s agrarian reform brought enormous economic growth and the settlement of unpopulated districts like Siberia.

Thus, Stolypin’s agrarian reform achieved its intended goal. But, despite the growth of the economy and the improvement of ideological and political relations, the adopted bills were in danger of failure due to mistakes made by Stolypin. When trying to fix social Security The working class of the state needed to carry out harsh repressions against organizations that contributed to the start of the revolution. And also the rules of the labor code at enterprises were not followed, such as accident insurance and compliance with duration standards work shift- people worked overtime 3–5 hours a day.

September 5, 1911 great reformer And political figure Pyotr Stolypin was killed. Some time after his death, the new board revised all the bills he created.

Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin and his reforms are one of the most controversial topics in the history of Russia. The prime minister became a symbol of the empire’s “lost chance” to move past the tragic and destructive revolution into a bright capitalist tomorrow.

The last reform in the history of the empire continued until its fall, while the reformer himself tragically died on September 5 (18), 1911. The murder of Stolypin is a reason to say: if he had remained alive, history would have gone completely differently. His reforms, and above all the agrarian one, would take Russia on the path of modernization without revolution. Or wouldn't they have taken me out?

It should be taken into account that the reform, which now bears the name of Stolypin, was developed before he came to power and did not end with his death. Pyotr Arkadyevich's role was to start a process that continued under other leaders. What this reform could give, it did.

Who to divide: the community or the landowners?

The key idea of ​​the transformation is to destroy the peasant community and divide its lands. Criticism of the community is associated primarily with the redistribution of land, which violates the sacred right of private property, without which an effective economy is hardly possible for a liberal. The community is considered an economic brake, due to which the Russian village could not follow the path of progress.

But a third of the former landowner peasants switched to household land ownership, and redistribution there was stopped. Why haven’t they taken the lead in labor productivity? In 46 provinces, with the exception of Cossack lands, in 1905, 8.7 million households with 91.2 million dessiatines owned land under communal law. Household ownership covered 2.7 million households with 20.5 million acres.

Household land ownership was not more economically progressive than communal redistribution; interstriping was also developed there; “land relations here are even more complicated than in a communal village. The transition from the traditional three-field system to more advanced crop rotations was even more difficult for a household village than for a communal one.” In addition, the community determined the timing of sowing and harvesting, which was necessary in conditions of limited land availability.

“Even the striping that arose during redistribution and greatly interfered with the peasant economy, pursued the same goal of protecting it from ruin and preserving its available labor force. Having plots in different places, the peasant could count on an average annual harvest. In a dry year, stripes in lowlands and hollows came to the rescue, in a rainy year - on hills,” writes the famous community researcher P.N. Zyryanov.

When the peasants did not want to carry out redistributions, they were free not to do them. The community was not at all some kind of “serfdom”; it acted democratically. The redistributions did not occur because of a good life. Thus, as land pressure intensified in the Black Earth Region, land redistributions returned, which almost ceased there in the 1860-1870s.

Speaking about the role of the community in economic development, it should be remembered that it contributed to the spread of three-field farming, and it “had to come into conflict with the desire of some owners, captured by the rush of the market, to “squeeze” the greatest profit from the land. The annual sowing of all arable land, even very fertile ones, led to its depletion.” The community also contributed to the implementation organic fertilizers, not only taking into account the manure of the soil during redistribution, but also demanding that community members “fertilize the land with soil.” Some communities, with the help of zemstvo agronomists, switched to multi-field and grass sowing.

Stolypin's reforms were launched during the revolution. Historians point to non-economic motives for the reforms: “By this time, the situation in the countryside had become threatening, and in the liquidation of the community the government and landowner circles hoped to find a panacea for all ills... The primary, dual task of the reform was the destruction of the peasant community, which gave peasant uprisings a certain organization, and the creation a strong conservative support of power from wealthy peasant owners." The community also seemed to be a lightning rod for landownership, which the democrats pointed to as the true cause of the backwardness of the agrarian sphere.

It was possible to overcome agrarian hunger only by solving two problems: bringing the excess population from the village to the city and employing it there, and at the same time increasing labor productivity so that the workers remaining in the countryside could provide food for the entire population of the country. The second task required not only social changes, but also technical and cultural modernization. By definition, it could not be accomplished quickly, and even with optimal social transformations in the countryside, the subsequent jump in labor productivity required time. In the second half of the 19th century. Russia still had this time, and at the beginning of the twentieth century. no longer - the revolutionary crisis was approaching faster.

In conditions acute shortage land to solve the agrarian problem required a head start in time, and this could be provided by the division of landowners' lands. But neither he nor the resettlement policy, for which in reality there were very few opportunities in Russia, could guarantee a long-term solution to the problem.

Populist author N.P. Oganovsky, assessing the results of the division of landowners' lands after the revolution of 1917, argued that already before it, peasants controlled half of the former landowners' lands in the form of deeds and leases. As a result of the division of land, the allotment per eater increased from 1.87 to 2.26 dessiatines - by 0.39 dessiatines, and excluding rented dessiatines - 0.2. This means an expansion of peasant plots by 21% (11% excluding rented land) while simultaneously removing the pressure on rental payments. This is a noticeable improvement. The peasants' standard of living clearly benefited from the abolition of rent payments and the expansion of allotments, albeit modestly. This did not solve the problems of low labor productivity and land shortage, but it provided a “breathing space” that could be used to solve the problems of intensifying production. Stolypin did not have the opportunity to get such a respite, since he stood guard over the landowners' property.

The famous St. Petersburg historian B.N. Mironov, who has a positive attitude towards Stolypin’s reforms, considers the refusal of the rapid distribution of landowners’ lands to be a mistake of the Provisional Government (and it is difficult to disagree with this). But even more so, this refusal must be recognized as a shortcoming of Stolypin’s agrarian policy. In his case it was not a mistake - he simply could not encroach on the privileges of the aristocracy.

The scale of change

On November 9, 1906, a decree was adopted, which (formally in connection with the termination of the redemption operation) allowed peasants to separate their farm from the community along with the land. Stolypin’s decree, confirmed by the law of 1910, encouraged leaving the community: “Every householder who owns allotment land under communal law can at any time demand the consolidation of his ownership of the part due to him from the said land.”

If the peasant continued to live in the village, his plot was called a cut. If the community agrees, the peasant's plots scattered throughout different places, exchanged so that the cut became a single section. A peasant could leave the village for a farm, in remote place. The land for the farm was cut off from the community’s lands, which made it difficult for livestock grazing and other economic activity peasant world. Thus, the interests of farmers (usually wealthy ones) came into conflict with the interests of the rest of the peasantry.

Peasants of non-redistribution communities, where land redistribution was not carried out after 1861 (podvorniki), automatically received the right to register the land as private property.

In villages where peasants had previously stopped redistributing land, almost nothing new happened, and in villages where the community was strong and economically justified, conflicts arose between community members and peasants who separated from the community, on whose side the authorities were. This struggle distracted the peasants from actions against the landowners.

Gradually (after Stolypin's death) the reform entered a calmer direction. If before the reform 2.8 million households already lived outside the redistribution community, then in 1914 this number increased to 5.5 million (44% of peasants). In total, 1.9 million householders (22.1% of community members) with an area of ​​almost 14 million acres (14% of community land) left the community. Another 469 thousand members of allotment-free communities received deeds for their allotments. 2.7 million applications for exit were submitted, but 256 thousand peasants withdrew their applications. Thus, 27.2% of those who declared a desire to strengthen the land did not have time or were unable to do this by May 1, 1915. That is, even in the future, the figures could only increase by a third. The peak of filing applications (650 thousand) and leaving the community (579 thousand) occurred in 1909.

87.4% of the owners of the allotment-free communities did not leave the community either. And this is not surprising. In itself, leaving the commune, even one without distribution, created additional difficulties for the peasants without obvious immediate gain. As A.P. writes Korelin, “the fact is that in itself the consolidation of land into personal property in economic terms did not give the “allottees” any advantages, often putting the community in a dead end situation... The production of individual allotments brought complete disorder to the land relations of societies and did not provide any benefits for those leaving the community, with the exception, perhaps, of those who wanted to sell the fortified land.” The owners now interfered with each other's work because of the stripes, everything arose big problems with grazing livestock, and had to spend more on fodder.

Advantages should have arisen when allocating farmsteads and cuttings, but this process of land management in conditions of land shortage was very complex and much more modest in scale. The peak of applications for land development occurred in 1912-1914, in total 6.174 million applications were submitted and 2.376 million farms were developed. On allotment lands, 300 thousand farms and 1.3 million cuts were created, which occupied 11% of the allotment lands, and together with the courtyards that strengthened the land - 28%.

The land management process could continue further. By 1916, preparations for land management affairs were completed for 3.8 million households with an area of ​​34.3 million dessiatinas. But the possibilities of improving the situation of the peasants even with the help of such land surveying in conditions of land tightness remained insignificant.

“It can be assumed that, having freed itself from the entrepreneurial and proletarian layers, the community has even stabilized somewhat.” It survived as an “institution of social protection” and managed to “ensure, to a certain extent, economic and agricultural progress,” concluded famous researchers of Stolypin’s reforms A.P. Korelin and K.F. Shatsillo. Moreover, “the German professor Auhagen, who visited in 1911-1913. a number of Russian provinces, in order to clarify the progress of the reform, being its adherents, nevertheless noted that the community is not an enemy of progress, that it is not at all opposed to the use of improved tools and machines, better seeds, the introduction of rational methods of cultivating fields, etc. Moreover, in communities it is not individual, especially developed and enterprising peasants who begin to improve their economy, but the entire community.”

“On the eve of the First World War, when reapers began to come into peasant use, many societies were faced with the question: either machines or the old small strip, which allowed only a sickle. The government, as we know, offered the peasants to eliminate the striped stripes by going to the farmsteads and cutting them off. However, even before Stolypin’s agrarian reform, the peasantry put forward its plan to mitigate striping while maintaining communal land ownership. The transition to “broad bands”, which began in the first years of the twentieth century, continued later,” writes P.N. Zyryanov.

The administration opposed this work, since it contradicted the principles of the Stolypin reform, solving the problem of striping differently and often more effectively - after all, “fortified” plots interfered with consolidation, and the authorities prohibited it, even when the owners of the plots themselves did not object. “In the above cases, we see the Stolypin agrarian reform from a hitherto little-known side,” sums up P.N. Zyryanov. - It was believed that this reform, despite its narrowness and undoubtedly violent nature, still brought with it agrotechnical progress. It turns out that only the progress that was prescribed in laws, circulars and instructions was implanted. It was planted from above, not really taking into account the circumstances (for example, the fact that not all peasants with little land were ready to go out to harvest, because this increased their dependence on the vagaries of the weather). And the progress that came from below, from the peasantry itself, was most often stopped without hesitation if it somehow affected the reform.”

It is no coincidence that at the All-Russian Agricultural Congress of 1913, which brought together agronomists, the majority sharply criticized the reform, for example, as follows: “The land management law was put forward in the name of agronomic progress, and at every step the efforts aimed at achieving it are paralyzed.” The zemstvos, for the most part, soon also refused to support the reform. They preferred to support cooperatives based not on private property, but on collective responsibility - as communities.

To reduce the severity of the “land hunger,” Stolypin pursued a policy of developing Asian lands. Resettlement occurred before - in 1885-1905. 1.5 million people moved beyond the Urals. In 1906-1914. - 3.5 million. 1 million returned, “apparently replenishing the pauperized strata of the city and countryside.” At the same time, some of those who remained in Siberia were unable to organize their economy, but simply began to live here. Relocation to Central Asia was associated with great difficulties due to the climate and the resistance of the local population.

“The migration flow was directed almost exclusively to a relatively narrow strip of agricultural Siberia. Here the free supply of land was soon exhausted. It remained either to squeeze new settlers into already occupied places and replace one overpopulated area with another, or to stop looking at resettlement as a means of alleviating land shortages in the interior regions of Russia.”

Consequences

The results of Stolypin's agrarian reform turned out to be contradictory. The increase in yields of main agricultural crops during the years of reforms decreased, and the situation in cattle breeding was even worse. This is not surprising, given the division of communal lands. “In economic terms, the separation of farmers and otrubniks was often associated with a violation of the usual crop rotations and the entire agricultural cycle of work, which had an extremely negative impact on the economy of the community members.” At the same time, thanks to the support of officials, those who stood out could receive the best lands. The peasants protested against the “enslavement of land into ownership,” to which the authorities could respond with arrests.

Protests were also caused by the actions of townspeople provoked by the reform, who had lost contact with the village and were now returning to allocate and sell the plot. Even before, the community could not stop a peasant who decided to go to the city. But she also preserved the land for those who decided to stay in the village and cultivate it further. And in this regard, the Stolypin reform introduced a very unpleasant innovation for the peasants. Now the former peasant could sell this land. The former peasants, who had already lost contact with the land, returned for a while to “strengthen” (one root with serfdom), to cut off part of the land from the peasants. Moreover, the opportunity to sell one’s part of the former peasant land and thus receive “lifting income” led to the fact that the Stolypin reform increased the influx of population into the cities - which were clearly not ready for that. The money raised from the sale of the plot quickly ran out, and a marginal, disappointed mass grew in the cities former peasants who have not found a place for themselves in their new life.

The flip side of Stolypin’s agrarian policy and its effectiveness was the famine of 1911-1912. Peasants in Russian Empire We have starved periodically before. The Stolypin reform did not change the situation.

The stratification of the peasantry increased. But Stolypin was mistaken in his hopes that the wealthy strata would become allies of the landowners and the autocracy. Even supporter of Stolypin’s reforms L.N. Litoshenko admitted: “From the point of view of the social world, the destruction of the community and the dispossession of a significant part of its members could not balance and calm the peasant environment. The political bet on the “strong man” was dangerous game» .

In 1909, economic growth began in Russia. In terms of production growth rates, Russia has taken first place in the world. Iron smelting in 1909-1913. increased in the world by 32%, and in Russia - by 64%. Capital in Russia increased by 2 billion rubles. But is it the Stolypin reform? The state placed large military orders at factories - after the Russo-Japanese War, Russia more carefully prepared for new international conflicts. The pre-war arms race contributed to the accelerated growth of heavy industry. The rapid growth rates were determined by the fact that Russia was going through a phase of industrial modernization and had cheap labor, which was the flip side of peasant poverty. Pre-war growth lasted no longer than a normal economic expansion cycle, and there is no evidence that such a “Stolypin cycle” could last much longer than usual without ending in another recession.

In general, the result of Stolypin’s reforms, no matter how you look at them, is very modest. It was not possible to destroy the community. The impact on agricultural productivity has been controversial. Anyway, The reform did not provide a systemic way out of the agrarian crisis and at the same time somewhat increased social tension in the cities.

A reform of this magnitude and direction could not seriously change the trajectory that led the empire to revolution. But this revolution itself could have taken place in very different ways. However, this is not the point Stolypin reform, but in a world war.

The Stolypin agrarian reform was of great historical significance for Russia.

It cannot be called completely positive, but it was necessary.

Apart from the statesman himself, Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin, few understood this.

Reasons for the agrarian reform of P. A. Stolypin

Disagreements between landowners and peasants over the issue of land ownership reached a boiling point. The peasants literally began to fight for the land. Discontent was accompanied by the destruction of landowners' estates. But where did it all start?

The essence of the conflict was disagreement over land ownership. The peasants believed that all the land was common. Therefore, it must be divided equally among everyone. If a family has many children, it is given a large plot; if there are few, it is given a smaller plot.

Until 1905, the peasant community existed without any oppression, supported by the authorities. But the landowners did not like the current situation. They advocated private property.

Gradually, the conflict began to flare up until it resulted in a real riot.

From this we can briefly describe reasons why Stolypin decided to carry out agrarian reform:

1. Land shortage. Gradually, the peasants had less and less land. At the same time, the population increased.
2. The backwardness of the village. The communal system hampered development.
3. Social tension. Not in every village the peasants decided to go against the landowners, but tension was felt everywhere. This couldn't go on for long.

The objectives of the transformation included resolving the current situation.

The purpose of the Stolypin agrarian reform

The main objective of the reform was the elimination of the community and landownership. Stolypin believed that this was the key to the problem, and this would solve all other issues.

Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin - statesman of the Russian Empire, State Secretary of His Imperial Majesty, actual state councilor, chamberlain. Governor of Grodno and Saratov, Minister of Internal Affairs and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, member of the State Council

The reforms were carried out to solve the land shortage of peasants and overcome social tensions. Stolypin also sought to smooth out the existing conflict between peasants and landowners.

The essence of Stolypin's land reform

The main condition was the withdrawal of peasants from the community with the subsequent assignment of land to them as private property. Since most peasants could not afford this, they had to turn to the Peasant Bank.

Landowners' lands were bought up and sold on credit to peasants.

It is important to note: the central idea was not aimed at fighting the peasant community. The essence of the struggle was to eliminate peasant poverty and unemployment.

Reform Methods

The reform was introduced through pressure from the police and officials. In a difficult time of executions and gallows, it was impossible to do otherwise. The right of the authorities to interfere in economic relations was approved by Stolypin.

As for the peasants, assistance to them included the provision of natural things necessary for farming. This was done in order to provide the peasants with work.

The beginning of agrarian reform

The procedure for peasants leaving the community and assigning land to them as private property began on November 9, 1906, after a decree was issued. According to other sources, the date of publication of the decree is November 22.

The first action was to provide peasants with equal rights with other classes. Later, the most important event was the resettlement of peasants beyond the Urals.

Leaving the community and creating farms and cuts

The land plots that peasants received in their possession had to meet the requirements of rational management. In reality, implementing this idea turned out to be not so easy. That's why it was supposed to divide the villages into farms and cuts.

This made it possible to form a layer of peasants whose economy met the requirements as much as possible. Rational management was necessary to eliminate the backwardness of villages.

Wealthy peasants were the most active in leaving the community. It was unprofitable for the poor; the community protected them. When they left, they were deprived of support and had to cope on their own, which did not always work out.

Resettlement policy as a critical stage of reform

At first, it was difficult for peasants to leave the communities. Stolypin tried to focus on the quality of property rights and economic freedoms. But the documents on processing were considered by the Duma for too long.

The problem was that the activities of the communities were aimed at blocking the peasants' path to independence. The law on changes to the reform was passed only on July 14, 1910.

Stolypin sought to bring peasants out of densely populated areas to Siberia and Central Asia, as well as the Far East, and give them independence.

The main provisions and results of the resettlement company are reflected in the table:

Thanks to this, there was a huge leap in the development of the economy and economy in Siberia. In livestock production, the region even began to overtake the European part of Russia.

Results and results of Stolypin’s agricultural policy

The results and consequences of Stolypin’s reform cannot be given an unambiguous assessment. They were both positive and negative. On the one hand, agriculture has received greater development.

On the other hand, it had a bad effect on many people. The landowners were unhappy that Stolypin was destroying centuries-old foundations. The peasants did not want to leave the community, settle in farmsteads where no one would protect them, or move to who knows where.

It is possible that the result of this discontent was the assassination attempt on Pyotr Arkadyevich in August 1911. Stolypin was mortally wounded and died in September of the same year.

Agrarian question occupied a central place in domestic policy. The beginning of agrarian reform, the inspirer and developer of which was P.A. Stolypin, put a decree on November 9, 1906.

Stolypin reform

After a very difficult discussion in the State Duma and the State Council, the decree was approved by the Tsar as a law from June 14, 1910. It was supplemented by the law on land management from May 29, 1911.

The main provision of Stolypin’s reform was community destruction. To achieve this, an emphasis was placed on the development of personal peasant property in the countryside by giving peasants the right to leave the community and create farmsteads.

An important point of the reform: landlord ownership of land remained intact. This caused sharp opposition from peasant deputies in the Duma and the masses of peasants.

Another measure proposed by Stolypin was also supposed to destroy the community: resettlement of peasants. The meaning of this action was twofold. The socio-economic goal is to obtain a land fund, primarily in the central regions of Russia, where the lack of land among peasants made it difficult to create farmsteads and farms. In addition, this made it possible to develop new territories, i.e. further development capitalism, although this oriented it towards the extensive path. The political goal is to defuse social tension in the center of the country. The main resettlement areas are Siberia, Central Asia, the North Caucasus, and Kazakhstan. The government allocated funds for the migrants to travel and settle down in a new place, but practice has shown that they were clearly not enough.

In the period 1905 - 1916. About 3 million householders left the community, which is approximately 1/3 of their number in the provinces where the reform was carried out. This means that it was not possible to either destroy the community or create a stable layer of owners. This conclusion is complemented by data on the failure of resettlement policy. In 1908 - 1909 the number of displaced people amounted to 1.3 million people, but very soon many of them began to return back. The reasons were different: the bureaucracy of the Russian bureaucracy, the lack of funds for setting up a household, ignorance of local conditions and the more than restrained attitude of the old-timers towards the settlers. Many died along the way or went completely bankrupt.

Thus, social goals goals set by the government were not achieved. But the reform accelerated the stratification in the countryside - a rural bourgeoisie and proletariat were formed. Obviously, the destruction of the community opened the way for capitalist development, because the community was a feudal relic.