What is guerrilla warfare? History of partisan wars.

People who are not very knowledgeable in history believe that guerrilla warfare is a recent invention days gone by, and literally the recent past - the Great Patriotic War. Those who know history a little better remember that partisans also took part in the Patriotic War of 1812, and remember the brave hussar and poet Denis Vasilyevich Davydov. In fact, guerrilla wars arose much earlier - even before our era.

British historian John Ellis became interested in this issue and published a book called From the Barrel of a Gun. If you translate it into Russian, you get something like “A rifle gives birth to power” (this is the beginning famous expression Mao Zedong). In his work, J. Ellis lists more than one hundred and sixty partisan wars - starting from the 6th century. BC. and as late as 1995. Having subjected guerrilla wars to comparative analysis, the historian comes to the conclusion that only “less than twenty of them can be considered completely successful.” It turns out to be a little more than twelve percent. Not enough, considering public opinion.

Based on such examples, we can safely say that any outside help (even unselfish - such as the sale of weapons) or ordinary moral support is definitely important factor for success in guerrilla warfare. As such moral support, one can cite the example of the Romans' diplomatic assistance to the Maccabees when the threat of Rome's war against Syria arose. This help definitely made a certain contribution to the victory of the Maccabees. And for the partisans of the famous bearded man Fidel Castro, help from the United States was very useful. This assistance was expressed in the form of an American trade embargo against the Batista regime. The American leftist parties provided the same assistance to the communists of North Vietnam in opposing the authorities of their own country and in creating an atmosphere of hatred towards their army, which contributed to their victory over South Vietnam.

As for popular support, it is actually extremely important for the successful conduct of guerrilla wars. Even if you don’t have weapons, ammunition, food - all this, in principle, can be taken away from the enemy. Even if you don’t have some kind of shelter base, it can be found in remote areas such as the Bryansk forests. But if there is no support from the local population, then you cannot instantly hide from the enemy or attack him just as suddenly, but the possibility of running into him just as suddenly is quite likely. After all, it is the local population that often provides information about the movements and dislocation of the enemy. Such support helps partisans operate quickly in ordinary areas - rural or urban. But the most important thing is that without the support of the population it is impossible to replenish human losses.

It is also necessary to take into account the fact that if partisan actions are not of the nature civil war, but are carried out under the slogans of the national liberation struggle, it is much easier for partisans to enlist the support of wider sections of the population. And, naturally, this will give them more advantages. That is why Mao, Tito and other partisan leaders - with the goal of social reconstruction - did not disdain nationalist rhetoric.

In order for the partisans' actions to be successful, we must not forget about such an important factor as military-political organization. As practice shows, it was precisely this that was lacking for many tribes and peoples who fought against more organized invaders. Here, as an example, we can cite the tribes of the Celts, Mayans and many other small or unorganized tribes.

In 200 BC. The territory of modern Israel was conquered by the Syrian Seleucid Empire. A little later, in 167 BC, the Jews were ruled by Antiochus IV, who legally prohibited the Jewish religion and forced them to worship the old, familiar, “pagan” gods. Having listened to the Pharisees, many Jews left Jerusalem and other cities and founded small, purely Jewish settlements in the desert area. Antiochus, in turn, decided to establish settlements of Greeks and Jews loyal to him so as to control all roads in the country. This caused discontent among many Jewish peasants. The discontent was ripening and ripening, all that was missing was a spark. The spark after which the uprising began in 167 was the murder of a pagan priest by the high priest Mattathias in the village of Modin. The priest was sent by the Syrian authorities to perform the ceremony and behaved very aggressively. Mattathias and his sons were forced to flee into the desert. A group of followers immediately formed next to him, who categorically did not like the situation. And soon Mattathias and his comrades began to organize raids on nearby settlements, destroying pagan idols and killing those who renounced the Jewish faith. The next year Mattathias died and the leadership of the uprising passed to his son named Judas and nicknamed Maccabeus, which means “Hammer.” From that moment on, the uprising went much more successfully. Thus, by his order he abolished the previously existing custom, according to which Jews on Saturday could neither fight nor even defend themselves. One can say that he was a flexible person; he did not look at the Talmudic rules if they interfere with life itself.

In just one year - the 165th - Judah-Maccabee cleared the entire countryside around his base area from Syrian troops. As an example of his tactics, we can consider such a maneuver - an attack on the base camp of the Syrians while simultaneously blocking the advancing enemy troops. The Syrians suffered relatively small casualties, but due to the loss of all supplies they were forced to retreat. By autumn, Maccabeus had cut off Syrian communications between the fortress of Acre in Jerusalem and the sea. True, they were not fools either - they learned to draw some lessons from this war and, having sent a large number of troops, cut off Maccabee from his base, depriving him of supplies with both food and reinforcements. Maccabee had no choice but to negotiate with the Syrians. As a result, the Syrians declared amnesty to the Maccabees who had broken the law and promised the Jews freedom of religion.

By the beginning of 163, only the fortress of Acre could be considered a stronghold and refuge by the Syrians. Maccabeus besieged Acre, but then his luck turned away from him - as a result of a successful attack by the Syrians, the partisans suffered a crushing defeat, and the invaders launched an attack on Jerusalem. It would seem that the partisans were at an end, but they were saved by internal Syrian problems - in 162, the Syrian king and commander-in-chief Lysias was somewhat uneasy - contenders were found for his throne, and he was forced to withdraw some of his troops to fight them.

The strength of the Maccabees grew and in March 160 the partisans became strong enough to even completely defeat the Syrian army at Adass. After this, Maccabeus made a treaty with Rome, and the Syrians, fearing the consequences of this alliance, sent their best troops against him. In the summer of 160, Maccabeus did everything possible to win a general battle, but then most of the partisans fled, and Maccabeus, along with the few remaining with him, fell in battle.

Now those who had not resigned themselves to the Syrian invaders were led by Maccabee’s brother, Jonathan. He returned to guerrilla tactics, and the Syrian garrisons knew no peace from him. He founded his bases in what is now Jordan. In 158, the ruler of Syria, Bahides, concluded a peace treaty with Jewish partisan rebels, as a result of which Israel was ruled by the Maccabean dynasty for almost a hundred years.

The second point is national-religious aspects. They are obvious, because nationalism and religiosity are great forces. The Maccabees very cleverly used them for the political organization of their movement.

The third point lies in the strategic and tactical wisdom of Maccabeus - he basically understood very clearly when to use purely guerrilla tactics and when to use army tactics.

Another example of guerrilla warfare, but with the exact opposite result, can be considered the Italo-Libyan war - events of not so long ago.

Italy invaded Libya in 1911, ostensibly to liberate the Libyans from "oppression" Ottoman Empire. The Turkish troops in Libya surrendered rather quickly, but the Libyans - to the deepest surprise of the Italians - stubbornly resisted their “liberation”. At first, there were no well-organized guerrilla actions - the Libyans, armed only with single-shot rifles, used the antediluvian tactics of mass cavalry attacks. By 1913, the Italians somehow managed to restore some kind of order in western Libya (Tripolitania), and in eastern (Cyrenaica), the Libyans, under the leadership of the Islamic sect of the Senussites, switched to guerrilla tactics.

In 1917, Britain forced Italy to make peace with the Libyans. The Western and Eastern provinces of Libya now had their own parliaments, local governments, and all Libyans received Italian citizenship. Thus peace was established, although not very lasting. However, the Libyans did not like the Italian legal system: they viewed the Italian settlers as targets for racketeering and did not understand why the authorities tried to punish them for this.

By 1928, the Italians managed to “calm” almost all of Libya (except Cyrenaica), placing numerous garrisons, disarming the natives, blocking or poisoning the wells used by the partisans. But cope with active actions They still failed to defeat the Senussite partisans. This continued until, in January 1930, General Rodolfo Graziani was appointed commander of the Italian troops in Cyrenaica. This one is undoubtedly clever man suppressed the rebels in a year and a half.

First of all, Graziani simplified the military command system - he introduced unity of command. Then he spent successful work to make their troops as mobile as possible. In addition, the general sent small but well-equipped patrols deep into partisan territory. He disbanded the auxiliary units of the "loyal" (by day) Libyans, replacing them with Ethiopian mercenaries. The general did not leave his attention to the non-combatants, completely disarming them in the spring of 1930. By his order, an “Airborne Military Tribunal” was created, designed to carry out a speedy trial of the local population who helped the partisans. There were only two sentencing options - either execution on the spot by hanging (if there was nowhere to put a gallows or nothing to make one out of, then execution), or sending to a camp. At the same time, almost all the nomads were sent to these camps, along with their herds. The camps were standard: twelve thousand tents on an area of ​​one square kilometer, surrounded by barbed wire and machine gun towers.

Simple, but, as they say, effective: the partisan bands suffered losses, and there was no one to replenish them. In September 1931, the leader of the partisans, Sheikh Omar Mukhtar, was captured and hanged by a quick verdict of the tribunal. The rebellion ended soon after.

The third example of guerrilla wars is the Rif Emirate: when guerrilla actions began successfully, and in the end they were just as successfully suppressed.

In 1921, the leader of the Berber (more precisely, Rif) Beni Uriagil tribe, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Krim al-Khattabi (better known as Abd al-Krim), began a war against the authorities of Spanish Morocco.

The beginning of the actions that interest us dates back to May-July 1921, when partisan detachments of the Rif tribes began to attack columns and posts of Spanish troops. Abd al-Krim had no more than five hundred fighters, but they managed to oust a Spanish army of 14 thousand people from many populated areas. The partisans were based in the mountains, and struck the Spaniards in the valleys.

The partisan forces kept growing, and in July-August 1921 they inflicted a major defeat on the Spaniards near Anval: 18 thousand people were killed and wounded, 1,100 prisoners, the partisans got 19,504 rifles, 392 machine guns and 129 cannons.

This was, in the full sense of the word, the destruction of the Spanish army in Morocco. After this, Abd al-Krim creates his own state - the Rif Emirate. He appointed himself not only emir, but also minister of war (vizier) and vizier of internal affairs. In addition to him, the government of the emirate included four more - the chief vizier, viziers of finance, foreign affairs and trade.

He had twelve Rif tribes under his command. Abd al-Krim's main demand to the Spaniards was to completely clear the entire territory of Morocco under their control (28 thousand sq. km with a population of 700 thousand, of which there were 40 thousand civilian Spaniards) - except for the cities of Ceuta and Melilla. The Spaniards obeyed and soon held only the coast.

The basis for such a brilliant victory was the tactics of surprise raids, skillful camouflage and sniper fire from commanding heights. As a result, in Ceuta alone, the Spaniards lost over 17 thousand killed and missing during their retreat. The then ruler of Spain, Primo de Rivera, frankly admitted in a newspaper interview: “Abd al-Krim defeated us.” By the way, the commander of the Catalan Military District of Spain, General Miguel Primo de Rivera, carried out a coup in September 1923, in particular because the liberal government of Spain planned to give autonomy to the reefs and thereby recognize the regime of Abd al-Krim. In his official manifesto, General Primo de Rivera declared two goals: to rid Spain of professional politicians and to solve the Moroccan problem.

But let's return to our partisan. Abd al-Krim, meanwhile, organized a regular army of 5 thousand people, while all able-bodied men between the ages of sixteen and sixty were listed in the reserve. If mobilization was announced, they were obliged to join the ranks of the army with their own rifles, ammunition and food supplies for several days.

The Rif Emirate existed as an independent state for almost four years. All over the world it was an example of how oppressed peoples can achieve independence. However, from the end of 1924, Abd al-Krim had big problems- the help of the French disappeared: until that moment it was they who supported his fight against the Spaniards. The support was both moral and material, although secretive. In France and in Europe in general, sympathy for the “liberation struggle of the reefs” was inflated, the emirate was called nothing less than a “republic”, and weapons were supplied through the international zone of Tangier. The French did not do this for nothing - they hoped to spread their influence throughout Morocco with the help of the reefs.

However, Abd al-Krim himself had a desire to expand the borders of his emirate, and primarily at the expense of the Vergi Valley, which was controlled by the French, from where a significant part of the food came. The Rifs began to raid the valley, and at the end of 1924, the commander of the French troops in Morocco, General Lyautey, built a line of fortifications to protect the valley, and in April 1925 the French began military operations against the army of the emir. In July, the French and Spanish agreed to joint action against Abd al-Krim. The outcome of the war was determined by the use by Europeans of types of weapons against which the partisans had nothing to fight: aviation and armored vehicles. The blockade, which deprived the emirate of its main sources of food, and the bribery of a number of leaders of the Rif tribes also played a role.

In October 1925, the Spaniards occupied the emirate's capital, Ajdir, and in May 1926, the French took Targwist, where Abd al-Krim's military headquarters was located. The emir chose to surrender and was sent into exile on the French island of Reunion in Indian Ocean. In 1947, however, he was amnestied, settled in Egypt and died at a respectable age in 1963.

Considering the history of successful and unsuccessful guerrilla wars, I would like to recall Bismarck, who argued that only fools learn from their mistakes. If all the leaders of the partisans fighting for their independence home country, studied the experience of predecessors, successful guerrilla wars were not twelve percent, but much more.

Guerrilla warfare- that's what they're called independent actions light detachments separate from the army, sent primarily to the rear and flanks of the enemy. Their goal is mainly to interrupt or impede the communication of the enemy army with the sources of its provisions and recruitment, as well as to destroy these sources. The success of such actions is determined by secrecy and speed of movements; therefore, the troops appointed for them usually consist of one cavalry. The first noticeable manifestation of partisan actions is usually seen in the 17th century, during the Thirty Years' War; but the actions of the leaders of the free detachments of that time (Count Mansfeld and others) were still far from what is now understood by the P. war. Only since the introduction of the store system of supplying the army (by the Minister of War of Louis XIV, Louvois), which led to extreme slowness of movements and the emergence of a communication line, P. war begins to take root more and more. For the first time, its techniques were used with success by Peter the Great during the great Northern War. When Charles XII, due to the depletion of food supplies, decided to move to Ukraine, Peter sent General Ifland with instructions, ahead of the Swedish troops, to slow down their movements and destroy food supplies. During the location of both armies in the winter quarters of P., the war greatly weakened the Swedes and contributed to the Poltava victory. Fully aware of the important strategic significance of partisan actions, Peter established the so-called. "corvolant" - light corps intended for large-scale partisan operations; their cavalry composition was sometimes supported by light cannons. P. warfare received further development in the era of Frederick the Great, in the first and especially the second Silesian Wars and in the Seven Years' War. Austrian partisan detachments, led by Menzel, Moraz, Trenck, Franchini, Nadasdy and others, surrounded the enemy army, interrupted its communication with the base, made it extremely difficult to transport everything necessary, forage, collect information about the enemy, and finally, with constant attacks on enemy troops exhausted them. Frederick II, when drawing up a plan of action, constantly takes into account the partisan actions of the enemy and especially carefully prepares to repel them. One of the outstanding examples of partisan actions in the seven-year war is the capture of Berlin by General Gallik in 1757. The military actions of the Spaniards against the French in 1809-1813. fit rather under the name of people's war - a phenomenon that is only in form close to the P. war. The war in our country gained further and very widespread development in 1812 and brought great fame to Davydov, Figner, Seslavin, Chernyshev and other leaders of light detachments operating on messages from the Napoleonic army. Napoleon understood the enormous danger of enemy partisan detachments in the rear of the army; from his letters one can see that it was the actions of the partisans that led mainly to the French army to its final death. The partisan detachments of Colomb, Lyutsov and others played a prominent role in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. After Napoleonic Wars The use of military warfare techniques on a large scale occurs only during the North American Civil War, when guerrilla warfare reached its apogee and showed unprecedented importance, which was greatly facilitated by railroads and the telegraph.

Wed. F. Gershelman, "Partisan War" ("Military Collection", 1884, book 3 et seq.).

The question of partisan actions is of great interest to our party and the working masses. We have already touched upon this issue in passing several times and now intend to proceed to the more comprehensive presentation of our views that we have promised*.

Start over. What basic requirements must every Marxist make when considering the question of forms of struggle? Firstly, Marxism differs from all primitive forms of socialism in that it does not associate movements with any one a certain form struggle. He recognizes the most diverse forms of struggle, and does not “invent” them, but only generalizes, organizes, and gives consciousness to those forms of struggle of revolutionary classes that arise by themselves in the course of the movement. Undoubtedly hostile to all abstract formulas, all doctrinaire recipes, Marxism requires careful attention to the ongoing mass a struggle that, with the development of the movement, with the growing consciousness of the masses, with the aggravation of economic and political crises, gives rise to ever new and ever more varied methods of defense and attack. Therefore, Marxism certainly does not renounce any form of struggle. Marxism in no case

* See Works, 5th ed., volume 13, p. 365. Ed.

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is not limited to possible and existing only at the moment forms of struggle, recognizing inevitability new, unknown to the figures of this period, forms of struggle against changes in this social situation. Marxism in this regard studies, so to speak, mass practice, far from pretensions learn masses to forms of struggle invented by armchair “systematists.” We know, said Kautsky, for example, when considering the forms of social revolution, that the coming crisis will bring us new forms of struggle, which we cannot foresee now.

Secondly, Marxism absolutely demands historical consideration of the issue of forms of struggle. To raise this question outside of a historically specific situation means not to understand the ABCs of dialectical materialism. At various moments of economic evolution, depending on various conditions political, national-cultural, everyday, etc., various forms of struggle come to the fore, become the main forms of struggle, and in connection with this, in turn, the secondary ones are modified, side forms struggle. To try to answer yes or no to the question about a specific means of struggle without considering in detail the specific situation of a given movement at a given stage of its development means leaving the soil of Marxism completely.

These are the two main theoretical principles which we must be guided by. History of Marxism in Western Europe gives us a wealth of examples to confirm what has been said. European Social Democracy currently considers parliamentarism and the trade union movement to be the main forms of struggle; it recognized the uprising in the past and is quite ready to recognize it, with changes in the situation, in the future - contrary to the opinion of the liberal bourgeoisie, such as the Russian Cadets 1 and the Bezzachlavtsev 2. Social democracy denied the general strike in the 70s, as a social panacea, as a means of immediately overthrowing the bourgeoisie in a non-political way - but social democracy completely

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recognizes the mass political strike (especially after the Russian experience in 1905) as one of the means of struggle necessary for famous conditions. Social democracy recognized the street barricade struggle in the 40s of the 19th century, but rejected it on the basis of certain data in late XIX century - expressed complete readiness to reconsider this last view and recognize the expediency of the barricade struggle after the experience of Moscow, which, according to K. Kautsky, put forward new barricade tactics.

Having installed general provisions Marxism, let's move on to the Russian revolution. Let's remember historical development forms of struggle put forward by it. First, economic strikes of workers (1896-1900), then political demonstrations, workers and students (1901-1902), peasant riots (1902), the beginning of mass political strikes in various combinations with demonstrations (Rostov 1902, summer strikes 1903, January 9 1905), all-Russian political strike with local cases of barricade struggle (October 1905), mass barricade struggle and armed uprising (1905, December), parliamentary peace struggle (April - June 1906), military partial uprisings (June 1905 - July 1906) , partial peasant uprisings (autumn 1905 - autumn 1906).

This was the state of affairs by the fall of 1906 from the point of view of forms of struggle in general. The “response” form of struggle of the autocracy is the Black Hundred pogrom, starting from Chisinau in the spring of 1903 and ending with Sedlec in the fall of 1906 3 . During this entire period, the organization of the Black Hundred pogrom and beating of Jews, students, revolutionaries, class-conscious workers is increasingly progressing and improving, combining the violence of the Black Hundred army with the violence of the bribed mob, reaching the use of artillery in villages and cities, merging with punitive expeditions, punitive trains, and so on. Further.

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This is the main background of the picture. Against this background, what emerges, undoubtedly as something private, secondary, incidental, is the phenomenon to the study and assessment of which this article is devoted. What is this phenomenon? what are its forms? its reasons? time of occurrence and extent of spread? its significance in the general course of the revolution? his attitude towards the struggle of the working class organized and led by social democracy? These are the questions to which we must now move from outlining the general background of the picture.

The phenomenon we are interested in is armed struggle. It is led by individuals and small groups of individuals. Partly they belong to revolutionary organizations, partly (in some areas of Russia more partly) do not belong to any revolutionary organization. Armed struggle pursues two various goals that are needed strictly distinguish one from another; - namely, this struggle is aimed, firstly, at killing individuals, superiors and subordinates of the military police service; - secondly, for confiscation Money both from the government and private individuals. The confiscated funds are partly used for the party, partly specifically for arming and preparing the uprising, partly for the maintenance of persons leading the struggle we characterize. Large expropriations (Caucasian at more than 200 thousand rubles, Moscow 875 thousand rubles) 4 went specifically to the revolutionary parties in the first place, - small expropriations go primarily, and sometimes entirely, to support the “expropriators”. This form of struggle undoubtedly became widely developed and widespread only in 1906, i.e. after the December uprising. The aggravation of the political crisis to the point of armed struggle and in particular the aggravation of poverty, hunger strike and unemployment in villages and cities played a major role among the reasons that caused the described struggle. As a priority and even exceptional form of social struggle, this form of struggle was adopted by the trampless elements of the population, the lumpen and the anarchists.

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hist groups. Martial law, the mobilization of new troops, the Black Hundred pogroms (Sedlce), and courts-martial should be considered as a “response” form of struggle on the part of the autocracy.

The usual assessment of the struggle under consideration boils down to the following: it is anarchism, Blanquism 5 , the old terror, the actions of individuals isolated from the masses, demoralizing the workers, alienating large sections of the population from them, disorganizing the movement, harming the revolution. Examples confirming this assessment can easily be found from events reported every day in newspapers.

But are these examples conclusive? To check this, let's take an area with the largest development of the considered form of struggle - Latvian region. This is how the newspaper “Novoe Vremya” 6 (dated September 9 and 12) complains about the activities of the Latvian Social Democracy. Latvian Social Democratic workers' party(part of the RSDLP) correctly publishes its newspaper in 30,000 copies 7. The official department publishes lists of spies, the destruction of which is the duty of every honest person. Those who assist the police are declared “opponents of the revolution” and are subject to execution, also answering with their property. Money for the Social-Democratic Party order the population to transfer only upon presentation of a stamped receipt. In the latest party report, among 48,000 rubles. Income for the year is listed as 5,600 rubles. from the Libau branch for weapons obtained through expropriation. - “New Time” is tearing up and rushing, of course, against this “revolutionary legislation”, this “formidable government”.

To call this activity of the Latvian Social-Democrats anarchism, Blanquism, terrorism. no one will dare. But why? Because here clear the connection between a new form of struggle and the uprising that took place in December and which is brewing again. When applied to all of Russia, this connection is not so clearly visible, but it exists. Spreading

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The “partisan” struggle precisely after December, its connection with the aggravation of not only the economic, but also the political crisis, is undeniable. Old Russian terrorism was the work of an intellectual conspirator; now he is waging a partisan fight, according to general rule, a blue-collar militant or just an unemployed worker. Blanquism and anarchism easily come to mind for people prone to stereotypes, but in the situation of uprising, so clear in the Latvian region, the unsuitability of these memorized labels is striking.

The example of the Latvians clearly shows the complete incorrectness, unscientific, unhistorical nature of our usual analysis of partisan warfare, regardless of the situation of the uprising. We must take this situation into account, think about the features of the intermediate period between major acts of uprising, we must understand what forms of struggle are inevitably generated in this case, and not get away with a memorized selection of words that are the same for both the cadet and the new time: anarchism, robbery, tramping!

They say: partisan actions disorganize our work. Let us apply this reasoning to the situation after December 1905, to the era of Black Hundred pogroms and martial law. What disorganizes the movement more in such era: lack of resistance or organized partisan struggle? Compare central Russia with its western outskirts, with Poland and the Latvian region. There is no doubt that partisan warfare is much more widespread and highly developed on the western outskirts. And it is also certain that the revolutionary movement in general, the Social-Democrats. movement in particular more disorganized in central Russia than in its western outskirts. Of course, it does not occur to us to conclude from this that the Polish and Latvian Social-Democrats. traffic is less disorganized thanks to guerrilla warfare. No. It only follows from this that guerrilla warfare is not to blame for the disorganization of the Social-Democrats. labor movement in Russia in 1906.

Here they often refer to the peculiarities of national conditions. But this link shows especially clearly

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weakness of walking argumentation. If it’s a matter of national conditions, then it’s not a matter of anarchism, Blanquism, terrorism - the sins of all Russia and even specifically Russian ones - but of something else. Take it apart for something else specifically, gentlemen! You will see then that national oppression or antagonism does not explain anything, for they have always been on the western outskirts, and only this historical period gave birth to partisan struggle. There are many places where there is national oppression and antagonism, but there is no partisan struggle, which sometimes develops without any national oppression. A specific analysis of the issue will show that the issue is not national oppression, but the conditions of the uprising. Guerrilla struggle is an inevitable form of struggle at a time when the mass movement has actually reached the point of uprising and when there are more or less large intervals between the “big battles” in the civil war.

It is not partisan actions that disorganize the movement, but the weakness of the party, which cannot pick up these actions. That is why the usual anathemas among us Russians against partisan actions are combined with secret, random, unorganized partisan actions that really disorganize the party. Powerless to understand what historical conditions give rise to this struggle, we are powerless to paralyze its bad sides. But the struggle continues nonetheless. It is caused by powerful economic and political reasons. We are unable to eliminate these causes and eliminate this struggle. Our complaints about the partisan struggle are complaints about our party weakness in the uprising.

What we said about disorganization also applies to demoralization. It is not guerrilla warfare that demoralizes, but disorganization, disorderliness, non-partisanship of partisan actions. From this most undoubted Condemnations and curses against partisan actions do not relieve us one bit from demoralization, because these condemnations and curses are absolutely powerless to stop a phenomenon caused by deep economic and political reasons. They will object: if we

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are powerless to stop an abnormal and demoralizing phenomenon, then this is not an argument for transition parties to abnormal and demoralizing means of struggle. But such an objection would be purely liberal-bourgeois, and not Marxist, because to consider at all An abnormal and demoralizing civil war or guerrilla war, as one of its forms, a Marxist cannot. The Marxist stands on the basis of the class struggle, not the social world. In certain periods of acute economic and political crises, the class struggle develops into a direct civil war, that is, an armed struggle between two parts of the people. In such periods the Marxist must stand on the point of view of the civil war. Any moral condemnation of it is completely unacceptable from the point of view of Marxism.

In the era of civil war, the ideal of the party of the proletariat is warring party. This is absolutely undeniable. We fully admit that from the point of view of the civil war it is possible to prove and prove impracticality various forms of civil war at one time or another. Criticism of various forms of civil war from the point of view military expediency we fully recognize and unconditionally agree that the decisive vote in like this the issue belongs to social-democratic practitioners. each individual locality. But in the name of the principles of Marxism, we unconditionally demand that the analysis of the conditions of the civil war should not be dismissed with hackneyed and cliched phrases about anarchism, Blanquism, terrorism, that senseless methods of guerrilla action used by such and such a Pepes organization 8 at such and such a moment should not be put forward as bogeyman on the question of the Social-Democratic participation itself. in guerrilla warfare in general.

References to the disorganization of the movement by guerrilla warfare must be taken critically. Any a new form of struggle, associated with new dangers and new victims, inevitably “disorganizes” organizations unprepared for this new form of struggle. Our old circles of propagandists were disorganized by the transition to agitation. Our committees are disorganized

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there was a subsequent transition to demonstrations. All sorts of things military action in any war it introduces a certain disorganization into the ranks of the combatants. It cannot be concluded from this that we should not fight. From this we must deduce that it follows learn fight. That's all.

When I see Social Democrats proudly and smugly declaring: we are not anarchists, not thieves, not robbers, we are above this, we reject guerrilla warfare, then I ask myself: do these people understand what they are saying? Throughout the country there are armed skirmishes and fights between the Black Hundred government and the population. This phenomenon is absolutely inevitable at this stage of development of the revolution. The population is spontaneous, unorganized - and that is why often in unsuccessful and bad forms - also reacts to this phenomenon with armed clashes and attacks. I understand that, due to the weakness and unpreparedness of our organization, we can refuse the party leadership in this area and at this moment this spontaneous struggle. I understand that this issue must be resolved by local practitioners, and that reworking weak and unprepared organizations is not an easy task. But when I see in a theoretician or publicist of Social Democracy not a feeling of sadness about this lack of preparation, but a proud complacency and narcissistically admiring repetition of phrases memorized in early youth about anarchism, Blanquism, terrorism, then I feel offended for the humiliation of the most revolutionary doctrine in the world .

They say: guerrilla warfare brings the class-conscious proletariat closer to the degenerate drunkards and tramps. It's right. But it only follows from this that the party of the proletariat can never consider guerrilla warfare the only or even the main means of struggle; that this means must be subordinated to others, must be proportionate to the main means of struggle, ennobled by the educational and organizing influence of socialism. And without this last conditions All, absolutely all means of struggle in bourgeois society bring the proletariat closer to various

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non-proletarian strata above or below him and, being left to the spontaneous course of things, are worn out, perverted, prostituted. Strikes, left to the spontaneous course of things, are distorted into “Alliances” - agreements between workers and employers against consumers. Parliament is being turned into a brothel, where a gang of bourgeois politicians sell wholesale and retail “people's freedom,” “liberalism,” “democracy,” republicanism, anti-clericalism, socialism and all other marketable goods. The newspaper is being perverted into a public procurer, into an instrument of corruption of the masses, of crude flattery to the base instincts of the crowd, etc., etc. Social democracy does not know universal remedies struggles, such as would fence off the proletariat with a Chinese wall from the strata standing a little above or a little below it. Social democracy in different eras applies various means, always furnishing their application strictly certain ideological and organizational conditions*.

The forms of struggle in the Russian revolution are extremely diverse compared to the bourgeois revolutions of Europe. Kautsky partly predicted this when he said in 1902 that the future revolution (he added: with the exception of Maybe perhaps Russia) will be not so much a struggle between the people and the government, but rather a struggle between two parts of the people. In Russia

* Bolshevikov Social-Democrats often accused of a frivolous and biased attitude towards partisan actions. It is therefore worth recalling that in the draft resolution on partisan actions (No. 2 of Party News 9 and Lenin’s report on the 10th Congress) Part Bolsheviks, which defends them, nominated following conditions their confessions: “exes” of private property were not allowed at all; “Exes” of state property were not recommended, but only were allowed under condition batch control and circulation of funds for the needs of the uprising. Guerrilla actions in the form of terror recommended against government rapists and active Black Hundreds, but under the following conditions: 1) take into account the mood of the broad masses; 2) take into account the labor traffic conditions of the given area; 3) take care that the forces of the proletariat are not wasted in vain. The practical difference from this draft resolution, which was adopted at the Unification Congress, is exclusively the fact that “exes” of state property are not allowed.

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and we see, undoubtedly, a broader development of this second struggle than in the bourgeois revolutions of the West. The enemies of our revolution among the people are few in number, but they are becoming more and more organized as the struggle intensifies and receive the support of the reactionary sections of the bourgeoisie. It is completely natural and inevitable, therefore, that in such era, in the era of nationwide political strikes, insurrection will not be able to result in the old form of individual acts limited to a very short period of time and a very small area. It is completely natural and inevitable that the uprising takes on higher and more complex forms of a long civil war covering the entire country, that is, an armed struggle between two parts of the people. Such a war cannot be imagined otherwise than as a series of few, separated by relatively large periods of time, major battles and a mass of small skirmishes during these intervals. If this is so - and this is undoubtedly so - then Social Democracy must certainly set as its task the creation of organizations that would be most capable of leading the masses and. in these major battles and, if possible, in these minor skirmishes. Social democracy, in an era of class struggle that has intensified to the point of civil war, must set as its task not only participation, but also a leading role in this civil war. Social democracy must educate and prepare its organizations to truly act as belligerent, not missing a single opportunity to cause damage to enemy forces.

This is a difficult task, there are no words. It cannot be solved immediately. Just as the entire people is re-educated and learns in the struggle during the civil war, so our organizations must be educated, must be rebuilt on the basis of experience in order to meet this task.

We have not the slightest pretension to impose on the practitioners some form of concocted struggle, or even to decide from the office

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the question of the role of certain forms of guerrilla warfare in the general course of the civil war in Russia. We are far from thinking of seeing a question in a specific assessment of certain partisan actions. directions in social democracy. But we see our task as helping, to the best of our ability, the right theoretical assessment of new forms of struggle put forward by life; - is to fight mercilessly against stereotypes and prejudices that prevent class-conscious workers from correctly posing a new and difficult question and correctly approaching its resolution.

Published according to the text of the newspaper “Proletary”

Irish Republican Army Volunteer Manual. Textbook

What is guerrilla warfare?

What is guerrilla warfare?

A people under the yoke of foreign forces can achieve their freedom only through guerrilla warfare. The enemy's overwhelming advantage in state power and state institutions, the presence of repressive bodies and a large regular army, the availability of material resources and the monopoly of propaganda, which can only be overcome by special guerrilla underground tactics and strategy.

Guerrilla warfare can be defined as: resistance to enemy forces, that is, struggle. In this struggle, the partisans or underground act as the warhead of the resistance.

Until World War II, military textbooks ignored guerrilla warfare completely. But during this war it became obvious that guerrilla warfare could not be ignored. England established a separate army to fight the partisan movement. It would seem strange to reckon with partisans in the age of atomic bombs.

Chief of Staff of the British armed forces Field Marshal William Slim says: “A fragmented type of warfare, whether the fragmentation is caused either by the profile of the terrain or the enemy’s weapons, requires two things: trained and determined junior commanders, and detachments of independent, physically trained and well-disciplined fighters.

The success of future ground operations depends on the presence of just such commanders and fighters who are ready to operate in small independent units. They must be ready to fight without established communications, and be guided only by circumstances, and rely only on themselves and the resources of the population of a given territory.

Invisible, unheard and unsuspected, they will creep up on the enemy, and when he discovers that they are very close, he will no longer be able to launch a nuclear strike without destroying himself.”

Hence the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare in the nuclear age - dissolution in the enemy environment.

As the last Iraq war shows, the Iraqis did just that. It was pointless for the Iraqis to stand in an open field against the obviously superior US army and its overwhelming air power. Therefore, the Iraqis ahead of time created hidden bases of the partisan underground and dissolved in the underground movement, which has been delivering successful strikes against the enemy for three years now.

Ordinary war.

In a conventional war, the whole essence of military maneuvers is to achieve material, numerical and military superiority at the right time and in the right place. The guerrillas are unable to deliver one massive blow, so they deliver many small strikes. The partisans constantly deliver small blows, biting into the enemy and not giving him a break. They hit - they disappeared, they hit - they disappeared again, and so on until the enemy was completely exhausted.

A regular army depends on many types of support: air, ground, communications, supplies, equipment, artillery, reserves, flanks, and so on. They have a lot of different weapons. Plans are being made General Staff and are betrayed down on command. The attacks are carried out under the cover of air, missile and artillery preparations. Armored vehicles make a breakthrough in enemy defenses. For the most part the soldiers do not even understand what is happening at a given moment in time. They rely on commanders. And as all military experience shows, it was completely in vain. Regular army soldiers are trained to act as cogs in a machine, and when that machine stops, they are all incapacitated and dead.

Guerrilla warfare.

The partisans are a completely different matter, the partisan receives strength from the population, from the people - otherwise, he fights himself, and therefore he must be independent and self-sufficient. If necessary, the partisan must fight alone, with the weapons at his disposal, and this, naturally, is not the best weapon. The partisan must find everything he needs himself; he is his own supplier. His stamina and endurance must be enormous, and therefore he must be physically tough, and have an astute mind. And above all, he must know what and for what he is fighting - for the liberation of his homeland from foreign pro-Israeli influence, leadership and abuse.

The guerrilla must move quickly and hit hard. He must adapt, and must constantly change his methods. The partisans must be prepared so that they can scatter during the retreat and regroup later. The task of the partisans is never to hold the defense or to hold locality or another territory.

What the guerrillas must do is:

The guerrillas must wear down the enemy with constant threats and attacks. The guerrillas must attack all the time and from all directions. Guerrillas must plan their withdrawals and counter-attacks, and avoid encounters with the enemy not on their own initiative.

Tactics must change constantly. Combat units must operate regardless of terrain conditions and lines of communication. This is what it means to be self-sufficient. The partisan never makes himself a target for the enemy. The partisan was brave in attack and skillful in retreat. Its main advantage is mobility.

Action plans should be simple, understandable to all participants, and, if possible, rehearsed.

The main effect of the partisans is surprise! To give the enemy a surprise, you must have excellent intelligence. The partisans must know everything about the enemy: his battle formation and dislocation, his strength, his weaknesses - even the plan of his counterinsurgency activity. Excellent intelligence and information activities create morale, and for partisans, morale is everything. This spirit - morality - gives the partisans their certainty, determination and victory.

If a partisan enters into battle, it must be cruel, merciless and to the end. The road may be long, the sacrifices may be great, but the partisans have the spirit, determination and will to win, and therefore the partisans cannot fail to win. Every day, set and achieve, at least small, goals. Small successes will add up to big victories, strengthening the morale of the people - this is the goal of guerrilla warfare, which brings ultimate victory.

Guerrilla warfare strategy.

The strategy of guerrilla warfare is to create many centers of resistance in the country, and force the occupying forces to lock themselves in major cities. This is done by creating obstacles to the movement of occupation forces and damaging communications and communications. Gradually, the centers of partisan resistance are intertwined into one territory controlled by them.

After this, the task is to lure the enemy out of his fortress and beat him. The point of the entire strategy is to deliver, through surprise and mobility, the strongest possible blow at the most weakness and dissolve. You need to be sure that the enemy has no forces in this place. You need to hit a weak point, and not at heavily fortified objects. Later, when the enemy is forced to transfer forces in pursuit of the partisans, he will begin to expose important objects, and then it may be possible to strike at them.

Guerrillas must do three things:

1). Suck human and material resources from the enemy.

2). To be the vanguard of the entire people in liberating their country from foreign, even disguised pro-Israeli influence.

3). Destroy the entire leadership of the occupation power.

The partisans are sucking human and material resources from the enemy by the mere fact of their existence and the constant threat to the enemy. The partisans must remember that their task is not to hold anything, but not to allow the enemy to hold it either.

The partisans are the vanguard of their people, constantly inspiring them with the goals of their movement. The enemy takes it out on the population, further strengthening their hatred of the enemy. This makes the people inveterate and stubborn, and this is very important, because in the long term, it is the resources of the people that ensure victory over the foreign regime under any of its guise, open tyranny or a more sophisticated pro-democratic and pro-Western shell.

The partisans actually destroyed the occupation administration when it introduced martial law, and thus signed that it could no longer lead conventional methods. In reality, by martial law, the enemy recognizes that he is alien to the conquered people, and that this people does not want him.

When the enemy thus realizes his alien position, he makes every effort to destroy the partisan and underground movement. And the partisans’ first priority is to ensure the failure of his plans.

The basic principles of any war can be reduced to these five:

1). Saving power.

2). Protection and awareness of the enemy's evil plans.

3). Surprise, and, conversely, the surprise of one’s actions for the enemy.

4). Aggressiveness and determination to knock the wind out of the enemy.

5). Purposefulness in carrying out your plans.

These general principles are also good for guerrilla warfare.