Patriotic War of 1812 message. Patriotic War (briefly)

A reference table on the history of the Patriotic War of 1812, it contains the main dates and most important events of the Patriotic War of 1812 against France and Napoleon. The table will be useful for schoolchildren and students in preparing for tests, exams and the Unified State Examination in history.

Causes of the Patriotic War of 1812

1) Russia’s actual refusal to participate in the continental blockade due to damage to foreign trade

2) Napoleon’s unsuccessful attempt to woo the sister of the Russian emperor

3) Napoleon’s support for the Poles’ desire to revive their state, which did not suit Russia.

4) Napoleon's desire for world domination. The only obstacle to the implementation of this plan remained Russia.

Plans of action of the parties and balance of forces

Main events and dates of the Patriotic War

battle of Borodino

Partisan movement and people's militia

Results of the Patriotic War of 1812:

1) Napoleon’s plans to establish world domination were thwarted

2) Awakening the national self-awareness of the Russian people and patriotic upsurge in the country

3) Liberation of European countries from French rule

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A source of information: History in tables and diagrams./ Edition 2e, St. Petersburg: 2013.

Napoleonic Wars - a glorious page Russian history, but no war happens just like that. It is impossible to speak briefly about the causes of the Patriotic War of 1812, because they are deep and multifaceted.

Causes of the Patriotic War of 1812

The era of the Napoleonic Wars began long before 1812, and even then Russia was in confrontation with France. In 1807, the Treaty of Tilsit was concluded, according to which St. Petersburg was to support Paris in the continental blockade of Great Britain. This agreement was considered temporary and forced by the upper classes, because it undermined the economy of the country, which received large cash injections from trade with England. Alexander I was not going to suffer losses from the blockade, and Napoleon regarded Russia as one of the main rivals in achieving world domination.

Rice. 1. Portrait of Alexander I.

Table “The main causes of the war between France and Russia”

In addition to the above reasons, another was Napoleon’s long-standing dream to recreate the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within its former borders. At the expense of the territory of Austria and Prussia, he had already created the Duchy of Warsaw. To complete the idea he needed western lands Russia.

It is also worth noting that Napoleonic troops occupied the Duchy of Oldenburg, which belonged to the uncle of Alexander I, which angered the Russian emperor, causing him a personal insult.

Rice. 2. Map Russian Empire at the beginning of the 19th century.

Since 1806, Russia waged a protracted war with the Ottoman Empire. Peace was concluded only in 1812. The protracted nature of the hostilities with the Ottoman Empire, which was not as strong as before, may have pushed Napoleon to take more decisive action against Russia.

France strongly supported Ottoman Empire in the fight against Russia, seeing in it an opportunity to pull Russian forces south, distracting them from the French threat. And although Napoleon did not directly intervene in the course of the fighting of the Russian-Turkish war, he exerted all possible influence in order to prolong the fighting and inflict as much damage on Russia as possible.

Rice. 3. Portrait of Napoleon Bonaparte.

As a result, mutual hostility began to grow between Russia and France from 1807 to 1812. Napoleon gradually built up military power on Russia's western borders, increasing his army through allied pacts with Prussia. But Austria subtly hinted to Russia that they would not actively help.

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The fate of Sweden in the political game between Russia and France is interesting. Napoleon offered the Swedes Finland, which they had recently lost in the war with Russia, and Alexander I promised to help Sweden conquer Norway. The Swedish king chose Russia, and not only because of this. It was separated from France by the sea, and Russian troops could reach it by land. In January 1812, Napoleon occupied Swedish Pomerania, putting an end to diplomatic preparations for war with the Russians.

Beginning his Russian campaign of 1812, on the morning of June 11 (23), he addressed an appeal to the already mobilized, prepared for invasion “ Great Army" It said:

“Warriors! The Second Polish War begins. The first ended under Friedland and Tilsit... Russia gives us the choice of dishonor or war, it is not in doubt. We will go forward, cross the Neman and bring war into its heart.

The Second Polish War will glorify French weapons as much as the first. But the peace we make will be lasting and will destroy fifty years of proud and misplaced Russian influence in European affairs.”

On the same day, at 9 pm, the crossing of the Neman River began.

Napoleon's crossing of the Neman. Colorized engraving. OK. 1816

A. Albrecht. The Italian corps of Eugene Beauharnais is crossing the Neman. June 30, 1812

Napoleon's "Grand Army" invaded Russia suddenly, without a prior declaration of war. Here lay a “small” military trick. On June 10 (22), the Ambassador of France in St. Petersburg A. Lauriston presented to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Prince A.I. Saltykov's note. It followed from this that from that time on, Emperor Napoleon I Bonaparte “considers himself in a state of war with Russia.” In Vilna, where the Russian sovereign was located, the note was delivered only three days later.

Napoleon rejected the peace proposal, since by that time his vanguard units were already on Russian territory and moving forward. He asked the Russian general:

Tell me, to get to Moscow, which is the best road to take?

To the arrogant question of the Emperor of France, Lieutenant General A.D. Balashov answered dryly and briefly:

Charles XII walked through Poltava...

On June 12 (24), Emperor Alexander I signed the Manifesto on the beginning of the war with France. It called on all sectors of society to defend faith, Fatherland and freedom and resolutely stated:

“...I will not lay down my weapons until not a single enemy warrior remains in My Kingdom.”

The superiority of the “Great Army” in strength, as well as the unsuccessful strategic deployment on the border of the Russian armies, their lack of unified leadership, forced the army commanders to look for a way out of the current situation, which was seen in the speedy connection of the 1st and 2nd Western armies. But this could only be accomplished by retreating deeper into their territory along converging directions.

With rearguard battles, the Russian armies were forced to retreat...

With rearguard battles, the 1st and 2nd Western armies were forced to retreat under the pressure of superior enemy forces. The 1st Western Army left Vilna and retreated to the Dris camp, and soon a gap of 200 km opened between the armies. The main forces of Napoleonic troops rushed into it, which occupied Minsk on June 26 (July 8) and created the threat of defeating the Russian armies one by one.

However, such an offensive movement of the French did not go smoothly for them. On June 16 (28), the rearguard detachment of the major general gave a stubborn battle to the vanguard of the marshal's corps near Vilkomir. On the same day, the general's flying Cossack corps fought with the enemy near Grodno.

After taking Vilna without a fight, Napoleon, changing plans, decided to attack the 2nd Western Army, encircle it and destroy it. For this purpose, the troops of E. Beauharnais (30 thousand people) and J. Bonaparte (55 thousand people) were allocated, and the 50 thousand-strong corps of Marshal L. Davout was ordered, moving east of Minsk, to go to the Russian rear and close the encirclement.

P.I. Bagration managed to avoid the threat of encirclement only through a forced retreat in a southeastern direction. Skillfully maneuvering among the Belarusian forests, the commander quickly withdrew his troops through Bobruisk to Mogilev.

On July 6 (18), Emperor Alexander I addressed the people of Russia with an appeal to gather within the state.

The “Great Army” was melting before our eyes as it moved deeper into Russia. The French emperor had to allocate significant forces against those Russian troops who were on his flanks. On the way to Moscow, the 30,000-strong corps of Ch. Rainier and the 3rd Western Army were left behind. Against the 26 thousandth corps of the lieutenant general, operating in the St. Petersburg direction, the corps of N. Oudinot (38 thousand people) and (30 thousand people) were detached from the main forces. A 55,000-strong corps was sent to capture Riga.

After the French occupied Mogilev, the Russian armies continued to retreat in the direction of Smolensk. During the retreat, several fierce rearguard battles took place - near Mir, Ostrovno and Saltanovka.

A. Adam. Battle of Ostrovno July 27, 1812 1845

In the battle near the town of Mir on June 27 (July 9), the Cossack cavalry of cavalry general M.I. Platova inflicted a brutal defeat on the enemy cavalry. On July 11 (23) near Saltanovka, the 26th Infantry Division of Major General I.F. fought valiantly. Paskevich, which withstood the blow of superior French forces.

N.S. Samokish. The feat of Raevsky's soldiers near Saltanovka. 1912

Smolensk and Polotsk battles, battles at Kobrin and Gorodechny

On July 22 (August 3), the Russian armies united near Smolensk, keeping their main forces combat-ready. The first big battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 took place here. The Battle of Smolensk lasted three days: from August 4 (16) to August 6 (18).

The Russian regiments repelled all the attacks of the French and retreated only on orders, leaving the enemy a burning city, in which out of 2,250 houses only about 350 survived. Almost all the inhabitants left it with the troops. Courageous resistance near Smolensk thwarted Napoleon's plan to impose a general battle on the main Russian forces in unfavorable conditions for them.

P.A. Krivonogov. Defense of Smolensk. 1966

Failures plagued the advancing “Great Army” not only near Smolensk and Valutina Gora. An attempt by the French to advance in the St. Petersburg direction with the corps of N. Oudinot and L. Saint-Cyr (reinforced by Bavarian troops) ended in defeat during the battles of Klyastitsy and Golovchitsy on July 18-20 (July 30 - August 1). The corps of General S. Rainier failed at Kobrin on July 15 (27) and at Gorodechna on July 31 (August 12), and Marshal J. MacDonald was unable to capture Riga.

Appointment of Commander-in-Chief M.I. Kutuzova

After the battles for Smolensk, the united Russian armies continued to retreat towards Moscow. M.B.’s retreat strategy, unpopular neither in the army nor in Russian society. Barclay de Tolly, leaving significant territory to the enemy forced Emperor Alexander I to establish the post of commander-in-chief of all Russian armies and on August 8 (20) appoint a 66-year-old infantry general to it.

His candidacy was unanimously supported by the Extraordinary Committee for the Selection of the Commander-in-Chief. Commander Kutuzov, who had extensive combat experience, was popular both among the Russian army and among the nobility. The emperor not only placed him at the head of the active army, but also subordinated to him the militias, reserves and civil authorities in the war-affected provinces.

Couriers were sent from the capital to the headquarters of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Western and Danube armies with notification of the appointment of the commander-in-chief. August 17 (29) M.I. Kutuzov arrived at army headquarters. When Napoleon learned about the appearance of the commander-in-chief, so familiar to him, in the enemy’s camp, he uttered a phrase that became prophetic: “Kutuzov could not come in order to continue the retreat.”

The Russian commander was greeted by the troops with great enthusiasm. The soldiers said: “Kutuzov came to beat the French.” Everyone understood that now the war would take on a completely different character. The troops started talking about an imminent general battle with Napoleon’s “Grand Army” and that the retreat had come to an end.

S.V. Gerasimov. Arrival of M.I. Kutuzov in Tsarevo-Zaimishche. 1957

However, the commander-in-chief refused to give a general battle to the enemy at Tsarevo-Zaimishche, considering the chosen position unfavorable for the Russian troops. Having withdrawn the army for several marches towards Moscow, M.I. Kutuzov stopped in front of the city of Mozhaisk. The vast field near the village of Borodino made it possible to position troops with the greatest advantage and simultaneously block the Old and New Smolensk roads.

August 23 (September 4) Field Marshal M.I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov reported to Emperor Alexander I: “The position in which I stopped at the village of Borodino, 12 versts ahead of Mozhaisk, is one of the best, which can only be found in flat places. Weakness I will try to correct this position, which is on the left flank, with art. It is desirable that the enemy attack us in this position; then I have great hope of victory.”

The offensive of Napoleon's “Great Army” during the Patriotic War of 1812

Battle for Shevardinsky redoubt

The Battle of Borodino had its own prologue - the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt on August 24 (September 5) on the extreme left flank of the Russian position. Here the 27th Infantry Division of the Major General and the 5th Jaeger Regiment held the defense. In the second line stood the 4th Cavalry Corps of Major General K.K. Sievers. In total, these troops, under the overall command of a lieutenant general, numbered 8 thousand infantry, 4 thousand cavalry with 36 guns.

A fierce and bloody battle broke out near the unfinished pentagonal earthen redoubt. Three infantry divisions of the corps of Marshal L. Davout and the cavalry corps of generals E. Nansouty and L.-P. approached Shevardino. Montbrun tried to take the redoubt on the move. In total, about 30 thousand infantry, 10 thousand cavalry attacked this field fortification of Russian troops, and the fire of 186 guns fell. That is, at the beginning of the Battle of Shevardin, the French had more than three times superiority in forces and overwhelming superiority in artillery.

More and more troops were drawn into the matter. The firefight over and over again escalated into hand-to-hand combat. The redoubt changed hands three times that day. Taking advantage of their numerical superiority, the French, after a stubborn four-hour battle, still occupied the almost completely destroyed fortification by 8 pm, but were unable to keep it in their hands. Infantry General P.I. Bagration, who personally led the battle, having carried out a strong counterattack at night with the forces of the 2nd Grenadier and 2nd Cuirassier Divisions, again occupied the fortification. During that battle, the French 57th, 61st and 111th linear regiments defending in the redoubt suffered significant casualties.

The field fortification was completely destroyed by artillery fire. Kutuzov realized that the redoubt could no longer pose a serious obstacle to Napoleonic troops, and ordered Bagration to retreat to the Semenov flushes. At 11 o'clock in the evening, the Russians left the Shevardinsky redoubt and took the guns with them. Three of them with broken carriages became enemy trophies.

French losses in the Battle of Shevardin amounted to about 5 thousand people, Russian losses were approximately the same. When the next day Napoleon inspected the 61st line regiment, the most damaged in the battle, he asked the regimental commander where one of his two battalions had gone. He replied: “Sire, he is in the redoubt.”



The general battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 took place on August 26 (September 7) on the Borodino field, famous for Russian weapons. When the “Great Army” approached Borodino, Kutuzov’s army prepared to meet it. Field fortifications were erected on the field at Kurgan Heights (Raevsky's battery) and near the village of Semenovskoye (unfinished Semenovsky, or Bagrationovsky, flashes).

Napoleon brought with him about 135 thousand people with 587 guns. Kutuzov had about 150 thousand people with 624 guns. But this number included 28 thousand poorly armed and untrained warriors of the Smolensk and Moscow militias and about 8 thousand irregular (Cossack) cavalry. The regular troops (113-114 thousand) also included 14.6 thousand recruits. Russian artillery had superiority in the number of large-caliber guns, but 186 of this number were not in combat positions, but in the main artillery reserve.

The battle began at 5 a.m. and lasted until 8 p.m. During the entire day, Napoleon failed to either break through the Russian position in the center or get around it from the flanks. The partial tactical successes of the French army - the Russians retreated about 1 km from their original position - did not become victorious for it. Late in the evening, the frustrated and bloodless French troops were withdrawn to their original positions. The Russian field fortifications they took were so destroyed that there was no longer any point in holding them. Napoleon never managed to defeat the Russian army.

The Battle of Borodino did not become decisive in the Patriotic War of 1812. Napoleon Bonaparte failed to achieve main goal of his campaign to Russia - to defeat the Russian army in a general battle. He won tactically, but lost strategically. It is no coincidence that the great Russian writer Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy considered the Battle of Borodino a moral victory for the Russians.

Since the losses in the battle were enormous and their reserves exhausted, the Russian army withdrew from the Borodino field, retreating to Moscow, while fighting a rearguard action. On September 1 (13), at the military council in Fili, a majority of votes supported the decision of the commander-in-chief “for the sake of preserving the army and Russia” to leave Moscow to the enemy without a fight. The next day, September 2 (14), Russian troops left the capital.

Change of strategic initiative

Under the cover of a rearguard commanded by an infantry general, the Main Russian Army carried out the Tarutino march-maneuver and settled in the Tarutino camp, reliably covering the south of the country.

Napoleon, who occupied Moscow after a catastrophic fire, languished for 36 days in the burnt-out huge city, waiting in vain for an answer to his proposal to Alexander I for peace, naturally, on terms favorable to him: after all, the French “struck Russia in the heart.”

However, during this time, the peasantry of the war-torn Great Russian provinces rose up in a large-scale people's war. Army partisan detachments were active. The active army was replenished by more than a dozen regiments of irregular cavalry, primarily 26 regiments of the Don Cossack militia.

Regiments of the Danube Army were redeployed to the south, to Volhynia, which, united with the 3rd Observation Army under the command of the admiral, carried out successful operations against the enemy. They pushed back the Austrian and Saxon corps of the “Grand Army”, occupied Minsk, where the French rear stores were located, and captured Borisov.

The troops of the French emperor were actually surrounded: Borisov, located in front of them, was occupied by the Russians, Wittgenstein's corps was hanging from the north, and the Main Army was moving from the east. In such critical situation Napoleon demonstrated extraordinary energy and high skill as a commander. He distracted the attention of Admiral P.V. Chichagova arranged a false crossing south of Borisov, and he himself was able to transfer the remnants of the troops across two hastily built bridges across the Berezina at Studenka.

Yu. Falat. Bridge over the Berezina. 1890

But crossing the Berezina was a disaster for the “Great Army”. She lost here, according to various estimates, from 25 to 40 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. Nevertheless, Napoleon managed to bring out and preserve for the future the flower of his generals, most of the officer corps and the imperial guard.

P. Hess. Crossing the Berezina. 1840s

The liberation of the territory of the Russian Empire from the enemy ended on December 14 (26), when Russian troops occupied the border cities of Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk.

In an order to the army, “the savior of the Fatherland,” Field Marshal Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov, Prince of Smolensky, congratulated the troops on the complete expulsion of the enemy from Russia and called on them to “complete the defeat of the enemy on his own fields.” This is how it ended Patriotic War 1812, or, as the great Russian poet A.S. called it. Pushkin, “The Thunderstorm of the Twelfth Year.”

“The enemy with poor remnants fled across our border”

The main result of the Patriotic War of 1812 was the virtual destruction of the “Great Army” of Emperor Napoleon I. His political prestige and the military power of his empire were irreparably damaged.

Unknown artist. Napoleon's departure from the army in 1812

It is believed that out of 608 thousand people who took part in Napoleonic’s Russian campaign, approximately 30 thousand people crossed back across the Neman. Only the corps of the Austrians, Prussians and Saxons operating on the flanks of the “Great Army” suffered minor losses. Over 550 thousand soldiers and officers from countries Western Europe found their death on the fields of Russia or were captured. The chief of staff of the Grand Army, Marshal A. Berthier, reported to the French emperor: “The army no longer exists.”

E. Kossak. Napoleon's retreat from Russia. 1827

M.I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov wrote to Alexander I at the end of the war: “The enemy with his poor remnants fled across our border.” His report to the emperor about the results of the 1812 campaign said: “Napoleon entered with 480 thousand, and withdrew about 20 thousand, leaving 150 thousand prisoners and 850 guns in place.”

Retreat of Napoleon's Grand Army from Russia

The official end of the Patriotic War of 1812 is considered to be the manifesto of Emperor Alexander I dated December 25 of the same year. In it, the victorious sovereign publicly announced that he had kept his word not to stop the war “until one of the enemies remains on Our land.”

The collapse of the Napoleonic invasion of Russia and the death of the “Great Army” in its vastness did not yet mean that Napoleonic France was defeated. But the victory of Russian arms in 1812 dramatically changed the political climate in Europe. Soon, the Prussian Kingdom and the Austrian Empire, allies of France, became allies of Russia, whose army became the core of the forces of the 6th anti-French coalition.

Material prepared by the Research Institute (military history)
Military Academy of the General Staff
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

On June 24 (June 12, old style), 1812, the Patriotic War began - the liberation war of Russia against Napoleonic aggression.

The invasion of the troops of the French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte into the Russian Empire was caused by the aggravation of Russian-French economic and political contradictions, the actual refusal of Russia to participate in the continental blockade (a system of economic and political measures applied by Napoleon I in the war with England), etc.

Napoleon strove for world domination, Russia interfered with the implementation of his plans. He calculated by delivering the main blow to the right flank of the Russian army in general direction to Vilna (Vilnius), defeat it in one or two general battles, capture Moscow, force Russia to capitulate and dictate a peace treaty to it on terms favorable to itself.

On June 24 (June 12, old style), 1812, Napoleon’s “Great Army”, without declaring war, crossed the Neman and invaded the Russian Empire. It numbered over 440 thousand people and had a second echelon, which included 170 thousand people. The “Grand Army” included troops from all Western European countries conquered by Napoleon (French troops made up only half of its strength). It was opposed by three Russian armies, far apart from each other, with a total number of 220-240 thousand people. Initially, only two of them acted against Napoleon - the first, under the command of infantry general Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, covering the St. Petersburg direction, and the second, under the command of infantry general Peter Bagration, concentrated in the Moscow direction. The Third Army of cavalry general Alexander Tormasov covered the southwestern borders of Russia and began military operations at the end of the war. At the beginning of hostilities, the general leadership of the Russian forces was carried out by Emperor Alexander I; in July 1812, he transferred the main command to Barclay de Tolly.

Four days after the invasion of Russia, French troops occupied Vilna. On July 8 (June 26, old style) they entered Minsk.

Having unraveled Napoleon's plan to separate the Russian first and second armies and defeat them one by one, the Russian command began a systematic withdrawal of them to unite. Instead of gradually dismembering the enemy, French troops were forced to move behind the escaping Russian armies, stretching communications and losing superiority in forces. While retreating, the Russian troops fought rearguard battles (a battle undertaken with the aim of delaying the advancing enemy and thereby ensuring the retreat of the main forces), inflicting significant losses on the enemy.

To help the active army to repel the invasion of the Napoleonic army on Russia, on the basis of the manifesto of Alexander I of July 18 (July 6, old style) 1812 and his appeal to the residents of the “Mother See of our Moscow” with a call to act as initiators, temporary armed formations began to form - popular militia. This allowed the Russian government to short time mobilize large human and material resources for the war.

Napoleon sought to prevent the connection of Russian armies. On July 20 (July 8, old style), the French occupied Mogilev and did not allow the Russian armies to unite in the Orsha region. Only thanks to stubborn rearguard battles and the high art of maneuver of the Russian armies, which managed to frustrate the enemy’s plans, did they unite near Smolensk on August 3 (July 22, old style), keeping their main forces combat-ready. The first big battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 took place here. The battle of Smolensk lasted three days: from August 16 to 18 (from August 4 to 6, old style). The Russian regiments repelled all French attacks and retreated only on orders, leaving the enemy a burning city. Almost all the inhabitants left it with the troops. After the battles for Smolensk, the united Russian armies continued to retreat towards Moscow.

The retreat strategy of Barclay de Tolly, unpopular neither in the army nor in Russian society, leaving significant territory to the enemy forced Emperor Alexander I to establish the post of commander-in-chief of all Russian armies and on August 20 (August 8, old style) to appoint infantry general Mikhail Golenishchev to it. Kutuzov, who had extensive combat experience and was popular both among the Russian army and among the nobility. The emperor not only placed him at the head of the active army, but also subordinated to him the militias, reserves and civil authorities in the war-affected provinces.

Based on the demands of Emperor Alexander I, the mood of the army, which was eager to give battle to the enemy, Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov decided, based on a pre-selected position, 124 kilometers from Moscow, near the village of Borodino near Mozhaisk, to give the French army a general battle in order to inflict as much damage as possible on it and stop the attack on Moscow.

By the beginning of the Battle of Borodino, the Russian army had 132 (according to other sources 120) thousand people, the French - approximately 130-135 thousand people.

It was preceded by the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt, which began on September 5 (August 24, old style), in which Napoleon’s troops, despite more than three times superiority in strength, managed to capture the redoubt only by the end of the day with great difficulty. This battle allowed Kutuzov to unravel the plan of Napoleon I and timely strengthen his left wing.

The Battle of Borodino began at five o'clock in the morning on September 7 (August 26, old style) and lasted until 20 o'clock in the evening. During the entire day, Napoleon failed to either break through the Russian position in the center or get around it from the flanks. The partial tactical successes of the French army - the Russians retreated from their original position by about one kilometer - did not become victorious for it. Late in the evening, the frustrated and bloodless French troops were withdrawn to their original positions. The Russian field fortifications they took were so destroyed that there was no longer any point in holding them. Napoleon never managed to defeat the Russian army. In the Battle of Borodino, the French lost up to 50 thousand people, the Russians - over 44 thousand people.

Since the losses in the battle were enormous and their reserves exhausted, the Russian army withdrew from the Borodino field, retreating to Moscow, while fighting a rearguard action. On September 13 (September 1, old style) at the military council in Fili, a majority of votes supported the decision of the commander-in-chief “for the sake of preserving the army and Russia” to leave Moscow to the enemy without a fight. The next day, Russian troops left the capital. Most of the population left the city with them. On the very first day of the entry of French troops into Moscow, fires began that devastated the city. For 36 days, Napoleon languished in the burnt-out city, waiting in vain for an answer to his proposal to Alexander I for peace, on terms favorable to him.

The main Russian army, leaving Moscow, made a march maneuver and settled in the Tarutino camp, reliably covering the south of the country. From here, Kutuzov launched a small war using army partisan detachments. During this time, the peasantry of the war-torn Great Russian provinces rose up in a large-scale people's war.

Napoleon's attempts to enter into negotiations were rejected.

On October 18 (October 6, old style) after the battle on the Chernishna River (near the village of Tarutino), in which the vanguard of the “Great Army” under the command of Marshal Murat was defeated, Napoleon left Moscow and sent his troops towards Kaluga to break into the southern Russian provinces rich in food resources. Four days after the French left, advanced detachments of the Russian army entered the capital.

After the battle of Maloyaroslavets on October 24 (October 12, old style), when the Russian army blocked the enemy’s path, Napoleon’s troops were forced to begin a retreat along the devastated old Smolensk road. Kutuzov organized the pursuit of the French along the roads south of the Smolensk highway, acting with strong vanguards. Napoleon's troops lost people not only in clashes with their pursuers, but also from partisan attacks, from hunger and cold.

Kutuzov brought troops from the south and north-west of the country to the flanks of the retreating French army, which began to actively act and inflict defeat on the enemy. Napoleon's troops actually found themselves surrounded on the Berezina River near the city of Borisov (Belarus), where on November 26-29 (November 14-17, old style) they fought with Russian troops who were trying to cut off their escape routes. The French emperor, having misled the Russian command by constructing a false crossing, was able to transfer the remaining troops across two hastily built bridges across the river. On November 28 (November 16, old style), Russian troops attacked the enemy on both banks of the Berezina, but, despite superior forces, were unsuccessful due to indecision and incoherence of actions. On the morning of November 29 (November 17, old style), by order of Napoleon, the bridges were burned. On the left bank there were convoys and crowds of stragglers of French soldiers (about 40 thousand people), most of whom drowned during the crossing or were captured, and the total losses of the French army in the battle of the Berezina amounted to 50 thousand people. But Napoleon managed to avoid complete defeat in this battle and retreat to Vilna.

The liberation of the territory of the Russian Empire from the enemy ended on December 26 (December 14, old style), when Russian troops occupied the border cities of Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk. The enemy lost up to 570 thousand people on the battlefields. The losses of Russian troops amounted to about 300 thousand people.

The official end of the Patriotic War of 1812 is considered to be the manifesto signed by Emperor Alexander I on January 6, 1813 (December 25, 1812, old style), in which he announced that he had kept his word not to stop the war until the enemy was completely expelled from Russian territory. empires.

The defeat and death of the "Great Army" in Russia created the conditions for the liberation of the peoples of Western Europe from Napoleonic tyranny and predetermined the collapse of Napoleon's empire. The Patriotic War of 1812 showed the complete superiority of Russian military art over the military art of Napoleon and caused a nationwide patriotic upsurge in Russia.

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Beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812

2012 marks the 200th anniversary of the military-historical patriotic event - the Patriotic War of 1812, which is of great importance for the political, social, cultural and military development of Russia.

Beginning of the war

June 12, 1812 (old style) Napoleon's French army, having crossed the Neman near the city of Kovno (now Kaunas in Lithuania), invaded the Russian Empire. This day is listed in history as the beginning of the war between Russia and France.

In this war, two forces collided. On the one hand, Napoleon’s army of half a million (about 640 thousand people), which consisted only half of the French and also included representatives of almost all of Europe. An army, intoxicated by numerous victories, led by famous marshals and generals led by Napoleon. The strengths of the French army were large number, good material and technical support, combat experience, faith in the invincibility of the army.

She was opposed by the Russian army, which at the beginning of the war represented one-third of the French army. Before the start of the Patriotic War of 1812, it had just ended Russian-Turkish war 1806-1812. The Russian army was divided into three groups far apart from each other (under the command of generals M.B. Barclay de Tolly, P.I. Bagration and A.P. Tormasov). Alexander I was at the headquarters of Barclay's army.

The blow of Napoleon's army was taken by the troops stationed on the western border: the 1st Army of Barclay de Tolly and the 2nd Army of Bagration (153 thousand soldiers in total).

Knowing his numerical superiority, Napoleon pinned his hopes on a lightning war. One of his main mistakes was to underestimate the patriotic impulse of the army and people of Russia.

The start of the war was successful for Napoleon. At 6 o'clock in the morning on June 12 (24), 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered the Russian city of Kovno. The crossing of 220 thousand soldiers of the Great Army near Kovno took 4 days. 5 days later, another group (79 thousand soldiers) under the command of the Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais crossed the Neman to the south of Kovno. At the same time, even further south, near Grodno, the Neman was crossed by 4 corps (78-79 thousand soldiers) under the overall command of the King of Westphalia, Jerome Bonaparte. In the northern direction near Tilsit, the Neman crossed the 10th Corps of Marshal MacDonald (32 thousand soldiers), which was aimed at St. Petersburg. In the southern direction, from Warsaw across the Bug, a separate Austrian corps of General Schwarzenberg (30-33 thousand soldiers) began to invade.

The rapid advance of the powerful French army forced the Russian command to retreat deeper into the country. The commander of the Russian troops, Barclay de Tolly, avoided a general battle, preserving the army and striving to unite with Bagration’s army. The numerical superiority of the enemy raised the question of urgent replenishment of the army. But in Russia there was no universal conscription. The army was recruited through conscription. And Alexander I decided to take an unusual step. On July 6, he issued a manifesto calling for the creation of a people's militia. This is how the first partisan detachments began to appear. This war united all segments of the population. As now, so then, the Russian people are united only by misfortune, grief, and tragedy. It didn’t matter who you were in society, what your income was. The Russian people fought unitedly to defend the freedom of their homeland. All people became a single force, which is why the name “Patriotic War” was determined. The war became an example of the fact that the Russian people will never allow freedom and spirit to be enslaved; he will defend his honor and name to the end.

The armies of Barclay and Bagration met near Smolensk at the end of July, thus achieving their first strategic success.

Battle for Smolensk

By August 16 (new style), Napoleon approached Smolensk with 180 thousand soldiers. After the unification of the Russian armies, the generals began to persistently demand from the commander-in-chief Barclay de Tolly a general battle. At 6 am August 16 Napoleon began the assault on the city.

In the battles near Smolensk, the Russian army showed the greatest resilience. The battle for Smolensk marked the development of a nationwide war between the Russian people and the enemy. Napoleon's hope for lightning war collapsed.

Battle for Smolensk. Adam, around 1820

The stubborn battle for Smolensk lasted 2 days, until the morning of August 18, when Barclay de Tolly withdrew his troops from the burning city to avoid a big battle without a chance of victory. Barclay had 76 thousand, another 34 thousand (Bagration’s army). After the capture of Smolensk, Napoleon moved towards Moscow.

Meanwhile, the protracted retreat caused public discontent and protest among most of the army (especially after the surrender of Smolensk), so on August 20 (according to modern style) Emperor Alexander I signed a decree appointing M.I. as commander-in-chief of the Russian troops. Kutuzova. At that time, Kutuzov was 67 years old. A commander of the Suvorov school, with half a century of military experience, he enjoyed universal respect both in the army and among the people. However, he also had to retreat in order to gain time to gather all his forces.

Kutuzov could not avoid a general battle for political and moral reasons. By September 3 (new style), the Russian army retreated to the village of Borodino. Further retreat meant the surrender of Moscow. By that time, Napoleon's army had already suffered significant losses, and the difference in numbers between the two armies had narrowed. In this situation, Kutuzov decided to give a general battle.

West of Mozhaisk, 125 km from Moscow near the village of Borodina August 26 (September 7, new style) 1812 A battle took place that will forever go down in the history of our people. - the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 between the Russian and French armies.

The Russian army numbered 132 thousand people (including 21 thousand poorly armed militias). The French army, hot on her heels, numbered 135 thousand. Kutuzov's headquarters, believing that there were about 190 thousand people in the enemy army, chose a defensive plan. In fact, the battle was an assault by French troops on a line of Russian fortifications (flashes, redoubts and lunettes).

Napoleon hoped to defeat the Russian army. But the resilience of the Russian troops, where every soldier, officer, and general was a hero, overturned all the calculations of the French commander. The battle lasted all day. The losses were huge on both sides. The Battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century. According to the most conservative estimates of total losses, 2,500 people died on the field every hour. Some divisions lost up to 80% of their strength. There were almost no prisoners on either side. French losses amounted to 58 thousand people, Russians - 45 thousand.

Emperor Napoleon later recalled: “Of all my battles, the most terrible was the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of winning, and the Russians showed themselves worthy of being called invincible.”

Cavalry battle

On September 8 (21), Kutuzov ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk with the firm intention of preserving the army. The Russian army retreated, but retained its combat effectiveness. Napoleon failed to achieve the main thing - the defeat of the Russian army.

September 13 (26) in the village of Fili Kutuzov had a meeting about the future plan of action. After the military council in Fili, the Russian army, by decision of Kutuzov, was withdrawn from Moscow. “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not yet lost, but with the loss of the army, Russia is lost”. These words of the great commander, which went down in history, were confirmed by subsequent events.

A.K. Savrasov. The hut in which the famous council in Fili took place

Military Council in Fili (A. D. Kivshenko, 1880)

Capture of Moscow

In the evening September 14 (September 27, new style) Napoleon entered empty Moscow without a fight. In the war against Russia, all of Napoleon’s plans consistently collapsed. Expecting to receive the keys to Moscow, he stood in vain for several hours on Poklonnaya Hill, and when he entered the city, he was greeted by deserted streets.

Fire in Moscow on September 15-18, 1812 after the capture of the city by Napoleon. Painting by A.F. Smirnova, 1813

Already on the night of September 14 (27) to September 15 (28), the city was engulfed in fire, which by the night of September 15 (28) to September 16 (29) intensified so much that Napoleon was forced to leave the Kremlin.

About 400 lower-class townspeople were shot on suspicion of arson. The fire raged until September 18 and destroyed most of Moscow. Of the 30 thousand houses that were in Moscow before the invasion, “hardly 5 thousand” remained after Napoleon left the city.

While Napoleon's army was inactive in Moscow, losing its combat effectiveness, Kutuzov retreated from Moscow, first to the southeast along the Ryazan road, but then, turning west, he flanked the French army, occupied the village of Tarutino, blocking the Kaluga road. gu. The basis for the final defeat of the “great army” was laid in the Tarutino camp.

When Moscow burned, bitterness against the occupiers reached its highest intensity. The main forms of war of the Russian people against Napoleon's invasion were passive resistance (refusal to trade with the enemy, leaving grain unharvested in the fields, destruction of food and fodder, going into the forests), guerrilla warfare and mass participation in militias. The course of the war was most influenced by the refusal of the Russian peasantry to supply the enemy with provisions and fodder. The French army was on the verge of starvation.

From June to August 1812, Napoleon's army, pursuing the retreating Russian armies, covered about 1,200 kilometers from the Neman to Moscow. As a result, its communication lines were greatly stretched. Taking this fact into account, the command of the Russian army decided to create flying partisan detachments to operate in the rear and on the enemy’s communication lines, with the goal of impeding his supply and destroying his small detachments. The most famous, but far from the only commander of flying squads, was Denis Davydov. Army partisan detachments received full support from the spontaneously emerging peasant partisan movement. As the French army advanced deeper into Russia, as violence on the part of Napoleonic army grew, after fires in Smolensk and Moscow, after discipline in Napoleon’s army decreased and a significant part of it turned into a gang of marauders and robbers, the population of Russia began to move from passive to active resistance to the enemy. During its stay in Moscow alone, the French army lost more than 25 thousand people from partisan actions.

The partisans formed, as it were, the first ring of encirclement around Moscow, occupied by the French. The second ring consisted of militias. Partisans and militias surrounded Moscow in a tight ring, threatening to turn Napoleon's strategic encirclement into a tactical one.

Tarutino fight

After the surrender of Moscow, Kutuzov obviously avoided a major battle, the army accumulated strength. During this time, 205 thousand militia were recruited in the Russian provinces (Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Tula, Kaluga, Tver and others), and 75 thousand in Ukraine. By October 2, Kutuzov withdrew the army south to the village of Tarutino, closer to Kaluga.

In Moscow, Napoleon found himself in a trap; it was not possible to spend the winter in the fire-ravaged city: foraging outside the city was not going well, the French's extended communications were very vulnerable, and the army was beginning to disintegrate. Napoleon began to prepare to retreat to winter quarters somewhere between the Dnieper and Dvina.

When the “great army” retreated from Moscow, its fate was decided.

October 18(new style) Russian troops attacked and defeated near Tarutino French corps of Murat. Having lost up to 4 thousand soldiers, the French retreated. The Tarutino battle became a landmark event, marking the transition of the initiative in the war to the Russian army.

Napoleon's retreat

October 19(in modern style) the French army (110 thousand) with a huge convoy began to leave Moscow along the Old Kaluga Road. But Napoleon’s road to Kaluga was blocked by Kutuzov’s army, located near the village of Tarutino on the Old Kaluga Road. Due to the lack of horses, the French artillery fleet was reduced, and large cavalry formations practically disappeared. Not wanting to break through a fortified position with a weakened army, Napoleon turned around the village of Troitsky (modern Troitsk) onto the New Kaluga Road (modern Kiev Highway) to bypass Tarutino. However, Kutuzov transferred the army to Maloyaroslavets, cutting off the French retreat along the New Kaluga Road.

By October 22, Kutuzov's army consisted of 97 thousand regular troops, 20 thousand Cossacks, 622 guns and more than 10 thousand militia warriors. Napoleon had up to 70 thousand combat-ready soldiers at hand, the cavalry had practically disappeared, and the artillery was much weaker than the Russian one.

October 12 (24) took place battle of Maloyaroslavets. The city changed hands eight times. In the end, the French managed to capture Maloyaroslavets, but Kutuzov took a fortified position outside the city, which Napoleon did not dare to storm. On October 26, Napoleon ordered a retreat north to Borovsk-Vereya-Mozhaisk.

In the battles for Maloyaroslavets, the Russian army solved a major strategic problem - it thwarted the plan for the French troops to break through to Ukraine and forced the enemy to retreat along the Old Smolensk Road, which they had destroyed.

From Mozhaisk the French army resumed its movement towards Smolensk along the road along which it advanced on Moscow

The final defeat of the French troops took place when crossing the Berezina. The battles of November 26-29 between the French corps and the Russian armies of Chichagov and Wittgenstein on both banks of the Berezina River during Napoleon's crossing went down in history as battle on the Berezina.

The French retreat through the Berezina on November 17 (29), 1812. Peter von Hess (1844)

When crossing the Berezina, Napoleon lost 21 thousand people. In total, up to 60 thousand people managed to cross the Berezina, most of them civilians and non-combat-ready remnants of the “Great Army”. Unusually severe frosts, which struck during the crossing of the Berezina and continued in the following days, finally exterminated the French, already weakened by hunger. On December 6, Napoleon left his army and went to Paris to recruit new soldiers to replace those killed in Russia.

The main result of the battle on the Berezina was that Napoleon avoided complete defeat in conditions of significant superiority of Russian forces. In the memories of the French, the crossing of the Berezina occupies no less place than the largest Battle of Borodino.

By the end of December, the remnants of Napoleon's army were expelled from Russia.

Results of the war

The main result of the Patriotic War of 1812 was the almost complete destruction of Napoleon's Grand Army. Napoleon lost about 580 thousand soldiers in Russia. These losses include 200 thousand killed, from 150 to 190 thousand prisoners, about 130 thousand deserters who fled to their homeland. The losses of the Russian army, according to some estimates, amounted to 210 thousand soldiers and militias.

In January 1813, the “Foreign Campaign of the Russian Army” began - the fighting moved to the territory of Germany and France. In October 1813, Napoleon was defeated in the Battle of Leipzig, and in April 1814 he abdicated the throne of France.

The victory over Napoleon raised the international prestige of Russia as never before, which played a decisive role at the Congress of Vienna and in the following decades exercised a decisive influence on European affairs.

Key dates

12 June 1812- invasion of Napoleon's army into Russia across the Neman River. 3 Russian armies were at a great distance from each other. Tormasov's army, being in Ukraine, could not participate in the war. It turned out that only 2 armies took the blow. But they had to retreat to connect.

August 3rd- a connection between the armies of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly near Smolensk. The enemies lost about 20 thousand, and ours about 6 thousand, but Smolensk had to be abandoned. Even the united armies were 4 times smaller than the enemy!

8 August- Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief. An experienced strategist, wounded many times in battles, Suvorov's student was liked by the people.

August, 26th- The Battle of Borodino lasted more than 12 hours. It is considered a general battle. On the approaches to Moscow, the Russians showed massive heroism. The enemy's losses were greater, but our army could not go on the offensive. The numerical superiority of the enemies was still great. Reluctantly, they decided to surrender Moscow in order to save the army.

September October- seat of Napoleon's army in Moscow. His expectations were not met. It was not possible to win. Kutuzov rejected requests for peace. The attempt to escape to the south failed.

October December- expulsion of Napoleon's army from Russia along the destroyed Smolensk road. From 600 thousand enemies there are about 30 thousand left!

December 25, 1812- Emperor Alexander I issued a manifesto on the victory of Russia. But the war had to be continued. Napoleon still had armies in Europe. If they are not defeated, he will attack Russia again. The foreign campaign of the Russian army lasted until victory in 1814.

Perception of the events of the Patriotic War of 1812 by the Russian common people

The topic of perception of the events of the War of 1812 by contemporaries remains one of the least developed in the extensive historiography of this event. The focus remains exclusively on the military and political aspects of the topic.

We have been interested in this problem for a long time. Back in 1882 N.F. Dubrovin spoke about the need to create a non-military history of 1812; in 1895, he published a number of interesting articles about the perception of Napoleon by Russian society at the beginning of the 19th century.

In 1893, on the pages of the magazine “Russian Antiquity” V.A. Bilbasov wrote that the study of the influence of the War of 1812 on contemporaries (both representatives of the educated class and the common people) is especially interesting for history; numerous memoirs of the era contain valuable material on this issue. In the famous seven-volume book “The Patriotic War and Russian Society,” in the creation of which more than 60 prominent Russian historians participated, only a few articles contained material about the perception of the events of the Patriotic War by Russian contemporaries (educated society). Almost nothing was said about the attitude of the bulk of the population (the peasantry, common people in cities, semi-educated urban society) to the war; only information was given about the anti-serfdom uprisings of 1812, as well as some general discussions about “the people in 1812”, which were not based on to sources.

Until the revolution of 1917, according to the prominent historian K.A. Voensky, the “everyday” history of 1812 remained completely undeveloped.

IN Soviet period the topic of the Patriotic War of 1812 remained unclaimed until 1937. In the 1920s, the theory of “historian number one” M.N. Pokrovsky, voiced in his “History of Russia in the most concise outline”, as well as in the collection “Diplomacy and Wars Tsarist Russia in the 19th century." The author, as he himself admitted, basically “reframed literature”; he portrayed the War of 1812 as a struggle between reactionary Russia and the progressive Napoleonic army, the bearer of democratic principles. The people in 1812 thought only about liberation and the overthrow of the hated regime. The work of Z. and G. Gukovsky “Peasants in 1812” was written in the same spirit.

Since the late 1930s and especially after 1951, Soviet historians have actually revived the monarchical myth about the people during the Patriotic War of 1812, only without the tsar. The people acted as a faceless gray mass, doing nothing but performing patriotic deeds.

Of the works related to the topic of perception of the War of 1812 by contemporaries, two articles were published in the Soviet period, dedicated to the educated Russian society.

Among the latest studies, only one article can be noted, also devoted to the reflection of the events of 1812 in the consciousness of an educated society (based on letters from contemporaries). The bulk of Russians in 1812 again remained outside the field of view of researchers. As far as we know, special research There is no problem with the perception of the War of 1812 by the common people.

The main source for studying the Russian common people of 1812 are memoirs of Russians and foreigners. Among the memoirs of Russian educated society, there is very little information about the people, since memoirists had almost no contact with them and, as a rule, did not consider the “rabble” worthy of their attention. A typical example is the famous memoirs of A.T. Bolotov, who left one of the largest memoir works of the 18th - early 19th centuries. (still not published in full). As soon as his notes talk about the “rabble,” the “vile people,” the author immediately says that everything related to this “does not deserve any attention.” As Bolotov himself points out, he first became acquainted with the “Russian people” in 1762, when he rounded up all his peasants to build a garden. The nobles of 1812 did not know their people at all, moving exclusively in a narrow circle of select society - for example, the landowner M.A. Volkova first became acquainted with provincial society (Tambova) in 1812; this happened as a result of extreme military circumstances that forced her to leave Moscow. Also as a result of this move, she gained some insight into the “people” by observing the warriors from the window of her house.

Of the memoirs of an educated society, the most interesting for research are the memoirs of the Muscovite A. Ryazantsev, who survived the entire period of occupation of the capital and left detailed notes about this time. The author himself was very close to the urban common people; in 1812 he was 14 years old, he studied at the Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy. His memoirs paint a detailed portrait of Moscow in 1812: the author used many recordings of peasant conversations, dialogues between the Moscow common people and residents of villages near Moscow, described in detail the situation in Moscow under the French, and provided valuable data on contacts between the local population and the enemy.

In addition, some interesting information about the masses of 1812 is scattered throughout the extensive memoir literature of other representatives of the educated Russian class; synchronistic sources - diaries and letters - are of particular interest.

The main source for studying our topic is the memoirs of the representatives of the common people themselves in 1812: soldiers, peasants, servants, poor merchants and priests of the lowest rank. Unfortunately, the tradition of writing memoirs among the bulk of Russian contemporaries in 1812 was completely absent: during the entire 18th century, only 250 Russians left memoirs, of which only one peasant Memories created by the representatives of the common people themselves in 1812 are an extremely rare phenomenon; as a rule, their memories have come to us in the form of recordings of oral stories.

We know of one memoir by a soldier from 1812 and two memoirs from 1839 from the words of a private and a non-commissioned officer who participated in the Battle of Borodino. “Notes” of Pamfiliya Nazarov is a rare work of memoirs written by a soldier in 1812. The author is completely alien to any historical or ideological assessments of the events of 1812-1814; he is poorly aware of the importance of what he experienced. In form, these are notes for himself and a narrow circle of loved ones, which he wrote in 1836 at the end of his service. The publishers of Russian Antiquity noted the uniqueness of this source, which is “unlike anything else.”

The works of I.N. stand apart. Skobelev, published in the 1830-1840s. The author served in the lower ranks for more than four years in the 1800s, subsequently rising to the rank of general, and a participant in the Patriotic War (with the rank of captain). Contemporaries quite reasonably claimed that he knew the Russian soldier like no one else. In his works “Soldier's Correspondence of 1812” and “Stories of a Russian Armless Disabled Person,” the author describes the events of the Patriotic War on behalf of a simple soldier. These books contain the most valuable material: this is the soldier’s language of the era of 1812 and the peculiarities of the perception of war by Russian soldiers, conveyed by Skobelev.

Of particular interest are the memoirs of A.V. Nikitenko - in 1803-1824. serf Count Sheremetyev, later a professor at St. Petersburg University and a prominent official of the Ministry of Public Education. The author describes in detail the life and morals of serfs, provincial society in Russia in the 1800-1820s.

The most valuable material on the topic was collected in the 1860s - 1880s. writer E.V. Novosiltseva (pseudonym of T. Tolychev). She focused on collecting memories of 1812 among the common people; as a result of searches in Moscow and Smolensk, she collected unique memories of surviving witnesses of the Patriotic War from peasants, former serfs and courtyard servants, merchants and clergy. In total, she managed to record the memories of 33 witnesses to the war of 1812. In 1894, Novosiltseva created a work for the people, “The Old Lady’s Tale of the Twelfth Year” - a story about the events of 1812 from the beginning of the invasion to the expulsion of Napoleon from Russia, where the story is told in the first person. As Novosiltseva pointed out in the preface, the information given in the book was not fictitious, all of it was gleaned from a survey of contemporaries in 1812 from the people; many of the memories collected by the author were not published, but were reflected in this book.

An analysis of Novosiltseva’s published memoirs shows that the original notes were subjected to stylistic and systematic processing in order to give them a more coherent and literary appearance.

In 1912, on the occasion of the centenary of the Patriotic War, interesting memories and legends of residents of the Smolensk province about the period of the Napoleonic invasion, compiled from materials from local archives, as well as from interviews with old-timers, were published in the Smolensk Diocesan Gazette. It is also worth noting that the records of the memoirs of three peasants, witnesses of the crossing of Napoleon’s army across the Berezina, published in 1869, are unfortunately extremely brief and uninformative.

The main source of information about the war for most Russians in 1812 (both educated society and common people) were rumors. Printed materials played an important role; on their basis, some rumors circulating among the people were formed; During the Patriotic War, the indirect influence of the press on the population was quite significant. It is impossible to clearly separate the influence of oral and printed sources of information on Russians, since both sources were closely related.

More or less reliable information about the War of 1812 was provided by printed materials. Using them presupposes the ability to read, and the level of literacy in Russia in 1812 was negligible. The most detailed and closest study of literacy in Russia to the period under study took place in 1844, 735,874 people were surveyed. :

Thus, of all respondents, only 3.6% were literate or semi-literate. In France, even by the end of the Old Order (1788-1789), the total number of literate people was at least 40% of the population (52% of men and about 27% of women), during the Revolution and especially under Napoleon, many new schools were opened, education was provided free of charge , or for the most reasonable fee.

Under Alexander I, they talked a lot about “enlightenment,” but all the achievements in this environment were purely in words: the total number of students in secular educational institutions in Russia increased from 46 thousand (1808) to 69 thousand (1824), figures so insignificant that they are hardly worth mentioning! For comparison, in Prussia with a population of 12 million in 1819, more than 1.5 million people studied in primary secular schools alone (already then almost All population school age received education), in 1830 this number exceeded 2.2 million people.

In Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. up to 2.8 million people lived in the cities, the main population of the cities were townspeople, merchants and courtyard workers, as can be seen from the table, their level of education was approximately the same, on average about 30% of them could read, this amounted to up to 750 thousand people per the entire empire. The average literacy rate among peasants did not exceed 3%, or about 1 million people. So, the number of literate people in cities in 1812 was almost equal to the number of literate people throughout the rest of Russia.

In addition, bookstores were located exclusively in cities (in 1811, out of 115 bookstores, 85 were located in Moscow and St. Petersburg), and it was possible to subscribe to periodical publications. In addition to widespread illiteracy, the most important obstacle to the spread printed products was its high cost and, of course, the poverty of the population: in 1812, as can be seen from advertisements placed in the St. Petersburg Gazette and Moskovskiye Gazette, the average cost of a book was 5-7 rubles, and the price of an annual subscription for a newspaper or magazine - 15-20 rubles, an amount unthinkable for most Russians. For clarity, we present information on the earnings of residents of territories that were invaded by Napoleonic troops (although these data refer to the 1840s, they almost correspond to the realities of 1812): in the fairly rich Moscow province, a farmer earned an average of 35-47 rubles. per year, in the Vitebsk province - 12-20 rubles, less often - 36 rubles, in Smolensk - 10-15 rubles, very rarely - up to 40 rubles. (women and teenagers were paid several times less); the majority of city residents (burghers) at that time did not have regular earnings, their incomes were extremely low; Moscow coachmen were in the most privileged position, receiving up to 20-30 rubles. per month (240-360 rubles per year), as well as watchmen and janitors who earned 100-130 rubles. per month, but the latter constituted an extremely small part of the population.

Domestic books had the least influence on the population. According to researchers, the total number of active readers in Russia in 1820 was only 50 thousand people, or less than 0.1% of the Empire's population. The number of publications was extremely small, they almost did not touch upon any current topics, most of them were novels. In the most educated Moscow, in 1803, only about 20 thousand books were sold in a population of 250 thousand people, i.e. one book for every ten people. Presumably, the greatest influence on the common people of the World War II era was a small essay by F.V. Rostopchin “Thoughts out loud on the Red Porch of the Russian nobleman Sila Andreevich Bogatyrev,” published in 1807 and sold an unprecedented 7 thousand copies. As far as we know, this is the most widely circulated work of secular literature of that time, and it is also one of the few books addressed to the people. The work is a monologue of a tipsy nobleman trying to speak in a “folk style.” In fact, this is a complete slur against the French and their imitators, where the French are presented as worthless and insignificant people. The book contributed to the maintenance of frivolous and mischievous sentiments among the people. During the 1812 campaign, only a few propaganda books about the war were published; they were initially aimed at the upper strata of society, and overall their influence was negligible.

More or less timely information about events was provided by periodicals. Due to censorship restrictions (despite the liberal censorship statute of 1804), she also almost did not touch on current topics, and in fact did not have the right to express her point of view on anything. The situation as a whole almost corresponded to the words of L.V. Dubelt about the rights of the periodical press, said in a conversation with F.V. Bulgarin in 1826: “Theater, exhibitions, guest houses, flea markets, taverns, confectionery shops - this is your area, and not a step further!”

In 1801-1806. in Russia there were only 27 newspapers and magazines, by 1810 - 60, by 1824 - 67 (of which only 33 were in Russian). The most widely circulated periodical publications during this period were the newspaper “Northern Post”, which had 1,768 subscribers in 1810, and 2,306 by 1816, and the magazine “Bulletin of Europe” with a circulation of 1,200 copies. (1802), by 1820 this figure had dropped to 1 thousand copies. The popular patriotic magazine of S. N. Glinka “Russian Messenger” in 1811 had only 750 subscribers (of which 300 were in Moscow). Other publications were published in microscopic editions. Under Alexander I, the newspaper “Russian Invalid” had the largest circulation - 4 thousand copies (1821). In general, the reading audience of Russian periodicals was very small, however, as already mentioned, it had an indirect influence on the common people.

In Russian villages in 1812, newspapers and magazines were common, and here literate people read them in the presence of the entire population. It should be especially noted that the trust in the printed word among the common people of that time was enormous. In 1807-1812. By political reasons The government diligently hid its contradictions with France; only brief correspondence appeared on the pages of newspapers, reporting, as a rule, about the successes of the French. Extremely valuable evidence of the influence of the press on the common people is contained in the secret report of the head of the office of the Special Department of the Ministry of Police M.Ya. von Fock (from May 15, 1812): “unenlightened people living inside the Empire, and especially the middle class and common people, accustomed to considering everything that is printed as an irrefutable truth, become despondent and hear only about victories and conquests Napoleon, who enslaves all peoples, loses the spirit of vigor, especially in remote cities and villages, where every sexton and literate is a luminary and every printed line is a Gospel.”

Information from the pre-war press about Napoleon's successes caused panic among Russian population, the rumors they generated, which exaggerated everything many times over, convinced many commoners that the enemy was invincible.

During the war, Russian newspapers and magazines published official news from the army about the progress of military operations, letters, captured documents (rarely), correspondence from different places, and translations of foreign articles. In journalistic articles, the enemy was humiliated in every possible way, often in a rude manner, and the idea of ​​​​the superiority of everything Russian over foreign was promoted. During 1812, the main printed source of information about the war were flying leaflets published by the army’s marching printing house and sent out officials, the texts of these leaflets were reprinted by newspapers and published as supplements (often in distorted form). In total, about 80 such leaflets were issued in July - December 1812. They contained daily records of army movements, military encounters, enemy losses and trophies (always greatly exaggerated), and from the autumn of 1812 they described the plight of the French army.

It was difficult for a common person to understand the text of many leaflets published in the summer - early autumn of 1812, since they contained a lot of meaningless names settlements, many names unknown to him. The leaflets were read publicly large cluster people. DI. Zavalishin recalled how the governor of Vologda read the news about military operations, and the people listened to him and sobbed. All that could be understood was that the Russian army was retreating, and from October 1812 it was advancing.

In Moscow, posters by F.V. were very popular. Rostopchina, the governor's printed appeals to residents, written in folk style, they were very reminiscent of the chatter of the tipsy Sila Andreevich Bogatyrev. In total, researchers have identified 57 Moscow “posters” created in July-December 1812, of which the authorship of 23 is attributed to F.V. Rostopchin. The author reassured and encouraged the residents, assuring them that the enemy was about to be defeated, mocked the French, sometimes retold the contents of official news about military operations, and cited astronomical figures about the number of Russian troops. The posters were famous not only in Moscow.

Already since 1811, a wide variety of rumors about the impending war with Napoleon were spreading among the Russian common people; among the mass of absurdities, quite reliable information that England and Sweden will provide assistance to Russia. However, the greatest influence on the Russians of that time was not political news, but the famous comet of 1811, which began to receive close attention in August. Here's what D.I. wrote about it. Zavalishin, who lived in Tver at that time: “It was in August and, therefore, when they went to church, it was still very light. But towards the end of the all-night vigil, but before the time when the people were leaving, there was an unusual movement on the porch at the church door. People somehow came out and came in again, and as they entered, they somehow sighed heavily and began to pray earnestly. The time finally came to leave the church, but the first ones leaving stopped, and the crowd thickened so that it was impossible to squeeze through it. And so those standing behind, losing patience, began to ask loudly: “What is it?” Why aren’t they coming?” The answer was: “Star.” Little by little, however, the crowd dispersed, so that we could go out almost behind everyone and saw the famous comet of 1811 right opposite us.

The next day, even before sunset, people began to go out and look at the place where they had seen the star rising yesterday. At dusk, our square was almost completely crowded with people, so it was very difficult not only for carriages to pass, but also to push through on foot. At the site of yesterday's appearance of the star, however, there was a black cloud. Despite all this, the people did not leave, but persisted in waiting. In other parts of the sky it was clear and small stars had already appeared. But as soon as 9 o’clock struck, the cloud seemed to settle below the horizon, and yesterday’s star appeared in an even more menacing form. As if on cue, everyone took off their hats and crossed themselves. Heavy, sometimes suppressed, sometimes loud sighs were heard. They stood in silence for a long time. But then one woman fell into hysterics, others began to cry, chatter began, then loud exclamations: “It’s true, the Lord was angry with Russia,” “We sinned in the wrong way, so we waited,” etc. Comparisons began: who said that the tail of a comet this is a bunch of rods, which someone likened to a broom to sweep away all the untruths from Russia, etc. Since then, people crowded the streets every evening, and the star became more and more menacing. Rumors began about the end of the world, that Napoleon was the prophesied Antichrist, indicated directly in the apocalypse under the name of Apolion.”

Interesting information about the comet of 1811 was recorded by a contemporary of the Patriotic War, Muscovite Pyotr Kicheev (according to “Annuaire pour l'an 1832”): the light from this comet at the moment of highest tension was equal to 1/10 of the light of the full moon; on October 15, 1811, the comet approached Earth at a minimum distance (47 million leagues), the diameter of its core was 1089 leagues, and the length of the tail reached 41 million leagues (172 million 200 thousand versts). The comet occupied up to 23 degrees in the sky. Kicheev also noted the enormous impression made by the comet on Muscovites.

An inexperienced Russian in 1812 was convinced that war is God’s punishment, therefore, it cannot depend on the tricks of diplomats and will individuals; He tried to decipher the traces of its approach and its course by all sorts of signs (the comet of 1811, frequent fires, etc.). During the war, Russians tried to find answers to all questions in the most revered and authoritative source - the Bible. D. Zavalishin recalled how residents of the province came to people who had the Slavic Bible and asked them what was written there about Bonaparte and what he would do to Russia, deeply convinced that all this was described there. In 1812, all kinds of predictions, revelations, descriptions of signs, etc. became extremely widespread among the people.

The most detailed records of the reaction of the common people to the invasion were left by Muscovite A. Ryazantsev: after the news of the declaration of war, the Moscow people gathered in the square and began to reason. First of all, it was unanimously decided that war is God’s punishment and one should pray fervently, and one merchant said that he had long sensed something was wrong: the porridge in his pot was not cooking properly, and brownie Vaska the cat got naughty and started looking at him unkindly. Fables about the French began to spread intensively, here is one of them: “The French, having abandoned the Christian faith, turned to idolatry, invented for themselves some kind of god Clever and slavishly worship him, that this block of Clever ordered them all to be equal and free, forbade them to believe in the true God and not recognize any earthly authorities. The idolaters, obeying their idol, became indignant, plundered their churches and turned them into places of entertainment, destroyed civil laws and, to complete their atrocities, killed their innocent, good, legitimate king.” This description of the French Revolution coincides almost word for word with the description of F.V. Rostopchin from the mentioned book “Thoughts Out Loud on the Red Porch...”, which is why it is more or less plausible, here we are dealing with the indirect influence of his work, which confirms its significance for the formation of public opinion. Or: “The French surrendered to the Antichrist, chose as their commander his son Appolion, a wizard who, by the flow of the stars, determines, predicts the future, knows when to start and when to end the war, moreover, has a wife, a sorceress, who charms firearms opposed to her to my husband, that’s why the French come out victorious.” E.V. Novosiltseva wrote down some folk legends of 1812, which said that the French were afraid of the cross, etc. A. Ryazantsev recalled that in the summer of 1812, from everything he heard, his “young fantastic imagination pictured the French not as people, but as some kind of monsters with wide mouth, huge fangs, bloodshot eyes with a copper forehead and an iron body, from which bullets bounce off like peas from a wall, and bayonets and sabers break like splinters.” At the end of August 1812, he went to see a group of prisoners of war that had arrived in Moscow to make sure “whether the enemy soldiers really do not look like people, but like terrible monsters?” . Almost all of Moscow gathered to look at the prisoners.

The described rumors clearly demonstrate the worldview of the Russians - a bizarre mixture of pagan and Christian ideas. The pagan element seems to be stronger. This is most clearly confirmed by the following example: a Moscow janitor explained the cause of death of the French cavalrymen killed by the Cossacks this way: the brownie strangled them because they did not pray to God when they went to bed. A.T. Bolotov was convinced that the majority of Russian peasants remained pagans. A.V. Nikitenko, having visited the village of Timokhovka in the Mogilev province in the summer of 1839, wrote in his diary that local peasants went to pray to gods and idols.

Official propaganda added fuel to the fire; in 1812 the Synod, as before in 1807, obediently proclaimed Napoleon the Antichrist; For propaganda in the army, Professor of the University of Dorpat V. Getzel sent M.B. Barclay de Tolly wrote an article in which he proved that Napoleon is the Antichrist; he proposed distributing its contents among the soldiers. For the French this had the most sad consequences. Among the Russian common people and soldiers, the Grand Army was perceived in the most literal sense as the army of the devil. I.N. Skobelev in “Soldiers’ Correspondence of 1812” calls Napoleon “the warlock Bunaparte”, Napoleonic soldiers - “sorcerers”, describing the retreat of the Napoleonic army, he writes that Napoleon calculated when to retreat “according to his black (i.e. witchcraft) - L.A.) books."

Repeatedly distorted and completely ridiculous rumors reached the province; a resident of the Smolensk province F.I. Levitsky recalled: “It was scary in Moscow, and it was even more terrible in the district towns and villages. Something the people haven't told! Sometimes you listen to enough of this talk and you won’t be able to sleep at night.” Many residents were sure that the French... eat people! Back in 1807, when Napoleon was first declared the Antichrist by the Synod, one captured Russian officer asked the French not to eat his subordinates! Such absurd statements were based on primitive counter-revolutionary propaganda, which in every possible way depicted that in France, since 1793, it was almost the end of the world. F.V. Rostopchin in “Thoughts Out Loud...” argued that the French during the revolution fried people and ate them! F.N. Glinka seriously believed that during the revolution the French unnecessarily “killed, fried and ate many of their mayors. Their own history is not silent about this.” Colonel M.M. Petrov believed that the French guillotined during the revolution millions their compatriots. Peasant Agafya Ignatieva of the village of Volti (Smolensk province) recalled that in 1812 she was sure that the French would eat her (she was 9 years old at the time), all the peasant children thought so. Meanwhile, the French (natural French, not their allies) almost never offended children and treated them very kindly. In a number of settlements they knew nothing about the war at all. This was due to the fact that in 1812, on the territory of Belarus and central Russia (the main theater of military operations), the vast majority of villages were located far from roads, population migrations were minimal, many villages were located in impassable wilderness, where no stranger had ever set foot. In Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. the bulk of the population had absolutely no experience of communicating with foreigners; the enemy did not appear in the original Russian territories for almost 200 years, as M.I. quite rightly pointed out. Kutuzov in a conversation with the French ambassador Lauriston in the fall of 1812. Russian peasants lived in isolation and traditionally, everything new was decidedly alien to them. As can be seen from a number of memoirs, for many residents of the Russian outback, a meeting with a Napoleonic soldier was an event more surprising than a meeting with an alien for a modern person. As we showed above, the imagination of the peasants was fueled by the most monstrous rumors about the enemy, very often namely fear before the enemy as such forced them to leave their homes. Napoleonic officer Italian Ch. Laugier in his diary describes the occupation of Smolensk by the Great Army - local residents for the most part fled, those who remained hid in churches and prayed earnestly, hoping that Holy place will protect them from the enemy. The Italian soldiers who entered the church, wanting to distribute food to them, were themselves dumbfounded with fear when those there began to utter wild screams of horror, it was truly animal fear .

In August 1812, a deaconess from the village of Novy Dvor (Smolensk province), seeing French cavalrymen, fainted and did not come to her senses for a long time, she was introduced to Napoleon, and she, trembling, continuously crossed herself and prayed, convinced that the French were devils from hell .

Of course, not all representatives of the common people perceived the French so primitively: an old peasant woman from the village of Staraya Rusa (80 versts from Moscow) was not afraid of the French, saying: “They won’t touch me, the old woman. And what benefit do they have in killing me? After all, they are not some kind of animals either.”

A resident of Smolensk, Kuzma Egorovich Shmatikov, talks about how differently the people perceived the war of 1812. This is how he describes the storming of Smolensk in August 1812: “I can’t tell you how afraid we were, because until then we had not They imagined how they would take the city. Well, let’s say we were children and everyone around us was women. Yes, some men reasoned no smarter than us: they thought that the armies would go against each other in fist fights. Many climbed the trees to look at it." Comments here are generally unnecessary. When Napoleon's army entered Moscow, crowds of people for about two hours (exactly as long as French troops entered the capital) argued whether it was the Swedes or the British who had come to our aid.

Having processed a large array of materials, we came to the conclusion that the behavior of the inhabitants of central Russia during 1812 can be divided into four main types: 1) panic; 2) perfect calm and arrogant, capricious mood; 3) the desire to throw off the yoke of serfdom, hope for Bonaparte’s help; 4) absolute ignorance or indifference. Arrogant sentiments and conviction of absolute superiority over the enemy were extremely widespread in people's environment, especially in areas that have not been invaded. Even the most educated segments of the population had similar sentiments; the commander-in-chief of the 2nd Western Army himself, P.I. Bagration was deeply convinced that the French would be defeated instantly; on June 8, 1812, he wrote to the Tsar, begging him to allow the Russians to advance and invade Poland themselves. Many other memoirs also record similar hat-throwing sentiments; they were actively supported by the press, especially Rostopchin’s posters. P. Kicheev’s grandfather sacredly believed them and therefore remained in Moscow, one Moscow priest on the very day of the surrender of Moscow laughed at his wife, who claimed that there were French in the city, his argument was as follows: “You believe the sexton, but you don’t believe the governor general!” , when the French came to his house, he fell silent and tore up the poster.

It must be said that such sentiments instantly disappeared with the approach of the enemy, impudent self-confidence was instantly replaced by panic and apathy, which is described in detail in the memoirs.

In Russia in 1812 there were many people who thought about the possibility of freeing themselves from the yoke of serfdom; the war provided a good opportunity for this. In 1812, the serf peasantry made up about 44% of the Empire's population (23 million people), the living conditions of most serfs were monstrous both materially and morally. Recently, historiography has been actively hushing up the realities of serfdom, trying in every possible way to embellish it. The most detailed and accurate life of serfs in the early 19th century. described in the memoirs of A.V. Nikitenko, it is supplemented by the memoirs of the surgeon F. Mercier, who spent two years in Russian captivity. The vast majority of Russian landowners were small-scale landowners and, as a rule, owned several dozen peasants, and in order to live “befitting their rank,” they needed hundreds, or even thousands, of rubles a year. Knowing the size of the peasants' earnings (see above), it is not difficult to calculate that the serf gave most of the money he earned to the landowner, who sucked all the juice out of him. Add to this the robbery of estate managers, whom no one actually controlled, oppression by rich peasants, etc. For thinking people, like A.V.’s father. Nikitenko, the most terrible thing in their situation was the complete lack of rights and the terrible humiliation associated with it, to which this noble man was subjected until his death. The following figure gives an idea of ​​the scale of the atrocities of landowners against serfs: only for 1834 - 45. 2,838 landowners were brought to trial for cruel treatment of peasants, of which 630 were convicted. At the same time, the vast majority of crimes of landowners remained unpunished.

According to historians, only for 1796-1825. In Russia there were more than 1,200 large peasant uprisings; these numbers are far from complete. Since 1961, it has been believed that in 1812 there were 60-67 anti-serfdom uprisings; this figure is greatly underestimated and needs clarification. Information about the uprisings in the occupied territories, which were most affected by the anti-serfdom movement, is almost completely ignored here. As noted by contemporaries, in particular the brigadier general of the Great Army Dedem de Gelder, the intendant of the Vitebsk province A. Pastore (an official of the French occupation administration), who acted behind the French lines, partisans A.Kh. Benkendorf, all Belarus (the territories of Vitebsk, Minsk and Mogilev provinces) was engulfed in an anti-serfdom fire, the peasants here rebelled against their landowners everywhere.

Sometimes anti-serfdom uprisings occurred “not without incitement from the enemy,” such as, for example, a major uprising on the Baryshnikov estate in Dorogobuzh district.

Hatred towards the nobles continued to smolder among the people; only 37 years had passed since the Pugachev era in 1812. The nobles themselves instinctively felt this hatred and were extremely afraid of it. The number of uprisings cannot estimate the scope of anti-serfdom sentiments in 1812; it is clear from the memoirs that the hope for freedom from Bonaparte was extremely widespread. A memoirist from the Moscow common people heard with his own ears from peasants near Moscow, who were ordered by the bar to prepare horses: “What! We will begin to train horses about the master's good. Bonaparte will come and give us freedom, but we don’t want to know the masters anymore!” Only after making sure that the French were robbing and not giving freedom, these peasants went into the forest. Former serf A.A. Sazonova recalled that “the people grumbled very much against the masters,” Muscovite G.Ya. Kozlovsky, who survived the occupation of Moscow, claimed that he was afraid of Russian men much more than the French. D.M. Volkonsky noted with horror in his diary on September 10, 1812 that the people were already ready for unrest. Marshal L.G. Saint-Cyr was absolutely right when he wrote that the war of 1812 demonstrated the internal weakness of Russia, the French simply did not take advantage of it.

A.V. left valuable evidence about the attitude towards the war in the provinces. Nikitenko (lived in Ukraine in 1812): “It is strange that at this moment of strong upheaval that Russia was experiencing, not only our close circle, with the exception of young Tatarchukov, but also the entire surrounding society was indifferent to the fate of the fatherland. ...I have never heard in their conversations a note of warm concern for the events of the time. Everyone, apparently, was only interested in their own personal affairs. The name Napoleon evoked surprise rather than hatred. In a word, our society was striking in its equanimity towards the misfortune that threatened Russia. This could partly stem from the remoteness of the theater of war... But the main reason for this, I believe, was hidden in the apathy characteristic of people alienated, as the Russians were then, from participation in public affairs and accustomed not to talk about what is happening around them, but just unquestioningly obey the orders of your superiors.”

In Russian historiography, the myth is often repeated that in 1812 the people happily joined the army. It is based on the memories of representatives of the nobility. Let us present the most valuable evidence from the diary of Rostov official M.I. Marakueva, entry dated July 12, 1812: Emperor Alexander arrived in the Kremlin, a huge number of people gathered, suddenly a rumor spread that they would order “to lock all the gates and take everyone by force as soldiers. As soon as this rumor had spread, the mob rushed out and in a few minutes the Kremlin was empty. An echo echoed from the Kremlin throughout Moscow and many black people fled from it.” This happened in the presence of the emperor himself! The next day, outside Moscow, he met crowds of men fleeing the capital. They asked him if they were taking him as a soldier in Moscow. P. Nazarov, drafted into the army in September 1812, wrote that no one from his village wanted to serve. During the war, authorities repeatedly reassured the militia by confirming that they were serving in the army only temporarily. The war ends sooner or later, and you will have to serve for 25 years; if you are not killed, you will be disabled, most likely without a pension. P. Nazarov received a pension of 20 rubles for 25 years of service and several serious wounds. per year, this was barely enough for food. Here is what the soldiers themselves said about their problems (from the memoirs of D.I. Zavalishin): “I say the truth that even after December 14, the soldiers of those regiments and detachments where there were no members of society and, therefore, the goals of the coup were not explained to them, joined willingly talked to us... discussing the double oath to Konstantin and Nikolai, they constantly told us the same thing: “We didn’t care whether one was the other. Now, if, gentlemen, you had told us then that there would be a reduction in service, that they would not force you into a coffin with sticks, that upon retirement you would not carry a bag, and that children would not be irrevocably accepted as soldiers, well, we would have gone for that.” ". Only for 1815-1825. There were 15 uprisings in the Russian army.

As a result of the research, we have outlined some prospects for studying the topic of perception of the Patriotic War by the common people.